

NATURE AND ADVENTURE

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Much of moral theory in the North American context, particularly moral theory with social and political concerns, has taken as its foundation a thin theory of the human essence, as opposed to a full-blown theory of human nature. This becomes abundantly clear if these current conceptions are compared to the section de homine in the Summa Theologicae, or with the philosophical anthropologies of Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, and Hume.

These contemporary thin theories recall the theories of Kant, on the one hand, and Bentham, on the other. Thus the following formulations are offered: the human being as "a rational person (rational in the sense of having made optimal use of all available information)"¹; human beings as "rational persons" or "the person as reasonable and rational and autonomous"²; the human being as "a separate person" or "our separate existences"³; "human action or agency" or "human voluntary and purposeful behaviour"⁴; or, finally, human beings as "individual persons".⁵

The purpose of beginning with such rudimentary conceptions would appear to be the establishment of a consensus at the start of ethical inquiry. For if it can be shown that such a bare notion is acceptable and furnishes premises for making deductions, perhaps the plurality of ethical views can be overcome. That means that all of the writers cited seek a minimalist conception that is generally acceptable and can be shown to be a source for developing a far-reaching ethical theory. However, despite the appearance of identical

premises in the theories of say Richard Brandt and John Rawls, there are still basic disagreements when it comes to explicating the significance of being a rational person, and so the recourse of thin theories of the human essence has not succeeded in overcoming the plurality of moral positions, even though there are some areas of agreement that may be explained less by the premises than by a common adherence to the liberal ideology of personal freedom.

Now what is striking in these writers is the refusal to talk about human nature and the contrast made, either explicitly or implicitly, between nature and morality. The tendency is certainly more overt in theories described as Kantian constructivism,⁶ like that of Rawls, but is present as well in theories clearly situated in the utilitarian tradition.

Of course any full-blown theory of human nature is controversial. The richer, the thicker such a conception is, the less likely it is to be generally acceptable as a point of departure. And yet, as was noted before, it cannot be said that the thinner version of the human essence – a formulation I use to indicate that the term human nature is avoided or anathema – has not been able to overcome the traditional dichotomies such as that between Kantian and utilitarian rationality.

Another feature of the contemporary moral rationalists – I use this term for convenience and for want of a better – is the complete disavowal of metaphysics. For instance, even when John Rawls presents his own theory of justice as Kantian constructivism, he refuses to commit himself to Kantian metaphysics.⁷ So the common theme is no metaphysics, if you please, or the defence of the non-metaphysical foundation of moral philosophy.

Now there are a number of points on which Jacques Maritain's moral philosophy is at odds with contemporary moral theory, despite some apparent similarities. Take the following passage from Man and the State:

[...] I am taking for granted that we admit that there is a human nature, and this human nature is the same in all men. I am taking for granted that we also admit that man is a being gifted with intelligence and who, as such, acts with an understanding of what he is doing, and therefore with the power to determine himself the ends which he pursues [...].⁸

If the expression "human nature" is overlooked, the sentiments expressed are akin to those of the moral rationalists. However, if one reads on about human knowledge of the natural law, it is asserted that this knowledge "has been progressively shaped and molded by the inclinations of human nature, starting from the most basic ones [...] those genuine inclinations which are rooted in man's being as vitally permeated with the preconscious life of the mind, and which either developed or were released as the movement of mankind went on."⁹ Here we are reminded of Maritain's attempt to retrieve the truths of Freudian psychology, on the one hand, and his remarkable account of "the preconscious life of the intellect" in Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, on the other.¹⁰ The vision is one that encompasses both a theoretical psychology and a practical or moral psychology,¹¹ that encompasses human rationality and human affectivity as well.

Secondly, while Maritain would agree of course that moral philosophy is a normative kind of inquiry, he contrasts the normative-deductive paradigm of moral theory articulated

by Kant with his own conception of ethics as normative-experiential.¹² It does not simply rely on the limited moral experiences of individuals or contemporary groups, but delves into the information provided for us by sociologists and anthropologists, thus establishing a link with social science research. It will also take into account historical knowledge, a factor which I shall consider later.

Thirdly, far from abjuring metaphysics, Maritain argues, in a phrase that recalls a book by Max Scheler, that the ethics he has in mind is based "on a view of man's situation in the world."¹³ The cosmic ethics he proposes would be related to the philosophy of nature and to metaphysics, a point made clear when Maritain speaks of the "ontological structure" of human beings. It is noteworthy that Maritain views positively the contributions of John Dewey and Henri Bergson to moral philosophy, primarily because of their cosmological perspective.¹⁴ He may indeed believe that Dewey's approach is empirical rather than ontological, that is, scientific rather than metaphysical. Nevertheless the cosmic perspective and the treatise in social psychology, Human Nature and Conduct, indicate that the human situation in the world was not ignored. Nor despite the early and persistent criticism of Bergsonian philosophy, does this distract from his admiration of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.¹⁵

Now, in the matter of the theoretical foundations of ethics, be it the philosophy of nature or metaphysics, Maritain would seem to part company with the Aristotelian school. For it sharply distinguishes between theoretical and practical philosophy to the extent of stressing the independence of ethical and political inquiry.¹⁶ Perhaps Maritain might respond that the praise of the contemplative life of the philosopher as a super-human

existence to be earnestly pursued, in Nicomachean Ethics X, only makes sense in conjunction with the theological conclusions of Aristotle's first philosophy.

Thus Maritain's position is to recognize the appropriate method of ethical inquiry while maintaining the need for a metaphysical grounding of ethics.¹⁷ Thus a complete disjunction between theoretical and practical philosophy is unacceptable to him.

Fourthly, the ahistorical character of the theories of contemporary moral rationalists is undeniable. In this they all have an air of the eighteenth century about them, that period that saw the culmination of modern natural law theory. There is still something appropriate about the ironical comment made at the time: "Every fair and every war brings forth a new natural law."¹⁸ For an impressive expression of contemporary moral rationalism, in the ahistorical mode, there is perhaps no better instance than Alan Gewirth's Reason and Morality, in which a deductive system is elaborated with considerable ingenuity.¹⁹

Since human experience, both that of the species and that of the individual, extends over time, this means that a system of natural ethics cannot ignore the historical dimension. It cannot abstract from it as the rationalist theories attempt to do. Historical data (foreign to the normative-deductive theories) enter into the constitution of Maritain's ethics. How such a historical perspective is to be integrated in ethics is the central issue of this paper.

In the process of contrasting necessary physical laws and particular events, in a chapter of The Degrees of Knowledge devoted to philosophy and experimental science, Maritain says

Existing reality is therefore composed of nature and adventure. That is why it has direction in time and by its duration constitutes an (irreversible) history -- these two elements are demanded for history.²⁰

What is the case for the physical world will also be the case for the moral or ethical world.

In somewhat different terms, the issue turns on the distinction between necessity and contingency.²¹ Spinoza's philosophy represents the denial of contingency in the name of the affirmation of nature. Existential philosophy, particularly in its Sartrean expression, is the denial of necessity and the affirmation of contingency. But how can philosophy that makes so much of both essence and existence fail to encompass both necessity and contingency?

As Martain became increasingly concerned with the development of an adequate moral philosophy, and the philosophy of history, he raised the issue of the connection between nature and history. His position can be seen as moving between two extreme positions. On the one hand, historicism, particularly German historicism, denies that nature as such can be a foundation for understanding the human being, or can provide the norms of action. Thus, Ortega y Gasset, expressing the core of German historicism, will say:

Man has no nature; what he has is history; because history is the mode of being of the entity that is constitutionally, fundamentally, mobility and change.²²

On the other hand, Leo Strauss, reacting against historicism, proposed a conception of nature and natural right that resolutely opposes the notion of progress and maintains

that for an understanding of human nature, we must return to classical political philosophy. This theory seems to deny the notion of moral progress in any sense.

Although historicism is of German origin, a product of German Romanticism, it has spread over much of the western world to pervade both philosophy and the social sciences. If the Kantian turn in moral philosophy rested on the opposition between nature and freedom, the Hegelian moment consisted in recounting the realization of freedom in time as the counterpart of the odyssey of consciousness. The one process led to the actualization of freedom in the modern state; the other process led to the advent of absolute knowledge. Later the neo-Kantians, notably Wilhelm Dilthey, inaugurated a critique of historical reason in the Kantian spirit. The end result of the German idea of history²³ has been "the replacement of nature by history as the key to understanding man."²⁴ Ortega y Gasset, in the text cited, simply reflects the influence of Dilthey's historicism.

Does philosophy, in a sense, find itself back at the stage of Heraclitus, of Cratylus, and the Platonic rejection of natural science? Does philosophy await a new Aristotle to argue for the intelligibility of nature against the irrational consequences of the philosophy of becoming? Or has it already found him?

There are two parts to the message of historicism. The first concerns the limitation of human knowledge; the second concerns the relativity of human values. As to knowledge, historicism asserts that "human understanding is always a captive" of its historical situation,²⁵ that knowledge "expresses a perspective on the world, a context which cannot be transcended."²⁶ Thus it denies the notion of eternal verities. As to values, it asserts

their temporal relativity. "No moral judgment [...] is universally valid, and [...] all norms of conduct are essentially relative to time and to the diversity of the moments of history."²⁷ The question, then, is whether historicism, having asserted the relativity of all values, inevitably leads to nihilism, the absence of all values and despair in the face of our dreadful freedom. In this way historicism is identified with existentialism.²⁸

Now the triumph of historicism did not go unchallenged. A number of contemporary German scholars fought against historicism and countered it by some form of naturalism, that is, the belief that nature is a locus of moral values.²⁹ Among the most trenchant critics of historicism and the attempt to answer it by a theory of natural right is surely that of the late Leo Strauss. And I suppose if Strauss is the Socrates of the return to classical natural right, Allan Bloom is the Plato.

Now many, including Maritain I think, believed that when Leo Strauss defended the conception of natural right, he was in fact an advocate of the natural law tradition. That appeared to be a plausible conclusion of his most important work, Natural Right and History.³⁰ However, this identification or confusion has been questioned in a recent study of Strauss's political theory, a study both complete and controversial. The alleged difference between Straussian natural right and Thomistic natural law may be illustrated by the importance of the conception of synderesis, the habitus of the first principles of natural ethics for Thomas Aquinas and Strauss's contention that this conception reveals a deviation from Aristotelian ethics.³¹ Rather than arguing for a natural law theory, Strauss steadfastly adheres to ancient political philosophy, and rather than Christian and medieval

thought being a continuation of ancient political wisdom, as the proponents of a perennial philosophy would have it, it is, on the contrary, a break with it.

Now, if Strauss's natural right must be clearly distinguished from natural law theory, what are its salient features? First of all, the notion of living according to nature is not taken in a narrow Stoic sense, but in a broad sense expressing a consensus among the diverse schools of ancient philosophy. It is characteristic for Strauss to stress similarities between Plato and Aristotle rather than differences.³² In fact, he proposes a kind of Platonic-Aristotelian political philosophy. Secondly, according to nature the philosophic life of contemplation is higher than the practical life of action. Thirdly, although the philosopher should rule, that is not feasible. However, the philosopher should rule indirectly or secretly.³³ Also since the philosophic life is the highest kind of life, there is a sense in which the end of politics is philosophy.

In Strauss's naturalistic perspective, there is no being higher than the human being and there is no natural law if that means an objective system of moral values. Though there is no foundation for religion or eternal moral truth (and the two are thought to go together) it is important that the non-philosophers should accept religion and the idea of an objective morality. To this end, the philosopher must perpetuate salutary myths, Plato's noble lies. If this is an accurate account of Strauss's theory of natural right, it is obvious to what extent it is at variance with the Thomistic tradition of natural law.

Now not only does Strauss want to return to ancient natural right, and proposes such a return as a solution to the impasse in which modern political philosophy has left us, but it would appear that there is little that is new in modern political philosophy, little that

was not known by the wise ancients. It is as if he had endorsed Hume's dictum: "New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters."³⁴ Modern philosophers, like Locke, for instance, are praised when they have managed to recapture the truth of the ancients.³⁵ Modern philosophers, like Machiavelli for sure, are criticized when they reveal those dangerous truths about the lack of foundation for religion and morality and thus become "teachers of evil." He is among the foolish moderns who bring philosophy to the masses who are unfit for it.³⁶ It is Shadia Drury's contention that the real dividing line for Strauss is not so much between ancient political philosophy and modern political philosophy, but between ancient political philosophy and Christianity. The wise ancients are contrasted with the submissive believers, Athens is contrasted with Jerusalem, and free insight with obedience.³⁷

In effect, the Straussian philosopher, according to Drury's interpretation, is beyond good and evil; the philosophic life transcends the moral life in every sense. It is above and beyond it.

By denying any validity to historicism and maintaining that time is irrelevant to truth, Strauss also rejects any concept of progress, and, a fortiori, any progress in our knowledge of natural right. This is evident in comments made in a review of Yves Simon's Philosophy of Democratic Government. Simon had spoken not only of a change of social conscience, but an improvement of it. Strauss responds:

I confess a great reluctance to believe that our conscience has improved on any important subject [...] He does not show, that is, whether what he regards as an improvement of our

conscience is not the inevitable consequence of the application of an unchanged conscience to a situation, or an opportunity, created by modern technology.³⁸

This passage reveals also the extent to which Strauss believes that control over nature has replaced conformity to nature. It would involve a complete misunderstanding of his political theory to think that he would consider an increasing control over nature as necessarily human progress.

To call Mariátegui's answer to these two opposing currents, historicism, on one hand, and ancient naturalism, on the other, a synthesis would be to falsify his own approach to the problem of natural law theory. It is rather the result of applying essence-existence metaphysics to moral theory. For human nature or the human essence exists in time, yet it is not pure historicity. Human beings have both a nature and a history.

In his treatment of natural law theory, Mariátegui distinguishes between natural law as it is in itself (the ontological aspect) and natural law as it is known to us (the gnosiological aspect).³⁹ Defined philosophically, natural law is "the normality of [human] functioning."⁴⁰ In what manner do we acquire knowledge of the natural norms? It is at this point that Mariátegui takes issue with many accounts of Thomistic natural law theory and, one must note, in so doing, he has not been particularly successful in persuading others to accept his own interpretation as authentically Thomistic. He defends the thesis that the natural knowledge of natural law is not through the operation of deductive reason, or rational knowledge, "but knowledge through inclination."⁴¹ And not only is this the natural knowledge of natural law, but it also seems to be one of the reasons why our knowledge of

natural law is progressive. Maritain takes the case of Abraham who was no doubt a holy man, though he was not aware, as we are, that certain actions are wrong. There is a fine line between using finesse and telling a lie. Abraham did not seem to be concerned with the question.⁴² Or the historical rejection of polygamy, once a widespread practice, indicates a change of moral consciousness. In Maritain's view "that progress of moral conscience is indeed the most unquestionable instance of progress in humanity."⁴³ Unquestionable, perhaps, unless you are Leo Strauss or one of his faithful followers.

Let us examine some instances of this progress in moral conscience and the explanations for them, for Maritain clearly suggests that knowledge through inclination is not the sole reason for the progress. One illustration both addresses the claims of ancient Greek (and Straussian) philosophy and attempts to refute them. What is more characteristic of this philosophy than the assertion that the "life according to the intellect is better than a merely human life," the life of action.⁴⁴ However, that claim entails a practical error for "it meant that mankind lives for the sake of a few intellectuals," and "the high truth of the superiority of contemplative life was bound up with the contempt of work and the plague of slavery."⁴⁵ However, Christianity has taught us that love is better than intellect, that the contemplation of the philosophers is not to be compared with the contemplation of the saints.⁴⁶ Furthermore Christianity proclaimed the dignity of labour. Thus the progress of moral conscience has an additional explanation, the influence of Christianity. Human beings do not have to rely solely on their powers to comprehend the natural law. They are aided by the message of the Gospel. In fact, Maritain says, "only when the Gospel has penetrated to the very depth of the human substance will natural law

appear in its flower and perfection."⁴⁷ It is notable that most of the instances he gives of the growth of moral conscience have been brought about through the influence of the Christian message, whether it be the development of political democracy or the concept of natural rights. In short, Maritain's argument for the progress of moral conscience is more firmly grounded in evangelical influence than in the account of the natural knowledge of natural law. If one rejects this influence, as Strauss does, what is left of the theory of the progress of moral conscience?

Maritain believed that the philosophy of history really constituted a part of moral philosophy. His essay on the philosophy of history shows the strong influence of French sociology with its search for laws of social behaviour. Maritain even believed that he himself had contributed such a law.⁴⁸ There are two of these laws that merit our attention. The first is a law of "the prise de conscience," the law of progressive self-consciousness.⁴⁹ I am inclined to think that the best illustration of this law would be progressive developments in philosophy. Maritain always believed that a philosophy of Thomist inspiration should attempt to assimilate the truths that were contained in other philosophies, shorn, however, of the errors with which they might be encased. In this, too, he is close to Bergson who thought to distinguish true insight from faculty conceptualization in the history of philosophy. The pertinent illustration is the awareness of the theory of knowledge as a branch of philosophical discourse in the modern period.

There is another law, parallel to this one, that has already been discussed, "the law of the progress of moral conscience."⁵⁰ Now Maritain clearly wants to distinguish between these two laws, for the first refers to conceptual knowledge and the second refers to

natural knowledge, knowledge through inclination. Yet that does not explain why the first is called a functional law and the second is called a vectorial law. Why are not the two both vectorial laws? The question remains unanswered, though it shows that Maritain do not want to confuse two ways in which human self-consciousness is achieved.

Among the ways in which moral conscience has progressed, in addition to the previous examples, one finds changes in the way prisoners of war are viewed, the perceive wickedness of child labour, the recognition of basic human equality, and moral concern for the respect of the person. After offering such historical modifications of moral conscience, Maritain quickly points out that the progress of the moral conscience must not be confused with a progress in human moral behaviour. In a philosophy of progress like that of Condorcet, moral enlightenment would necessarily be equated with moral goodness. "Condorcet doesn't separate intellectual progress from moral progress. Moreover, along with his whole period, he believes that they are inseparable, and that intellectual progress implies and conditions moral progress."⁵¹ Since moral knowledge alone does not suffice for moral goodness Maritain's position is not to be confused with the philosophy of progress. For nothing is said about the problem of regression or setbacks in moral conscience. It is as if the acquisitions of moral conscience cannot be lost, cannot be forgotten, cannot be repudiated. And that gives one pause. A little over a century ago the noted liberal political philosopher T. H. Green observed that in the ancient world, defective children were exposed, "a practice in strong contrast with the principle of modern law that even a child in the womb has a right to live."⁵² And he goes on to say "we treat life as sacred event in the human embryo."⁵³ Then one turns to an American political philosopher of some

prominence, Richard Flathman, who provides an argument for abortion on demand based on what he calls the liberal principle.⁵⁴ If the principal difference between Green's position and what of Flathman is that Green was still influenced by Christian notions of human life, and Flathman is not, it focuses attention once again on the influence of Christianity on the progress of moral consciousness. Eliminate that influence and that progress becomes problematic. Leo Strauss, having apparently rejected Judaism and not accepted Christianity, does not believe in any law of the progress of moral conscience. It may be hard to avoid the conclusion that it is the Judeo-Christian tradition itself that is the main, if not the sole cause, of any progress of the moral conscience. For Maritain's other explanation of this progress has been his account of the natural knowledge of the natural law and to say that it has not gained acceptance among Thomists would be an understatement.⁵⁵ Of course, he might fall back on the more general law of prise de conscience, but what would not furnish an explanation of how ordinary people, as opposed to philosophers, acquire a moral consciousness. That there has been a progress of moral conscience seems undeniable. It is the explanation of that fact that is elusive.

1. Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. v.
2. John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures, 1980", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXVI, No. 9, September 1980, pp. 535-536.
3. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) p. 33. See also Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard, 1981 p. 107).
4. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1978), p. x and p. 22.
5. Richard Flathman, Toward a Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) p. 6.
6. John Rawls, op.cit., pp. 515-572.
7. Ibid., p. 566.
8. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Pres 1951) pp. 85-86.
9. Ibid., p. 92.
10. Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (Princeton: University Press, 1953), p. 71-100.
11. By theoretical psychology, I mean the approach followed by Aristotle in the treatise On the Soul. By practical or moral psychology, I mean the approach followed to Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric.

12. Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to the Basic Problems of Moral Philosophy (Albany: Magi Books, 1990), p. 4. I have altered the translation of Neuf leçons sur les notions premières de la philosophie morale (Paris: Tequi, 1951) since "experiential" seems more appropriate than "empirical".
13. Ibid., p. 1. See Max Scheler, Man's Place in Nature (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961). This is the translation of Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos.
14. Ibid. pp. 6-7 and p. 19. For the complete treatment of the ethical thought of Dewey and Bergson, see Chapter 14 of Maritain's Moral Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964) pp. 396-447.
15. Maritain has positive remarks about Bergson in Moral Philosophy and in an earlier essay, "The Bergsonian Philosophy of Morality and Religion," in Ransoming the Time (New York: Gordian Press, 1972) pp. 84-112.
16. "Aristotle's view that practical science cannot or should not depend directly on theoretical science." Carnes Lord. Aristotle. The Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984) p. 18. "the Aristotelian distinction between theoretical and practical sciences implies that human action has principles of its own which are known independently of theoretical science (physics and metaphysics) and therefore that the practical sciences do not depend on the theoretical sciences or are not derivative from them." Leo Strauss, "Epilogue" in Hilaire Gildin (ed.) Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo Strauss (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), p. 103. On the other hand, Joachim Ritter says that "the ethics and politics of Aristotle are unthinkable without the connection to physics and metaphysics, in which the basic

- concepts of form, substance, act, potency, final cause, and so forth are developed." Cited in Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) p. 201.
17. Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to the Basic Problems of Moral Philosophy, p. 9, p. 27.
 18. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, p. 83.
 19. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality. In a review of the work in Ethics, 89 (1979), pp. 401-414, Henry Veatch called it "an incomparable philosophical performance" (p. 401), but concluded that Gewirth has not succeeded in his aim (p. 414). In the discussion following the presentation of this paper, Leslie Armour objected to my characterization of Gewirth's philosophy. He stressed its metaphysical foundations and its similarity to an Aristotelian conception of human nature. These are clearly rectifications of my interpretation. There seems to be no disagreement concerning the a historical mode of thinking.
 20. Jacques Maritain, Distinguish to Unite: Or. The Degrees of Knowledge (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959) p. 26.
 21. Maritain deals with the relations of necessity and contingency in Raison et raisons (Paris: Eglloff, 1947) pp. 45-66.
 22. Jose Ortega y Gasset, Historical Reason (New York: W.W. Norton and Company 1984) p. 118. Of Dilthey, Ortega says "the writer to whom we owe more than to any one else concerning the idea of life, and who is, to my mind, the most important thinker of the second half of the nineteenth century" (p. 312).

23. The best historical account I have found of this current is Georg Iggers, The German Conception of History: The National of Historical Thought from Herder to the Present (Middletown, Ct.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968).
24. Hilail Glidin (ed.), op. cit., p. X.
25. Robert D'Amico, Historicism and Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 1989) p. x.
26. Ibid., p. xi.
27. Jacques Maritain, Moral Philosophy, p. 264.
28. Leo Strauss, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Political Philosophy," in Thomas L. Pangle (ed.), Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983) p. 30.
29. Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss are identified with this position by Georg Iggers who himself contends that "there is a common human nature and that from this common human nature there derives at least a minimal ethics applicable to all men" op. cit., p. 276.
30. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953). See especially Chapter 4 on classic natural right, pp. 120-164.
31. Ibid., p. 157-158.
32. Victor Gourevitch, "Philosophy and Politics I," in The Review of Metaphysics, September, 1968, Vol. XXI, No. 1, p. The author questions the idea that classical political thought "spoke with a clear single voice" (p. 61). Like Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, Strauss maintains throughout his works that the truth about nature, at least human nature, is to be found in the beginning of western philosophical

- thought. But it is not the disclosure of truth by the Pre-Socratics, as Heidegger would have it, nor the revelation of the meaning of politics in Homer's *Iliad*, as Heidegger's pupil Hannah Arendt would insist. It is the great tradition of mature Greek philosophy, the common teachings of Plato and Aristotle, of the Stoics and Epicureans.
33. Shadia Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988) p. 34.
 34. David Hume, "Of the Original Contract," in Frederick Watkins (ed.) Hume: Theory of Politics (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1951) p. 214.
 35. Shadia Drury, op. cit., p. 44.
 36. Ibid., p. 55-56, "A wise man ought not to say publicly that there is no God and no unchanging moral law." (p. 56).
 37. Ibid., p. 39, p. 40, p. 45.
 38. Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959) pp. 309-310.
 39. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, pp. 85-94.
 40. Ibid., p. 86.
 41. Ibid., p. 91.
 42. Jacques Maritain, On the Philosophy of History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1957) pp. 105-106.
 43. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, p. 94.

44. Jacques Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics (Garden City: Doubleday and Sons, 1960) p. 165.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, p. 90.
48. Jacques Maritain, Ransoming the Time, pp. 227-239. It is also mentioned in On the Philosophy of History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957) p. 97.
49. Jacques Maritain, On the Philosophy of History, p. 69.
50. Ibid., pp. 104-105.
51. Alexandre Koyré, Études d'histoire de la pensée philosophique (Paris: Gallimard, 1971) p. 114.
52. Thomas Hill Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans Gren, 1963, p. 157).
53. Ibid., p. 158.
54. Richard Flathman, op. cit., p. 205. The liberal principle states that "it is a *prima facie* good for persons to form, to act on, and satisfy and achieve desires and interests, objectives and purposes," p. 6.
55. Either by explicit rejection or by silence, the following writings indicated that Maritain was not successful in imposing his interpretation of Aquinas's teaching.

Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason," in Anthony Kenney (ed) Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City: Doubleday and Sons, 1969)

pp. 340-380. Paul E. Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop Publishers, 1970) p. 190. Michael Bertram Crowe, The Changing Profile of the Natural Law, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977) p. 259. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). Richard J. Regan S. J., The Moral Dimensions of Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) pp. 23-27.