Though ethical and epistemological considerations, respectively, open and close the years covered by this volume, Bradley’s focus across these years of 1883–1902 was upon metaphysics and psychology, disciplines to which he had always been attracted as evidenced by his early writings, but within which he had not yet worked in a sustained fashion to develop his own views. What were the specific promptings leading him to take up these disciplines at this time? What relation did he consider to exist between them? It is these questions that I wish to explore, before briefly highlighting the unpublished materials included in this volume.
Considering first Bradley’s pursuit of metaphysics, his initial writings left unresolved a number of metaphysical issues, as he himself often pointed out. In The Presuppositions of Critical History, we are introduced to a definition of ‘fact’ which maintains that facts are neither merely subjective nor merely objective, but somehow a product of both. We meet ‘my real world’ and ‘personal experience’ with assigned criteriological roles. The sense in which experience can be ‘personal’ and yet not simply subjective, moreover, is acknowledged as a crucial issue and is, to some measure, addressed. These themes all point to Bradley’s pivotal doctrine of immediate experience, a doctrine that is hard at work throughout The Presuppositions, though present in a somewhat germinal fashion, rooted in Hegel’s psychology.1 The key difficulty here is that this doctrine is working without benefit of critical scrutiny either as a foundational metaphysical doctrine or as a key psychological theory.
In Ethical Studies, Bradley cautions against any expectation that he is ‘a finished student of metaphysic’, though he unequivocally claims that ‘ethical theories rest in the end on preconceptions metaphysical and psychological’.2 Leaving aside momentarily the relation of psychology to ethics, we find a number of metaphysical questions that arise within the context of his own ethic of self-realization, questions which he readily acknowledges require consideration, but which must be deferred because of his lack of a metaphysics. For example, what is the nature of realization? What do we mean by ‘realize’, by ‘real’? What is the nature of self? No one can discount the force of Bradley’s descriptive powers in ‘My Station and its Duties’ as he poses a dialectical corrective to the one-sidedness both of the atomistic self associated with the ‘School of Experience’ (represented by the Mills and Alexander Bain) and of the formalistic self attributed to an exaggerated Kantianism. Yet, however powerful his description of the English child, whose entry into this world and subsequent development is neither as a bare particular nor a bare universal, still it is a description dependent upon the preconception of a foundational ground of immediacy, which, again, lacks metaphysical warrant. Moreover, Ethical Studies includes other metaphysical issues in want of response. What is the metaphysical status of ‘process’? Does the process of self-realization involve ‘progress’? What is ‘progress’? Further, given the evolutionary character of the moral point of view, what is the metaphysical status of evolution? What do we mean by higher and lower if we speak of moral progress in the race? in the individual? If we mean more or less ‘real’, then once again we are thrown back upon metaphysics.
In turning to The Principles of Logic, we find Bradley remarking that, though some will consider this work to be ‘too metaphysical’, his metaphysics is ‘really very limited’.3 Here, as in Ethical Studies, he repeatedly defers metaphysical considerations. In so doing, he maintains, in marked contrast to Hegel, that logic can be looked upon as a special science and hence dealt with in virtual independence from metaphysics. But, in adopting a view of reality that he considered consonant with common sense, he was unable to stay within its boundaries. His subsequent shifting between a common sense view of reality and a view of reality as the Absolute left this work begging for clarification of a metaphysical nature. Hence with the completion and submission of The Principles in 1882, Bradley could no longer defer coming to grips with the metaphysical issues underlying this work as well as his previous works. If the theories advanced in philosophy of history, ethics and logic are based upon metaphysical presuppositions, then the latter require critical scrutiny in order that these theories may be granted a more stable ground than that of merely provisional theories, theories awaiting the metaphysical establishment of their facts.
This much abbreviated excursion into some metaphysical preconceptions at work in Bradley’s pre-Appearance writings highlights reasons internal to his own philosophy for his focusing upon metaphysics. This appears to be the basis as well for his pursuing psychology, a basis beyond, of course, his own interest in this field in its own right. His linkage of philosophy and psychology from the inception of his work derives, to a large degree, from his indebtedness to Hegel’s psychology for his doctrine of immediate experience. Given the very nature of immediate experience and the centrality of immediacy to Bradley’s thought, he was led to draw upon psychology in a special way. It was to psychology that he turned in the mid-1880s – and returned after writing Appearance and Reality – for assistance in articulating the nature of immediacy or feeling, in considering the relation of pleasure and pain to immediacy, in explaining the genesis of the self and not-self from within immediacy, and in clarifying such concepts as conation and volition. In so doing, he was led beyond Hegel to the Herbartians and, in his post-Appearance work, to still more recent psychologists of various points of view.
Further, as we noted above, Bradley considers ethics to rest not only on metaphysical presuppositions but on psychological ones, too.4 The ethical theories which he criticizes in Ethical Studies as well as his own ethical theory involve psychological preconceptions about pleasure and pain, desire and volition, and the development of the good self and the bad self, to cite but a few examples. To firm up the foundation of his ethics would hence require verification of his psychological claims. Then, too, as Bradley briefly considered ethical issues after completing The Principles of Logic, such issues as whether there can be pure malevolence and whether interest in others derives from sympathy, he found himself once again drawing upon psychological accounts of malevolence and sympathy.5
But, however much Bradley considered psychology to be a critical source of knowledge for philosophic work, he remained a staunch opponent of psychologism, as Lotze had before him in his Logic and as Husserl would after him in his Logical Investigations.6 More specifically, in The Principles of Logic, Bradley had targeted the psychologism of English empiricism, countering that logic is concerned with ideas as symbols or universals, not as psychical entities or particular mental occurrences. Though psychology can make a contribution to our understanding of judgment, inference and universal ideas, its descriptive methodology, for Bradley, is, in principle, too restrictive for logic.7 His advocacy of a rigorous distinction between the psychological and the logical is, of course, applicable to any form of psychologism, not merely to the empiricist version associated with the ‘School of Experience’, with the Mills and Bain. What adds fuel to the fire in the case of ‘the School of Experience’ is its psychological atomism. It is this particular form of reductionism that provokes Bradley’s critique of the empiricist theory of inference, of the empiricist view of associationism, a critique to which he would return in ‘Association and Thought’ after some further work in psychology.8 What Bradley sought was a psychological theory that would counter the atomistic, mechanistic theory of empiricism, whether that atomism be advanced in logic, ethics or psychology itself. He desired a psychological theory that would cohere with a metaphysics offering a foundational unity of experience, a unity in which the abstractionism of atomism would be shown to fail and the age-old problem of the one and the many would somehow find resolution. But even such a psychology must be kept distinct from logic. It is not that there is no appropriate place for a psychological study of judgment or of other logical processes or, again, that such a study may not be useful to the logician; the point for Bradley is, quite simply, that logic is not that place, since it is not confined to the descriptive as psychology is, but is involved in valuation. As he would later express this in the second edition of The Principles, both logic and psychology, as special sciences, are in a sense defective because limited in scope. Both logic and psychology, ‘considering in part the same matter, are forced to take up that matter each one-sidedly and in the end untruly. These sciences of course should throw light one on the other, but neither deals with the entire fact, and the reduction of one to the other is impossible.’9
Hence there were several factors intrinsic to Bradley’s own work that demanded his commitment to the study and pursuit of psychology. Of course, there was also the wider cultural milieu in the nineteenth century in which psychology was gaining ever-increasing prominence with Lotze’s development of physiological psychology mid-century and Wundt’s subsequent establishment of a psychological laboratory. The evolution of psychology from its ranks within philosophy to its status as an independent, empirical science did not nullify the close link between the two fields in Bradley’s day. In England, one formal acknowledgement of the strength of this link was the founding in 1876 of Mind: A Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, a journal funded by Alexander Bain, with George Croom Robertson as its initial editor, succeeded by G. F. Stout in 1892, philosophers whose work in psychology was extensive. Then, too, the lengthy article on psychology by James Ward in the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1886 drew much attention, not only because of Ward’s biological approach to psychology, but because of the reassessment of psychology’s relation to philosophy that this approach involved.10 Furthermore, in recognition of the cross-fertilization occurring within these disciplines, collaborators principally from the United States and Britain, with a handful from France, Austria, Germany and Italy, worked under the editorship of the American philosopher and psychologist James Mark Baldwin to produce a two-volume Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology in 1901, with a third volume, appearing in 1905, offering an extensive bibliography compiled by Benjamin Rand.11 Because the cultural context was one which considered psychology not only as a key discipline in its own right, but also as a useful tool in the service of philosophy, Bradley was eager to point up to younger philosophers such as Samuel Alexander and A. E. Taylor its importance, and he expressed concern about there not being more psychological activity in Oxford.12 His dual interest in philosophy and psychology reflected, in some measure, the era in which he came of philosophical age, though ultimately his pursuit of psychology resulted from his own assessment both of the significance of this discipline and of the needs of his own work. With this perspective, he would join the ranks of such other philosophers emergent in the last quarter of the nineteenth century as Nietzsche, Ward, Stout, Dewey, James, Brentano and Bergson. Perhaps the interest which the closure of twentieth-century philosophy will inevitably evoke about its origins, will lead to a careful examination of the psychological sources that such thinkers shared in common, a feature that may well have contributed to a certain family resemblance among some of their doctrines, despite the diversity they represent.
In considering why Bradley chose to work more or less concurrently in metaphysics and psychology for about five years prior to initiating the writing of Appearance and Reality in the autumn of 1887, a comment he made on Waitz’s view of the relationship of metaphysics and psychology may be instructive. He noted that a critical exploration of metaphysical issues was intrinsically dependent, at least in part, upon psychology, and added as well that the relationship between these disciplines was a synergistic one. Psychology is both ‘founded on provisional metaphysics’ and, in turn, ‘founds metaphysics’ since ‘the history of the mind is one part of the facts which Metaphysics must take into account’, facts which ‘provisional Metaphysics must be used’ to establish.13 That metaphysicians should avail themselves of the wealth of information afforded by psychological investigations of psychical events, their origins and classifications, their laws of coexistence and sequence, he thus affirms. But he cautions that psychology’s provision of ‘facts’ is not privileged, since every field of knowledge has this function in relation to metaphysics. Nor does psychology hold criteriological pre-eminence. It serves only as a norm, not the norm, of coherence in metaphysical enquiry as is the case, again, with other fields of knowledge. He further remarks that metaphysics must be able to show its ‘own psychological developement to be possible’ or suffer condemnation ‘because not adequate to facts of the universe’.
This essential interplay between psychology and metaphysics requires a certain vigilance, however, in order to ensure that the distinction between these fields is not blurred and to avoid the consequent danger of methodological confusion. For Bradley, the appropriate methodology of psychology as an empirical science is phenomenalism, since psychology involves the examination of mental events from the perspective of their coexistence and succession. Metaphysics, on the other hand, has as its function to seek out the ultimate nature of reality as against phenomena. Hence the all too ready importation of metaphysics into psychology by some thinkers may well lead to taking, for example, a given meaning of self, a meaning valid in a certain psychological context, as an absolute or ultimate meaning, thereby blurring the distinctiveness of these fields, their objects, and their methodologies. Moreover, as a special science, psychology requires no importation or intrusion of metaphysics, since its findings are working ideas, not claimants to ultimate truth.14 To fail to acknowledge and sustain this distinction is to create mischief and needless ambiguity in both philosophy and psychology. Perhaps it is because Bradley thought that he might be easily misunderstood if he imported psychology into his own metaphysics that he wrote of being loath to doing so in sketching ‘The Meanings of Self’ for Appearance and Reality. Yet he also wrote that he had no choice but to do so, a point he made as well in Appearance, wherein he clarified that his so doing did ‘not mean that metaphysics is based upon psychology. I am quite convinced that such a foundation is impossible, and that, if attempted, it produces a disastrous hybrid which possesses the merits of neither science. … But, on the other hand, the metaphysician who is no psychologist runs great dangers. For he must take up, and must work upon, the facts about the soul.’15 The tension with psychology being at once indispensable to metaphysics and yet, in some measure, inconsequential to metaphysical truth because of its restriction to phenomenalism is one with which Bradley does wrestle. Though he is firm in underscoring the methodological difference between these disciplines, yet because of the primacy of immediate experience in his metaphysics and the other doctrinal links suggested above, psychology is given a role in his philosophy that no other science has; if not ‘privileged’, it remains his favourite drawing card. Whether his importation of psychology into his own metaphysics, especially in his account of the self, ultimately helps or hinders his metaphysical discussion, or, again – to avoid the fallacy of the false alternative – is simply a draw, is both an interesting and important question, but one that cannot be dealt with here.16
Yet it is not only the blurring of appropriate methodological distinctions that Bradley cautions against in considering psychology and metaphysics. He warns also against confused meanings not only in ordinary discourse but in professional usage as well. The rooting out of unnecessary ambiguity in our ordinary conceptions as well as in usage of professional terminology is an important common thread in Bradley’s metaphysical and psychological writings, a thread that obviously demands attentiveness to conceptual clarification and delineation. If we look first at Bradley’s metaphysics in this light, there is no doubt that the metaphysics offered in Appearance and Reality is a meaning-oriented one. In Book One, we meet well-known metaphysical concepts, however much clothed in the garb of common sense and the science of the day, concepts which Bradley scrutinizes and finds lacking as contenders to the throne of the metaphysical ultimate. Time, space and self, among others, all fall. Though his polemically charged use of terms such as ‘unreal’ did not serve him or his readers well, nonetheless there is no question as to whether time or space or the self exists. Of course they exist and hence may be said to be ‘real’, but not ultimately real or ultimate reality. Why not? Because their meanings cannot be understood in a manner free from contradiction. It is this that Bradley questions in his metaphysics, namely, whether we can understand any meaning of time or space or, again, of self in a manner free from contradiction. His approach is not dissimilar to the phenomenological method; he ‘brackets’ existence, concerned not with the ‘that’, but with the ‘what’. Moreover, his goal in examining meanings of time, space and self is not merely negative. He is not simply concerned with pointing up the contradictions inherent in our ordinary conceptions or professional usages and their consequent failure as metaphysical ultimates, however significant this strategy is to his metaphysics. Rather, he is concerned as well with clarifying what the ordinary conception of time, for example, is or what the psychological conception, say, of the normal self is, and with underscoring that a meaning barred from metaphysical usage may be appropriate in its special sphere of discourse as a partial meaning or a working idea, whether that sphere be our practical world or the discipline of psychology.
To pursue this a bit further, there is a sense in which Bradley in his discussion of meanings of self in Appearance and Reality is seeking to advance the interests of psychology, not merely to use it in the service of philosophy. For in turning to psychology for meanings of self, he also sharpens the meanings in current psychological usage. That it was his hope to bring clarity to the chaos he found in psychological terminology, is suggested, moreover, by a remark of Bosanquet in his letter of 24 July 1886 to Bradley on the occasion of Bradley’s publication of ‘Is there a special activity of Attention?’: ‘If you can really breathe some spirit of thoroughness and precision into English psychology, it will turn the tables in many ways.’17 That this remained Bradley’s goal after he completed Appearance and Reality is evidenced by his 1893 Mind article ‘Consciousness and Experience’, an article which does seek to change psychological usage of the term ‘consciousness’. In submitting this article to Stout, he apparently expressed again his desire to clarify the meaning of key terms within psychology, for Stout in his letter of 31 January 1893 sought to dissuade him from taking up this task, remarking that it was too late to turn the tide of usage in English psychology.18 Nonetheless Bradley pursued this goal, choosing to examine topics that not only were central to psychological discussions of the time but had significance as well for his own earlier philosophical work. This commitment to psychology from 1893 to 1902 so dominated his work that he strayed from it only to publish an article on punishment, together with two notes on ethical matters, and to respond, of course, to critics of Appearance and Reality, a response that chiefly took the form of a second edition.
There are several questions that emerge in light of Bradley’s work across the years of 1883–1902, especially since he spent most of this time on psychological writings, writings which, despite the recent renaissance of interest in his thought, have, with few exceptions, been largely ignored. To what extent do these writings address the psychological preconceptions at work in his early writings? Does his psychological work illumine these earlier writings? If so, in what ways?19 Then, too, since Bradley intended to put more time into psychology prior to writing Appearance and Reality than he subsequently did do, and since he considered the account of immediate experience in that book to be deficient because it lacked an adequate psychological treatment, there is the question of whether his post-Appearance psychological writings offer a corrective to this deficiency, and, if so, what they specifically add to Bradleian metaphysics.20 Still another angle from which to question the import of psychology for Bradley’s philosophical work is to consider whether his psychological writings across these twenty years influence his later writings. These questions, together with the one raised earlier about whether his drawing upon psychology in his account of the self in Appearance benefits or hinders his metaphysics, all focus upon Bradley’s own work. But there are also questions concerning the impact of his psychological writings upon other fields. Though he clearly was among the transitional thinkers who had an effect upon psychology in terms of his opposition to the atomistic associationism of the empiricist tradition, and though his own psychology has affinity with Gestalt psychology and other developments within continental psychology, there is at present scant evidence of his psychological writings per se having had a direct, long-term effect upon psychology.21 After all, ‘impact’ requires a two-way street and the path to Bradley’s psychological writings has barely been tread by philosophers, much less by psychologists. Perhaps a more fruitful enquiry would involve consideration of the import of his writings as a whole, both philosophical and psychological, for contemporary psychology, for the continuing development of philosophy of mind, and for the relatively new field of cognitive science, however much Bradley himself warned against a hybrid science of cognition.22 Quite obviously, this array of questions goes beyond the scope of the present Introduction to explore. Yet the highlighting of such questions may serve to suggest that much remains to be mined in Bradley’s thought before we can determine the worth of the find.
A few words are now in order about the previously unpublished work included in this volume. The volume opens with MS BK a (2.1), a notebook used by Bradley c. 1883–7, a time when he was bringing to completion a few ethical articles, making notes about metaphysical issues, writing on spiritualism, and developing psychological articles on the concepts of comparison and attention, as well as one on pleasure, pain, desire and volition. Though Bradley states in the Preface to Appearance and Reality that he did not begin writing this work until the autumn of 1887, MS BK a confirms that his metaphysical jottings preceded that date, as does a remark of Bernard Bosanquet in a letter of 6 December 1884 to Bradley, wherein he writes of his hope that Bradley is progressing with his metaphysical work.23 But consonant with Bradley’s remark in the Preface to Appearance is that an outline of this work, included in MS BK T (2.2) was not developed until mid-summer 1887. MS BK T also reveals that Bradley’s thoughts were on other matters during this time, since preceding the outline are numerous aphorisms, many dealing with love.24 It quite probably was at this time that Bradley considered the possibility of marriage to ‘Eve’ Radcliff, the daughter of an American engineer, who lived with her father in the French Riviera and whom he had met while travelling down the Nile from November 1880 to May 1881. Whatever the reasons for his not marrying her, he immersed himself in metaphysics; Appearance and Reality would bear the dedication: ‘To my friend E. R. this unworthy volume is respectfully dedicated.’
MS BK T, which he used c. 1887–92, is devoted almost exclusively to notes in preparation of his major metaphysical work. However, while using this notebook for jotting down his thoughts, Bradley was also drafting chapters of this book. The papers titled ‘Sketches of Chapters of Appearance and Reality’ (2.3) consist of entries from two further notebooks and provide an opportunity to see this work as a work in progress, replete with doctrinal and organizational questions. Bradley would acknowledge in the second edition of Appearance that he regretted the ‘want of system’ in his book, but against criticism of the order of the book, he would write:
The order of the book seemed to myself a matter of no great importance. So far as I can see, whatever way I had taken the result would have been the same, and I must doubt if any other way would have been better for most readers. From whatever point we had begun we should have found ourselves entangled in the same puzzles, and have been led to attempt the same way of escape. The arrangement of the book does not correspond to the order of my thoughts, and the same would have been true of any other arrangement which it was in my power to adopt.25
This text, though about the organization of the book, suggests at least two senses of ‘want of system’ in this work that have troubled its readers: (1) its lack of a framework for analysis of the phenomenal world, and (2) its lack of an explicit interconnectedness among its chapters. For example, in Book One, ‘Appearance’, the reader is met with a series of more or less discrete essays on various current conceptions of contenders for the title of ultimate reality, but is offered no conceptual framework for the ensuing onslaught that occurs. In light of such criticism of Appearance and his own words about the order of the book, the opening items of this volume may have added interest in showing Bradley’s method of composition of this his major metaphysical work.
Once Bradley had submitted the manuscript of Appearance and Reality for publication first to Clarendon Press and then to Swan Sonnenschein in 1892, and had made the revisions suggested by the latter publisher, he returned to a focused reading of contemporary psychological works, principally French and German works, but including as well the writings of James Ward and G. F. Stout.26 During this decade from 1893 to 1902, he used MS BK Z (2.4), in the main, for notations for the psychological articles he would produce and for some notes germane to his revision of Appearance and Reality. He also considered replying to Alfred Sidgwick’s ‘Mr. Bradley and the Sceptics’ in 1894, drafting ‘Reply to Alfred Sidgwick’ (2.5), which he decided against publishing.27 Though somewhat unpolished, this reply nonetheless is of interest in that it serves to underscore Bradley’s ongoing struggle with scepticism and his own efforts at distinguishing different forms of scepticism. In 1895 he produced ‘On Shand’s “Attention and Will”’(2.6), which he intended to publish, but an accident prevented its appearing in Mind in a timely fashion. This unpublished essay, however, was of sufficient importance to Bradley that he chose to readdress some of its points some years later in ‘On Mental Conflict and Imputation’.28 Both writings are significant for readers interested in pursuing the degree to which Bradley’s psychological writings of this period impact upon his earlier ethical writing or in considering his theory of the ‘mine’. Similarly, such readers would find of interest Bradley’s Mind articles on conation and volition, the latter being a development of his ‘On Pleasure, Pain, Desire, and Volition’, an 1888 Mind article to which he rather frequently refers.
Signalling a renewed interest in matters metaphysical is Bradley’s ‘On the Absolute Theory of Time’ (2.7), an unfinished essay prompted by Bertrand Russell’s ‘Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative?’.29 The closing pages of both parts of MS BK Z also show his being drawn back to metaphysical issues in his resumption of work on the metaphysical status of immediate experience, together with the thorny epistemological problem of how immediacy or feeling is known. These pages further reveal another transition in Bradley’s philosophical development, a movement to reconsider issues related to the nature of the criterion of truth and reality, a move that would refocus his attention in his final decades on metaphysics and epistemology.
Lastly, this volume includes ‘Selections from Bradley’s Reading Notes’ (2.8) across the years 1883–1902. Because of the staggering volume of material from which selections had to be made, several of the selections are of excerpts from his reading notes. Many of his notes – especially those on works of French and German psychologists in the 1890s – are brief, topical notes, offering little, if any, evaluative commentary. These have been systematically excluded, as were his notes on Volkmann’s Lehrbuch der Psychologie for the same reason, though, as noted above, he credits Volkmann as being a key influence upon his development. Other instances of exclusion or rigorous excerpting are based upon the judgment that some extensive detail, for example about sense organs in notes on H. R. K. Fortlage’s System der Psychologie als empirische Wissenschaft not only goes beyond that with which the general reader would have an interest but discloses virtually nothing about the development of Bradley’s thought. Generally, an effort has been made to balance the import of his notes for enriching our understanding of his thought against the constraints of available space. The ‘List of What Bradley Read’ across these years, provided as an Appendix, offers the full range of texts that can be evidenced as having been read by him, in whole or in part.30
1 See PL, n. 1, p. 515. Bradley’s clarification of his indebtedness to Hegel’s psychology on this point occurs within a wider context of an account of his view of psychology and its relationship to philosophy generally and to logic in particular.
2 See ES, p. viii.
3 See PL, p. xi.
4 See n. 2. For a discussion of Bradley’s view of the relation between ethics and psychology, see Don MacNiven, Bradley’s Moral Psychology (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987), especially chap. 1. See also Philip McEwen (ed.), Ethics, Metaphysics and Religion in the Thought of F. H. Bradley (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996), a collection of essays prompted by MacNiven’s book.
5 See Bradley’s ‘Is there such a thing as Pure Malevolence?’, Mind, vol. 8 os,
no. 31 (July 1883), pp. 415–18, reprinted in CE, pp. 133–7; and ‘Sympathy and Interest’, Mind, vol. 8, no. 32 (October 1883), pp. 573–5, reprinted in CE,
6 For a fine, though brief, discussion of Bradley and Husserl on psychologism, see T. L. S. Sprigge, James & Bradley: American Truth & British Reality (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), pp. 293–5.
7 See PL, pp. 1–10. For Bradley’s later remarks on psychology and logic in the second edition of PL, see pp. 515–16, n. 1 and pp. 612–13.
8 See PL, pp. 299–347 for Bradley’s criticism of the empiricist theory of the association of ideas; see also ‘Association and Thought’, Mind, vol. 12 os, no. 47 (July 1887), pp. 354–81, reprinted in CE, pp. 205–38. In the second edition of PL, he would remark that, in his critique of associationism, he did intend to ‘show that a truer logic must imply a diverse view of psychical fact. Judgment and Inference, in other words, when interpreted rightly by logic, must show their essential nature even at their psychical beginning’ (p. 515, n. 1). As Sprigge (see n. 6) rightly points out, Bradley’s rejection of psychologism does not mean that he wishes to isolate logic from a study of thinking. For a recent discussion of Bradley’s criticism of the empiricist view, see Phillip Ferreira, ‘F. H. Bradley’s Attack on Associationism’, in Philosophy after F. H. Bradley, ed. James Bradley (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996),
pp. 283–306. In mentioning Ferreira’s essay, I wish to note as well that this book is a major contribution to Bradley scholarship in its focus upon Bradley’s impact upon a wide variety of thinkers and philosophical topics.
9 See PL, p. 613.
10 See James Ward, ‘Psychology’, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 20, 9th ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1886), pp. 37–85.
11 See James Mark Baldwin (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 3 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1901–1905). The bibliography, which includes publications only up to 1900, lists in the psychology section thirteen of Bradley’s Mind articles published between 1885 and 1900. During the years covered by this volume Bradley would complete six additional psychological articles, though their publication dates would range from 1901 to 1904. For a list of Bradley’s publications, see CW, vol. 5, Appendix E. It is convenient to add here that The Journal of Philosophy, published in the United States, was at its inception in 1904 called The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods.
12 See CW, vol. 4, pp. 51–2, for Bradley’s letter of 25 September 1892 to Samuel Alexander wherein he suggests that Alexander’s ‘not being further advanced in psychology’ would make his securing a fellowship at Merton College rather difficult. See A. E. Taylor’s ‘F. H. Bradley’, Mind, vol. 34 ns (January 1925), pp. 1–12, esp. p. 7, for Bradley’s urging of the study of the Herbartians as an antidote to Hegel; see also CW, vol. 4, pp. 170–71, for Bradley’s letter of 10 December 1898 to G. F. Stout, wherein he recommends Taylor for a post, noting, among other things, that Taylor is well versed generally in psychology. Finally see CW, vol. 4, pp. 89–91, for Bradley’s letter of
14 March 1894 to G. F. Stout, wherein he expresses his desire for more psychology in Oxford. It is convenient to note here that in a letter of
5 January 1920 to Gabriel Marcel, Bradley observed that he was most influenced in psychology by Hegel, the Herbartians Moritz Drobisch, Wilhelm Volkmann and Theodor Waitz, and Lotze; see CW, vol. 5, pp. 243–4. He made similar remarks to R. F. Alfred Hoernlé in his letters of 9 August 1907 and 12 February 1914; see CW, vol. 5, pp. 59–60 and pp. 184–6.
13 See p. 472 in this volume for the full text of Bradley’s remark on Theodor Waitz’s view in Grundlegung der Psychologie (Hamburg: Perthes, 1846). The quotations at the close of this paragraph are also from this text.
14 For Bradley’s development of the restriction of psychology to phenomenalism, see AR, chap. 11, pp. 105–109 and ‘A Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology’, Mind, vol. 9 ns, no. 33 (January 1900), pp. 26–45, reprinted in CE, pp. 364–86. On barring metaphysics from psychology, see also PL, pp. 340–41, and ‘Association and Thought’, Mind, vol. 12 os, no. 47 (July 1887), pp. 354–5, reprinted in CE,
pp. 205–206. For discussions of Bradley’s phenomenalism, see Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1955), pp. 445–70; J. D’Andrade, ‘F. H. Bradley’s Psychology’, in Philosophy and Life, and Other Papers (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1952), pp. 156–70; and R. N. Kaul, ‘Phenomenalist Psychology of F. H. Bradley’, Review of Philosophy and Religion (India), vol. 3 (1932), pp. 33–44; vol. 6 (1935), pp. 26–38. For similarities between Bradley and Husserl on phenomenalism in general, see Sprigge, James & Bradley: American Truth & British Reality, pp. 538–9.
15 See p. 187 in this volume and AR, p. 65.
16 See Carol A. Keene, ‘F. H. Bradley’s Theory of Self’ (Dissertation; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1969), wherein it is argued that the specific psychological meanings that Bradley used in Appearance and Reality did not serve his metaphysics well.
17 See CW, vol. 4, pp. 24–9, esp. p. 29.
18 See Bradley’s ‘Consciousness and Experience’, Mind, vol. 2 ns, no. 6 (April 1893), pp. 211–16, reprinted in ETR, pp. 192–8. For the Stout letter, see CW, vol. 4, pp. 63–5.
19 For a good discussion of the impact of some of Bradley’s later psychological writings on the theories of desire and volition offered in Ethical Studies, see MacNiven, Bradley’s Moral Psychology, chap. 5.
20 It is in Bradley’s letter of 3 February 1893 to Stout that he mentions this deficiency in Appearance and Reality, and speaks of his original intent as well; see CW, vol. 4, pp. 65–6.
21 See D. W. Hamlyn, ‘Bradley, Ward, and Stout’, in Historical Roots of Contemporary Psychology, ed. B. Wolman (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 298–320, who, in examining Bradley’s role relative to the empiricist associationism, observes that his principal positive contribution to psychology was ‘the emphasis on the part played by judgment in mental processes like perception, and all that this entails’, an emphasis that, in Bradley’s own view, ‘was not a psychological matter at all’ (p. 302). See MacNiven, in Bradley’s Moral Psychology, pp. 178–88, wherein he suggests some similarity between Bradley’s view and that of Lawrence Kohlberg in the latter’s Essays on Moral Development (1981–2), and David Crossley, ‘Feeling in Bradley’s Ethical Studies’, Ethics, Metaphysics and Religion in the Thought of F. H. Bradley, ed. P. MacEwen (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press), pp. 154–76, who also discusses the affinities between Bradley’s theory and that of Kohlberg. It is convenient to note here Fred Wilson’s ‘Bradley’s Critique of Associationism’, Bradley Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 5–60. Though I have only had a chance to glance at this article, Wilson situates Bradley historically within the psychological theories of his day and considers, as well, the relationship of his critique of associationism to his metaphysical doctrine of relations.
22 See AR, p. 65. The ‘disastrous’ hybrid, in Bradley’s view, would be a union of metaphysics and psychology.
23 See CW, vol. 4, pp. 15–17.
24 Some forty of these aphorisms were selected by Bradley for inclusion in Aphorisms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).
25 See AR, p. 491.
26 Regarding Bradley’s submission of Appearance and Reality, see CW, vol. 4, pp. 48–50 for his letters to Clarendon Press and Swan Sonnenschein.
27 See Alfred Sidgwick ‘Mr. Bradley and the Sceptics’, Mind, vol. 3 ns, no. 11 (July 1894), pp. 336–47.
28 The article which provoked these essays is Alexander F. Shand, ‘Attention and Will: A Study in Involuntary Action’, Mind, vol. 4 ns, no. 16 (October 1895), pp. 450–71. See also ‘On Mental Conflict and Imputation’, Mind,
vol. 11 ns, no. 43 (July 1902), pp. 289–315, reprinted in CE, pp. 444–75.
29 See Bertrand Russell, ‘Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative?’, Mind, vol. 10 ns, no. 39 (July 1901), pp. 293–317.
30 There are a few works which Bradley took notes on either in 1882 or in 1883. They have been included neither in this list nor in the one in CW, vol. 1, because the year in which they were read cannot be determined. They are
W. Aldridge’s Lectures on Grammar and Rhetoric, an unidentified work by one Dumont, John Henry Cardinal Newman’s Grammar of Assent and Fichte’s Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftlehre.
Bibliographical references are given in full for the works cited and for other works consulted by the editor, with the exception of the writings of Bradley himself. For a list of his previously published writings, the reader is directed to CW, vol. 5, Appendix E. The year of initial publication is given for texts referred to by Bradley, unless he has specified otherwise.
Alexander, Samuel, Moral Order and Progress (London: Trübner, 1889).
Bain, Alexander, The Senses and the Intellect, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Robert, and Green, 1864). Bradley also used the 1st ed. (1855) and the 3rd ed. (1868).
Baldwin, James Mark (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 3 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1901–1905).
Balfour, A. J., A Defence of Philosophic Doubt, being an Essay on the Foundation of Belief (London: Macmillan, 1879).
Binet, Alfred, ‘Recherches sur les alterations de la conscience chez les hysteriques’, Revue philosophique, vol. 27 (1889),
Binet, Alfred and Féré, Charles, Le magnétisme animal (Paris: Alcan, 1887); English trans. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1887).
Blanshard, Brand, The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1955).
Bosanquet, Bernard, Knowledge and Reality (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1885).
–––––, ‘Comparison—In Psychology and Logic’, Mind, vol. 11 os, no. 43 (July 1886), pp. 405–408.
–––––, Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888).
–––––, The Essentials of Logic (London: Macmillan, 1895).
Bouillier, Françisque, Du plaisir et de la douleur (Paris: Ballière, 1865).
Brentano, Franz, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1874).
Cornelius, Hans, Psychologie als Erfahrungswissenschaft (Leipzig: Teubner, 1897).
Crossley, David, ‘Feeling in Bradley’s Ethical Studies’, ed.
P. MacEwen (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996), pp. 154–78.
D’Andrade, J., ‘F. H. Bradley’s Psychology’, in Philosophy and Life, and Other Papers (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1952),
Delbouef, J., Le sommeil et les rêves avec théories de la certitude et de la mémoire (Paris: Alcan, 1885).
Dessoir, Max, Das Doppel-Ich (Berlin: Siegismund, 1889).
Dewey, John, Psychology (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887).
Drobisch, Moritz, Empirische Psychologie nach naturwissenschaftlicher Methode (Leipzig: Voss, 1842).
Ebbinghaus, Hermann, Über das Gedächtnis; Untersuchungen zur experimentellen Psychologie (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1885).
Ehrenfels, Christian, Ueber Fühlen und Wohlen (Vienna: Georld’s Sohn, 1887).
Ferreira, Phillip, ‘F. H. Bradley’s Attack on Associationism’, in Philosophy after F. H. Bradley, ed. James Bradley (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996), pp. 283–306.
Fiske, John, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, 2 vols. (London, Macmillan, 1874).
Forel, August, Der Hypnotismus (Stuttgart: Enke, 1889).
Fortlage, H. R. K., System der Psychologie als empirische Wissenschaft, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1885).
Goncourt, Edmond de, Journal de Goncourt mémoires de la vie littéraire, 3 vols. (Paris: Charpentier, 1887–8).
––––– and Jules de, Germinie Lacerteux, new ed. (Paris: Charpentier, 1889); first published in 1864.
Hamlyn, D. W., ‘Bradley, Ward, and Stout’, in Historical Roots of Contemporary Psychology, ed. B. Wolman (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 298–320.
Hegel, G. W. F., Werke, vol. 12: Philosophie der Religion, vol. 2 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1840).
Hobhouse, L. T., The Theory of Knowledge (London: Methuen, 1896).
Hodgson, Shadworth H., ‘Reflective Consciousness’, Mind,
vol. 3 ns, no. 2 (April 1894), pp. 208–21.
–––––, The Metaphysic of Experience, 4 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1898).
Höffding, Harald, Outlines of Psychology (London: Macmillan, 1892).
–––––, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1905).
Irons, David, ‘The Nature of Emotion’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 6 (1897), pp. 242–56.
James, William, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Holt, 1890).
Janet, Pierre, L’automatisme psychologique (Paris: Alcan, 1889).
–––––, État mental des hystérique: les stigmates mentaux (Paris: Rueff, 1893).
Kaul, R. N., ‘Phenomenalist Psychology of F. H. Bradley’, Review of Philosophy and Religion (India), vol. 3 (1932),
pp. 33–44; vol. 6 (1935), pp. 26–38.
Keene, Carol A., ‘F. H. Bradley’s Theory of Self’ (Dissertation; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1969).
Ladd, George Trumbull, Philosophy of Mind (New York: Scribner’s, 1891).
Lehmann, Alfred, Die Hypnose und die damit verwandten normalen Zustände (Leipzig: Reisland, 1890).
Lotze, Hermann, Metaphysik (Leipzig: Weidmann, 1841).
–––––, Medicinische Psychologie (Leipzig: Weidmann, 1852).
–––––, Mikrokosmus, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1856–64).
–––––, Metaphysik: Drei Bücher der Ontologie, Kosmologie und Psychologie (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1879).
–––––, Grundzüge der Psychologie (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1881).
–––––, Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1882).
MacEwen, Philip (ed.), Ethics, Metaphysics and Religion in the Thought of F. H. Bradley (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996).
MacNiven, Don, Bradley’s Moral Psychology (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987).
Maury, L. F. Alfred, Le sommeil et les rêves, 4th ed. (Paris: Didier, 1878).
Mill, James, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, new ed., ed. J. S. Mill (London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1869).
Moll, Albert, Hypnotism (London: Scott, 1890; also published in New York: Scribner and Welford, 1890; and in Berlin: Fischer, 1890 under the title of Der Hypnotismus).
Moore G. E., ‘The Nature of Judgment’, Mind, vol. 8 ns, no. 30 (April 1899) pp. 176–93.
Morgan, C. Lloyd, Introduction to Comparative Psychology (London: Scott, 1894).
–––––, Animal Behaviour (London: Arnold, 1900).
Morris, William, The Earthly Paradise, 4 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1896–7; 1904–1915).
Müller, Georg E., Zur Theorie der sinnlichen Aufmerksamkeit (Leipzig: Edelmann, 1873).
Münsterberg, Hugo, Ueber Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie (Leipzig: Abel, 1891).
Pikler, Julius, The Psychology of the Belief in Objective Existence (London: Williams and Norgate, 1890).
Pringle-Pattison, Andrew Seth, ‘A New Theory of the Absolute’, Contemporary Review, vol. 66 (1894), pp. 694–716 and
Rogers, Neville (ed.), The Complete Poetical Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972–5).
Royce, Josiah, The Conception of God (Berkeley: Philosophical Union, 1895).
–––––, The World and the Individual, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1899 and 1901).
Russell, Bertrand, ‘On the Notion of Order’, Mind, vol. 10 ns,
no. 37 (January 1901), pp. 30–51.
–––––, ‘Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative?’, Mind, vol. 10 ns, no. 39 (July 1901), pp. 293–317.
Schroeder, Ernst, Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1890).
Schumann, F., ‘Zur Psychologie der Zeitanschauung’, Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, vol. 17 (1898), pp. 106–48.
Shand, Alexander F. ‘An Analysis of Attention’, Mind, vol. 3 ns, no. 12 (October 1894), pp. 449–73.
–––––, ‘Attention and Will: A Study in Involuntary Action’, Mind, vol. 4 ns, no. 16 (October 1895), pp. 450–71.
–––––, ‘Types of Will’, Mind, vol. 6 ns, no. 23 (July 1897),
Sidgwick, Alfred, ‘Mr. Bradley and the Sceptics’, Mind, vol. 3 ns, no. 11 (July 1894), pp. 336–47.
Sidgwick, Henry, ‘A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy, II’, Mind, vol. 8 os, no. 31 (July 1883), pp. 313–37.
Smith, W. G., ‘The Relation of Attention to Memory’, Mind, vol. 4 ns, no. 13 (January 1895), pp. 47–74.
Sollier, Paul, Der Idiot und der Imbecile (Hamburg: Voss, 1891).
Sprigge, T. L. S., James & Bradley: American Truth & British Reality (Chicago: Open Court, 1993).
Stallo, J. B., The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics, 2nd ed. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1882).
Steinthal, Heymann, Allgemeine Ethik (Berlin: Reimer, 1885).
Stendhal, De l’amour (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1882).
Stout, G. F., ‘A General Analysis of Presentations as a Preparatory to the Theory of their Interaction’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 2 os (1891–2), pp. 107–20.
–––––, Analytic Psychology, 2 vols. (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1896).
–––––, A Manual of Psychology, 2 vols. (London: Clive, 1899).
–––––, ‘Perception of Change and Duration’, Mind, vol. 9 ns,
no. 33 (January 1900), pp. 1–7.
–––––, ‘Alleged Self-Contradictions in the Concept of Relation—A Criticism of Mr. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality, Pt. I, Ch. III’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 2 ns (1901–1902),
Stricker, Salomon, Studien über die Bewegungsvorstellungen (Vienna: Braumüller, 1882).
Stumpf, Carl, Tonpsychologie, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1883 and 1890).
Sully, James, Outlines of Psychology (London: Longman, Green, 1884).
–––––, The Human Mind, A Text-book of Psychology, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1892).
Taylor, A. E., The Problem of Conduct (London: Macmillan, 1901).
–––––, ‘F. H. Bradley’, Mind, vol. 34 ns (January 1925), pp. 1–12.
Teichmüller, Gustav, Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt; Neue Grundlegung der Metaphysik (Breslau: Koebner, 1882).
Venn, John, The Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic (London: Macmillan, 1889).
Volkmann, Wilhelm [Ritter von Volkmar], Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 2 vols. (Cöthen: Schulze, 1875–6).
Waitz, Theodor, Grundlegung der Psychologie (Hamburg: Perthes, 1846).
–––––, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft (Brunswick: Vieweg, 1849).
Ward, James, ‘Psychology’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 20 , 9th ed. (Cambridge, 1886, pp. 37–85).
–––––, ‘Psychological Principles (iii)’, Mind, vol. 12 os, no. 45 (January 1887), pp. 45–67.
–––––, Naturalism and Agnosticism, 2 vols. (London: Black, 1899).
Wilson, Fred, ‘Bradley’s Critique of Associationism’, Bradley Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 5–60.
Wolman, B. (ed.), Historical Roots of Contemporary Psychology (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).
Wundt, Wilhelm, Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie,
2 vols. (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1874).
–––––, Logik, 2 vols. (Stuttgart: Enke, 1880 and 1883).