

DAMASCENE, AQUINAS, AND MARITAIN ON THE HUMAN PERSON

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Introduction

Maritain was deeply committed to Truth in all its domains: in the speculative realm of metaphysics and in the practical realm of politics. In both of these realms, the idea of the human person brooks large in his thought. He took up the difficult concept of the human subject or subsistence in his most important speculative work--*The Degrees of Knowledge*¹—and his defense of a political “personalism” against modern “individualism” was perhaps the hallmark of his reflections in the realm of praxis.²

In looking at his doctrine on these matters, I am going to defend a dual thesis: that he is mistaken in his speculative views, but correct in his practical ones. I am going to argue that he is misled by Cajetan’s doctrine on subsistence; whereas Aquinas’s view, and the simple truth of the matter, has ever been nearer to that of Capreolus. On the other hand, I am going to defend his personalism, even though I believe its accent is other than that of Aquinas himself. I think Maritain is closer to the truth and to the teaching of the Church, which has developed since Aquinas’s day.

1. Aristotle and Damascene

Let me turn directly to the speculative issue.

The entire Thomistic tradition teaches that there is some distinction between a particular human being and a human person. The only question is in what that difference consists.

¹ See Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge* (New York: Scribners, 1959), Appendix 4, 430-444.

² See, in particular, *Scholasticism and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1940), chapter 3: “The Human Person and Society,” 45-70, and *The Rights of Man and Natural Law* (New York: Scribners, 1943).

There is likewise agreement that this fine philosophical point is brought to the surface by virtue of a truth of Catholic faith: namely, that Jesus of Nazareth is a particular human being, yet not a human person. There must, then, be some difference between these.

The Christological controversies of the early Church faced this matter directly, especially in the 5th Ecumenical Council, in 553. Damascene passes on to Aquinas the fruit of this controversy, and he follows Damascene closely. We need to begin, then, by looking at the views of Nestorians, Monophysites, and Chalcedonians.

These, however, make use of an Aristotelian account of 900 years earlier. So we must first repair to it, specifically to his discussion of “substance” in the *Categories*.

There, Aristotle discusses the idea of “primary” or “individual” substance. It differs from “substance” in two ways: it denotes the ultimate subject of predication, underlying all characteristics, and it includes accidental characteristics in its idea. “Socrates” is the proper subject of all predication: we say “Socrates is a man,” not “man is a Socrates.” And “Socrates” is a subject possessed of individual characteristics—son of Sophronicus, pug-nosed, etc.—whereas “man” designates the essence he shares with all other human beings, i.e. being a rational mortal animal.³

Aristotle also goes on to place the individual parts of a subject—head, heart, etc.—in the category of substance. Yet, unlike the individual substance, these exist in it, as in a whole, and cannot exist apart from it. These are not properly individual substances, then, because they are not the subject of predication, but exist in the individual properly speaking, and can be predicated of him. We do not say “the hand’s Socrates,” but rather “Socrates’s hand.”⁴

In the Christological controversies, the Nestorians sought to safeguard the true humanity of Jesus. He possessed a particular human nature—born of Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate—and not just “human nature.” The Monophysites equally sought to safeguard the unity of His person: in Him there were not two subjects engaged in “parallel-play,” as it were, but one subject, of all His actions

³ John Damascene will later summarize this doctrine of the individual substance, or person, in the following words: “Persons do not differ one from another in substance, but rather in the accidents, which are their characteristic properties, characteristic, however, of the person and not of the nature. And this is because the person is defined as a substance plus accidents. *Thus, the person has that which is common plus that which is individuating, and, besides this, existence in itself.* (On the Orthodox Faith, [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1958], Book Three, Chapter 6, 279.)

⁴ For Aristotle’s discussion of individual substance and “secondary substance,” see the *Categories*, chapter 5; for his discussion of individual parts as belonging to substance, as a part in a larger whole, see chapter 5, 3a: 28-31, and chapter 7, 8a: 25-33, and 8b: 15-24.

and passions. Each emphasized one aspect of Aristotle's idea of an individual: either its individual accidents or its being an underlying subject.

Yet, while on opposite ends of the debate, they shared one point in common: they assumed that any nature possessing individual accidents must be the underlying subject of predication. The Nestorians affirmed this nature, and thus asserted there were two subjects in Christ: human and divine. And the Monophysites supposed that anyone positing a nature with individual accidents must also be asserting a human subject. Since they denied there were two subjects, they felt compelled to deny such a nature as well.

It is not surprising that both thought this way. After all, other human individuals are both the underlying subjects of their acts, and possessed of individual accidents! We ever encounter this subject, possessed of these individual characteristics.

The Chalcedonians, however, were sure that we must assert Christ's specific human accidents, while denying that a man was the ultimate subject of His acts and passions. To articulate their own position, they used the other Aristotelian distinction: between an individual in the proper sense of the word, and as a part in a whole. Properly speaking, there was only one individual in Christ: one person meant one individual, in the proper sense. Yet, the Word does assume a specific human being—Jesus of Nazareth, not just “human nature”—as the Nestorians had insisted upon. But this is not to be a person or an individual in the proper sense of the word, but only in an analogous sense. For the individual human nature of Christ does not exist as the ultimate subject, but ever exists in the Divine Word.⁵

The Chalcedonian position, then, was that the human being Jesus of Nazareth is the human heart and mind of God. Just as our individual heart and mind are unique to each of us, and yet exist as ours, not on their own but as part of us, so the particular human being Jesus is the unique enfleshment of God, yet ever exists as the particular humanity of the Word, and not on his own.

Note that, while asserting a *via media* between Nestorians and Monophysites, the Chalcedonian position is closer to the latter. For it agrees with them that there is only one underlying subject in Christ. Since Jesus's individual humanity exists in the Word, and not as the ultimate subject of all predication, he is not a human person or individual in the proper sense of that term. Chalcedonians differ from Monophysites only in holding that to deny that Christ is a human subject does not require the denial of his individual human nature: this exists as a part in a larger whole.

⁵ For a better sense of the complicated history behind these debates and ideas, see Leo Davis, S.J.'s *The First Seven Ecumenical Councils* (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1987).

Damascene has a perfect grasp of all this and he passes on the key ideas to Aquinas. For Damascene, the Word assumes the individual human nature of Jesus; yet, he ever exists in the Word and not as a human individual. Here is a distinctive passage:

When God the Word became Incarnate, He did not assume His human nature as taken in a purely theoretical sense—for that would have been no real incarnation, but a fraudulent and fictitious one. Nor did He assume it as taken specifically, because He did not assume all persons. But He did assume it as taken individually....For He assumed the first-fruits of our clay not as self-subsistent and having been an individual previously and as such taken on by Him, but as having its subsistence IN His Person (OF, III, 11, 289-90).

Thus—as is commonly held—the idea of “en-hypostasis” that comes to the fore in the 5th Council simply explicates the position affirmed by Chalcedon.

2. Aquinas

In turning to Aquinas, we can really be much more brief. For the simple fact is that he merely passes on the earlier achievement: both in concept and in word. That is to say, *for Aquinas, Christ is no more a human individual than He is a human person*. His definition of a human person always follows Boethius: an individual of a rational nature. Since Christ is not a human person, neither is He a human individual. Over and over, Aquinas makes this point. The human individuality of Christ exists only in the *analogous* sense of an individual part within a larger whole.

Let us begin with two texts that apply the distinction between the proper and analogous notion of individual to the case of Christ:

The individual substance which is included in the definition of a person means a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else. Otherwise, a man’s hand might be called a person, since it is a kind of individual substance; nevertheless, because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a person; nor FOR THE SAME REASON can the human nature in Christ [be called a person] although it may be called something individual and singular (III, 16, 12, ad 2).⁶

This is from the *Tertia Pars*. So is the following:

We must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself (“per se existit”), and not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, namely in the whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a person being defined as an individual substance, for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human

⁶ All translations from the *Summa Theologiae* are taken from the original Dominican translation, adopted by Benzinger, as this appears in the *Great Books* series (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952).

nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately (“non per se separatim existit”), but in something more perfect, namely in the Person of the Word (III, 2, ad 3).

The doctrine is identical to Damascene, in each instance.

From what we have already seen another point is quite clear, and is expressly made by Thomas himself: Jesus is not a human person, for there is an additional reality that is true of him as of no other human being: he exists in a higher reality, the Person of the Word (see III, 2, ad 2). Because of this marvelous (indeed miraculous) union, Jesus is not a human person, although *he otherwise would be*:

Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of the human nature but through the addition of something which is above human nature, namely the union with a Divine Person (III, 4, 2, ad 2). Absorption [in the Word] does not here imply the destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hindering of what might otherwise have been. For *if* the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person, the human nature *would have had its own personality*; and in this way it is said, although improperly, that the Person absorbed the person, because the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature from having its own personality (III, 4, 2, ad 3).

This is just what we would expect Thomas to say. Jesus possesses a perfect human nature, lacking nothing necessary to be a human person; had that nature not existed *in* the Word, he would have been a human person. We find the same doctrine in *Quodlibet Question #9* (2, 2).

Thus, while it true for us as for the angels (see *Quodlibet Question 2, 2, 2*) that “person” adds to “nature” both individual accidents and existing per se, it is the latter that is the *key* difference. For the humanity of Christ can possess human accidents without being a human person, but it cannot exist per se without being a human person. (And the same would hold in the case were God chose to assume an angelic nature, which Thomas regarded as possible, albeit unfitting; see III, 4, 1, ad 3.) Furthermore, theological considerations aside, actions follow being, so the radical basis of the person lies in its existence, in its being the subject of existential being, of its existing per se.

3. The Commentators and Maritain

This is, of course, just what Capreolus and all Thomists up to and including Cajetan in his earlier writings held.⁷ Capreolus did not hold that *esse* itself was the specific difference of a human person, as though the latter were some tertium quid made up of nature and *esse*; this is ruled out by the real difference between essence and existence: they pertain to two different orders of being and cannot be “combined” to make a species. Rather, he held that a person was the first

⁷ I confess to being no scholar on these matters, and am relying on the magisterial monograph by Francisco Muniz, O.P.: “El constitutivo formal de la persona creada en la tradicion tomista,” *La Ciencia Tomista* (1945, #212-213, 5-89, and 1946, #219, 201-93).

subject of *esse*, that which existed primarily and per se, that which “stood under” *esse*.

Thus, Capreolus held that there is no intrinsic difference between an individual nature and a person; there was only an extrinsic difference, in that “person” referred to the individual nature as standing under or having *esse*, whereas “individual nature” did not.

I believe Thomas would say that “individual nature” need not refer to existing per se, since it can be used in the *analogous* sense of a part in a larger whole; whereas “person” always refers to existing per se. For Aquinas, there is a real difference *only* between person and the *analogous* use of “individual”; whereas there is NO real difference—intrinsic or extrinsic—between person and individual, taking the latter in the proper sense. (See III, 2, 2.) If we but attend to the Patristic source of Aquinas’s thought, in Damascene, we cannot help but see that Capreolus was interpreting him in at least “the right spirit.”

Cajetan, on the other hand, insists that there *is* a real intrinsic difference between individual and person. Not merely that the latter denotes a relation to *esse*, as to an extrinsic principle, but that it possesses an intrinsic perfection that is missing to the former: a principle that terminates the individual nature and renders it apt to exist in itself, and not in another. For Cajetan, this mode of being was missing to Christ’s human nature, and thus it could be assumed by the Word; whereas, had it possessed this, it could not have been assumed.

Now I am not going to enter into a lengthy discussion of the possible merits of this view.⁸ I am simply going to note this: it is opposed to what Thomas teaches, and even to his express words. Christ lacks nothing on the side of nature, according to Thomas, to be a human person. That nature would have been a human person, had it not been assumed by the Word. Cajetan’s position flatly contradicts this expressly stated view of Thomas.

Whenever Maritain begins “refining” the simple ideas of Aquinas, I confess I grow uneasy. I always find little light is shed, and instead I am immersed in distinctions without clear difference and a kind of “baroque” Thomism that is hard to reconnect to Thomas’s simpler ideas. Maritain’s diverse views on the supposit are a case in point. Here, as in other places, he follows the Dominican commentators, under the lead of Garrigou-Lagrange. Unfortunately, in my

⁸ At least this much might be said on Cajetan’s behalf. In being willing to concede that there is *some* difference between an individual nature and a person, Capreolus *appears* to approach the view that there were two hypostases, but only one person, in Christ. Perhaps Cajetan was sensitive to Capreolus’s view not quite according with Thomas’s words. On the other hand, Cajetan’s view *appears* all too close to Scotus’s idea of *haecceity* (although this is obviously against his intention!) This whole debate indicates how crucial and difficult is the interrelation between Thomas’s doctrines of individuation and *esse*: a matter made difficult precisely by Thomas’s assuming an Aristotelian position into his own thought on the real difference between essence and existence.

estimation, he follows the wrong Dominican commentators. Cajetan's authority was quite strong in the earlier part of the century among Dominicans. Yet, here (as, in my opinion, in many other places) he does not serve us well. His view (in origin that of Giles of Rome, as Muniz makes clear in his articles) leads us—and Maritain—away from Thomas's true position.

Perhaps someone will be able to enlighten me on the need for the distinction urged by the Cajetanian tradition Maritain follows. I await enlightenment. For myself, at present I must confess to not seeing the need for the complex distinctions he attempts. With Boethius, Thomas, and the main medieval tradition, it seems to me that a human person *is* an individual of a rational mortal nature; with Capreolus...and Damascene, and Aquinas..."person" simply signifies that individual nature as existing primarily and *per se*.

I trust it is clear that, in this way of viewing the matter, "individual substance," "hypostasis," or "supposit" is an analogous term, as analogous as substance or "being" itself. An individual poppy differs significantly from an individual lump of gold, as life differs from non-life. Similarly, the individual mammal possesses the qualified interiority of sensible existence absent the individual flower. The difference is even greater when we move from the "brute" to ourselves and the immaterial sphere, and infinitely greater when we move from the created to the Uncreated. Yet, even though analogical terms are a kind of equivocation, they are not entirely so.

Again, in this tradition, the word "person" is reserved precisely for individual substances of an intellectual nature, of immaterial beings possessed of mind and free will. Such usage designates the great dignity of such beings, each destined to exist forever and possessed of a unique interiority. Here, too, the term remains analogous, since some persons are by nature embodied (us) and others not (the angels); while, with the Divine Persons, the real distinction between nature and individual that marks creatures ceases altogether: there is no real difference between each Person of the Divine Trinity and the Divine Essence, but only between the Divine Persons in relation to each other. Yet, despite the differences attendant upon the diverse degrees of being, it remains true that to speak of an individual person—whether human, angelic, or divine—is to speak of an individual intellectual substance. There is no real difference between these ideas. The only individuals that are not persons are ones that do not transcend matter. It is thus simply an error to attempt to distinguish a human individual from a human person; they are identical.

4. Maritain's Politics

Having said "no" so totally to Maritain's attempted metaphysical distinction between human person and human individual, you might expect that I would have little good to say of his political personalism. For, let us recall, this is founded just on his effort to distinguish person and individual, as in this eloquent passage:

The word person is reserved for substances that possess that divine thing, the spirit, and are in consequence, each by itself, a world above the whole bodily order, a spiritual and moral world which, strictly speaking, is *not a part* of this universe, and whose secret is hidden even from the natural perception of the angels....The word individual, on the contrary, is common to man and beast, to plant, microbe, and atom....in so far as we are individuals we are only a fragment of matter, *a part* of this universe, distinct, no doubt, but a part, a point of that immense network of forces and influences, physical and cosmic, vegetative and animal, ethnic, atavistic, hereditary, economic and historic, to whose laws we are subject. As individuals we are subject to the stars. As persons, we rule them.⁹

Clearly that human beings can be considered in both these ways derives from their being that distinct union of material body and intellectual soul that makes their death natural yet unnatural.¹⁰

Maritain uses this distinction in his political philosophy to insist that, precisely as *persons*, human beings cannot be treated simply as *parts* of a larger social whole: “Man is constituted as person, made for God and for eternal life, before being constituted part of a human community; and he is constituted part of familial society before being constituted part of political society. Hence, there are primordial rights, which the latter must respect, and which it dare not wrong when it demands for itself the aid of its members because they are its parts” (*Scholasticism and Politics*, 61). Thus, it is precisely as persons that we possess fundamental rights, including religious liberty, “the right to travel toward eternal life along the road one’s conscience acknowledges as designated by God.”¹¹

What comments are in order concerning Maritain’s distinction of person and individual in the social order? For me, at least three. First, it is true that Maritain tries to ground his views on his metaphysical distinction, and there of course I cannot follow him. Second, that distinction is not necessary for his social doctrine; for his personalism is importantly different from a modern individualism that tends to reduce the human being to the material and our interior subjectivity to a naked egoism. The traditional distinction is sufficient for this: to reduce the human to material considerations alone is to reduce him to an individual that is not a person. Third, and most importantly for my purpose here, Maritain’s distinction between person and individual is *conceptually identical* to

⁹ For a similar expression, see *The Person and the Common Good*, p. 20 and p. 38.

¹⁰ (My main point, in relation to beautiful passages such as this, is simply that the distinction Maritain rightly makes here requires nothing more than noting the dual aspect of our human nature—as material and spiritual—with its diverse “pulls”: towards the material and “social body” [as a part of a whole] and towards the spiritual and interpersonal love [of a whole with a whole]. Maritain himself often makes his point that way. The truth and importance of this observation does not depend upon his own metaphysical distinction between individual and supposit.)

¹¹ Jacques Maritain, *Ransoming the Time* (New York: Scribners, 1941), “Human Equality,” 25.

Thomas's distinction between an individual in the proper sense and in the analogous sense of that term. For Maritain's idea of the "individual" is that of *a part in a whole*: precisely Thomas's idea of an individual member existing within the subject properly speaking. The difference is purely a verbal one: when Maritain speaks of an "individual," Thomas speaks of an "individual part," or individual in an analogous sense, but the idea is *identical*.

Put this way, we could say that Maritain's caution is that we must never treat people as "non-persons," as though they were only parts of a larger whole, and not endowed with a transcendent dignity and certain inalienable rights founded on that dignity. To end by treating human beings simply as parts of a social whole, to which they can be sacrificed, is to treat them—in Thomas's words—as though they were not proper individuals, but something less: individuals in only an analogous sense.

So understood, I believe Maritain is quite right, and right as well in his drawing forth from this principle certain transcendent rights, including that of religious freedom. But taking this position requires honestly admitting that Thomas was a creature of his age and that he erred in his approach to some of these matters.

Maritain's view has a different accent than that of Thomas.

For Thomas expressly argues that an individual *is* part of the body politic and subordinate to its end. He uses just such an argument, for example, in his justification of capital punishment:

Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. *Now every individual person is compared to the whole community as part to whole.* Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good (II-II, 64, 2).

Needless to say, Thomas thinks heretics are excellent examples of people who should be put to death in order to protect the common good (II-II, 11, 3 and 4).

Perhaps Thomas's most striking use of this analogy is literal, namely in his justification of judicial maiming:

Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is expedient for the body...*As the whole of man ("ipse totus homo") is directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he is a part...it may happen that although the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may nevertheless be directed to the community, in so far as it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so he is deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins* (II-II, 65, 1).

The analogy is exact: the person is a member of the body politic and hence able to have a physical member cut off for its good.

To me there is something that cannot help but sound “off” when reading Thomas’s defense of these matters. How can the *whole* of a person be directed to the human community? How, that is, given Thomas’s own position that all human beings possess a natural desire to see God, as one who infinitely transcends any human community? And how not be startled to read that an *individual person* is compared to the community as a *part to a whole*? How, that is, given what we have just seen is his doctrine on the human person, namely that it precisely is *not* to exist as a part in a whole, but in itself! Ironically enough, were he to reduce a human being to just such a part, Thomas would precisely deny that he *is* a person in the way he argues—in the case of our Lord—is most fundamental.

And, it is again ironic that Maritain, who does not grasp Thomas’s metaphysical doctrine quite correctly, nevertheless manages to defend Thomas’s “personalism” in the social domain better than Thomas himself! For, in refusing an unqualified use of the part-whole relation of person to society, he insists that properly speaking a person transcends that relation, that existing in ourself (and as ordered towards God) gives us an ontological standing beyond that of a “part.” Surely, Thomas must agree.¹²

I had hoped to make my point even stronger here by adding Thomas’s defense of judicial torture to my previous examples. Yet, as far as I have been able to determine by my research, he (deliberately?) does not discuss this practice, anywhere...and this despite its being a recent and growing phenomenon in his day, and one employed by his brother Dominicans. Yet, were Thomas to have said something on it, I suspect that—even noting Augustine’s clear objections to this practice in *The City of God* (19, 6)—he would have been hard-pressed by his principles not to justify such judicial procedures. He does explicitly teach the duty to incriminate ourselves, if asked by a judge (II-II, 69, 1). It is hard not to think he would regard torture as warranted, when a judge is faced with an accused person who fails dutifully to confess to him.

Had Thomas asserted as much, however, he would certainly have erred. Or at least that is the judgement every *Catholic* must render on this. For the

¹² Put differently, Thomas *does not sufficiently emphasize* his own idea that “man is not ordered to the body politic according to all that he is and has” (I-II, 21, 4, ad 3), and he does not do so because of the close relation between Church and State in his day; whereas Maritain takes up this idea (e.g. in *The Rights of Man and Natural Law*, 14) and gives it far greater weight, no doubt because it speaks to the changed political reality of *his* day. The changed relation of Church and State in his day, however, gets at an important *truth*. We have learned *something* in the last 700 years!: precisely the transcendent dignity of the human person, and our need to guard against turning any individual human being into a “part of the social whole” or a means to some social end.

Catechism of the Catholic Church is quite explicit about such matters. It acknowledges that for some time the Church followed Roman law about judicial torture, and it condemns this: “Torture which uses physical or moral violence to extract confessions, punish the guilty, frighten opponents or satisfy hatred is *contrary to respect for the person and for human dignity.*”¹³ It goes on to reject the “cruel practices” previously allowed by the Church and her tribunals: It has become evident that these cruel practices were neither necessary for the public order, nor in conformity with the *legitimate rights of the human person* (CCC, 2298, my italics).

And, of course, Vatican II’s defense of religious freedom is well known and also duly endorsed by the *Catechism*:

Nobody may be forced to act against his convictions, nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience in religious matters in private or in public, alone or in association with others, within due limits.’ This right is based on the very nature of the human person, whose dignity enables him freely to assent to the divine truth which *transcends the temporal order*. For this reason it continues to exist *even* in those who do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it (CCC, 2106, my italics).

In all of this, one can almost hear Maritain himself speaking! Indeed, the emphasis upon the dignity of the human person that is so central to John Paul II’s pontificate, and that resonates so strongly in the *Catechism*’s treatment of social and political issues, is a total vindication of Maritain’s own most cherished social and political views.

This, it seems to me, is the most important truth to take from an assessment of his views on the human person. Not that he has been misled on the metaphysical discussion of individual and person, generated by a theological debate outside his main area of research. Nor that he would have a difficult time arguing that his concern for the transcendent dimension of the human person and its rights was Thomas’s own view. But rather that he fought for the truth of those rights and for the transcendent dignity of the human person. And that he opened Thomism to this truth and led it away from certain tendencies in Thomas to unify concerns of Church and State too closely, tendencies that were inherent in his age.

To end on a dramatic note, it seems to me that the Church’s endorsing religious freedom as it has exorcises certain demonic tendencies towards social and religious *control*—of which the diabolical instruments of torture are the most telling instance—that have threatened Her life in the past and sullied Her holiness; and, further, it makes one of the—if not the greatest—“causes celebres” of the Reformation its own cause, and thereby closes perhaps the most significant chapter of that painful “story.” This hard victory won on this matter should surely

¹³ *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), #2297, 553.

bring joy to our hearts, especially to those dedicated in friendship to Maritain. For he fought all his life for such truths and his voice helped “carry the day.” For both his advocacy, and for the triumph of this truth today, we all should be most profoundly grateful!

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