Bosanquet and Bradley: some recent discussions

William Sweet

for Bradley Studies 2000

In his 1983 book on Bradley's Logic, Anthony Manser remarked that "[i]t has been suggested that there was, at the end of the nineteenth century, a great English philosopher named 'Bradley-Bosanquet'."⁽¹⁾ Manser is, of course, just echoing the view of J.S. MacKenzie who wrote, in his 1927 review of the second edition of Bradley's Ethical Studies, that "Bradley and Bosanquet have almost to be regarded as one person [...] Neither is readily intelligible without the other."⁽²⁾ And it is fairly well known--at least to the audience of this journal--that Bosanquet himself sometimes wrote that his and Bradley's respective views were largely in harmony--that "there is never [...] any more than a verbal difference or difference of emphasis, between us."⁽³⁾ And despite the recognition in Bosanquet's own time that he had a distinctive and powerful voice on philosophical topics,⁽⁴⁾ the impression created by such remarks--that Bosanquet is not really offering a distinctive position from Bradley--has been long held, and it is at least partly responsible for the consequence that, until fairly recently, philosophical interest in Bosanquet's work has taken, at best, second place to that of Bradley.⁽⁵⁾

In a number of recent studies, I have argued that the relation between Bradley and Bosanquet is much more complicated than the previous remarks would suggest.⁽⁶⁾ Bosanquet and Bradley should be distinguished not only in matters related to logic,⁽⁷⁾ but also in metaphysics,⁽⁸⁾ politics,⁽⁹⁾ ethical theory, 'applied ethics' (e.g., punishment and social policy),⁽¹⁰⁾ and religion.⁽¹¹⁾ In subsequent discussions, however, a number of questions have arisen.

Principal among these questions are those of how different the views of Bosanquet and Bradley are, what might account for raise the differences alleged to exist between them, and what we might conclude about the plausibility of their respective views--and, specifically, of their 'absolutism.'And these questions have led to yet others--particularly about the relation of Bosanquet's views to those of his contemporaries and predecessors in the idealist tradition.

In this short discussion piece, I want to address the first two--and, to an extent, the last--of these questions. Specifically, I want to review some of the discussion and responses to my views on three issues on which both Bradley and Bosanquet had something important to say in print--the nature of punishment, the notion of rights, and the relation of religion and morality. This will, I think, lay some groundwork for a more extensive historical and philosophical analysis of Bosanquet's work.

I

Though there are differences between them, there is no denying that Bosanquet and Bradley are, broadly speaking, representative of the same philosophical tradition. They were products of the same period of intellectual ferment in Oxford in the mid nineteenth century, they were both students of T.H. Green, and were marked by the introduction of Hegel's and Kant's philosophy into England. Both were implacably opposed to the still-influential empiricist, individualist, and associationist views of Alexander Bain, David Hartley, and J.S. Mill, both responded with a logic and a metaphysics that reflected an absolute idealism, and both sought to avoid the less thoroughgoing metaphysics of the personal idealists.

Still, such similarities as these are not, I have argued, sufficient to establish that their positive views are much the same. Perhaps the first and most obvious difference between them is in their logic. This is the point on which most commentators see a distinction between them, and it is the one on which Bosanquet and Bradley explicitly disagreed. Some of Bosanquet's early work was critical of Bradley,⁽¹²⁾ and Bradley acknowledges the weight of Bosanquet's criticisms of the first edition of his Principles of Logic. Several points of difference have been noted by Phillip Ferreira⁽¹³⁾ and by Manser.⁽¹⁴⁾ The principal issues that Bosanquet took exception to were ADD And, in fact, the differences may even be greater than either recognised, if Stewart Candlish is right about Bradley not holding a coherence theory⁽¹⁵⁾, since there is some evidence to believe that Bosanquet did. Still, it is difficult to say exactly how far these differences go. Bosanquet later admitted that his early criticisms may have been too strong, (WHERE?). In any event, I cannot discuss this in any detail here; an adequate treatment of their respective logics would require a much lengthier study than present circumstances permit.

Some important differences between Bosanquet and Bradley are to be found, I have argued⁽¹⁶⁾, in their ethics--both theoretical and applied.

Now these differences were, until fairly recently, generally overlooked. Part of the reason for this, I would suggest, is that Bradley's views on ethics have frequently been misunderstood. Bradley's ethical theory is often held (by those who have read little of his work) to be pretty much that represented in Essay V of Ethical Studies--that of 'my station and its duties'--and his politics have been often seen as rather conservative.⁽¹⁷⁾ Bosanquet's views on politics and social policy have received similar treatment. But commentators such as Peter Nicholson, Charles Le Chevalier, and Richard Wollheim⁽¹⁸⁾ among others, have consistently reminded us that Bradley's view is not that represented in Essay V, but is to be found later in Ethical Studies. And this leads to two questions--namely, what exactly is Bradley's positive view, and where exactly does Bosanquet stand in relation to it? So let em turn now to the three issues indicated above--the nature of punishment, the notion of rights, and the relation of religion and morality.

1

While there are a number of similarities in Bosanquet's and Bradley's respective discussions of punishment, a closer reading suggests that there is a significant difference between them here. In "'Absolute Idealism' and Finite Individuality,"⁽¹⁹⁾ especially pp. 444-449, I noted that Bosanquet holds a basically retributive view of punishment--that, like Kant,⁽²⁰⁾ Bosanquet held that punishment involved the recognition of a "personal bad will"⁽²¹⁾ and that the infliction of punishment is, in part, an attempt to 'undo'⁽²²⁾ the act and ensure that the bad will "shall not fail to apprehend the integrity of the annulling act."⁽²³⁾ In doing so, Bosanquet draws on a Kantian notion of the value of the autonomous will⁽²⁴⁾, thereby showing a respect for the individual. For Bosanquet, punishment implies a recognition of human beings as beings whose (guilty) will must be respected.

For Green's view, see LPPO, secs. 185-186.

While there is some acknowledgment of an element of retributivism in Bradley, his own position on punishment is rather 'utilitarian.'⁽²⁵⁾ Bradley explicitly rejects all three of the classical justifications of punishment--retribution, deterrence, and reformation--and argues that the treatment of individuals is instead to be subject to a social Darwinian "principle of social surgery" (CE 152, see 164), where the community has the duty and right to treat its members in accord with its own welfare (CE 158).

breaks the connexion of punishment and guilt (CE 153) by allowing

We see here, I would argue, not only some evidence that Bosanquet has a different view of punishment, but some corroborating evidence for claiming that he has a different view of the value of the human finite individual. By itself, this difference is not sufficient to establish that this reflects a different metaphysical view than what we find in Bradley. (I have noted elsewhere that Bosanquet sees the finite human individual as a link or copula between nonhuman nature and the Absolute.) Nevertheless, if one has reason to believe that Bosanquet does recognise an important value of the human individual, the difference in their respective views of punishment would confirm it.

But some might be sceptical here. Peter Nicholson,⁽²⁶⁾ for example, has suggested to me that it is not clear whether Bradley's view of punishment is as distinct from Bosanquet's as I suggest. Both Bosanquet and Bradley deny that punishment can be based on immorality or moral guilt (see my p. 446). As Bradley states, it is impossible to determine guilt or moral crime (CE 154), and so punishment cannot be based on either. Moreover, one might say, even if Bradley and Bosanquet do have distinctive views, it's not clear that that has any bearing on any putative metaphysical disagreement between them. For, Nicholson writes, "moral and political philosophy [...] cannot offer particular moral and political prescriptions,"⁽²⁷⁾ and thus one cannot make any kind of inference from the latter to the former. And besides, one might suggest that Bradley could, in principle, move to Bosanquet's position without changing his metaphysics--that there is no metaphysical ground for elevating the moral organism above the individual.

Now, in the first place, Bosanquet is clearly sympathetic to a retributivist basis for punishment. As he notes in the Introduction to the second edition of The Philosophical Theory of the State⁽²⁸⁾:

However much we may ameliorate the operations of criminal law, yet definitely to check the definite bad will as such, by a reaction expressly directed against it, that is, by punishment for punishment's sake, will always be a civic necessity. p. 45

Now I would note that Bosanquet does not mean that punishment is based on, or graded according to, the level of moral guilt. With Bradley, Bosanquet acknowledges that neither the state nor the rest of us can have a complete estimation of the degree of someone's moral guilt. Nevertheless, it does seem clear that, for Bosanquet, publishment does depend on (at least the possibility of) ascribing moral guilt (see my p. 446)--and this may in fact have been a position that Bradley once subscribed to himself.⁽²⁹⁾ For Bosanquet, one cannot claim the rights of moral innocence unless one can be morally guilty as well⁽³⁰⁾, and to deny the possibility of moral guilt is to deny the possibility of responsibility. And Bosanquet also talks about the importance of treating the person 'justly' in punishment--i.e., that the reformation theory is unjust.⁽³¹⁾ And he categorically rejects as "an insult" and unjust any theory that holds that "may freely be done [to those beings "incapable of guilt"--the insane and the mentally handicapped--that] which is kindest for them and safest for society, from quasi-medical treatment to extirpation."⁽³²⁾ But then Bradley asserts "justice is a subordinate principle, and that to remove the innocent is unjust but not in all cases wrong",⁽³³⁾ and that "over its members the right of the moral organism is absolute Its duty and its right is to dispose of these members as seems to it best."⁽³⁴⁾

Punishment is the response to the act of a bad will--i.e., to an action against the common good that has been carried out by one who can be held responsible for it, but the extent to which one is punished is determined by the context. Punishment also has a preventive character--"That which is to be prevented by punishment is a violation of the State-maintained system of rights by a person who is a party to that system.⁽³⁵⁾ And punishment has a reformatory element as well. Bosanquet says that "the aim of punishment is to make the offender good."⁽³⁶⁾ Yet Bosanquet objects to a purely reformatory theory, as ignoring "'reversionary rights' of humanity."⁽³⁷⁾ And Bosanquet concludes that:

The three main aspects of punishment which we have considered are really inseparable, and each, if properly explained, expands so as to include the others.⁽³⁸⁾

Now, how do two students of Green come to such different views of punishment? Some guidance might be provided if we look at some of Green's remarks on punishment.

At first look, it seems as if Bradley's view is closer than Bosanquet's to that of Green. Green, in lecturing on Hegel, writes that "you can have [...] even punishment and crime without morality"⁽³⁹⁾

Again, Green raises, as Bradley does, a number of problems with retributivism. In the first place, Green rejects revenge as a proper motive for punishment (LPPO §178-9; see Bradley ____). And, second, Green thinks it impossible to calculate the amount of suffering caused by a crime and the amount of punishment that would 'fit' it (LPPO §188, esp §§190-191; see Bradley, CE 154).

Thus, on this first point, while acknowledging that there is a social "indignation [that] is inseparable from the interest in the social well-being", Green quickly rejects any form of retributivism that might carry with it a trace of private vengeance. [178] And, on this second point, he writes that the infliction of punishment should not be taken as implying that that punishment fits the moral culpability of the agent. Green writes:

there is no direct reference in punishment by the state [...] to moral good or evil. The state in its judicial action does not look to the moral guilt of the criminal whom it punishes, or to the promotion of moral good by means of his punishment in him or in others. (LPPO ____)

Green argues that the object of punishment of crime is not vengeance. It is, rather,

preventive in its object [...--] justly preventive of injustice." And "in order effectually to attain its preventive object and to attain it justly, it should be reformatory." Though the reformatory character of punishment is "an incident of its preventive function"

But there is more to Green's view than this. While Bradley follows Green in his criticism of punishment qua private vengeance, he goes beyond Green's account of the positive aim of punishment. Bradley says that while the three justifications retain "we may rather presume, a certain value", they must be superseded by "the principle of social surgery".⁽⁴⁰⁾

Green, however, says that, in answer to the question

"whether punishment according to its proper nature is retributive or preventive or reformatory. The true answer is that it is and should be all three." [178]

And while he rejects any form of retributivism that might carry with it a trace of private vengeance [178], this does not mean that there is no room for retribution..

The idea of punishment implies on the side of the person punished at once a capacity for determination by a conception of a common or public good [...] and an actual violation of a right or omission to fulfil an obligation" [185] The aim of punishment is "the maintenance of rights' [185]. He sees that the punishment is his own act returning on himself" [186]

There are, moreover, clear restrictions on punishment. Even the criminal has rights, founded "on the capacity [of the criminal] for contributing to social good" and which can be forfeited--and the criminal "put out of the way" only when "this capacity was absolutely extinct." (LPPO ___) And punishment must respect the principle of justice. Green writes: "If punishment is to be just it must be reformatory i.e., it is for the moral good of the community and [so far as he is part of the community] of the criminal himself."

Where does Bosanquet's view fit here? Bosanquet's account is, I would argue, more closely in line with Green's.

Bradley altogether rejects the retributive form, and is very casual about matters of justice--whereas Bosanquet is not casual about justice

The law means that there is something worth maintaining, and that this is recognised, and that to violate this recognition is not merely to be unpopular, but to sin against the common good, and to break an obligation. 73

objects altogether to the attempt to prevent by punishment either immorality or irreligion as such. This objection a sound social theory must uphold. 94

Punishment corresponds much better to the negative method which alone is open to the State for the maintenance of rights. 205

It is true, however, that the offender, as a human being, and presumably capable of a common good, has, as Green puts it, "reversionary rights" of humanity, and these punishment must so far as possible respect. 207

applied to responsible human beings, such a theory, if really kept to its distinctive contention, is an insult. 208

the conditions of true punishment exist (i.e. the reaction of a system of rights violated by one who shares in it), 211

But brad says that the three justifications remain, but also must be superceded by the principle of social surgery 152

In the LPPO, Green writes

there is a right to "free life" for all those who are capable of "free action contributory to social good" 176

punishment follows on the violation of rights 177

"It is commonly asked whether punishment according to its proper nature is retributive or preventive or reformatory. The true answer is that it si and should be all three." [178] But Green quickly rejects any form of retributivism that might carry with it a trace of private vengeance. [178] (though there is a social "indignation [that] is inseparable from the interest in the social well-being") And retribution should not be taken as implying that one finds a punishment that fits the moral culpability of the agent / / but this does not mean that there is no room for retribution.. "The idea of punishment implies on the side of the person punished at once a capacity for determination by a conception of a common or public good [...] and an actual violation of a right or omission to fulfil an obligation" [185] The aim of punishment is "the maintenance of rights' [185]. He sees that the punishment is his own act returning on himself" [186]

"there is no direct reference in punishment by the state [...] to moral good or evil. The state in its judicial action does not look to the moral guilt of the criminal whom it punishes, or to the promotion of moral good by means of his punishment in him or in others. [...] Thus punishment of crime is preventive in its object [...--] justly preventive of injustice." And "in order effectually to attain its preventive object and to attain it justly, it should be reformatory." Though the reformatory character of punishment is "an incident of its preventive function"

The "proper and direct object of state-punishment [is...] the general protection of rights" But note that even the criminal has rights, founded "on the capacity [of the criminal] for contributing to social good" and which can be forfeited--and the criminal "put out of the way" only when "this capacity was absolutely extinct."

If punishment is to be just it must be reformatory i.e., it is for the moral good of the community and [so far as he is part of the community] of the criminal himself

What is underlying Green's account here?

Where does Bosanquet's view fit here?

Bosanquet's account is more closely in line with Green';s

Bradley altogether rejects the retributive form, and is very casual about matters of justice--whereas Bosanquet is not casual about justice

Bosanquet does seem to improve on Green's account (LPPO 183) of a judge's determination of sentences. Bos says that the judge 'interprets it as belonging to another class of action' Green's solution (see LPPO 194)

B agrees with Green:: Green: person punished as having "a capacity for determination by conception of a common or public good" 185 -- a "practical understanding of the nature of rights as founded on relations to such public good" 185

Bosanquet " It is true, however, that the offender, as a human being, and presumably capable of a common good, has, as Green puts it, "reversionary rights" of humanity, and these punishment must so far as possible respect." PTS 207

for brad, there is no restriction of punishment to crime 153

Like Green, Bosanquet would say that punishment (as in ll matters of legal compulsion) focuses on controlling behaviour; it cannot directly affect motive. Bosanquet is one with Green on this point (See PTS 180 and LPPO, sec. 15).

--the importance of justice in punishment Green 185; 186 - not justified unless it is just and therefore that there is an intentional violation of real right or neglect of real obligation. Cf punishing a dog 187

Green : limits of punishment - what is 'required for the maintenance of rights' i.e., for 'liberties of action or acquisition which there is [...] real public interest in maintaining' 185

Bosanquet 'maintenance of rights' 193, 195, 203 205, 206, 207

Bosanquet: compulsion through punishment and the fear of it, though primarily acting on the lower self, does tend, when the conditions of true punishment exist (i.e. the reaction of a system of rights violated by one who shares in it), to a recognition of the end by the person punished, and may so far be regarded as his own will, implied in the maintenance of a system to which he is a party, returning upon himself in the form of pain. 211 See Green: "He [the criminal] sees that the punishment is his own act returning on himself, in the sense that it is the necessary outcome of his act in a society governed by the conception of rights -- a conception which he appreciates and to which he does involuntary reverence." 186

B's discussion re the starving man is just like green 194

in a nutshell, for brad guilt is irrelevant; there is an unrestricted right of the moral supremacy of the community over its members (152) there is no restriction of punishment to crime 153

for Bosanquet and green it is relevant, in tat one is attempting to bring the criminal to consciousness of his actions.

But what does the difference between Bosanquet and Bradley suggest here? Is there any reason why Bradley could not move to Bosanquet's position on punishment, without a change in his metaphysics?

Bradley writes that eh is not concerned with practical matters--or, at least, he thinks that his political philosophe doesn't require any specific practical policy. If Bradley is right in this, then perhaps there is no reason why Bradley couldn't adopt Bosanquet's views on punishment.

Now, to begin with, it would be odd if he did. For he does suggest a reason why the 'moral organism' represented in the state is greater than its individual members--it is that it is more real (or has a higher degree of appearance)--or, at least, that the human individual does not have as high a degree. So it would be odd to allow human individuals to have a higher place in practical matters if, in fact, metaphysically they were not very significant at all.

Again, there is at least a prima facie case for thinking that, in Bradley, the conception of morality reflects or rests on metaphysics [see Bradley's comment on p. viii of ES/1st p of Preface to 1^st ed]

But even if Bradley could make this move to Bosanquet's ethical or political philosophy, I would suggest that Bosanquet could not make the move to Bradley's position. There are two reasons for this--first, it would be inconsistent with Bosanquet's account of rights and, second, it would be inconsistent with Bosanquet's social ontology.

2

Peter Nicholson suggests that the views of Green, Bosanquet, Ritchie, among other idealists, all reflect more or less the same understanding of rights (Nicholson, British Idealists, pp. 256-257, n. 9).

It is perhaps revealing that Bosanquet's discussion of punishment immediately follows his first extensive discussion of rights. It is also worth noting that, in Green, the discussion of punishment occurs within the context of the discussion of "the right to punish" (§§___). In Bradley, this si not the case at all. In Ethical Studies, his 'negative' discussion of punishment appears some time before his remarks on rights, and in his essay "Some Remarks on Punishment," he is rather dismissive of questions of rights.

Bradley wrote little on the notion of rights--and what he did write is almost entirely contained in the famous appendix (on 'Rights and Duties') to essay V ('My Station and Its Duties') of Ethical Studies, and it is certainly not an example of his prose at its best.

In general, rights are claims on others to do or to refrain from doing something in light of some general principle. For Bradley, a right is "the expression of law" (ES 207); more precisely, the relation of law to right is "the relation of the [moral] universal to the particular" (ES 207; see also n. 1). Thus, a right describes something about the relation of one (who is capable of consciously realizing the moral universal) to that universal. To have a right implies the existence of "the moral world" (213).

Where the moral universal is represented in "the will of the ideal-social or non-social ideal," we have "ideal rights" (208) or what Bradley later calls "moral" rights (210)--right that is "merely thought of" (212). Bradley also refers to "real" rights--right which 'actually exists' (213)--where the moral universal is represented in "the will of the state or society"; these seem to be equivalent to what Bradley calls 'legal rights'. These are the sorts of rights one has in a morality of 'my station and its duties.' Society or the state can have rights, just as individual human beings can have rights.

Now in cases like conscription, the right of society trumps. There is a public right which takes priority over "mere private right" (212). But legal rights are limited in two senses. First, legal rights change; "no existing social organism secures to its individuals any more than an imperfect good" (Appearance and Reality, p. 373). Second, if the will of society or the state does not represent that moral universal--i.e., if it is not moral--Bradley says that there is no right (ES 209).

We do not have here any clear statement of whether rights must be 'recognised,' by whom or by what they might be recognised, or how precisely the ascription of rights takes place. Rights imply "the consciousness (or presumed capacity for consciousness) of the relation of [one's] will to the universal as the right" (208), and the moral universal is one that demands self realization (see 224)--"free individual self-development" (210). But this leaves mechanisms of the recognition of rights unstated, and it is unclear what we are to make of "ideal rights" where these rights are "merely thought of"? It is clear, however, what Bradley's position was on the rights of animals. Because animals are incapable of that level of consciousness, there are, therefore, no animal rights (see ES 208; cf 31, n. 2).

Now though Bosanquet's explicit discussion of rights is only slightly lengthier, it is more thorough and systematic. In fact, Bosanquet's view of rights, while certainly not foundational, provide a useful point of entry into understanding his political philosophy in relation to those of his principal predecessors. According to Bosanquet, rights are "claims, recognized by the State, i.e., by Society acting as ultimate authority, to the maintenance of conditions favourable to the best life" (PTS old 188). Thus, a right must have both legal weight and be morally binding.

Like Bradley, Bosanquet saw rights as open only to sentient beings--in fact, only to those beings who were conscious of the notion of a common good. Thus, rights also required the existence of a common good, or some kind of moral universal. And, further, Bosanquet held that rights are related to a position or station that is defined in terms of such a good, and he draws on Bradley's locution of 'my station and its duties.' [___] in explaining this (though the source of this notion long antedated them both⁽⁴¹⁾). Specifically, they are the powers or means required by a person who has a position within a social order to work towards the realization of this common good.

Now interestingly, Bosanquet seems to have stayed with the morality or the practical ethics of 'my station,' whereas Bradley (who associated this with Hegel's position) does not. Again, in Bosanquet's account of rights, he shows a concern for the individual and the individual's role in relation to the common good, and he provides a more developed concept of the social good than Bradley. In fact, it is this that enables Bosanquet to discuss how one might respond to an inadequate social morality. And Bosanquet also argued that rights must be recognised--by the state (a matter which led him into almost endless debate, even with those who were otherwise sympathetic to some of his liberal views).

Still, there are important differences

- ideal rights

Again, to see the relation of Bosanquet and Bradley here, I want to take a moment and look at how their views compare with those of Green.

Green defines a 'right' as "the negative realisation of" "the power of the individual to make a common good his own" (LPPO, sec. 25), and says that they have "no being except in a society of men recognising each other" (LPPO, sec. 139) and that they are tied to life in society "in which each has a function to fulfil" (LPPO, sec. 154). We see here the central features of rights as involving a common good, as requiring recognition, and of this common good and this recognition as being related to one's 'function.'

Yet Green goes further. He notes that Plato and Aristotle, in laying "the foundation for all true theory of `rights'", assert "the doctrine of `natural rights'" (LPPO, sec. 39), and Green himself refers to "a system of rights which should be maintained by law... and which may properly be called `natural'" (LPPO, sec. 9). Thus, Green speaks of a right as "a claim... arising out of [a person's] rational nature" (LPPO, sec. 139, see sec. 150), and refers to a right to "free life" for all those who are capable of "free action contributory to social good" (LPPO 176). While Green says that "rights are made by recognition" (LPPO, sec. 136), he allows that some "existed when there was as yet no state" (LPPO, sec. 141), and refers to "implicit" rights (LPPO, sec. 144) "which remain rights though any particular state or all states refuse to recognise them" (LPPO, sec. 141).

Nicholson argues that, for Green, "men's status as rights-holders [rests] upon their moral personality, not upon their social functions".⁽⁴²⁾ Indeed, Green acknowledges that there is a distinction between legal rights and rights which `ought to be recognized' in law (see LPPO, secs. 138-141)⁽⁴³⁾. At the very least, then, it appears that even if rights must be recognized, they do not need to be recognized in law.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Green's account has had a number of critics⁽⁴⁵⁾ and, even if these critics fail, it is instructive to see what they were concerned about, and how this concern was addressed by Bosanquet and Bradley.

In the first place, H.A. Prichard argues that Green's account of the origin of rights is inconsistent and problematic. He objects that, in distinguishing between "is forced to single out certain rights, viz. to liberty, life, and property (viz. those which we think of as natural rights), as forming a special class which do not come into being with the state and can be treated without reference to the form of society which concedes them" and that Green "attributes rights to individuals who plainly are not members of a society in his sense".⁽⁴⁶⁾ Moreover, referring to Green's distinction between Recht and Naturrecht⁽⁴⁷⁾, John Plamenatz maintains that on Green's view, "there may exist natural rights... even if they were recognized neither by the government, nor by the majority of the members of a society, so long as their exercise would tend to promote the existence of what is good".⁽⁴⁸⁾

But the existence of rights needs recognition by someone or some thing. Prichard notes that "we can only rightly speak of a man's community as securing to him certain powers, if we think of it as doing so through an agent. To substitute something called custom or the law of opinion is useless".⁽⁴⁹⁾ And to say that some rights are recognised by the state, and others these and other authors allege, shows a clear inconsistency in Green's view on the nature and origin of rights.⁽⁵⁰⁾

Green's theory of rights, then, elicited some of the concerns that I noted with Bradley's view of rights--save that Bradley's political philosophy is certainly much more fragmentary and incomplete⁽⁵¹⁾

But is Bosanquet's account more able to withstand challenge? Some of the recent discussion of Bosanquet reminds us of several long-standing concerns--how does recognition occur?; what is the relation of the individual to the common good? (and how does each individual will the common good?); and does Bosanquet provide a means by which one can respond to an inadequate social morality?

For Bosanquet, recognition is...

Recognition of rights by the state is... and it is required simply because...⁽⁵²⁾

Now this at least serves to address Prichard's concern

Bosanquet would respond, first, by reminding us that "every social group or institution is the aspect in space and time of a set of corresponding mental systems in individual minds" (PTS 161). Since, as we have seen, the existence of a position involves a mutual recognition, Bosanquet finds it difficult to understand how someone could be said to be a member of a society and have a certain position and yet not be recognized as such by the community. "'[P]ositions' and the recognition of them are one and the same thing" (PTS 196).

Now, for one to claim a right, Bosanquet has argued, it must attach to a position, for it is simply "the authoritative vesture" (PTS 190) of a position. A right could not go unrecognized, because this would entail that society was unaware of a power that is part and parcel of a position which, by definition, society recognizes. The recognition of a position means the recognition of what that position involves. The point is, as noted above, purely a logical one. A `recognition' of rights does not require some supplementary act, over and above what already is the case within this `attitude of minds'.

But even should society be `inconsistent'--that is, recognize certain positions without the corresponding powers--this does not mean that claims which it does not recognize are unrecognized rights. Moreover, Bosanquet notes that recognition need not be "reflective", that is, something of which members of society are explicitly conscious (PTS 197). Recognition may be implicit in the structure, rules, laws and institutions of society. Indeed, Bosanquet says that it is in our daily activities that "the social system of rights... has our habitual recognition" (PTS 201). All recognition requires is that we be "aware of and respect the imperative on which [the social order] rests" (PTS 201). Thus, paradoxically perhaps, Bosanquet seems to allow that a right could exist and could be claimed without individuals being conscious of it.

Why is it, then, that Bosanquet insists that rights must be recognized by the state? A first response would be that, without this, such a claim would be indistinct from--and would amount to nothing more than--a wish that there be such a right. Moreover, without a definitive recognition, it would be difficult to identify the nature, the role, and the limits of such claims in organized social life, and there would be no clear means by which one could enforce and ensure the respect of these non-legal `rights'.⁽⁵³⁾ (In this respect, then, Bosanquet's theory clearly addresses Prichard's criticisms of Green, noted earlier.

How does one respond to an inadequate social morality? Green's solution would seem to be that one had (or could have) a right to do so.

For Green, even though now rights are "derived from the state",, while the individual has no right to disobey the laws so far as they "fulfil the idea of a state," it seems one in fact has such a right "for the purpose of making the state in respect of its actual laws more completely correspond to what it is in tendency or idea" (LPPO, sec. 142). Thus, not only is there a duty to resist despots (LPPO, secs. 109ff.), but there may even be a right to do so. This is one respect in which Green's account of rights differs from Bosanquet's. (For Hobhouse's praise, albeit mitigated--of Green on this point, see Leonard T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State, [London: Allen and Unwin, 1918], pp. 118-120.)

Bradley's view is certainly more complex. On the one hand, according to Bradley, "[w]e should consider whether the encouraging oneself in having opinions of one's own, in the sense of differing from the world on moral subjects, be not, in any person other than a heaven-sent prophet, sheer self conceit" (ES 200). But then there is ideal morality.....

Bosanquet does not go as far as Bradley when it comes to the value of private opinion.

Now Bosanquet doesn't insist on 'my station' as the end of the matter of morality. Recall that he refers to the duty to rebel. But when it comes to matters of rights, there is no right to revel because Bosanquet insists that rights must be recognised--and here again we have a difference from Bradley.

How do you deal with an imperfect state? See Green here

Bosanquet "[n]o person and no society is consistent with itself" (PTS 198) and there is, in the universe, a "conation towards unity and self-completeness" (SS 57; see PIV 129-131). As individuals and social facts change, `inconsistencies' are worked out and, thus, a `common good' becomes more comprehensive and complete and approximates the "universal good" or end.⁽⁵⁴⁾

A.J.M. Milne argues that "[w]hat lies behind" Bosanquet's distinction between duties and obligations is a difference in level of rational activity--that "at the level of moral rules and customs, the rational agent's duty is to observe the established rules and customs of his society"--these are one's obligations--while "at the higher levels of rationality", the agent "must think out his responsibilities for himself and on occasion this may involve claiming new rights"--these are one's duties (See A.J.M. Milne, The Social Philosophy of English Idealism, [London, 1962], p. 272).

But Milne provides no textual evidence for this reading, and it more closely resembles, in fact, the shift from the morality of `my station and its duties' to that of `ideal morality' that one finds in "Essay VI" of F.H. Bradley's Ethical Studies. There are good reasons to believe that Bosanquet does not follow Bradley in this respect--principally because Bosanquet does not seem to have abandoned a view of ethics based on `my station'

In short, then, one sees from this why, given his theory of rights, even if Bradley were able to move to Bosanquet's view, Bosanquet could not move to Bradley's views on punishment.

But there is more to the difference here than that. Bosanquet's account of rights is not simply something ad hoc (vs Milne) but is, as I have argued elsewhere, rooted in (what I have called) his "social ontology."

It is important to note that Bosanquet's theory of rights is not part of his social ontology. By 'social ontology' is meant

"Social ontology" = df >How is society possible? How is society constituted? How does the social

>relate to the individual? How does the social relate to the mental and the

>material? How are intentionality and collectivity related? Do social

>objects exist sui generis? How should one explain social phenomena? How

>should one arrange the social lives of human beings? These are among the

>questions defining the rising field of social ontology.

individuality and

>sociality; the ontology and methodology of social explanation; and the

>ontology of moral and political philosophy.

Now, because we are talking about ontology, we are at the level of metaphysics. And so it is ultimately here, I would argue, that the source of the differences between Bosanquet and Bradley are to be found. In fact I have, in other work, pointed to some differences between them.

Perhaps more needs to be said on this point--to show the various respects in which Bradley and Bosanquet differ in their metaphysics. And, I would suggest, it is here that a comparative study of their respective views on logic (and, pace Bosanquet, theory of knowledge --see Hornle) would be useful. But this is clearly a matter for another time.

A. In the first place, I would point to a difference in social ontology. In fact, it is doubtful whether Bradley would have had such a thing as a social ontology

I do not mean to claim that the social ontology is, in fact, fundamental, but that it provides a way of access into their respective accounts of ethics and politics

B. In general, I would hold that it is in their logic that one finds the source of differences.

C. I would also argue that these differences are due to, or reflect the influence of,

i) Green and ii) others.

[

See Bosanquet, Psychology, pp. 87-88, 94. The capacity of an individual to acquire and to use a moral language as depending on the social community was also noted by Bradley. (See David Crossley, "Bradley on the Absolute Rights of the State over the Individual", in Ethique et droits fondamentaux / Ethics and Basic Rights, [ed. Guy Lafrance], "Collection Philosophica", [Ottawa: Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1989], pp. 138-144, p. 140.)]

Each contributes, in its distinctive way, to the intellectual, moral, social, and spiritual development of the human person and Bosanquet, therefore, refers to them as "ethical ideas".⁽⁵⁵⁾

And society is, therefore, fundamentally, an organic unity.⁽⁵⁶⁾

In short, the individual has his or her individuality only through the social consciousness (FS 281; see Bosanquet, Psychology of the Moral Self, [London: Macmillan, 1904], p. 51). Similarly, Bradley writes that "when [a man] can separate himself from that world, and know himself apart from it, then by that time his self... is penetrated, infected, characterized by the existence of others" (ES 172).

the state provides a concrete indication of the requirements of morality.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Still, there are important differences

- ideal rights

- this goes beyond 'my station' [do I want to qualify this in view of the conclusions of my 'social policy' paper?]

(1964) Richter, Melvin. The Politics of Conscience: T.H. Green and his Age. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson

(1987) Thomas, Geoffrey. The Moral Philosophy of T.H. Green. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

can be accounted for, at least in part, by something of their common debt to their teacher, T.H. Green.

Now rights and duties...

This account is clearly different from that offered by Bosanquet. For Bosanquet

- related to position

- this is found in Green [discussed in my book], and also in Hegel and Kant

Admittedly, there are some points of agreement.

- no animal rights - a matter of consciousness [but the same issue about consciousness?]

Still, there are important differences

- ideal rights

- this goes beyond 'my station' [do I want to qualify this in view of the conclusions of my 'social policy' paper?]

These concerns lead us to a larger question--whether Bosanquet and Bradley differ in their respective conceptions of morality. Now, one might think that they do not--that (as Peter Nicholson suggests) Bradley could adopt Bosanquet's views, for example, on punishment without changing his metaphysics.

But I would say that Bradley's and Bosanquet's conception of morality do differ--i) that they don't hold the same view on ideal morality and, ii) they don't hold the same view on the relation of morality and religion. And so even though they seem to have a similar view on moral philosophy and practical matters (see ES 193), .....

What evidence do we have for saying that they do not hold similar views on ideal morality?

I) ideal morality

ii) the relation of morality and religion [ see Bos early letter to Bradley Vol. 4, pp. 6-8)

Thus, in one of his essays on social work, he emphasizes that one must "individualise the case; don't classify".⁽⁵⁸⁾

A.J.M. Milne argues that "[w]hat lies behind" Bosanquet's distinction between duties and obligations is a difference in level of rational activity--that "at the level of moral rules and customs, the rational agent's duty is to observe the established rules and customs of his society"--these are one's obligations--while "at the higher levels of rationality", the agent "must think out his responsibilities for himself and on occasion this may involve claiming new rights"--these are one's duties (See A.J.M. Milne, The Social Philosophy of English Idealism, [London, 1962], p. 272).

But Milne provides no textual evidence for this reading, and it more closely resembles, in fact, the shift from the morality of `my station and its duties' to that of `ideal morality' that one finds in "Essay VI" of F.H. Bradley's Ethical Studies. There are good reasons to believe that Bosanquet does not follow Bradley in this respect--principally because Bosanquet does not seem to have abandoned a view of ethics based on `my station' (see Bosanquet's Some Suggestions in Ethics, [London, 1918] especially Chapter 2, and my "F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet," in Philosophy after F.H. Bradley, (ed. James Bradley), [Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, (forthcoming)])

Green's position

T.H. Green defines a right as "the power of the individual to make a common good his own" (LPPO, sec. 25). He adds that rights have "no being except in a society of men recognising each other" (LPPO, sec. 139) and refers to the state as the "sustainer of... rights" (LPPO, sec. 142). To this point, at least, Bosanquet's view is consistent with that given by Green in LPPO. What distinguishes their respective views of rights, according to both Bosanquet and his critics, is the precise role of the state.

Mill's objection to "social rights" is not just that they are `general', but that they involve legal intervention in the private sphere. He understands such `rights' to entail that "every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought" and that they can be enforced at law. Thus, Mill maintains that "there is no violation of liberty which it [i.e., an appeal to social rights] could not justify" (L 87).

While Green and Bosanquet do use the term `social right' neither employs it in the above sense. In Green, `social right' means a right of a person that belongs to him or her in virtue of "belonging to a society of persons recognizing a common good" (LPPO, sec. 180; see LPPO, secs. 38-39). In Bosanquet, it appears to be used in the sense of `political right' or the `system of rights' (See PTS, pp. 98-99).

H.A. Prichard notes in his critique of Green's theory of political obligation, "we can only rightly speak of a man's community as securing to him certain powers, if we think of it as doing so through an agent. To substitute something called custom or the law of opinion is useless".⁽⁵⁹⁾

H.A. Prichard argues that Green "is forced to single out certain rights, viz. to liberty, life, and property (viz. those which we think of as natural rights), as forming a special class which do not come into being with the state and can be treated without reference to the form of society which concedes them" and that Green "attributes rights to individuals who plainly are not members of a society in his sense".⁽⁶⁰⁾ Moreover, referring to Green's distinction between Recht and Naturrecht⁽⁶¹⁾, John Plamenatz maintains that on Green's view, "there may exist natural rights... even if they were recognized neither by the government, nor by the majority of the members of a society, so long as their exercise would tend to promote the existence of what is good".⁽⁶²⁾ There is, these authors allege, a clear inconsistency, then, in Green's view on the nature and origin of rights.⁽⁶³⁾

even if rights must be recognized, they do not need to be recognized in law.⁽⁶⁴⁾

Why is it, then, that Bosanquet insists that rights must be recognized by the state? A first response would be that, without this, such a claim would be indistinct from--and would amount to nothing more than--a wish that there be such a right. Moreover, without a definitive recognition, it would be difficult to identify the nature, the role, and the limits of such claims in organized social life, and there would be no clear means by which one could enforce and ensure the respect of these non-legal `rights'.⁽⁶⁵⁾ (In this respect, then, Bosanquet's theory clearly addresses Prichard's criticisms of Green, noted earlier.

Importance of recognition -- a thorny point, Colin Tyler

To these criticisms,

Bosanquet's refusal or (if his account is, indeed, ambiguous) inability to distinguish society and its institutions from the state.⁽⁶⁶⁾ These critics argue that one can have rights independently of the state, that--if rights need to be recognized at all--they could be recognized by society, and that the state must, in fact, respect these rights. It is precisely because Bosanquet neglects to make such a distinction that, some suggest, Bosanquet's views on the nature and the authority of the state are incompatible with those of T.H. Green and, thus, reflect a departure from the liberal roots of the British idealist tradition

Or again, given his view of the moral end, John Morrow claims that because "the choices individuals made did not pertain to the development of their own moral characters", Bosanquet "abandoned Green's stress on the moral development of individuals" as a fundamental value.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Or, yet again, H.A. Prichard claims that Green's defense of "the existence of a common good... implies the idea that the persons to whom it is common are identical"⁽⁶⁸⁾ and thus, as Gerald Gaus says, "blurs the boundaries between personalities".⁽⁶⁹⁾ Given that Bosanquet's arguments for a common good are similar to Green's, one could imagine an analogous criticism of Bosanquet's view.

similarity of Bosanquet's view, cited earlier, that too much state action would lead to "moral and intellectual death" (PTS 200) with Green's claim that the "complete regulation of life [is] incompatible with the highest object of human attainment, a free morality" (Green, LPPO, sec. 223).

Couldn't Bradley nevertheless move to Bosanquet's position without changing his metaphysics?

II

Why, then, do they hold different views on ideal morality? What might account for these differences?

"The dialectical move to 'My Station and its Duties', associated with Hegel's position,

though an improvement over these other views in its recognition of the self as a concrete universal, is still found to be wanting, in its

one-sided view of the self as merely social and in its failure to provide potential for a corrective of social ills. And hence the dialectical

prod moves us beyond 'My Station and its Duties' to an ideal morality. This ideal morality, Bradley's constructive ethic,

acknowledges 'My Station' as being, to a large extent, an adequate foundation of the self to be realized, 'my ideal self', and includes

as well social ideals and non-social ideals, the latter being ideals such as the pursuit of truth or of beauty, ideals which fall outside

the control of the state or other social organizations. The culmination of the Bradleian dialectic, however, lies within religion, wherein

the contradictions inherent in morality are surmounted by the religious consciousness, in the union of the human and divine. This

thumbnail sketch of Bradley's ethical work provides a backdrop for 'Notes toward Ethical Studies' (1.6), notes that highlight this work

in its developmental stages, offering early draft fragments of some sections, together with material that Bradley chose not to include

in this work, at least not in its original format.

During 1877 or 1878, according to his own dating, Bradley wrote two essays, the first 'On Morality' (1.8) and the second 'On Knowledge' (1.9). The essay on morality covers a broad spectrum of issues, dealing chiefly with the concept of human perfection, the relation between morality and ethicality (Moralität and Sittlichkeit), as well as the connection between virtue and happiness

III

A natural question at this point is, is Bosanquet preferable to Bradley? Wasn't Bradley simply a better philosopher? (Consider Russell's response to the second edition of Bradley's Logic, whereas R doesn't respond to Bos.)

IV

What does this allow us to conclude about Bosanquet and Bradley?

- on the relation of the individual and the absolute

- as an absolutist

V Conclusion

1. Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain [No. 37/38, 1998, pp. 100-103], by Peter Nicholson, University of York (U.K.)

2. Bradley Studies [Vol, 4, No. 1, 1998, pp 115-118], by Geoffrey Thomas, Birkbeck College, London.

3. Philosophy in Review [Vol, XIX, No. 1, 1999, pp. 71-73], by James Connelly, Southampton Institute, England.

4. History of Political Thought [Vol, XX, No. 1, 1999, pp 379-381], by Colin Tyler, University College, London.

5. Collingwood Studies [Vol. VI, 1999], by Stamatoula Panagakou, University of York (U.K.).

6. Dialogue [Vol. XXXVIII, 1999, forthcoming], by David Crossley, University of Saskatchewan.

7. British Journal of the History of Philosophy [Vol. 8, 2000, forthcoming] by Philip Ferreira, Kutztown University of Pennsylvania.

8. Indian Philosophical Quarterly [Vol. XXVI, No. 2, 1999] by S.V. Bokil, University of Poona, India.

3. Still, what the place of Bosanquet is--in relation to his predecessors and his contemporaries has yet to be determined. But we can at least start to sketch this out by saying what it was not.

1. the received view

2. the received view has been challenged (by me) - note Robinson and J Bradley's article in MacEwan; I have argued that Bos and Brad should be distinguished in metaphysics, politics, ethics, 'applied ethics' (punishment and social policy), religion [see Mander volume] [also a failure to distinguish BB from HB]

3. Still, what the place of Bosanquet is--in relation to his predecessors and his contemporaries has yet to be determined. But we can at least start to sketch this out by saying what it was not.

4. what I want to do here is

i) review and reply to some of the criticisms of B's philosophy [in book reviews of my book] and, particularly, to Peter Nicholson's comments on my IPQ article

ii) extend my views on the difference between Bos and Brad --about religion? (see

some of their contemporaries to say that the two "may almost be regarded as a single philosophical personality.". But much of Bosanquet's work appeared only after Bradley had already published on the same, or related, topics, and critics often speak of Bosanquet as simply "applying [Bradley's world view] and exhibiting its fruitfulness." Indeed, Bosanquet suggests as much himself. As late as 1920, he wrote that "since the appearance of Ethical Studies... I have recognized [Bradley] as my master; and there is never, I think, any more than a verbal difference or difference of emphasis, between us". It is no surprise, then, that the standard view of their relationship is that Bosanquet was essentially "a follower of Bradley". For a dissenting view, see Jonathan Robinson, "Bradley and Bosanquet," Idealistic Studies X (1980), pp. 1 - 23. According to Robinson, "Bradley and Bosanquet disagreed so profoundly over such questions as the nature of reality and the relation of thought to feelings that they ought not to be looked on as representing some common doctrine" (op. cit., p. 2).

==========

According to Robinson, "Bradley and Bosanquet disagreed so profoundly over such questions as the nature of reality and the relation of thought to feelings that they ought not to be looked on as representing some common doctrine" (op. cit., p. 2).

1. Bradley's Logic, Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1983, p. 198.

2. Review of Ethical Studies, 2nd edition, in Mind n.s. 37 (1928), pp. 235-236.

3. See his letter to Lello Vivante, 27 March 1920, cited in J.H. Muirhead, Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends, (London, 1935), esp. pp. 262-263; see Peter P. Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists: Selected Studies, Cambridge: 1990, p. 52.

4. The importance and distinctiveness of Bosanquet's views are clear from the fact that the classical criticism of idealist political thought, Leonard Hobhouse's The Metaphysical Theory of the State (London: Macmillan, 1918), is principally a critique of Bosanquet. There is other evidence as well. In his obituary in the Times, Bosanquet was said to have been "the central figure of British philosophy for an entire generation." (See Muirhead, Friends, p. 19) and, according to François Houang, "les historiens britanniques le [that is, Bosanquet] présentent souvent comme un des penseurs les plus puissants et les plus originaux de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, comme le philosophe représentatif de ce néo-hégélianisme qui a marqué la penseé anglaise de 1870 à nos jours." (Néo-hégélianisme en Angleterre: la philosophie de Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), (Paris: Vrin, 1954), p. 7). See also Rudolf Metz, Die philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart in Grossbritannien (Felix Meiner Verlag: Leipzig, 1935). Translated as A Hundred Years of British Philosophy (Tr. J.W. Harvey, T.E. Jessop, Henry Sturt; Ed. J.H. Muirhead), London: Allen and Unwin, 1938. p. 346.] Metz claims that "[d]espite the considerable agreement between them... Bosanquet's philosophy... represents an independent re-creation, extension and application of Bradley's doctrine on the part of a genuine thinker who happened to be congenial with him and who scarcely fell below him in ability" (Metz (1938), p. 346).

5. Aside from Bradley, McTaggart's work has been frequently discussed in philosophical circles.

6. To the issues of interpreting Bosanquet's own work must be added the frequent failure to distinguish Bosanquet's views from those of his wife Helen.

7. Some of Bosanquet's early essays--e.g., "Our Right to Regard Evil as a Mystery." Mind, VIII (1883), pp. 419-21, and "Mr. F. H. Bradley on Fact and Inference." Mind, X (1885), pp. 256-65--and his first book--Knowledge and Reality. A Criticism of Mr. F. H. Bradley's "Principles of Logic." London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1885--explicitly challenge Bradley's early logical views.

8. See my "F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet," in Philosophy after F.H. Bradley, (ed. James Bradley), Bristol, U.K.: Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 31-56.

9. Idealism and Rights, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997.

10. See my "Social Policy and Bosanquet's Philosophy," in Collingwood Studies, VI (1999): 127-146.

11. See my "Bernard Bosanquet and the Nature of Religious Belief," in Anglo-American Idealism: 1865-1927, (ed. W.J. Mander), Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000: 123-139.

12. See note 7 above.

13. Bradley and the Structure of Knowledge

14. While Manser notes Bradley's indebtedness to Bosanquet in logic (particularly on those issues that led to the preparation of the second edition of the Principles of Logic), he adds that "[i]n many cases, it seems that Bosanquet did not fully understand Bradley's arguments; at best he gives them a somewhat shallow interpretation" (op. cit., p. 199)

15. S. Candlish, "The Truth about F.H. Bradley," Mind 98, (1989): 331-48, and "Resurrecting the Identity Theory of Truth," Bradley Studies 1 (1995): 116-24. See also R.C.S. Walker,, `Bradley's Theory of Truth', in Appearance versus Reality, ed. Guy Stock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) pp. 93-109.

16. See my book, Idealism and Rights, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997, and "'Absolute Idealism' and Finite Individuality," in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (1997): 431-462. "F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet," in Philosophy after F.H. Bradley, (ed. James Bradley), Bristol, U.K.: Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 31-56. "Bernard Bosanquet and the Nature of Religious Belief," in Anglo-American Idealism: 1865-1927, (ed. W.J. Mander), Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000: 123-139.

17. See Sturt, Sabine, Ralph G. Ross, Benn and Peters [noted by Peter Nicholson in "Bradley as a Political Philosopher," in The Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, (ed. Anthony Manser and Guy Stock), Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 117-130].

18. Peter P Nicholson,. The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists: Selected Studies. Cambridge, 1990; Charles LeChevalier,. La pensée morale de Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923): Etude sur l'univers moral de l'idéalisme anglais au 19e siècle. (Thèse complémentaire pour le doctorat ès lettres) Paris: Vrin, 1963; republished under the title Ethique et idéalisme: le courant néo-hegelien en Angleterre, Bernard Bosanquet et ses amis. Paris: Vrin, 1963; Richard Wollheim, F.H. Bradley, 2^nd ed, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969.

19. in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (1997): 431-462.

20. Apart from his statements on the value of the good will in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals and The Critique of Practical Reason, in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant speaks of punishment as respecting the principle "that everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth" (see The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, (ed. John Ladd), Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965, Part II, sec. 1, § 49 E. i, p. 102).

21. Some Suggestions in Ethics, 1918, p. 198.

22. (SS 191)

23. (SS 193

24. There is also a clear influence of Hegel here as well. For Hegel's view, see Hegel's Philosophy of Right, (tr. T.M. Knox), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945, sec. 100 (add): "punishment is regarded as containing the criminal's right and hence by being punished he is honoured as a rational being".

25. On the 'utilitarian' character of Bradley's view, see David J. Crossley, "Bradley's Utilitarian Theory of Punishment," Ethics, 86 (1976): 200-213.

For Bradley's discussion, see his "Some Remarks on Punishment," in International Journal of Ethics, Vol. IV (1893-1894), pp. 269-284, reprinted in Collected Essays (Oxford, 1935), pp. 149-164. Bradley also discusses punishment in Ethical Studies (1876; 2^nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927) Chapter 1, pp. 26-33, but leaves the matter of the positive justification of punishment unresolved. Is there a shift in his view between these two essays? I would argued that there is not. In the first place, despite the gap in date of first publication, there is reason to believe that the International Journal of Ethics article was actually written in 1878 or 1879 [see Nicholson, 1984, p. 130, n. 11]. Besides, in that essay, Bradley writes that he has "little to correct in the old statement [in Ethical Studies] of [his] view except a certain number of one-sided and exaggerated expressions"(CE 164, note 1).

26. Personal communication, 22 April 1998. See also Nicholson's views on the relation of theory and practice in Bradley in his 1984 essay, "Bradley as a Political Philosopher," in The Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, (ed. Anthony Manser and Guy Stock), Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 117-130.

27. Nicholson, 1984, pp. 120-121. See also Bradley here: "in an ethical discussion I even venture to think that practical proposals are out of place. [...] I am sceptical as to the value for any such a purpose of any moral philosophy [...]" (CE 163). And see David Crossley, "Feeling in Bradley's "Ethical Studies". Idealistic Studies, 19 (1989): 43-61. Here, Crossley argues that, for Bradley, "moral principles cannot tell us what to do since they will either be formal and empty of content or empirical generalizations not necessarily applicable to future situations."

28. I refer throughout to the 'new' edition of this work, The Philosophical Theory of the State and Related Essays by Bernard Bosanquet, ed. with Introductions, notes, and annotations by William Sweet and Gerald F. Gaus, Bristol, UK/South Bend, IN: Thoemmes Press/St Augustine's Press, 1999.

29. According to Don MacNiven, Bradley quotes Kant approvingly on the relation of punishment and guilt. (See MacNiven, Bradley's Moral Psychology, Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1987, p. 62). But this is not as obvious a matter as MacNiven suggests. Note that MacNiven is referring to Chapter 1 of Ethical Studies, and that Bradley does not explicitly offer any positive view on punishment here.

30. PTS 208.

31. PTS 207.

32. PTS 208.

33. CE 155; see especially Bradley's note on this page.

34. CE 158.

35. PTS 212

36. PTS 207.

37. PTS 207.

38. PTS 215 [See further the essay "On the Growing Repugnance to Punishment" in Some Suggestions in Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1918) [ch. viii]. ]

39. See Vol. 5, p. 175.

40. CE 152.

41. While Bosanquet's use of such expressions as `function', `station' or `position' is clearly a reflection of their employment by Green and Bradley, he traces their origin to the notion of ergon in Plato's Republic. See Bosanquet, A Companion to Plato's Republic for English Readers: Being a Commentary adapted to Davies and Vaughan's Translation, (New York: Macmillan, 1895), pp. 63, 82.

42. Nicholson, British Idealists, p. 87. Still, Nicholson notes that one's moral personality is "made by social recognition" (op. cit., p. 89). In any event, it is clear that, if one were to describe such rights as natural, they are so only in the sense that they are "necessary to the end which it is the vocation of human society to realise" (LPPO, sec. 9)--not "in the sense they actually exist when a man is born and that they have actually existed as long as the human race" or that they are "antecedent to society" (LPPO, sec. 30). Consequently, the concept of `natural right' used here is obviously radically different from that of Herbert Spencer or that of modern natural rights theory.

43. See also A.D. Lindsay, "T.H. Green and the Idealists," in The Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age, (ed. F.J.C Hearnshaw), London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1933, pp. 150-164, at p. 161.

44. This is the position that many ascribe to Green. See Hobhouse, p. 119.

45. He has also had his defenders. See, notably, Colin Tyler, Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) and the Philosophical Foundations of Politics

46. Prichard, p. 79.

47. See LPPO, sec. 16.

48. John Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 95. Hobhouse also argues that Green is inconsistent in insisting that rights be recognized (see Hobhouse, p. 119). Plamenatz notes the existence of a similar view in Ritchie (Plamenatz, op. cit.).

49. H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest, (London, 1968), p. 75.

50. Prichard, p. 76.

51. In fact, the main source for Bradley's political philosophy is his volume on ethical theory, Ethical Studies, published in 1876. It seems that Bradley thought that his views here were fairly conclusive, for he wrote almost nothing more on these topics. The sole exceptions are "Some Remarks on Punishment," in International Journal of Ethics, Vol. IV (1893-1894), pp. 269-284 and "The Limits of Individual and National Self Sacrifice," in International Journal of Ethics, Vol. V (1894-1895), pp. 17-28) (both reprinted in Collected Essays (Oxford, 1935)). Despite the publication dates, both were written possibly as early as 1878. For a discussion of the relation between Bradley and Bosanquet's political philosophy, see Nicholson, British Idealists, preface and studies I and VI, and my review of Nicholson in Laval théologique et philosophique, Vol. 48, (1992), pp. 477-480.

52. The Scottish-Canadian idealist, John Watson, seems to try to hold a middle ground here between Green and Bosanquet. He appears to hold a view very much like that of Bosanquet when he writes that "the right to life is bound up with [one's] position in the State", yet (obviously echoing Green's comments in LPPO, sec. 154) Watson then goes on to speak of "the right to free life as a human being" (The State in Peace and War, p. 230).

53. Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar criticism of Alan Gewirth's view of rights as existing independently of "particular types of social institutions or practice" (see MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed., [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984], p. 67).

54. For a similar view of the `evolution' of the common or "social good", see Green, LPPO, sec. 142.

55. See PTS, Chapter XI ("Institutions considered as Ethical Ideas").

56. Bradley would seem to push this unity even further. Recall his comment that "[u]nless there is a real identity in men, the `Inasmuch as ye did it to the least of these' becomes an absurdity" (ES 334-335, n. 2.)

57. See Bradley, ES 199-200: "What is the `world' in this sense? It is the morality already existing ready to hand in laws, institutions, social usages, moral opinions and feelings." According to Green, moral principles are present in laws and institutions (LPPO, sec. 215).

58. See "The Affinity of Philosophy and Casework," in Social and International Ideals, (London: Macmillan, 1917), pp. 161-182, at p. 164. Arguably, this reflects a `Kantian' view, inherited from Green, but abandoned by Bradley.

59. H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest, (London, 1968), p. 75.

60. Prichard, p. 79.

61. See LPPO, sec. 16.

62. John Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 95. Hobhouse also argues that Green is inconsistent in insisting that rights be recognized (see Hobhouse, p. 119). Plamenatz notes the existence of a similar view in Ritchie (Plamenatz, op. cit.).

63. Prichard, p. 76.

64. This is the position that many ascribe to Green. See Hobhouse, p. 119.

65. Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar criticism of Alan Gewirth's view of rights as existing independently of "particular types of social institutions or practice" (see MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed., [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984], p. 67).

66. See, for example, Hobhouse, MacIver, Nalini Pant and H.B. Acton. According to Hobhouse "[t]o confuse the state with society and political with moral obligation is the central fallacy of the metaphysical theory of the state" (Hobhouse, p. 77). R.M. MacIver raises the same objection in Community, Appendix B, "A Criticism of the Neo-Hegelian Identification of Society and the State," pp. 425-33. See also H.B. Acton, "Bernard Bosanquet," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed. Paul Edwards), (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1967). Vol. 1, pp. 347-350, p. 349.

As noted above, in Chapter 2, Nalini Pant accuses Bosanquet of "an inconsistency in uniting the social, legal, and moral aspects of rights" (Theory of Rights: Green, Bosanquet, Spencer, and Laski, [Varanasi: Vishwavidyalaya Prakashan, 1977], p. 92) which she attributes to Bosanquet's "following the idealist tradition in not making an absolute demarcation between the notions of state and society" so that "the two terms are likely to be interchanged at times" (op. cit., p. 94).

67. "Liberalism and British Idealist Political Philosophy: A Reassessment," History of Political Thought, 5 (1984), pp. 91-108, pp. 102 and 97.

68. Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest, (London, 1968), p. 72.

69. The Modern Liberal Theory of Man, (Canberra: Croom Helm, 1963), p. 71.