

COSMOPOLITANISM, STOICISM, AND LIBERALISM

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In recent political philosophy, there has been growth in interest in cosmopolitanism. In the current era of globalization, nationalism, and multiculturalism, perhaps such a focus is to be expected, but the concept of cosmopolitanism itself is very old.¹ This paper will investigate how the ancient and modern theories differ, and whether original formulations of cosmopolitanism might be of service to their modern counterpart.

Liberal foundations by and large provide the theoretical basis for current work on cosmopolitanism, but the ancients who minted the term did not have that dominant background influencing their thinking. Because of its liberal background, this paper will argue, modern cosmopolitanism is open to criticism from environmentalism: the resources required for a successful adoption of cosmopolitanism as understood today are unavailable. Such a criticism is fatal, so far as it locates modern cosmopolitanism firmly in the realm of impractical utopias. But the ancients, with their different route to and understanding of cosmopolitanism, may be of service to our contemporaries. The Greeks and Romans interested in cosmopolitanism operate in a conceptual environment of Cynicism and, especially, Stoicism. Once these differences between ancient and modern versions of cosmopolitanism have been sketched out, we can move on to the question of how ancient cosmopolitanism can be of service in combating the environmentalist challenge.²

THE AIMS AND FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COSMOPOLITANISM

A number of recent authors have turned to the modern version of cosmopolitanism in order to develop a theoretical basis for just conduct in a world of international integration. Kwame Anthony Appiah, in his recent and popular book *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*, notes the degree of interconnection in the modern world, coupled with the differences that still exist between cultures, communities, and individuals. Humans are increasingly able to have drastic effects on the lives of others (and especially those in far off places), both for better and for worse. "Each person you know about and can affect is someone to whom you have responsibilities: to say this is just to affirm the very idea of morality."³ What is necessary in such circumstances is a "rubric" of ensuring that one's behaviour does not have a negative impact on others

(and again, the unseen and far off are of special concern), but rather benefits them.⁴ For Appiah, cosmopolitanism is that rubric. Appiah's cosmopolitanism is a blend of two principal convictions:

One is the idea that we have obligations to others - obligations that stretch beyond those to whom we are related by the ties of kith and kind, or even by the more formal ties of a shared citizenship. The other is that we take seriously the value not just of human life but of particular human lives, which means taking interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance. People are different, the cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn from those differences. Because there are so many human possibilities worth exploring, we neither expect nor desire that every person or every society should converge on a single mode of life. Whatever our obligations are to others (or theirs to us) they often have the right to go their own way.⁵

This dual notion of the content of cosmopolitanism - universal obligations coupled with universal tolerance - can be found again and again in modern versions of cosmopolitanism. For examples of the obligatory nature of cosmopolitanism, we may turn to Louis Cabrera:

My central claim is that full acknowledgement of the demands of moral cosmopolitanism also should commit us to strong institutional cosmopolitanism, specifically, to the creation of a network of strong democratic institutions above the state. The fully integrated institutional form would be a democratic global government capable of ensuring that any person born anywhere can lead a decent life.⁶

Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse hold a similar view:

As a thesis about responsibility, cosmopolitanism guides the individual outwards from obvious, local obligations to distant others. Contrary to a parochial morality of loyalty, cosmopolitanism highlights the obligations we have to those whom we do not know, and with whom we are not intimate.⁷

Compare also Kok-Chor Tan:

From the cosmopolitan perspective, principles of justice ought to transcend nationality and citizenship, and ought to apply equally to all individuals of the world as a whole.⁸

These views on obligations are invariably coupled with a need to be sensitive to the differences that exist among the citizens of the world. Tan's book, for example, is an attempt to show that this "cosmopolitan" ideal of universal justice need not contradict feelings of special preference to one's family, culture, and nation. Christine Sypnowich also tries to combine concerns for universal well-being with cultural compassion, and explains our obligations in terms of providing the conditions necessary for human flourishing:

We live in a world characterized by enormous disparities of wealth and property, of health, self-respect, and the development of human potential. The moral worldliness of contemporary arguments for cosmopolitanism must be paired with cultural worldliness to give scope to the non-material aspects of human flourishing and sensitivity to the diversity that culture presents.⁹

Finally, David Held, while championing the obligatory side of cosmopolitanism, sees those obligations working hand in hand with the notion of tolerance:

The principles of cosmopolitanism are the conditions of taking cultural diversity seriously and of building a democratic culture to mediate clashes of the cultural good. They are, in short, about the conditions of just difference and democratic dialogue.¹⁰

This kind of analysis is dominant in the literature.¹¹

In this brief survey we see how clearly liberalism has left its mark on the concept of cosmopolitanism. We see this clearly in the content of the obligations mentioned; cosmopolitanism turns out to be the business of promoting world-wide liberalism: we have a *universal* duty to respect the freedom of others to participate in ways of life different from our own as well as the obligation to provide less fortunate people with the means to actualizing their potential. While the varieties of liberalism are many, these two moral precepts are foundational. The classic formulation of the principle of respect for the freedom of others to do as they will comes from Mill:

That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right...The only part of the conduct of

anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns him, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.¹²

Mill presents his case at the individual level, whereas current cosmopolitans tend to voice their concerns in terms of respecting national and cultural rights to independence - but the basic emphasis on liberty is consistent. For liberals, the concern with individual liberty is often joined by the observation that having freedom means little to those without the material wherewithal to enjoy it, and hence the urge to justify positive duties to others. Indeed, the idea is as old as Solon. As Plutarch tells us concerning Solon's reforms,

The remission of debts was peculiar to Solon; it was his great means for confirming the citizens' liberty; for a mere law to give all men equal rights is but useless, if the poor must sacrifice those rights to their debts, and, in the very seats and sanctuaries of equality, the courts of justice, the offices of state, and the public discussions, be more than anywhere at the beck and bidding of the rich.¹³

Solon does not go so far as promote actual positive duties on the part of the wealthy to help to ensure the flourishing of the less fortunate, but the idea that poverty subtracts from a person's liberty is present, and this idea is central to the thought of social liberals such as T. H. Green and L. T. Hobhouse, who call for state intervention to create the conditions necessary for the flourishing of human freedom. If liberals are committed to egalitarianism, then it seems that some form of obligation to ensure such an equality is required. It is true that classical liberalism places much more emphasis on protecting individual freedoms, and is wary, even, of the positive duty to help provide the means for others to accomplish happiness,¹⁴ but this is an old discussion in liberalism - it is telling that the same debate comes up in the literature on cosmopolitanism - and few liberals today would hold that we have no obligation to help promote opportunities for others to achieve happiness.

Working with the general understanding of contemporary cosmopolitanism as the promulgation of social liberalism on the world stage (with an added sensitivity to cultural as well as individual liberty), we can now move on to outline an important challenge implicit in this view. Societies based on liberal foundations have been criticized for consuming resources at an unsustainable rate,¹⁵ and one possible explanation of this fact lies in the need for resources to actualize freedoms. As noted, the liberal tradition includes theorists (such as Hobhouse and

Green, and even, in a prototypical way, Solon) who point out that it does no good to be given freedom without also receiving the material resources necessary for expressing that freedom. Liberalism, particularly social liberalism, has a history of understanding freedom in a strongly materialistic sense, and it is this materialistic facet of liberalism to which the environmental critique is largely directed. For the cosmopolitan, the environmental critique has particular bite, since the cosmopolitan is looking to expand social liberalism to the entire world. An environmentalist would counter that the world is already over-burdened in providing the material means for social-liberal societies; expanding the scope of social liberalism to include all nations simply courts disaster. What the modern cosmopolitan needs is a response to this challenge that allows for the expansion of liberal ideals without overwhelming the environment. With this challenge before us, we can move on to investigating the roots of cosmopolitanism.

ANCIENT COSMOPOLITANISM

Did the first cosmopolitans worry about the freedom of others? Were they egalitarians? And if not, what did cosmopolitanism mean to those who first used the term? The original cosmopolitan was Diogenes the Cynic. The story we get of the term's initial use does not go very far in promoting liberal concerns: "Asked where he came from, he said, 'I am a citizen of the world [*kosmopolites*]'."¹⁶ This is the barest of statements, and extracting a full theory of cosmopolitanism from it goes beyond what the text warrants. At worst, the aphorisms surrounding this pithy saying are unrelated to it; more charitably, they, like it, depict how the original Cynic behaved, possibly in an attempt to outline Cynicism by example. If we take the stance that the saying is to be fit into the general confines of Cynicism, we find little room to read liberalism back into it. Rather, the saying fits well with the Cynics' known penchant for disregarding social niceties and holding that they are meaningless to the good life. By claiming citizenship of the universe, Diogenes places himself beyond the differences found between the cities of the Hellenistic world, and in league with the universal concerns of virtue. The saying can most comfortably be read as a part of the general Cynic objection to being concerned with values that are culturally relative to the particular polis in which they are found.¹⁷

As far as we know, the concept of cosmopolitanism received its first sustained theoretical treatment in the hands of the Stoics. This should not be surprising, given the degree to which Stoicism is informed by Cynicism; Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, first studied with Crates, the leading Cynic in the generation following Diogenes, and Zeno's philosophy showed the influence of Cynicism in various ways.

When considering the Stoics' explicit treatment of cosmopolitanism and its use to the modern context, two passages come to mind. First, Seneca:

Let us take hold of the fact that there are two communities - the one, which is great and truly common, embracing gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our state by the sun; the other the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of our birth.¹⁸

Second, Clement:

The Stoics say that the universe is in the proper sense a city, but that those here on earth are not - they are called cities, but are not really. For a city or a people is something morally good, an organization or group of men administered by law which exhibits refinement.¹⁹

Both passages conjoin the notion of the moral goodness we naturally associate with a city with that of the whole universe, affirming that the universe is in fact a more true expression of the goodness of which we sometimes find an image in the city. This last point bears emphasis: both passages make clear that the city - our participation in which provides the basis for our concept of citizenship - is in fact inferior in its citizenship-sense of goodness to the entity that is the entirety of things. This judgment echoes the above interpretation of Diogenes' original complaint, and we can hypothesize that Stoic cosmopolitanism remains constant to its Cynic roots in devaluing the limited concerns of particular communities. Such an approach allows us to point to a continuity between Diogenes' Cynicism, Zeno's agenda of removing the arbitrary and sometimes contradictory rules concerning conduct that are manifest in different cities, and the concerns of Seneca and Clement for the "truly common."²⁰ The Stoics go beyond the Cynics' negative evaluation of common cities, in proposing some positive content to the universal city which possesses goodness in virtue, and Clement indicates that this lies in the universe being an organization of "men administered by law which exhibits refinement." A comment reinforcing this position on law comes from Arius Didymus:

The world is like a city consisting of gods and men, with the gods serving as rulers and men as their subjects. They are members of a community because of their participation in reason, which is natural law; and everything else is created for their sake.²¹

These comments indicate that the Stoic notion of cosmopolitanism rests on the more celebrated Stoic doctrine of natural law: there is a law that rules, is universal in scope, will benefit those who follow its precepts, and will punish those who attempt to work against it.²² A good way of understanding this natural law-infused cosmopolis is to continue with the analogy with politics that the word "cosmopolitan" invokes: there is an authority in the community (and, in the Greek world, this would be made up of the citizen body) that determines the laws which are to be obeyed by the members of that community. It is important to note that even those members of the community who have no part in determining the law are constrained to obey it. Stoic cosmopolitanism asserts that there is a law of nature as well, a set of rules by which affairs are to be conducted, and this law is a product of the authority of nature itself. For Didymus, humans, while not given the creative faculty of forming the content of natural law, are still beholden to understand and obey it because of their rationality - this, in the same way that non-citizen members of a polis are required to obey the law of that polis even though they have no legislative power. To push the analogy further, for Didymus the *gods* are given some formative power over the constitution of natural law, just as citizens are in the city. Continuing with the analogy to social circumstances, we can further explain Didymus' and Clement's reference to law in terms of flourishing and suffering. There are laws of the community defining criminal behaviour that are to be obeyed, and obedience carries both positive and negative connotations. In the community, punishment is a normal outcome of disobeying the law, and conversely, the flourishing of the individual citizen normally flows from obeying the law. So too in the universe: if one acts contrary to the natural law, one will suffer because of it, and if one acts in accord with the natural law, benefits will follow.

Furthermore, this natural law lends an organizational structure to the universe, just as laws lend structure to a political community. As Clement notes, its organization is a positive value of the universe. Similarly Aristocles:

The nexus and succession of these [all the causes] is fate, knowledge, truth, and an inevitable and inescapable law of what exists. In this way everything in the world is excellently organized as in a perfectly ordered society.²³

Things with organization are rational structures - i.e. they are understandable on some level - and, for the Stoics, this is a key component of their having value. Similarly, arrangements without organization (if such things are ever fully possible) are faulty or defective in some way, and such a lack of integrity can be the cause of suffering or dissolution. The term "cosmopolitanism" does a good job of making this

relationship explicit, as one of the earliest meanings of the word *kosmos* is "order": it is used in this sense in the *Iliad*²⁴, and it is only later that philosophers take it up and use it to designate the world - or, indeed, in its earliest philosophical use, "world-order".²⁵ Viable translations of the term 'cosmopolitan' would include phrases like "citizen of the world-order", or even "citizen of the order".

With this natural law background in place, the other half of the term *kosmopolites* presents the philosopher with a problem of coherence. There is an argument to be made that at this point the Stoic concept of cosmopolitanism has in effect left the field of political philosophy altogether, as it is no longer concerned with policies governing behaviour that humans can enact or repeal. Rather, Stoic cosmopolitanism crosses over into something else that grounds ethical conduct on criteria external to human influence. For a liberal, the concept of citizenship necessarily entails a political validation of the autonomy of individuals. Lack of such self-determination undermines the concept of liberal citizenship, but the Stoic notion of the *kosmopolites* seems to do just that (i.e., it greatly reduces autonomy), and so we are left with the problem of discerning in what sense Stoics could call themselves "citizens" of the cosmos, should such citizenship consist in merely obeying natural law.

One possible response to this problem would be to assert that Didymus is operating outside of mainstream Stoicism (and hence is not crucial to coming to an understanding of Stoic cosmopolitanism). After all, on the issue of the gods, Didymus' passage runs counter to Stoic theology which is generally understood as being monotheistic and imminentist. However, we see the same position reflected in other texts on Stoicism, and these in the context of discussions of the cosmic city. So Cicero:

In the first place the universe itself was created for the sake of gods and men, and the things it contains were provided and contrived for the enjoyment of men. For the universe is as it were the common home of gods and men, or a city that belongs to both.²⁶

Elsewhere Cicero states that "the Stoics hold that the world is governed by divine will: it is as it were a city and state shared by men and gods, and each one of us is a part of this world."²⁷ Dio Chrysostom also makes reference to a plurality of separate gods when discussing the cosmopolis:

This is the only constitution or indeed city one should call purely happy: the community of gods with one another - even if you include also everything that is capable of reason, counting in men

with gods, as children are said to partake in the city along with men, being naturally citizens not because they understand and perform the duties of citizens nor because they share in the law, being without comprehension of it.²⁸

The last two comments in particular indicate that our anxiety concerning the expressly political nature of the cosmopolis are on the right track, as the comparison between adults in community and gods to children in community and citizens makes clear. The force of the comparison rests on the fact that children do not participate in the formation of the city's laws, nor are able to understand it to the degree that adults do; nevertheless children are still obliged to follow that law. The comparison shows that a similar situation exists for adults when those adults are considered simply as constituents of the entire universe: they have no control over the makeup of the law of nature and are only able to comprehend that law vaguely. Nevertheless, adults must try to understand natural law as best they can and, in any event, are forced to comply with its dictates. This conception of citizenship (at least for humans) is virtually disconnected from autonomy. For Dio, citizens of the universe are citizens in the sense that children born to Athenian parents are citizens of Athens. It is a freer use of the term, and one somewhat at odds with the usual understanding of "citizen", which, for a liberal, implies autonomy, but it has the virtue of being more consistent with the Stoic analysis of freedom and causation than a notion of citizenship overflowing with materially-based self-determination.

Still, we can go somewhat further in theorizing how the Stoics justified calling themselves citizens of a self-determining sort in a universe that demanded their obedience to natural law. Dio's account of citizenship seems to be reducible to the claim that one must abide by the law, but the Stoics did try to preserve a sense of autonomy for the individual, even in the face of their revelations over the nature of causality and determinism. While here is not the place to give a detailed account of those Stoic insights, we do know that Chrysippus countered worries centred on the fate-driven collapse of personal autonomy by emphasizing the degree to which character or personal nature is responsible for actions taken.²⁹ One can never be free of one's own nature, and that nature is the most proximate cause to the effect:

He resorts to his cylinder and spinning top: these cannot begin to move without a push; but once that has happened, he holds that it is thereafter through their own nature that the cylinder rolls and the top spins. . . assent, just as we said in the case of the cylinder, although prompted from the outside, will thereafter move through its own force and nature.³⁰

As a further example of this kind of thinking we could say that I am the cause of my typing this essay because it is my nature to be a thing that types. Other things may have "pushed" me into typing it, such as a discussion I heard that critiqued cosmopolitanism, but any explanation of my typing that does not include a description of my nature leaves out the most obvious cause of the typing - and, of course, without my nature being present, no typing would occur. When coupled with the observation that humans have a rational nature which is the condition for active assent to living in accord with nature, this view of responsibility elicits the position that cosmopolitans are free citizens.³¹ Thus, as we see in the second half of the text above by Cicero: assent to behaving in a natural fashion is for Chrysippus the content of the notion of autonomy. These Stoic cosmopolitans can themselves be said to be the authors of that behaviour and, indeed, in some proto-Kantian sense, the legislators of the law under which they live (in the sense of validating the legislation they see before them). One recognizes the value of living according to nature, and so one chooses to do so. Epictetus writes,

You are a citizen of the world and a part of it, not one of the underlings but one of the foremost constituents. For you are capable of attending to the divine government and of calculating its consequences.³²

The citizenship referred to here relies on this rational faculty and, in line with Chrysippus' reasoning above, we can connect citizenship with rationality by positing the ability of Stoics to assent to the world-order as they see it unfolding, and indeed to actively take up their role in that process. Assent, or the process of embracing fate, requires the rational faculty insofar as assent requires knowledge of the nature of the proposition being assented to. Assent also indicates some degree of autonomy, minimal though it may seem to the liberal, and so preserves a sense of the citizen being self-determining. Ancient cosmopolitanism then, restricts the extent of a citizen's true freedom to the internal world and the ability to embrace fate. In stark contrast to this, modern cosmopolitans consider freedom to be expressed through the ability to manipulate and control the external world.

COSMOPOLITANISM, FREEDOM, AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRITIQUE

If this is a fair description of what it means for a Stoic to be a cosmopolitan, then substantial similarities and differences between ancient and modern cosmopolitanisms are apparent. In terms of similarities, both ancients and moderns are agreed concerning the extent of the political

community; neither accepts citizenship as being co-extensive with the scope of the nation or state. Furthermore, both are broadly egalitarian (although in different ways). Recall Hierocles's famous image of the concentric circles in which all people are arranged. Those closest to us are placed in the interior circles, and others are placed in outer circles corresponding to the closeness (or the distance) of their relation to us. The point for Hierocles is to bring those in the outer rings into the centre, so that all people are treated with equal fairness, and love.³³ As evidenced by the passages cited at the start of this paper, modern cosmopolitans are deeply concerned with treating distant people in a similar fashion.

A clear difference between old and new cosmopolitanisms comes when we consider the extent of personal freedom that each is willing to embrace. Modern cosmopolitans, building on their liberal foundations, necessarily operate in an environment where personal liberty has a wide scope and great value. This is done by appealing to the convictions that liberal values should be universal in scope, and that any view of autonomy as being largely indexed to national origin is simply unjustifiable. Ancient cosmopolitanism is not saddled with our liberal agenda, and so is not politically oriented in the sense that modern cosmopolitanism is: the Stoics did not go out of their way to promote a world state which would protect the liberty of individuals. While, in the ancient world, Stoic cosmopolitanism might have been pressed into the service of those who were seeking to create a world state - and thereby providing the theoretical justification for the creation of such a state³⁴ - this was clearly *not* an explicit political goal of the Stoics themselves. We know this because of the goal that Stoicism is explicitly devoted to: to explain and even show by personal example how happiness is available to everyone, no matter what station one has in life, be it slave or emperor. Hardships that infringe upon one's seeming liberty are truly no impediment at all, being "things which contribute neither to happiness nor unhappiness, as is the case with wealth, reputation, health, strength, and the like."³⁵ Stoics believe that, even without these external goods, an individual can become happy, wise, and therefore free in the truest sense of assenting to one's lot in life. Thus Stoics are able to conceive of a happy life which does not demand much in the way of external resources to support it, and indeed, is even indexed to relative freedom unlike the view of the liberal.

It is tempting to assert that this difference between the two cosmopolitanisms indicates that the moderns have little to learn from the Stoics, so long as the agenda remains the kind of emancipation mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this essay.³⁶ Modern cosmopolitanism, with its background of materially-based human freedom, must allow for humans to be whatever they wish to be, and then deal with the fact that material circumstances curtail that freedom, possibly relegating some to a status of being less-than-human, because of a lack of freedom. For the

modern cosmopolitan, resource-curtailment implies at the very least a loss of the ability to participate in the rights and benefits that go with the status of citizen. There is a basic rejection here of the Stoic notion that happiness is possible without external goods. One result of such a stance in relation to external goods is that some may devote substantial energy towards increasing their complement of external goods, with the goal of facilitating a greater degree of liberty and therefore happiness. Thus we have an objection to a liberal-based cosmopolitanism from the direction of the environmentalist movement - one based on the claim that the environment simply cannot sustain the amount of wealth required for this type of autonomy. Such an 'environmental' restraint forces the modern cosmopolitan to recognize limits on human freedom. If the modern cosmopolitan remains firm in the belief of the ultimate value of a freedom understood in terms of external influence, and if the environmental critique holds, then a concomitant belief in an egalitarian and universal citizenship must be abandoned.

However, if modern cosmopolitans are to prioritize that kind of citizenship - in other words, if they are to be cosmopolitans first, and liberals second - then it becomes necessary to confront the issue of how personal happiness and fulfillment might be achieved without the amount of freedom a contemporary cosmopolitan might expect. The question of how citizenship can be preserved with a reduced level of freedom is a major issue for cosmopolitans, and a Stoic answer to this dilemma entails reconfiguring our conception of freedom to include an expanded role for the interior world. As we have seen, Stoicism offers a path to cosmopolitanism that requires much less in the way of external goods. Unencumbered with the question of how much material wealth is enough, the Stoics are also able to move directly to questions concerned with the nature of humanity. A more Stoic brand of cosmopolitanism would not be susceptible to the criticism of environmentalism, because the version of citizenship that arises there is based on rational character rather than material freedom. Thus, Stoic cosmopolitanism entails a far lighter drain on resources than its liberal counterpart while still maintaining the importance of citizenship. A kind of freedom, connected to the concept of citizenship, remains - but it does not rest on the ability to alter or make use of external resources. Since freedom here means the ability to properly embrace one's own nature, it becomes crucially important to generate an understanding of what that nature consists in; we find even at an early stage of Stoicism a rich analysis of human nature, especially human psychology.³⁷ Ultimately, the Stoics reach their cosmopolitanism through an analysis of human nature that comes from the realization that each individual has a necessary role to play in the history of the universe, and is a constituent of that universe. In actively endorsing that role, individuals become citizens of the universe. It remains to be seen whether modern

cosmopolitans can accept this altered understanding of the freedom attendant upon citizenship. But again, if the environmental critique is sound, they may be forced to.

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NOTES

¹ For a brief analysis of how these three factors contribute to the rise in interest in cosmopolitanism, see Carole A. Breckenridge et al., eds. *Cosmopolitanism* (London: Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 2-7. For a longer treatment, see Walter Mignolo, "The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism," in Breckenridge et al., pp. 157-87.

² Indeed, the project of bringing the ancient conception of cosmopolitanism into the service of modern political discussion is having something of a renaissance; thus Martha Nussbaum's famous essay, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," *Boston Review* 19.5 (Fall 1994), and Thomas Pangle, "Socratic Cosmopolitanism: Cicero's Critique and Transformation of the Stoic Ideal," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 31 (1998): 235-62. See also Appiah, below.

³ Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), p. xiii.

⁴ Appiah, p. xiii.

⁵ Appiah, p. xv.

⁶ Louis Cabrera, *Political Theory of Global Justice: A cosmopolitan case for the world state* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 2.

⁷ Gillian Brock & Harry Brighouse (eds.), *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 3.

⁸ Kok-Chor Tan, *Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 1.

⁹ Christine Sypnowich, "Cosmopolitans, Cosmopolitanism, and Human Flourishing," in Brock & Brighouse, p. 74.

¹⁰ David Held, "Principles of Cosmopolitan Order," in Brock & Brighouse, p. 16.

¹¹ For further examples, see Ulrich Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); Pheng Chea, *Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006).

¹² John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1980), p. 13.

¹³ Plutarch, *The Comparison of Poplicola with Solon*, p. 3.

¹⁴ The most famous statement of the relationship between positive and negative liberties, and the classical liberal's wariness of positive liberty, is

found in Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty," in *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 18-72.

¹⁵ The problem is given legitimization at the cosmopolitan (or at least the "Gaia-political") level, through the publication of *Our Common Future*, the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, in 1987. The Commission was convened by the United Nations in 1983.

¹⁶ Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VI 63.

¹⁷ For an engaging reconstruction of Diogenes' attitude towards social niceties along the lines given above, see Luis E. Navia, *Diogenes the Cynic: The War Against the World* (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2005).

¹⁸ Seneca, *On Leisure* 4.1.

¹⁹ Clement of Alexandria, *The Stromata*, or *Miscellanies*, IV 26.

²⁰ Zeno famously recommends sweeping social changes in his *Republic*. Diogenes Laertius, 7.32-3:

"Some people, including the circle of Cassius the Sceptic, criticize Zeno extensively. . . for his doctrine set out in the *Republic* concerning community of wives, and his prohibition at line 200 against the building of temples, lawcourts and gymnasia in cities. They also take exception to his statement on currency: 'The provision of currency should not be thought necessary either for exchange or for travel', and for his instruction that men and women should wear the same clothes and keep no part of the body completely covered."

Chrysippus' exhortation to intercourse with family members, cannibalism, and temple pollution (Plutarch, *On Stoic Self-Contradictions*, 1044f-1045a) can be read in this vein as an elaboration on a Stoic project originating with Zeno, but in truth extending back to Diogenes.

²¹ Didymus, in Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation*, 15. 15.4-5.

²² The classic formulation outlining all of these qualities of natural law is Cicero, *De Republica* 3.33.

²³ Aristocles, in Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation* 15.14.2.

²⁴ *Iliad*, 10.472.

²⁵ According to Diogenes Laertius, 8.48, it is Pythagoras or Parmenides who first uses the term in the sense of "world-order".

²⁶ Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*, II 3.154. Cf. Cicero, *De Legibus*, 1.23.

²⁷ Cicero, *De Finibus*, 3.65.

²⁸ Dio Chrysostom, *Orationes*, XXXVI 23. Dio Chrysostom's reliability as a source for Stoicism has been questioned; the charge is that it is too difficult to separate authentic Stoic doctrine from his own theorizing. But on his reliability here, see Malcolm Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 57-64.

²⁹ For an in-depth analysis of Stoic views on fate, see Susanne Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). For a shorter synopsis, Dorothy Frede, "Stoic Determinism," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp. 179-205.

³⁰ Cicero, *De Fato*, 42-43.

³¹ For the Stoic doctrine that happiness consists in living in accord with nature, see Stobaeus 2.77, 16-27; Diogenes Laertius 7.87-9; and, especially for our purposes here, Seneca, *Letters* 76.9-10.

³² Epictetus, *Discourses*, 2.10.

³³ See Stobaeus, 4.671,7-673,11

³⁴ For an example of this use of Stoic cosmopolitanism, see Plutarch's *On the Fortune of Alexander*, where Alexander is presented as accomplishing in reality what the Stoics only dreamed of.

³⁵ Diogenes Laertius, 7.104.

³⁶ There is of course the further problem, central to liberalism itself, of the inherent tension between the two principles that Appiah outlines and which we may take as basic to modern cosmopolitanism. A tension exists between the need to provide universal standards which we would be willing to enforce on others, and the need to respect the liberty of foreign cultures and nations. How stoic cosmopolitanism might be of service in addressing this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth mentioning that there is nothing preventing a Stoic from being a democrat or even a liberal, given the Stoic resolution to "the Lazy Argument" - which refutes the claim that Stoicism is a brand of fatalism, so that the Stoic does not act in the world; see Cicero, *De Fato* 28-30 - and the recognition of current democracies and our participation in them being the natural result of fate.

³⁷ See Margaret Reesor, *Nature of Man in Early Stoic Philosophy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).