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It was a hundred years ago when Henri Bergson published the first of his major philosophical works, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. This was to be followed by Matière et mémoire (1896) and l'Évolution créatrice (1907). Maritain examined "the new philosophy" in his famous critique of Bergson which appeared just prior to the first world war. If Bergsonism was the new philosophy before the first world war, existentialism had that honour at the end of the second world war. By that time, with some exceptions such as the celebration of the century of Bergson's birth in 1959, Bergsonism has been in eclipse.

Now no doubt Maritain was a severe critic of the new philosophy of Bergson, though finding some truth in the concept of duration, albeit he thought a sound intuition had been badly conceptualized. He was hard on the tendency of the new philosophy to substitute time for being, to eliminate the concept of substance, to confuse intellectual analysis with its misuse, or limited use, to fall into irrationalism, and to opt for inaccessible middle positions. Despite Maritain's rough treatment of Bergsonism in Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, there are those who take Maritain's frequent use of the term "intuition" to argue that Maritain is closer to Bergson than first appears. A close reading of Maritain's commentaries on Bergson, however, will quickly dispel that notion. Perhaps the word

insight is relatively free from some of the connotations of intuition, but Maritain is surely defending the role of intellectus.<sup>1</sup>

When The Two Sources of Morality and Religion appeared, Maritain was still critical of a number of aspects of Bergsonian philosophy, yet he is clearly sympathetic to Bergson's approach to ethics and consequently, I believe, it is defensible to see in Maritain's own ethics a continuation of Bergson's inquiry. This is not to say that Maritain endorsed either the doctrine or the method.<sup>2</sup> No. The continuity consists in adopting a problem as posed by Bergson and attempting to go beyond the solution offered by his old teacher. This will be true in ethics as it was true in the field of knowledge. Bergson sought to show that the activities of constructive mind envisaged by Kant did not allow access to reality - Kant's denial of intellectual intuition - and tried to show that through his own concept of intuition, the Kantian objection could be overcome. Maritain's concern with epistemological questions in the period following his attack on Bergsonism was a continuous attempt to show that there is a power of intellectual intuition and what it attains. Now, just as his own efforts in the theory of knowledge were a response to Bergson's definition of the problem of knowledge, so also was his approach to ethics a response to the Bergsonian problematic. Like Bergson he pays attention to the immediate data of consciousness, in this context meaning the immediate or primary data of moral consciousness. And among these data the central concern is with the sense of moral obligation. This feeling had been confused with necessity, as when it was argued that where there is obligation, there is no freedom. In other words, the feeling of obligation has been confused with mere physical force.

It will be noted that Maritain's focus in ethics undergoes a change from his first commentary on Bergson's ethics in 1936 to his treatment of Bergson in Moral Philosophy to 1960. If in the earlier comments, he seems to oppose an end-centred approach to that of Bergson,<sup>3</sup> in the second instance Maritain has surely adopted an obligation-centred approach. The primary question is not to determine the tabs, but to give an account of what the feeling of obligation is all about.

However, a dialogue between Bergson and Maritain on the meaning of moral obligation would be an incomplete way of understanding the genesis of Maritain's conception of moral obligation. For Bergson's response to the sociological conception of obligation elaborated by Durkheim and his followers (notably Lucien Lévy-Bruhl). Now while it is true that behind Durkheim there is Kant, since Kant's theory of moral obligation casts a long shadow over all subsequent accounts of moral obligation, it is reasonable to see Durkheim's view as first in a series, whose second stage is Bergson's Two Sources and whose culmination is Maritain's Nine Lectures. This is not a dialectical series in which an initial opposition is overcome by a philosophical reconciliation. The series develops rather from the exclusive to the inclusive, from Durkheim's reductionist conception of the source of morality as found in society alone, to Bergson's two sources of morality, to, finally, Maritain's assertion that there are indeed three sources of morality.

We begin, then, with Emile Durkheim. In examining the relation between individuals and the collectivity, sociologists, and other social scientists, have employed either of two opposing methods. On the one hand, there is methodological individualism.

Methodological individualism is a doctrine about explanation which asserts that all attempts to explain social (or individual) phenomena are to be rejected ... unless they are couched wholly in terms of facts about individuals.<sup>4</sup>

From Hobbes to Nozick contractarian political theorists have employed this method. In sociology, it was articulated by John Stuart Mill in the early stages of that discipline's development, and by a number of contemporary writers including George Homans.<sup>5</sup> Frederick Hayek and Karl Popper have defended methodological individualism against the tenets of collectivist or holistic approaches.<sup>6</sup> This means a denial of the ontological reality of collectivities in either an explicit or implicit way. According to one of the most important commentaries on his work, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre is noteworthy for "grounding methodological individualism ontologically."<sup>7</sup>

Now if a choice has to be made between methodological individualism and the opposing view which maintains that collectivities cannot be reduced to simple aggregates of individuals, one must also make some commitment of an ontological kind, rudimentary as it may be. Either society has a fictional kind of being or it is a real entity. Durkheim in adopting the collectivists methodology has also, as a result, adopted a theory of social realism. Society is a real entity, and not a mental construct. In order to argue for the priority of the collectivity over the individual - "the individual is born of society, and not society of individuals"<sup>8</sup> -- Durkheim felt compelled to eliminate psychological considerations in order to contest those like Mill who ground sociology on individual psychology. This would obviate recourse to human nature as an explanation. In any case, society is viewed as an organism with a common consciousness. Thus the danger of

personification is not foreign to Durkheim's sociology. The sociologist is concerned with social facts and their explanation. Social facts are treated as if they were things. It is an important axiom of Durkheim's rules of method that the explanation of social facts is in terms of other social facts.<sup>9</sup> Social phenomena, then, have their own independent objective existence as, for instance, laws as codified. Those social facts which particularly concern us are moral facts and religion.

The social researcher wants to discover the origin of such facts, their causes if you will, and the function of these facts within society. "Man is a moral being only because he lives in society."<sup>10</sup> If this excludes individual morality, what is the relationship between the sociology of morals and moral philosophy? Is it the case that "we cannot have a universal theory of morality?"<sup>11</sup>

What Durkheim offers us is "an attempt to treat the facts of the moral life according to the method of the positive sciences."<sup>12</sup> Does a science of morals, then, exclude a philosophy of morals, as one might expect from a positivist perspective? If the source of morality is society, what would the object of moral philosophy be? Now Durkheim does entertain briefly the possibility that there could be a kind of "metaphysical ethics."

Possibly ethics may have some transcendental aim beyond experience, that is the concern of the metaphysician. Possibly, there is an eternal law of morality, written by some transcendental power, or perhaps immanent in the nature of things, and perhaps historically morality is only a series of successive approximations, but this is a metaphysical hypothesis that we do not have to discuss.<sup>13</sup>

Consequently we conclude that it is a hypothesis that can be ignored. In the context, Durkheim wants to avoid getting into a dispute with philosophers. Now in contrast to Durkheim's caution, Lévy-Bruhl seems closer to the positivist inspiration when he poses a choice between sociology and theoretical ethics and argues that the former replaces the latter. "Afterward, on the ruins of the late moral philosophy, sociology will erect a new science of morals." <sup>14</sup>

The task of the sociology of morals is to discover the origin and determine the function of moral facts. The primary moral fact is obligation. Durkheim "had been early on impressed by Kant's insistence upon the imperative, or obligatory character of moral rules, and this was one of the sources of his identification of the constraining character of social facts in The Rules." <sup>15</sup> The central feature of morality is its effect in inducing a sense of obligation on the members of society. Society imposes its rules on the individual and these rules embody duties. Durkheim rejects the idea of self-obligation and consent. The commandment is restraint; obligation is a social pressure. How, then, is obligation to be defined?

The obligatory character of moral acts derives not from their content, but from the sanctions which stem from violation of a moral (and therefore social) rule. <sup>16</sup>

These sanctions are negative in the form of social disapproval, punishment and blame. They are positive in that they involve rewards, honour and praise. The notion of discipline is an important component of social morality. The function of moral rules is to foster social coherence or solidarity. The opposition between rule and freedom is to be overcome by the process of the internalizing of the rules or norms. Thus, the

Durkheimian account of social, that is moral, obligation leaves room for the freedom of autonomy. In fact, the three elements of morality are the spirit of discipline, attachment to social groups, and autonomy. But it is clearly not autonomy defined as obedience to self-imposed law.

The stress on the Kantian influences in Durkheim's account of morality must be balanced by another side of his theory. Where the notion of the good seems customarily to be associated with teleology and, in a Kantian ethics, excluded from the determination of the formal aspects of morality, Durkheim makes a significant addition to his theory with the concept of desirability or the good.

Everyone, really, more or less clearly distinguishes two elements in morality, which correspond precisely to those we ourselves have just distinguished. The moralists refer to them as the good and the necessary. The necessary is morality insofar as it prescribes and proscribes ... The good is morality insofar as it seems to us a desirable thing, a cherished ideal to which we aspire through a spontaneous impulse of the will. <sup>17</sup>

If the essential part of morality seems to depend on duty or obligation, Durkheim wants to allow for enthusiasm, for devotion, for spontaneity, in short, movements towards the good. Beyond Kant's duty for the sake of duty and a pure utilitarianism, Durkheim suggests a kind of synthesis. Nevertheless, he leaves this inclination for the good at this point and does not examine this as a possible source of morality.

Finally, something should be said about Durkheim's proposals for a moral education, at least his reasons for proposing such an education. Maritain once remarked about the use of Kantian morality "by the first theorists of secularity" in France. <sup>18</sup> Durkheim's project is to substitute a secular moral education for the religious, Roman Catholic

education in France. But if Durkheim himself, and followers, like Célestin Bouglé, advocated such a secular morality, the reply to religious education seemed weak, because of "the simple fact that society no longer constitutes a coherent whole today."<sup>19</sup> The very pluralism of a secular society makes a secular morality difficult if not impossible to achieve.

All the indications are that The Two Sources of Morality and Religion was a reaction to Durkheim's view. In a work in which there are relatively few citations, there are a number of references to Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl, the former in regard to the theory of religion, the latter in regard to the notion of a primitive mentality.

Now Bergson appears to accept certain general aspects of Durkheim's account of morality as having a social origin, that is, he thinks this "conception of morality is accurate with regard to the closed society,"<sup>20</sup> but not with respect to what Bergson calls the open society. Let it be noted that Bergson's approach is that of introspective psychology, while Durkheim wanted to develop a sociological approach quite distinct from that of the psychologists. The difference in approach is not trivial, but in the final analysis Bergson agrees with Durkheim that the source of morality, and particularity moral obligation, is social pressure. It is "pressure on our will"; "we feel a sense of obligation."<sup>21</sup> Bergson goes on to speak of obligation in general as a kind of general force. While obligation is similar to necessity, that is, it is like a law of nature, it has to be distinguished from necessity with which one can argue."<sup>22</sup> It then seems safe to say that it is a necessity compatible with freedom. The essence of our obligation to society is to cultivate a social ego which means submitting to rules and regulations. Why should we

obey? "You must because you must."<sup>23</sup> If that hardly constitutes a rationale, it does entail a purpose. "Our social duties aim at social cohesion."<sup>24</sup>

Obligation is described as a virtual instinct. Social instinct is the basis for the closed society in its most basic biological forms. In a language that he doesn't usually employ, Bergson says that "another kind of obligation supervenes above and beyond the social pressure,"<sup>25</sup> but ordinarily what he calls aspiration, in contrast to pressure, is not considered to be a form of obligation, for that is identified with a pressure on the will. It is a disputed question among Bergson scholars whether indeed there is one or two conceptions of obligation in The Two Sources.<sup>26</sup> The assumption in this paper is that obligation properly speaking is pressure. The distinction between the two is spelled out in the following way by Bergson.

Whereas natural obligation/social obligation/ is a pressure or a propulsive force, complete and perfect morality has the effect of an appeal.<sup>27</sup>

Now at this point there is a problem, for Bergson initially speaks of two moralities stemming from two sources. The one is social; the other is just human. But then he says that the two moralities "appear now to be one,"<sup>28</sup> just as instinct and intelligence come from the same source. The one is impersonal; the other more person-centred. He will speak of "two different parts,"<sup>29</sup> and yet he will return to the expression, the two moralities.<sup>30</sup> And this seems to be the way he describes them thereafter, and the way in which he is ordinarily understood.<sup>31</sup>

In any event, the second morality is an answer to Durkheim's contention that there is only one source of morality, and that source is social. The two moralities are related both to the realm of intellect and to the idea of movement.

We have seen that the purely static morality might be called infra-intellectual, and the purely dynamic, supra-intellectual.<sup>32</sup>

No third possibility is given.

The second morality is based on an appeal or a call. We are no longer under pressure; we are summoned. But summoned by whom to do what? Here I think that there is a need to make a distinction in order to discover what the source of the second morality, the morality of aspiration, is. I noted earlier that its source appears to be human, though not social. If it is a product of "human genius,"<sup>33</sup> it is human, all too human. The call comes from great moral figures, "the mystic souls."<sup>34</sup> Yet is the call from them or are they the vehicles by which the call is made known to human kind? Are the mystics the instruments of God, if we think of God as "a Being who can hold communication with us?"<sup>35</sup> Certainly there are those who think that they are God's instruments. If these mystic souls include the Old Testament prophets, Jesus Christ himself, the Christian mystics, Saint Francis and Joan of Arc, as well as Greek, Buddhist, and Alexandrine mystics, is it not clear that the appeal is not their's alone, that they are the intermediaries, the messengers, the instruments of a source them, superior to them?

If we follow the present line of inquiry, we would have to assert that the contrast between the morality of obligation and the morality of aspiration is not a distinction between a social source and a purely human source, the one particular, the other

universal; but that the two sources are society, on one hand, and the divine, on the other. That there are two sources is not in question. What they are precisely is. If the interpretation is correct, it follows that Bergson refutes Durkheim's alternative: God or society. For the two moralities have society and God as their sources.

Bergson is unrelenting in his criticism of the limitations of the human intellect. There are two forms of moral rationalism which he more or less explicitly attacks. On the one hand, he rejects Kantian rationalism as vacuous.<sup>36</sup> Nothing remains of those purely formal Kantian elements present in Durkheim's account of morality. The second kind of moral rationalism, or intellectualism, criticized is the Platonic kind. He identifies Platonic morality with the proposition that "the attraction of God is the principle of obligation."<sup>37</sup> It thus becomes a teleological theory with a notion of obligation-attraction. Now, is this an anticipation of the kind of account of obligation that Maritain presents in the Nine Lectures? I think not. The kind of rationalism that is at stake here, however, may be linked to those Thomistic ethical theories which take God as meaning the telos and then maintain that obligation consists in doing what we must in order to achieve the telos, it being understood, of course, that not everything is permitted as a means to the end, that the means too must be evaluated. Suffice it to say that the conception of obligation as the attraction of the Good (as telos) is not what Maritain means by obligation.

If Bergson should be understood as presenting us two moralities, the morality of Pressure (social, static) and the morality of aspiration (divine, dynamic) the one infra-rational, the other supra-rational, there will, of course be those who opt for a single

morality, be it social or religious. However, there are critics who question whether Bergson has any morality at all.

Because having two moralities is to risk not having any at all the first disappearing in sociology and the second in religion.<sup>38</sup>

More commonly several writers who were positive about The Two Sources found it wanting because there was no place for ordinary morality, no place for reason as a basis for morality, and, as a consequence, no moral obligation in the proper sense of the term.<sup>39</sup> If he had set out to explain the meaning of moral obligation, he had failed. Regardless of the merits of Bergson's approach, this was its blind spot. It is no surprise to find Maritain in this company of critics. After having defended the intellect against Bergson's attempt to reduce it to being a faculty for working on matter or for making tools, Maritain now defends the role of reason in ethics. In his first review of The Two Sources, he says that morality has vanished from view.

The most captivating thing about Bergsonian ethics is precisely that morality, in the strictest sense of the word, has been eliminated.<sup>40</sup>

Between the infra-rational and the supra-rational, there is no place for the mere rational. It is "an ethics of the creative elan which preserves, I dare say, all of morals except morality itself."<sup>41</sup> It is noteworthy that Maritain criticizes Bergson from a teleological perspective, observing that the notion of the end is missing from this philosophy. It is an end-centred emphasis and nowhere in this essay does Maritain offer an alternative conception of moral obligation, although apparently such a conception would be based on reason.

In the second treatment of Bergson's ethics in Moral Philosophy an advance in Maritain's own reflections on ethics is evident. Now he does not confine himself to criticism, but offers an obligation-centred alternative.

The paradox of this bond by which free will is held and which nevertheless is conatural to it and leaves intact all its spontaneity ... this unique constraint.<sup>42</sup>

The force of obligation "is purely that of intellectual knowledge conditioning the exercise of the will."<sup>43</sup> He also thinks that the word inspiration would be preferable to aspiration to cover what Bergson is trying to convey. There seems little doubt that Bergson's formulation of the problem of moral obligation had a great deal to do with Maritain's new stress on the problem of moral obligation in the 1950s.

Henceforth, having noted the influence of Durkheim and Bergson on Maritain's definition of the problem of obligation, I leave aside the question of influence and attempt to reconstruct the main steps in Maritain's development of a philosophical conception of moral obligation. If we begin with the feeling of moral obligation, we may be led to investigate the ways in which the process of socialization leads individuals to internalize, as Durkheim would say, the rules and norms of society. It would be erroneous to conclude that the moralist intends to accept the view that socialized morality is primary. No. Maritain argues that the sentiment is presupposed, that socialized morality is super-imposed on the "pre-existing dynamics of moral obligation"<sup>44</sup> or, in other words, that it is because there is a sentiment or feeling of obligation, that social norms have a kind of hold on us. In the strong case, rules are imposed on moral conscience in an

unconditional way. The strong case is embodied in the formulation "you must because it is good."<sup>45</sup> But, what is good?

Maritain presents an analysis of the concept of the good in ethical discourse. In the course of this analysis, he distinguishes between and among three aspects of the good: value, norm and end. Initially, at least, it is the opposition between value and end which is relevant to the problem of moral obligation.

The key to Maritain's analysis of the concept of the good is the distinction between two orders or two perspectives of the good. The order of specification is distinguished from order of exercise. In Aristotelian terms, the order of specification is that of formal causality; the order of exercise is that of final causality. Value is one facet of the good viewed in the perspective of the order of specification. Norm is the other. The end is the good viewed in the order of exercise. Maritain's insistence on using the term value to signify an aspect of the good, indeed as the good in the order of formal causality, would be unacceptable to those who identify values as having a purely subjective connotation. Regardless of how philosophers may wish to subjectivize values and objectivize facts, the value of an act of generosity does not rest in a judgment determined purely or even mainly by our preferences or tastes. There are judgments of value as there are judgments of "simple reality," and they are no less objective.

Let us examine more closely what Maritain is trying to say about the order of speculation. It is a Thomistic axiom that acts are specified by their objects. Value is "the good as signifying the intrinsically good quality of a human act."<sup>47</sup> Moral values, then, specify the moral act. Acts are specified by their objects, not by ends. Hence

when it is a question of the moral goodness of an act, it will depend first and foremost on the goodness of an object.<sup>48</sup>

What value indicates is the idea of moral good properly so-called, of the bonum honestum (good as right). A theory of value means a theory of what is intrinsically good or evil. For Maritain, the notion of right, what is right, is not opposed to the notion of good, but one aspect of it.<sup>49</sup> Thus the bonum honestum is both end and value according to the respective orders: the order of exercise and the order of specification. The distinction Maritain has in mind can be illustrated by the evaluation of actions which could be means to achieve an end. The actions are first to be judged or evaluated in themselves. An action may be purely a means, that is, it has no goodness except referentially. By this is meant that it is morally indifferent or a "pure" means. If this is so, then its goodness would be determined by an end, assuming, of course, that the end is good. But one would think that means have "their own goodness"<sup>50</sup> and thus can be judged prior to being related to an end. If the value is missing in the action, the end cannot confer it. And if the value is there, the end does not confer it. The end justifies the means, in a strict sense, only if the means are "pure" and the end is good in the moral sense of being good.

The distinction between the orders is preparatory to drawing conclusions about the basis of moral obligation. "Moral obligation rests on value."<sup>51</sup> It "depends immediately on value; it is situated in the order of intrinsic formal causality, not in the ultimate end."<sup>52</sup> There are several implications of this statement. Obviously Maritain breaks with the view that obligation is to be found in the order of exercise, that is, in the relations

of means to an end. It is Maritain's intention to establish that from a philosophical viewpoint, obligation is located in the order of specification; it is based on value. The ultimate end has a supreme value and because it does, "I am morally obliged in regard to it."<sup>53</sup> In other words, "the ordination to the ultimate end does not ground moral obligation; it presupposes it."<sup>54</sup>

If moral obligation is to be unconditional, to be a moral imperative, how is it to be stated? Maritain refers to the first principle of practical reason, do good and avoid evil, as the formulation of the moral imperative. What Maritain is doing is to conflate the first principle of practical reason and the basis of obligation, in other words, to combine what has tended to remain distinct in Thomistic ethics.<sup>55</sup> But he would defend this as suitable to a philosophical ethics, while recognizing that Thomistic ethics is essentially theological.

If Maritain's main thesis is that moral obligation is to be found in the order of specification, not in the order of exercise, he nevertheless attempts to show that these two orders are distinct, but not separate. They are joined as two moments. Maritain notes that it does not suffice to remain in the order of specification if moral obligation is to be justified. The order of exercise must be re-introduced once one has understood the role of the object in specifying moral acts. Maritain says that in the case of Antigone, her act of piety appears to her as not only better in itself, as superior value, but also as better for her.<sup>56</sup> The value of the action and her own ultimate end are not opposed; they coincide. Along with the consideration of the end, there is also the concept of happiness. The point is that there is no absolute cleavage between value and end.

They are distinguished according to orders, not as two separate things. A person cannot seek an object without setting in motion a tendency toward his ultimate end, and he cannot tend to his ultimate end without first knowing objects which possess certain degrees of value.

What conclusions follow from the examination of the series which began with Durkheim and ended with Maritain? Clearly Durkheim's exclusive notion of morality, that there is social morality and no other, was rejected. Instead there are two sources of morality, a social origin and a divine origin. However, it is not enough to recognize social morality and a divinely-originated ethics; reason must have its due. Bergson widened the scope of morality; Maritain widened it even further. For Durkheim there is one source, for Bergson there are two, and for Maritain there are three: social, theological and rational.

Still, it would be a mistake to ignore the agreements among these writers. 1. There was an agreement that moral theory ought not to be constituted apart from a knowledge of sociology and anthropology. 2. There was an agreement that the fundamental datum of moral inquiry is the feeling of obligation, a kind of pressure, however different their explanations of that pressure may be. This includes the priority given to the problem of obligation as opposed to the teleological orientation in ethics. 3. Finally, each of these writers agreed that, in the last analysis, the moral question cannot be separated from the religious question. If Durkheim tended to blend the two, and Bergson, in a way contrasted them, if morality means social morality, Maritain wanted to

distinguish a philosophical ethics from a theological ethics, while maintaining that moral philosophy will remain inadequate unless subordinated to theology.

## NOTES

1. Henry Bars, "Sur le rôle de Bergson dans l'itinéraire de Jacques Maritain," Cahier Jacques Maritain, no. 9, April, 1984, pp. 5-31.
2. Raymond Aron, "Réflexions sur la philosophie bergsonienne" (1941), Commentaire, Vol. 8, Nos. 28-29, Raymond Aron: Histoire et Politique (Paris, Julliard, 1985) pp. 351-358.
3. Jacques Maritain, "The Bergsonian Philosophy of Morality and Religion," in Ransoming the Time (New York: Gordian Press, 1972) p. 94.
4. Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York, Harper and Row, 1973) p. 110.
5. Ibid., p. 112.
6. Ibid., pp. 113-115.
7. Raymond Aron, Histoire et dialectique de la violence (Paris: Gallimard, 1973) p. 227.
8. Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1965) p. 26.
9. Emile Durkheim, Les règles de la méthode sociologique. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967) p. 143.
10. Robert Nisbet, The Sociology of Emile Durkheim (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974) p. 190.
11. Anthony Giddens, Durkheim (London: Fontana Press, 1978) p. 64. "The preeminent attribute of morality is its capacity for inspiring in the individual the sense of obligation, of oughtness," Robert Nisbet, op.cit., p. 193.
12. Robert Nisbet, op.cit., p. 188.
13. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1960), p. 423.
14. Simon Deploige, The Conflict Between Ethics and Sociology (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1938) p. 2. Maritain wrote a preface to the third edition of this work in 1923. Oeuvres complètes, Vol. 2, pp. 1282-1284.

15. Anthony Giddens, op.cit., p. 64.
16. Ibid., p. 65.
17. Emile Durkheim, Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Practice of the Sociology of Education (Garden City: Free Press, 1973) pp. 93-94.
18. Jacques Maritain, Integral Humanism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968) p. 174.
19. Raymond Aron, Mémoires (Paris: Julliard, 1983) pp. 69-70.
20. Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1973) p. 505, n. 44. A chapter of the book is devoted to the sociology of morality, pp. 410-434. See also Guy Lafrance, La philosophie sociale de Bergson: Sources et interprétations (Ottawa: University d'Ottawa, 1974) p. 45.
21. Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1956) p. 10.
22. Ibid., p. 92.
23. Ibid., p. 25.
24. Ibid., p. 31.
25. Ibid., p. 33.
26. While Isaac Benrubi, Les sources et les courants de la philosophie contemporaine en France (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1933) Vol. 2, p. 817, maintains there are two notions of obligation, Idella Gallagher, Morality in Evolution: The Moral Philosophy of Henry Bergson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) says Bergson calls "our feeling of being necessitated and at the same time being able to elude the necessitating force" obligation (p. 57).
27. Henri Bergson, op.cit., p. 39.
28. Ibid., p. 50.
29. Ibid., p. 55.
30. Ibid., p. 58.
31. Leszek Kolakowki expresses the usual view in his short study Bergson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) pp. 74-77. The author also shows a strong animus toward Maritain.

32. Henri Bergson, op.cit., p. 64.
33. Ibid., p. 80. 34. &W. p. 84.
35. Ibid., p. 241.
36. Guy Lafrance accuses Bergson of having "badly understood and deformed Kant's thought on this point," op.cit., p. 48.
37. Henri Bergson, op.cit., p.1 270.
38. Madeleine Barthélemy-Madaule, Bergson adversaire de Kant (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966) p. 163.
39. See A. Sertillanges, Avec Bergson (Paris: Gallimard, 1941) pp. 46-47; Frederick Copleston, Bergson on Morality (London: Oxford University Press, 1955) pp. 263-265; and Jean Guittou, Profils parallèles (Paris: Fayard, 1970) p. 447.
40. Jacques Maritain, Ransoming the Time, p. 93.
41. Ibid., p. 94.
42. Jacques Maritain, Moral Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964) p. 430.
43. Ibid., p. 434.
44. Jacques Maritain, Neuf leçons sur les notions premières de la philosophie morale (Paris: Tequi, 1952) p. 14.
45. Jacques Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 432.
46. Jacques Maritain, Neuf leçons, p. 41.
47. Ibid., p. 32.
48. Ibid.
49. Cf. Vernon Bourke, "Aquinas and Recent Theories of Right," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XLVIII, 1974, pp. 187-197.
50. Jacques Maritain, Neuf leçons, p. 80.
51. Ibid., p. 83.

52. Ibid., p. 84.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 85.
55. If Maritain combines the principle of practical reason and the ground of obligation, where others would distinguish them, he distinguishes the order of specification from the order of exercise which some Thomists would combine in dealing with the question of moral obligation.
56. Jacques Maritain, Neuf leçons, p. 95. See the commentary of Henry Bars, Maritain en notre temps (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1959) p. 311.