Across the years 1865-82, F. H. Bradley evolved from an undergraduate scholar at University College, Oxford, to author of two pamphlets and of two books which would each be characterized one day as 'epoch-making'.1 From the outset of his career, Bradley set his sights methodologically upon a critical approach to prevailing points of view, seeking to unearth the preconceptions, if not prejudices, that were undercurrent in such views. To do justice to such an approach required commitment to study in more than one school, in order to avoid the prejudices of intellectual insularity and to avert the apotheosis of philosophy which such insularity breeds. But, beyond a pluralistic approach so defined, Bradley sought as well to pursue plural paths within philosophy, largely because, as he so often said, he did not know where one field ended and another began. In these initial decades of his philosophic work, he would pursue philosophy down the paths of philosophy of history, ethics, and logic, paths which involved epistemological considerations as well as metaphysical and psychological presuppositions. For, as the interests of philosophy transcend any given school of thought, so, too, the unity of knowledge makes difficult, if not ultimately impossible, the sphering off of issues into separate and isolated fields of thought. Though the latter is necessary practically, and special sciences must acknowledge and respect their appropriate limits, in the end it must also be acknowledged that their lines of demarcation are arbitrary. This is the framework within which F. H. Bradley chose to develop his philosophy. It would serve him well throughout the almost sixty years he devoted to the philosophic life, and from the roots of such pluralism would spring a key transitional figure in the development of twentieth-century philosophy.
Bradley's origins were such that a certain rebelliousness toward dogmatism, whatever be its form, manifested itself even in his youth. Born 30 January 1846 at Clapham, Surrey, and named Francis Herbert, he was the fourth child of the Reverend Charles Bradley and his second wife Emma Linton. Reverend Bradley, who came from an old Yorkshire family, was a well-known preacher of the evangelical sect of the Church of England. He had been a member of St Edmunds Hall, Oxford, but never took a degree, deciding in 1810, when twenty-one, to marry Catherine Shephard, with whom he had thirteen children, twelve of whom survived. Curate of High Wycombe in 1812, vicar of Glasbury in Brecknockshire in 1825, and in 1829 the first incumbent of St James Chapel at Clapham, noted for the famous 'Clapham Sect', he published almost twenty books, mainly volumes of sermons but including as well religious tracts and works on grammar. Because of his fame as a great preacher, his volumes of sermons received wide circulation throughout Britain and America, and were, indeed, 'best-sellers', often used by other preachers for their sermons. When his first wife died in 1831, Reverend Bradley married Emma Linton, a daughter of a stockbroker and a member of his congregation at Clapham, about whom we know only that she had musical and artistic talent. Of the eight children from this second marriage, four other than Bradley himself emerge within the Bradley Papers: A. C. Bradley, later a renowned literary critic and Professor of Poetry at Oxford, Marian Bradley de Glehn, Emma Bradley Bull, and John Hebert Bradley, a promising scholar who drowned in the Isis in 1866 but weeks before he was to enter New College. A granddaughter of Reverend Bradley writes that her grandfather's stress in supporting such a large family resulted in a nervous condition which made him 'so irritable that it must be admitted that he was an object of fear rather than love to most of his horde of children'.2 Reportedly, it was Bradley, known within the family as Herbert or 'H', who was the ringleader of outbursts of rebellion against his father. Later, he would write not only of his loathing of the religion of his childhood, but also of his distress about what that religion had done to some members of his family. When asked in the early 1920s whether his father's letters should be retained, he observed that old letters evoked only melancholy in him and served no useful purpose, though he had no objection if any member of the family wished his father's letters retained. In keeping with this distinction about utility, when his mother died he retained a notebook in which she had recorded texts from the New Testament during the 1830s, and he used it as a commonplace book.
Upon the Reverend Bradley's retirement from his post at St James in 1852, the family moved to Cheltenham, residing at 19 Royal Parade. Bradley entered Cheltenham College in August 1856 and left in September 1861. In October 1861, he entered Marlborough College, where his half-brother George Granville Bradley, later Master of University College, Oxford, and Dean of Westminster Abbey, was then headmaster. Though he did not like changing schools, he later told one of his sisters that he lived first in Granville's house and that he was not unhappy. Granville Bradley, a Latin scholar, brought Marlborough to the front ranks of the schools of England, with a remarkable number of academic distinctions being achieved by its pupils, chiefly at Oxford. Described as a kind man, he is also characterized as being capable of inspiring terror in his pupils. A similar description is offered of Bradley's eldest half-brother, the Reverend Charles Bradley of Southgate, who was also well known in educational circles and whom Bradley assisted with pupils prior to his receipt of a fellowship to Merton College. Whether the description is simply a common characterization of headmasters or whether it points to familial shared traits, it could be extended not only to their father but to Bradley as well, as G. R. G. Mure's anecdotal account of him reveals (save for the specific reference to pupils, since Bradley had no teaching duties as a Fellow of Merton).
While at Marlborough, Bradley was quite active. He played football and was a member of the Rifle Corps, the latter serving him well in later years when he had a shooting gallery above his Merton rooms and was known to shoot at cats to save birds. However, his schooling came to an abrupt end when he developed typhoid fever and pneumonia in June 1863. Once fully recovered, on 14 October 1865 he entered University College, Oxford as a scholar. Though none of Bradley's academic records at the College have surfaced as yet, at the time he went up to Oxford, the course of study was dominated by the classics, and, as he conveyed to George S. Morris, by Aristotle's Ethics in particular. Yet, however dominant the classics, undergraduates in Literae Humaniores were exposed as well to modern philosophy. Though much has been written about the prominence of John Stuart Mill's influence upon Oxford then, the actual intellectual milieu suggests a more complex view of the situation. Clearly, the Mills and Bain were to be read in Oxford, but writers such as William Hamilton and his pupil Henry Longueville Mansel, both of whom transformed the Scottish school by the introduction of Kant's thought, were also being considered. Whether such reading was prompted by John Stuart Mill's An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865) or not, Hamilton and Mansel were nonetheless being read, and, in any event, Kant's foothold in England was secured through Coleridge and Carlyle. Moreover, given Berkeley and his successors, idealism was no stranger to the intellectual life within Britain. There were other stirrings afoot, too. In the 1860s, the evolutionary point of view as represented by Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin was emerging, as was Communism, and in 1865 James Hutchinson Stirling's The Secret of Hegel brought Hegel onto the British philosophic stage. Of course, it needs to be remembered that in 1865 Oxford already had Edward Caird, T. H. Green and Benjamin Jowett among its faculty, with William Wallace joining their ranks in 1866 and Walter Pater in 1869, individuals all well-versed in Kant and Hegel, and proponents of bringing them into the course of study. It was at Jowett's urging, for example, that T. H. Green advanced the study of Hegel in Oxford, initiating as well the teaching of historical surveys of philosophy. Hence the Oxford intellectual milieu as Bradley came upon the scene offered an ambience in which one could seize the opportunity of a pluralistic approach to philosophy if one so chose. As Bradley later wrote about the latter half of the sixties: 'The study of philosophy was becoming a serious affair. There were lectures on German philosophy, and also by Green on Hume. I don't think that any of the younger teachers (who made any mark) followed Mill.' Though he conceded that 'in the sixties Mill's influence in Oxford was very great', he confirmed that access to other points of view was available.3 Given his remark about the younger teachers, it appears that it was older dons who followed Mill, leaving Oxford in Bradley's undergraduate days in a period of transition, where the system still was under the sway of Mill's influence, but where the seeds of a pluralistic approach to philosophy were being sown.
Offering a rare glimpse into Oxford education in the late 1860s are Bradley's undergraduate essays (1.1). These essays show the dominance of Plato and Aristotle, the influence of Utilitarianism, and an occasional effort to relate the classical thinkers to modern thought by seeking a comparison with Hobbes or, again, by comparing the position of women or the concept of Communism from both a classical and contemporary perspective. While an undergraduate, Bradley attended lectures of T. H. Green during four terms. Among the Bradley Papers are two complete sets of lecture notes. One set, 'Notes on Green's Lectures on Moral and Political Philosophy' (1.2), shows both the historical and Hegelian approach associated with Green's teaching and provides a framework for some of the undergraduate essays that Bradley wrote.4 The other set of lecture notes concerns the history of Greek philosophy and may well be on lectures delivered by Green in Michaelmas 1867. These notes are not included here principally because they add little to our understanding of Bradley and appear not to be linked to any of the undergraduate essays among the Bradley Papers.
Among the undergraduate papers, there is one essay - "A Revolution is a New Idea" - which includes remarks of a tutor that are useful in calling attention to two features of Bradley's mode of philosophizing that would persist throughout his career, despite the tutor's urgings to the contrary. The tutor, who may have been Green given the topic of the paper, questions why Bradley argues from the meaning of a word. To readers of Bradley's writings, this remark must strike a chord, for one persistent feature of his writing is his meaning-oriented approach to whatever be the specific subject of discussion, an approach that links him to later developments within the wide spectrum of analysis and of phenomenology. To cite but a few examples, in The Presuppositions of History we find him focusing on what 'fact' means, on what 'personal experience' means and, again, on what 'historical testimony' means. In Ethical Studies, we are introduced to meanings assigned by the ordinary person, Bradley's methodological 'plain man', as contrasted with those meanings used by 'enlightened thinkers'. In The Principles of Logic, the focus is upon ideas as symbols, as meanings, as opposed to ideas as psychical particulars, and here again we meet questions about meaning, the meaning of such terms as 'this', 'here', 'now', 'presence', 'all' and 'or', with a focus on the subtleties of ordinary usage. Then, too, in Appearance and Reality, we are presented with a meaning-oriented metaphysics, one which specifies as the criterion of ultimate reality that the meaning of which can be understood in a manner free from contradiction. Meanings of 'time', 'thing' and 'self' current in various dimensions of the culture are carefully delineated, closely examined and found wanting; hence, in accordance with the criterion, time, thing and self are branded appearance, not ultimate reality. Appearance and Reality pivots about a meaning-focused methodology. Bradley's psychological writings, too, abound with queries about professional usage of a given term and ordinary usage of a term or phrase, and a careful look at the writings from his final decades also shows his continuing use of this methodological tool. Though in the context of this introductory chapter we can only suggest a given theme, not develop or argue it, the methodological role of the analysis of meanings in Bradley's thought should not be overlooked.
The second point that the tutor makes is that Bradley should stop writing in a 'soliloquizing vein'. Certainly this remark did nothing to impede this feature of Bradley's writing either, for such a 'vein' infuses his writing, published and unpublished. Soliloquizing was intrinsic to Bradley's mode of philosophizing and, quite naturally, infected his style. Moreover, philosophy was not some detached enterprise for him; it was a way of being, as several of his aphorisms suggest.
In addition to his philosophical activities as an undergraduate, Bradley was a member of the rowing team and, as the Bradley Papers confirm, also enjoyed literary activity. There is a manuscript, for example, showing that he and A. C. Bradley were toying with writing a dramatization of Edgar Allan Poe's The Assignation in German. A love of poetry was also shared by several of the Bradley siblings. Granville, a close friend of Tennyson, often read poetry aloud to his family, and his daughter Margaret Bradley Woods would herself become a poet as well as a novelist. The Bradley brothers - F. H., A. C. and John Hebert, showed their interest in poetry by translating Latin and German poems. There is a notebook, compiled by A. C., of some forty translations c. 1866-8, with A. C. contributing five translations, John Hebert, given his death, only one, and F. H., the remaining. Marian de Glehn, their sister, too, loved poetry and wrote poems as well. H. W. Garrod, Fellow of Merton, classical scholar and writer of several books on the English poets, was given the brothers' notebook by Mrs de Glehn after Bradley's death, and found Bradley's translations to be very sensitive renderings. He also reveals that he learned of Bradley's continuing such work in his later years. But these translations, chiefly of Goethe, Mrs de Glehn chose to retain.
Though Bradley received a first in Classical Moderations in 1867, in 1869 he received only a second in Literae Humaniores. It has been suggested that this was because of his repudiation of Mill and interest in German philosophy, in short, of his being philosophically unorthodox. The examinations that he took in 1869 are included in Appendix A and show the unquestionable dominance of the classics, with a handful being within the empiricist tradition and a few that might be discussed from the vantage point of German idealism if one so chose. The truth about his 'second' is that the cause simply is not known.
Bernard Bosanquet, who received a first, was the recipient of the fellowship at University College, Bradley's college. Hence Bradley had to continue to compete elsewhere. It was thus that he became a Fellow of Merton College in December 1870, receiving the last life-research fellowship, a fellowship requiring no teaching, but terminable by marriage, given the semi-monastic rule that governed Oxford until 1877. Only months after joining the Merton community, in June 1871, Bradley became critically ill, remaining so until October, suffering a severe kidney inflammation and a low fever. This illness left him with a chronic kidney condition, pyelitis, that led him to lead a rather quiet and reclusive life in order to try to stave off fatigue or stress, either of which could trigger an inflammation. In later years this condition would leave him unable to do any serious work for months at a time. Moreover, at least in the last few decades of his life, he spent very little time in Oxford, considering its climate unsuitable for his condition. As his letters show, he spent much of each year by the seashore, whether in the Mediterranean area or in England at Weston-super-Mare, Bournemouth, Ilfracombe, or Totland Bay on the Isle of Wight.
In or about 1872, Bradley began work preparatory to writing The Presuppositions of Critical History. 'Notes Toward The Presuppositions of Critical History' (1.3) offers reading notes and draft fragments which suggest that the provocation for Bradley taking up the question of the possibility of historical knowledge and hence the issue of the epistemic status of testimony was the controversy about miracles, namely, whether testimony can provide a sound ground for acceptance of any miracle, given that miracles are exceptions to the law of nature. The 'Notes' show that Bradley considered at one point dealing with this issue explicitly in The Presuppositions and retreated from so doing. They further reveal that, from Bradley's point of view, his handling of probable evidence and analogy in this work jeopardized his conclusion, though he sought to circumvent this problem by the addition of Note C.
That Bradley's initial path in pursuing philosophy was within the philosophy of history is suggestive in considering the overall development of his thought. For, in addition to the methodological tool of uncovering presuppositions, there are themes enunciated in this work that weave their way throughout his writings - the historicity of knowledge itself, the need to avoid any form of mere subjectivism that would be tantamount to a form of scepticism, the importance of 'my real world' to all knowledge, and the view of immediate experience as the primordial and continuative ground of knowledge, however much this last is present only in germinal form. Recent scholarship signals that this much-neglected work is beginning to receive the attention it warrants.5
While writing The Presuppositions, Bradley also wrote an abstract of a paper titled 'Relativity of Knowledge', a paper which in its final version (c. 1873-4) is offered here (1.4). He may have intended to incorporate this paper into his initial work or to include it as one of the appended Notes. Whatever be the case, the paper itself appears to have been sparked by Hamilton and Mansel's writings. The thesis of relativity, as advanced by Hamilton, involves acceptance of the view that we are never given a pure object that can be known absolutely and that the subject-object dualism emerges within a medium to which it, too, is relative. Within his own framework, Bradley would grapple with the issue of such relativity throughout his career in his own continuing struggle with scepticism.6
Another essay titled 'Progress' (1.5), written in 1874, shows Bradley's interest in examining Herbert Spencer's concept of progress, as the headnote of this item explains. What, precisely, he intended to do with this essay is unclear. In a petition to Green, which he, his brother A. C. Bradley, R. L. Nettleship and a few others signed in June 1872, Green's assistance was requested in an effort to improve the status of philosophy as a serious discipline in its own right, to ensure philosophical pluralism and to relate philosophy to the problems of the day. Mention is also made of a society being formed for the reading of philosophical papers. Perhaps the paper on progress, as well as 'Relativity of Knowledge', was intended for that Essay Society, if, indeed, it continued to function. In any event, the concept of progress would be briefly considered by Bradley both in Ethical Studies and in The Principles of Logic. 7
It was in or about 1874, a year in which he spent the month of May in Belgium, that Bradley turned to writing Ethical Studies. This work offers an ethic of self-realization and shows Bradley at his dialectical best, confronting both the one-sidedness of the Utilitarian view of 'pleasure for pleasure's sake' with its focus on the atomistic self, and the one-sidedness as well of a form of Kantianism that he himself acknowledges is an exaggeration, a form nonetheless that in its proclamation of 'duty for duty's sake' implies a self that is a formal universal, with no flesh and blood. The dialectical move to 'My Station and its Duties', associated with Hegel's position, though an improvement over these other views in its recognition of the self as a concrete universal, is still found to be wanting, in its one-sided view of the self as merely social and in its failure to provide potential for a corrective of social ills. And hence the dialectical prod moves us beyond 'My Station and its Duties' to an ideal morality. This ideal morality, Bradley's constructive ethic, acknowledges 'My Station' as being, to a large extent, an adequate foundation of the self to be realized, 'my ideal self', and includes as well social ideals and non-social ideals, the latter being ideals such as the pursuit of truth or of beauty, ideals which fall outside the control of the state or other social organizations. The culmination of the Bradleian dialectic, however, lies within religion, wherein the contradictions inherent in morality are surmounted by the religious consciousness, in the union of the human and divine. This thumbnail sketch of Bradley's ethical work provides a backdrop for 'Notes toward Ethical Studies' (1.6), notes that highlight this work in its developmental stages, offering early draft fragments of some sections, together with material that Bradley chose not to include in this work, at least not in its original format.
In turning to ethics, however, Bradley found himself wrestling again with the question of relativity, not only in the sense of our individual moral judgments, but also in terms of changes that occur within social mores, the bedrock of 'My Station and its Duties'. The Bradley Papers suggest, moreover, that he was exploring the question of the conditions under which an object may be knowable, as he was drafting Ethical Studies, resuming from a somewhat different perspective issues dealt with in 'Relativity of Knowledge'. 'Miscellaneous Notes' (1.7) includes his work on this question and related epistemological and metaphysical issues, as well as a lengthy note on objectivity which pertains to his Mr Sidgwick's Hedonism, published in 1877. Indeed, in the Preface to that work, Bradley states that 'some general remarks on the "objective" character of morality have been excluded for want of space'. The selection included here on objectivity is that to which he is referring.
During 1877 or 1878, according to his own dating, Bradley wrote two essays, the first 'On Morality' (1.8) and the second 'On Knowledge' (1.9). The essay on morality covers a broad spectrum of issues, dealing chiefly with the concept of human perfection, the relation between morality and ethicality (Moralität and Sittlichkeit), as well as the connection between virtue and happiness. It touches also upon morality and the Absolute, and upon the relationship of morality to self-sacrifice, a topic that Bradley would explore in 1878 or 1879, culminating in 'On the Limits of Individual and National Self-Sacrifice', which, however, would not be published until 1894. The second essay, the essay 'On Knowledge', serves as a precursor to Appearance and Reality, for it includes issues that would subsequently be developed within that work. Its opening line - 'To know is to have qualities in relation' - sounds a theme that would echo throughout Appearance, as does its closing line 'Knowledge is of the given-in-relation and that is not real'.
But instead of taking a path to metaphysics, Bradley chose to work next in logic in or about 1878. Within the compass of logic, he could pursue some of his epistemological concerns. Thus in The Principles of Logic, he advances the view that all judgments are hypothetical and hence conditional, a view that challenged Aristotelian logic, and, in so doing, moved logic in a new direction. It was a view that raised for Bradley, still again, the issue of a certain relativity in knowledge, an issue to which he would return repeatedly in his later work. The Principles is also noted for its critique of Mill's logic and the empiricist psychologism evidenced in the Associationist view put forth by Mill. 'Notes toward The Principles of Logic' (1.10) shows, in some measure, the manner in which Bradley developed this work. Though the Bradley Papers include much more preparatory material than is presented in the 'Notes', that material approximates too closely the published work to warrant inclusion here.
Early in his career, Bradley developed a habit of keeping reading notes usually in notebooks used exclusively for this purpose. 'Selections from Bradley's Reading Notes' (1.11) offers an extensive sample of his notes in an attempt to highlight the broad range of his reading during these years. However, especially in the early years covered by this volume, Bradley tended to take notes in the format of a topical outline or of brief summaries of the given text, refraining, in the main, from his own evaluative commentary. Because of the volume of material and constraints of space, such notes have been systematically excluded from this edition. Other notes have been excerpted, retaining Bradley's evaluative remarks. One disappointing feature of the Bradley Papers is that they include little on Hegel, and what is included, generally, is without commentary. This is the case with Bradley's notes on Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, his Lectures on Aesthetics and an essay about scepticism, and thus these notes have been excluded. However, notes on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion and his Philosophy of Right, which do have brief commentary, have been included. With Kant and Mill, there are extensive notes, but here, again, with little commentary, and in the case of Kant, commentary added, in some instances, in 1877, subsequent to the initial reading. Hence, only excerpts are included from these notes. Nonetheless, despite such limitations, it is hoped that 'Selections from Bradley's Reading Notes' will be found useful to Bradley scholars. Also provided is a list of books for which evidence exists that he read them either in whole or in part across the years 1865-82 (Appendix B). Lastly, discussion of some textual principles used in editing this volume and the other four volumes of this set can be found in Appendix C.
1 See Bernard Bosanquet, ‘Life and Philosophy’, Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series, ed. J. H. Muirhead, 3rd imp. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), pp. 57–8, regarding Ethical Studies, and R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of Willliam James, vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1935), p. 639, for the comment of James on The Principles of Logic. Though The Principles was not published until 1883, it was completed by Bradley in 1882.
2 See Papers of Margaret Bradley Woods, ‘Memoirs of Charles Bradley’, MS DON. d. 129, fols. 152–62, Bodleian Library, Oxford. It is convenient to note here that it is not my intent in this Introduction to offer a full biographical account of F. H. Bradley, but rather only to provide some background to his undergraduate days. In the Introduction to the correspondence volumes, however, a sketch of the man, as revealed through his letters, is offered (see CW, vol. 4, pp. ix–xxviii). In addition to the Woods manuscript, I have drawn principally upon the Bradley Papers and the Papers of G. S. Morris (Bentley Library, University of Michigan). For biographical information about Bradley, see Brand Blanshard, ‘Francis Herbert Bradley’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 22 (1925), pp. 5–15; H. W. Garrod, Genius Loci and Other Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950); Olive Heseltine, Lost Content (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne, 1948); J. H. Muirhead, ‘Francis Herbert Bradley’, in The Great Victorians, ed. H. J. and H. Massingham (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1932), pp. 35–47; G. R. G. Mure, ‘F. H. Bradley: Towards a Portrait’, Encounter, 88 (1961), pp. 28–35, originally published in French in Les études philosophique, vol. 15 (1960), pp. 75–89; A. E. Taylor, ‘F. H. Bradley’, Mind, vol. 34 ns (1925), pp. 1–12; his ‘Francis Herbert Bradley, 1846–1924’, Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 9 (1924–5), pp. 458–68; and his ‘Francis Herbert Bradley’, Dictionary of National Biography, 1922–30 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 101–103. The DNB also provides biographies of Reverend Charles Bradley and his sons A. C. Bradley and George Granville Bradley.
3 See Bradley’s letters to Wilfred Ward, CW, vol. 5, pp. 200–202. See also Wilfred Ward, Men and Matters (London: Longmans, Green, 1914). Regarding T. H. Green, see Melvin Richter The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996; first published 1964). For further information about this philosophic era, see Robert Adamson, The Development of Modern Philosophy (London: Blackwood, 1903); A. W. Benn, History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1906); T. Forsyth, English Philosophy (London: Black, 1910); Rudolf Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950); J. H. Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy, 2nd imp. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965); John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 2nd ed. rev. (London: Duckworth, 1966); J. Pucelle, L’idéalisme en Angleterre (Neuchatel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1955); Arthur Kenyon Rogers, English and American Philosophy since 1800 (New York: Macmillan, 1922), and W. R. Sorley, A History of British Philosophy to 1900 (Cambridge University Press, 1920).
4 These lectures have recently been published as well in The Works of T. H. Green, vol. 5, ed. Peter P. Nicholson (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997). Nicholson and I discussed this set of notes about two years ago and agree as to the attribution of these lectures to Green and to the dating of them as c. 1867. See the headnote to this item for a detailed consideration of this matter. Though the Oxford University Calendar during Bradley’s undergraduate days did not list lecture series, it did provide information regarding the works to be read by undergraduates preparatory to examinations. A list of the books which Bradley read as an undergraduate is included in Appendix B of the present volume.
5 The Bodleian Library includes a letter of 15 July 1932 from R. G. Collingwood to H. W. B. Joseph regarding Bradley’s Presuppositions of Critical History (see MS Eng. Lett. c. 453, fol. 202). Joseph apparently had sent Collingwood a copy of this book, together with his notes. In this letter Collingwood attributes Bradley’s not republishing The Presuppositions to his having assumed a concept of analogy borrowed from Mill, a concept much at odds with Bradley’s later work in The Principles of Logic. For Collingwood, this work also shed light upon the origin and meaning of Bradley’s logical doctrines. Moreover, he found it most interesting that what he referred to as Bradley’s destruction of Mill’s logic resulted from his reflection on historical thinking, not scientific thinking. Collingwood further described The Presuppositions as the most brilliant study of critical history that had ever been done, though he added that the general problem with which Bradley dealt was now somewhat out of date. James Connelly, in his ‘Bradley, Collingwood and the “Other Metaphysics”’, Bradley Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (Autumn 1997), pp. 89–112, touches upon this letter in a most interesting discussion of the relationship between these men. For other recent studies of Bradley’s work on historical knowledge, see D. Holdcroft, ‘Bradley, Collingwood and The Presuppositions of Critical History’, Bradley Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 5–24; Christopher Parker, ‘Bradley, Russell and Julius Caesar’, Bradley Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1998), pp. 158–72; and Lionel Rubinoff, ‘The Autonomy of History: Collingwood’s Critique of F. H. Bradley’s Copernican Revolution in Historical Knowledge’, in Philosophy after F. H. Bradley, ed. James Bradley (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), pp. 127–46, a welcome addition to his excellent Introduction to his edition of The Presuppositions of Critical History (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1968),
pp. 1–74; Guy Stock, ‘The Plurality of Worlds, Historical Time, and Uniqueness’, in Current Issues in Idealism, ed. Paul Coates and Daniel H. Hutto (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), pp. 179–202; and W. H. Walsh, ‘Bradley and Critical History’, in The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley, ed. Anthony Manser and Guy Stock (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 33–52.
6 The Bradley Papers suggest that, in working through this paper, Bradley may also have availed himself of Georg Gabler’s System der theoretischen Philosophie: Lehrbuch der philosophischen Propadeutik als Einleitung zur Wissenschaft (Erlangen: Palm, 1827). It should be noted that the final version of ‘Relativity of Knowledge’ was previously published in French as ‘Relativité’, ed. and trans. Pierre Fruchon, Les Études philosophiques, vol. 15 (1960), pp. 3–22.
7 See ES, pp. 190–92 and PL, p. 547.
Bibliographical references are given in full for the works cited and for other works consulted by the editor, with the exception of the writings of Bradley himself. For a list of his previously published writings, the reader is directed to CW, vol. 5, Appendix E. The year of initial publication is given for texts referred to by Bradley, unless he has specified otherwise.
Adamson, Robert, The Development of Modern Philosophy (London: Blackwood, 1903).
Aeschylus, Agamemnon, trans. E. Fraenkel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
Aesop’s Fables, ed. S. A. Handford, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1984).
Aristophanes, Lysistrata, The Archarnians, The Clouds, ed.
A. H. Sommerstein (New York: Penguin, 1973).
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).
–––––, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).
–––––, Aristotelis Opera, ed. I. Bekker, 2 vols. (Berlin: Reimer, 1831; reprint, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1970).
–––––, Politics, trans. Ernest Barker, Revd R. F. Stalley (Oxford World’s Classics, 1995).
Arnim, Hans (ed.), Stoicorum veterum fragmente, vol. 3: Chrysippi fragmenta moralia (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964).
Arnold, Matthew, Essays in Criticism (London: Macmillan, 1865).
–––––, Culture and Anarchy (London: Smith, Elder, 1869).
–––––, Literature and Dogma (London: Nelson, 1873).
Bacon, Francis, The Advancement of Learning (London: Tomes, 1605); ed. J. Devey (New York: Collier, 1901).
Bain, Alexander, The Emotions and the Will (London: Parker, 1859); 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1864); 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1875).
–––––, The Senses and Intellect, 2nd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1865); 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1868).
Beeton, Samuel Orchart, Beeton’s Bible Dictionary (London: Lock, 1870).
Benn, A. W., History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1906).
Bentham, Jeremy, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: Payne, 1789).
Blanshard, Brand, ‘Francis Herbert Bradley’, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 22 (1925), pp. 5–15.
Bosanquet, Bernard, ‘Life and Philosophy’, in Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series, ed. J. H. Muirhead, 3rd imp. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965), pp. 49–74.
Bosanquet, Bernard et al., ‘F. H. Bradley’, The Times,
20 September 1924. [Obituary which, in the main, used the obituary on file by Bosanquet.]
Brown, Daniel, Hopkins’ Idealism: Philosophy, Physics, Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
Brown, John, A Dictionary of the Holy Bible (London: G. Virtue, 1852).
Butler, Joseph, The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature; … also, Fifteen Sermons, ed. Joseph Angus (London: Religious Tract Society, 1855).
Carlyle, Thomas, Sartor Resartus (London: Fraser, 1833).
–––––, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (London: Fraser, 1841).
Carpenter, William Benjamin, Principles of Mental Physiology (London: Henry S. King, 1874).
Clarke, Samuel, A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God; the Obligations of Natural Religion, etc. (London: Knapton, 1711).
Collingwood, R. G., Letter of 15 July 1932 to H. W. B. Joseph, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Comte, Auguste, Système de politique positive (Paris: Mathias, 1851).
Connelly, James, ‘Bradley, Collingwood and the “Other Metaphysics”’, Bradley Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (Autumn 1997), pp. 89–112.
Cooper, Anthony Ashley, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristiks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 3 vols. (London, 1711).
Cudworth, Ralph, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (London: Knapton, 1731).
Cumberland, Richard, De Legibus Naturae Disquisitio Philosophica (London: Flesher, 1672).
Diels, H. and Kranz, W., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 11th ed. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1964).
Drobisch, Moritz, Neue Darstellung der Logik (Leipzig: Voss, 1836).
Edwards, Paul (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8 vols. in 4 (New York: Macmillan, 1972 reprint; first published 1967).
Erdmann, Johann Eduard, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Berlin: Hertz, 1869–70).
Ferrier, James, Institutes of Metaphysic (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1854).
Fischer, F., Die Naturlehre der Seele (Basel: Schweighauser’schen, 1834).
Fischer, J. C., Hartmann’s Philosophie des Unbewussten (Leipzig: Wigand, 1872).
Forsyth, T., English Philosophy (London: Black, 1910).
Fruchon, Pierre (ed. and trans.), ‘Relativité’ by F. H. Bradley, Les Études philosophiques, vol. 15 (1960), pp. 3–22.
Gabler, Georg, System der theoretischen Philosophie: Lehrbuch der philosophischen Propadeutik als Einleitung zur Wissenschaft (Erlangen: Palm, 1827).
Garrod, H. W., Genius Loci and Other Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950).
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, Faust (Princeton University Press, 1994).
Grote, George, A History of Greece, 12 vols. (London: John Murray, 1854–6).
Hamilton, Sir William, Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, ed.
H. L. Mansel and John Veitch (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1859–60).
Hare, Thomas, The Machinery of Representation (London: Maxwell, 1857).
–––––, A Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1859).
Hartley, David, Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations, 2 vols. (Barth: Leake and Frederick; London: Hitch and Austen, 1749).
Hartmann, Eduard von, Philosophy of the Unconscious, 3 vols. (London: Trübner, 1884).
Hegel, G. W. F., Philosophie des Rechts, in Werke, vol. 8 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1832).
–––––, Philosophie der Religion, in Werke, vol. 11 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1840).
–––––, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (London: Bohn, 1857); also The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956, reprint of Colonial Press 1899 edition).
–––––, The Logic of Hegel, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874).
–––––, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942).
Helvétius, Claude Adam, De l’esprit (Paris: Chez Durand, 1758).
Herbart, J. F., Schriften zur Metaphysik, vol. 2, in Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 4, ed. Gustav Hartenstein (Leipzig: Voss, 1850–52).
Heseltine, Olive, Lost Content (London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne, 1948).
Holdcroft, D., ‘Bradley, Collingwood and The Presuppositions of Critical History’, Bradley Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1997),
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, The Sphere and Duties of Government (London: Chapman, 1854).
Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (London: Millar, 1751); also for editor, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).
Jevons, W. Stanley, The Principles of Science (London: Macmillan, 1874).
Kant, Immanuel, Logik, ed. G. B. Jasche (Konigsberg: Nicolovius, 1800).
–––––, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed., in Werke, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Voss, 1838).
–––––, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, in Werke, vol. 3 (Leipzig: Voss, 1838).
Kirchmann, J. H. von, Die Grundbegriffe des Rechts und der Moral, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Heimann, 1873).
Laertius, Diogenes, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks (Loeb Classical Library, 1972).
Lange, Friedrich, Logische Studien (Iserlohn: Baedeker, 1877).
Lazarus, Moritz, Ideale Fragen in Reden und Vorträgen (Berlin: Hofmann, 1878).
Lewes, G. H., The History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Berlin: Oppenheim, 1873).
Liebmann, Otto, Kant und die Epigonen (Stuttgart: Schober, 1865).
–––––, Ueber den individuellen Beweis für die Freiheit des Willens (Stuttgart: Schober, 1866).
–––––, Ueber den objectiven Anblick (Stuttgart: Schober, 1869).
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Basset, 1690; reprint, 2 vols., New York: Dover, 1959).
Long, George (trans.), The Thoughts of M. Aurelius Antonius (London: Bell and Daldy, 1862).
Lotze, Hermann, Metaphysik (Leipzig: Weidmann, 1841).
–––––, Mikrokosmos, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1856–64).
–––––, Metaphysik: Drei Bücher der Ontologie, Kosmologie und Psychologie (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1879).
–––––, Logik: Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1880; first published 1874).
Lowe, Robert, Viscount Sherbrooke, Speeches and Letters on Reform (London: Bush, 1867).
Lucretius, De rerum natura, trans. H. A. J. Munro (Cambridge: D. Bell, 1864).
Mackintosh, Sir James, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy Chiefly during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Philadelphia: Carey and Lea, 1832; Edinburgh:
A. & C. Black, 1836).
Mansel, Henry Longueville, Metaphysics, or, The Philosophy of Consciousness (Edinburgh: Black, 1860).
–––––, The Philosophy of the Conditioned (London: Strahan, 1866).
Marshall, James Garth, Minorities, Majorities and their Rights (London: Ridgeway, 1853).
Metz, Rudolf, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950).
Michelet, Karl, Anthropologie und Psychologie (Berlin: Sander, 1840).
–––––, Das System der philosophischen Moral (Berlin: Schlesinger, 1828).
Mill, James, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2 vols., new ed., ed. J. S. Mill (London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1869).
Mill, John Stuart, A System of Logic, 2 vols. (London: Parker, 1843).
–––––, Dissertations and Discussions, Political, Philosophical, and Historical, 2 vols. (London: Parker, 1859; 2nd ed., 3 vols., London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1875).
–––––, On Liberty (London: Parker, 1859)
–––––, Considerations on Representative Government (London: Parker, Son and Bourn, 1861).
–––––, Utilitarianism (London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, 1863).
–––––, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865).
–––––, Principles of Political Economy, vol. 2 (London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1867; first published 1848, London: Parker, 1848).
–––––, Autobiography (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1873).
Morris, G. S., Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.
Muirhead, J. H., The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931; 2nd imp., 1965).
–––––, ‘Francis Herbert Bradley’, in The Great Victorians, ed.
H. J. and H. Massingham (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1932), pp. 35–47.
––––– (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy, First and Second Series, 3rd imp. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965; First Series first published in 1924; Second Series, 1925).
Mure, G. R. G., ‘F. H. Bradley: Towards a Portrait’, Encounter, vol. 88 (1961), pp. 28–35, originally published in French in Les études philosophique, vol. 15 (1960), pp. 75–89.
Nettleship, R. L. (ed.), ‘Memoir’ in Works of Thomas Hill Green, vol. 3 (London: Longmans, Green, 1888), pp. ix–clxi.
Nicholson, Peter P., The Collected Works of T. H. Green, vol. 5 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1997).
Oxford University Calendar (Oxford: Parker, 1865–70).
Paley, William, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (London: Faulder, 1785)
–––––, A View of the Evidences of Christianity, vol. 1, 5th ed. (London: Faulder, 1796). Included in Early Commentaries on Hume’s Writings, ed. James Fieser (Internet Release, 1995).
–––––, Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity (London: Faulder, 1802).
Parker, Christopher, ‘Bradley, Russell and Julius Caesar’, Bradley Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1998), pp. 158–72.
Passmore, John, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 2nd ed. rev. (London: Duckworth, 1966).
Perry, R. B., The Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols. (Boston: Little Brown, 1935).
Plato, Platonis Opera, ed. J. Burnett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953 reprint; first published 1900–1901).
–––––, Greater Hippias, in The Dialogues of Plato, ed. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Random House, 1931).
–––––, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Bollingen Foundation/ Pantheon Books, 1961).
–––––, The Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Bollingen Foundation/Pantheon Books, 1961); Shorey trans. also in Loeb Classical Library (1930).
–––––, The Republic of Plato, ed. James Adams, 2nd ed. with D. A. Rees, 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1965).
Pucelle, J., L’idéalisme en Angleterre (Neuchatel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1955).
Ribot, Théodule, La psychologie anglaise contemporaine (Paris: Ladrange, 1870).
Richter, Melvin, The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996; first published 1964).
Ritter, H. and Preller, L. (eds.), Historia Philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ex Fontium Locis Contexta (Hamburg: Perthes, 1838).
Rogers, Arthur Kenyon, English and American Philosophy since 1800 (New York: Macmillan, 1922).
Rubinoff, Lionel, ‘Introduction’, in The Presuppositions of Critical History (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1968), pp. 1–74.
–––––, ‘The Autonomy of History: Collingwood’s Critique of
F. H. Bradley’s Copernican Revolution in Historical Knowledge’, in Philosophy after F. H. Bradley, ed. James Bradley (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1966), pp. 127–46.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, Ueber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Hermann, 1846).
–––––, Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, in Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 4 (Leipzig: Inselverlag, 1860).
–––––, Die Welt als Wille, vol. 1, in Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1873–4).
–––––, Parerga und Paralipomena, in Sämmtliche Werke, vols. 5 and 6 (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1873–4).
Shelley, Percy Bysshe, The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, ed. Neville Rogers, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972–5).
Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1874).
–––––, Review of Ethical Studies, Mind, vol. 1 os, no. 4 (October 1876), pp. 545–9.
Sigwart, Christoph, Logik, vol. 1 (Tübingen: Laupp’schen, 1873).
Smith, Goldwin, Lectures on Modern History, Delivered in Oxford: 1859–61 (Oxford: Parker, 1861).
Smith, Warren Sylvester, The London Heretics: 1870–1914 (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1968).
Sorley, W. R., A History of British Philosophy to 1900 (Cambridge University Press, 1920).
Spencer, Herbert, Social Statics (London: Chapman, 1851).
–––––, Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1858; also London: Williams and Norgate, 1863).
–––––, Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative, Second Series (London: Parker, 1863).
–––––, The Principles of Sociology, vol. 1 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1876).
Spinoza, Benedictus de, The Collected Works of Spinoza, ed.
E. M. Curley, vol. 1 (Princeton University Press, 1985).
Stephen, James Fitzjames, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 2nd ed. (London: Smith, Elder, 1874).
Stirling, James Hutchinson, The Secret of Hegel, 2 vols. (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865).
Stock, Guy, ‘The Plurality of Worlds, Historical Time, and Uniqueness’, in Current Issues in Idealism, ed. Paul Coates and Daniel H. Hutto (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), pp. 179–202.
Stumpf, Carl, Über den psychologischen Urspring der Raumvorstellung (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1873).
Swinburne, Algernon Charles, Atalanta in Calydon (London: Moxon, 1865).
–––––, Poems and Ballads (London: Moxon, 1866; London: Hotten, 1866).
Taylor, A. E., ‘Francis Herbert Bradley, 1846–1924’, Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 9 (1924–5), pp. 458–68.
–––––, ‘F. H. Bradley’, Mind, vol. 34 ns (1925), pp. 1–12.
–––––, ‘Francis Herbert Bradley’, Dictionary of National Biography, 1922–30 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 101–103.
Tennyson, Alfred, ‘Maud’ in Maud and Other Poems (London: Moxon, 1855).
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library, 1958–62).
Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in America, 2 vols. (London: Saunders and Otley, 1835).
–––––, L’ancien régime et la révolution (Paris: Lévy, 1856).
Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf, Das Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1868).
Venn, John, The Logic of Chance, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1876).
–––––, Symbolic Logic (London: Macmillan, 1881).
Wallace, William, Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics, ed. E. Caird (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898).
Walsh, W. H., ‘Bradley and Critical History’, in The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley, ed. Anthony Manser and Guy Stock (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 33–52.
Ward, Wilfred, Men and Matters (London: Longmans, Green, 1914).
Wempe, Bernard, Beyond Equality: A Study of T. H. Green’s Theory of Positive Freedom (Delft: Eburon, 1986).
Whewell, William, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England (London: Parker, 1852; new ed., Cambridge: Deighton Bell, 1862).
Wollaston, William, The Religion of Nature Delineated (London: privately printed, 1722).
Woods, Margaret Bradley, Papers: Memoirs of Charles Bradley, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
Zeller, Eduard, Vorträge und Abhandlungen geschichtlichen Inhalts (leipzig: Fues, 1865).
Carol A. Keene, 'Introduction', Collected Works of F.H. Bradley, ed. W. J. Mander and Carol A. Keene (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999), vol. 1: A Pluralistic Approach to Philosophy, 1865-1882, ed. Carol A. Keene, pp. xi-xxiv.
© Carol A. Keene, 1999.
All rights reserved. For personal Use only.