The years 1903–1924 were highly productive for Bradley, despite the fact that they, like the preceding decade devoted to psychology, resulted in no new work of the stature achieved by Ethical Studies, The Principles of Logic and Appearance and Reality. They were years marked by careful and persistent refinement and revision of his previous work, but a refinement and revision which became interwoven with his desire to define his own position in relation to Pragmatism, variants of Realism, and contemporary developments within Idealism. Consequently, his work during these years has a freshness which belies any attempt to view it as a mere revisiting of his former works. Because new ground is broken in these later writings, they are essential to any serious undertaking to understand Bradley’s thought in its fullness and its final rendering, and hence to any serious effort to assess his place in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. As a result of the revival of interest in Bradley, first sparked in the 1960s, major strides have been made toward acknowledging the importance of looking closely at the developmental character of his thought from The Presuppositions of Critical History to his unfinished article ‘Relations’, though, unfortunately, with few exceptions, this interest has not extended to his psychological writings. But the growing trend to consider also Bradley’s relationship to individual thinkers and to the plural movements that have coursed through this century may still spur interest in the latter; in any event it is continuing to call attention to his philosophical work as a whole and to acknowledge thereby the significance of the writings done during the years covered by this volume.1
Bradley’s return to philosophy, after a decade of working chiefly in psychology, is marked by his desire to take up issues in his earlier work that required reconsideration. To some degree, of course, he had identified lingering issues in the writings themselves, as we had occasion to observe regarding The Presuppositions of Critical History, Ethical Studies and The Principles of Logic in the previous volume of this edition.2 Appearance and Reality had its thorny issues as well. Some of these, in varying degrees, were recastings of concerns undercurrent in his earlier writings, concerns about such topics as the relativity of knowledge, the fallibility of judgment, and the metaphysical status and epistemic role of immediate experience. Others were embedded in, and peculiar to, the metaphysics that he had advanced, issues which evolved from his views on the criterion of truth and reality, the epistemic role of the Absolute, the difference between God and the Absolute, the nature of appearance, and the nature of relations.
As these last decades open, Bradley appears to be a man with boundless energy and with questions that take him in a number of directions at once. As MS BK Z (2.4) reveals, in beginning to turn from psychology to philosophy in 1902, he sought immediately to consider a cluster of issues concerning the theory of immediate experience that he had put forth in Appearance and Reality. Since he had been moved, in part, to take up psychology to enrich his understanding of immediacy, it is not surprising that he should seek now to clarify his position on this matter. Moreover, G. F. Stout had posed to Bradley the critical question of whether immediate experience can be objectified, and, if so, how and to what degree.3 That this question is, indeed, a crucial one for Bradley’s philosophy as a whole, and not merely for his metaphysics, is evidenced by his viewing immediacy as our metaphysical touchstone with reality and by his assigning it the key epistemic role of being the ground of knowledge. His initial wrestling with this issue, moreover, appears to have been the impetus for his toying with a book during the autumn of 1902 on the criterion of truth and the relation of ideas to reality, a book for which two very brief outlines can be found in the closing pages of MS BK Z (2.4). This intended book would raise the further epistemological question of whether immediate experience can be considered, if not the criterion of truth, a criterion of truth.
In the latter part of 1902 and the opening days of 1903, the Bradley Papers also show that Bradley was rereading The Principles of Logic and reading John Neville Keynes’ Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic.4 This reading appears nevertheless to have been done in light of his intended book, not as a first step preparatory to revising The Principles. Though some of the articles that he would write while immersed in the interplay of epistemological and metaphysical issues would be germane to topics he had addressed in The Principles, nonetheless his concern was now with broader issues than those generally associated with logic.
As MS BK L (3.1) and ‘MSS for a Once Intended Book’ (3.2) reveal, he lost no time in pursuing his book on the criterion, a book that was to examine some presuppositions that were lurking in his prior work, to develop positions that he had previously sketched only in rather broad strokes, and to correct errors that he now recognized to be such. Among the topics he wished to revisit were those of scepticism in philosophy, truth and philosophy, the relation of ideas to reality (including correction of the position on floating ideas advanced in The Principles of Logic), the nature of the reality qualified by ideas, the conditionality of all truth, the paradox regarding our knowledge of immediacy, immediacy and self-contradiction as criteria of truth, and scepticism relative to memory (a further development of his 1899 Mind article on this subject).5 Drafting the initial chapters of this book, drawing up a somewhat detailed outline of its remaining chapters, abstracting some of these later chapters, sketching an essay on faith and its relation to knowledge and doubt – these dominated his early efforts. As both MS BK L and ‘MSS for A Once Intended Book’ reveal, his book was well underway during the initial years of these final decades.
Yet during this period Bradley was also busy targeting Pragmatism in ‘On Truth and Practice’,6 draft fragments of which can be found in the opening entry and subsequent entries of MS BK L (3.1), the commonplace book he used from the early summer of 1903 to September 1915. MS BK L further reveals that in 1903 he was drafting a correction of his 1885 Fortnightly Review article ‘The Evidences of Spiritualism’.7 Then, too, in 1904, he wrote a paper ‘The Individual for Psychology’ (3.3), a powerful repudiation of the primacy of the subject–object dualism and its bifurcation of experience. That such a dualism emerges from within immediate experience or feeling and, when present, is itself felt, is the position he advances in this paper. In 1904, he also sketched an article ‘On Prof. James’s “Humanism and Truth”’ (3.4), intending, as detailed in the headnote to this item, to offer it to Mind, but withholding it when he learned that H. W. B. Joseph had been asked by Stout to write a response to James’s article. During the next few years, in addition to showing a continuing interest in confronting Pragmatism, Bradley became interested in taking up various issues with Bertrand Russell, as his correspondence with Russell demonstrates; he also tackled the challenges posed to his own work by Russell and Stout’s repudiation of coherence as a test of truth in the case of facts of perception and memory.8 However, as he became drawn into dialogue with his philosophical contemporaries, his work on his intended book appears to have ebbed, and there is every indication that he abandoned it no later than spring of 1909.
Though Bradley mentions his ‘once intended’ book in the Preface to Essays on Truth and Reality,9 he offers no explanation there or elsewhere as to why he abandoned it. Yet, there are plausible reasons for his so doing. First, as suggested above, he was now reading widely in contemporary philosophy, seeking to keep up not only with current strains of Idealism, but even more so with Pragmatism and emergent variants of Realism, evidence of which can be found both in his reading notes and his correspondence across the years 1903–1908 and, indeed, subsequent years as well. Though Bradley had always been a staunch advocate of studying in more than one school, his stature during the post-Appearance years somewhat necessitated his keeping up with current philosophical discussion, much of which was directed at, if not against, his philosophical views. He had clearly been a major player in Mind since 1883 and dominated it for some twenty years after the publication of Appearance and Reality. Discussions of his views were also no stranger to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society and The Philosophical Review, nor would they be such to the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods after its inception in 1904. Such developments in the philosophic milieu appear to have led him to redirect the manner in which he would address issues about the nature of the criterion. No longer having the luxury of clarifying his philosophy on its own terms, Bradley turned to clarifying his views by differentiating them from those of his contemporaries, by defending them against mounting criticism, and by subjecting the views of his critics to careful scrutiny. His Mind articles published from 1908 to 1912, which he would include in Essays on Truth and Reality, also support this interpretation of the abandonment of his ‘once intended’ book, for, in the main, they are prompted by the writings of Dewey and James, Joachim and Royce, and Russell and Stout. Such redirection simply went beyond the original scope of his intended book.
There are, however, at least two other possible explanations for Bradley’s abandonment of this book. First, given his increasingly declining health and the delays caused by it, he may simply have decided that the project would take too long to complete, or, indeed, might never be completed, and that hence the more prudent path would be to simply make any further intended chapters available to Mind as he was able to complete them.10 Secondly, there is the fact that Bradley was first and foremost an essayist. As he himself on occasion described his work, he wrote ‘studies’ or ‘essays’. Even in works such as The Principles of Logic and Appearance and Reality, his manner of composition, as revealed in the papers preparatory of these works, tended to suggest the writing of somewhat discrete essays, as did the final products, Appearance more so, though, than The Principles. It may well be that the organizational scheme that he had devised could not be sustained, that ‘the formal treatise’ which he may have intended initially, turned out to be beyond his reach, in keeping with his earlier admissions of an inability to produce a systematic work.11 In any event, these various explanations for his decision to terminate his original project are not incompatible, and each may have played a role in that decision.
Bradley’s interest in issues beyond those that directly joined metaphysics and epistemology may have been another factor in his abandonment of his intended book. For once freed from the confines of a focus on criteriological issues, he further pursued questions about such topics as immortality and the relation of God and the Absolute While so doing, he continued to show interest in issues that did join metaphysics and epistemology directly. He revisited ‘my real world’, a doctrine that had made its initial appearance in The Presuppositions of Critical History. His ‘What is the Real Julius Caesar?’ would, too, have implications for this earliest of his works, though prompted by Russell’s ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’.12 These essays would be published in Essays on Truth and Reality, together with those of his previously published articles that could reasonably be brought within the framework of a work so titled. Then, too, as ‘MSS for a Once Intended Book’ (3.2) shows, much of what Bradley had completed by the end of 1908 would find its way into Essays on Truth and Reality in one form or another.
In the Preface to Essays on Truth and Reality, Bradley expressed his intent ‘to collect some other scattered writings, as well as perhaps to republish those early volumes which I can no longer hope to re-write’.13 The ‘scattered writings’ to which he refers are his earlier Mind articles of an ethical and a psychological nature, as well as articles on ethics that he had published in International Journal of Ethics in 1894 and 1895, and his 1885 Fortnightly Review article ‘The Evidences of Spiritualism’. That he had already given some thought to such a collection prior to completing Essays on Truth and Reality is evidenced by ‘On Christian Morality’, a paper, written in or about 1909. This paper begins with a reference to ‘views expressed in the two foregoing papers’, a reference to ‘On the Nature of Punishment’ and ‘On National and Individual Self-Sacrifice’, papers which critics considered ‘anti-Christian’. Clearly he intended to republish these, appending to them ‘On Christian Morality’, a paper highly critical of taking the moral doctrine of the New Testament as one’s guide, a criticism that he had briefly, but sharply, made also in ‘On National and Individual Self-Sacrifice’. From his notes in the Bradley Papers 2B9, it appears that he was prompted to write this paper by a remark made by the Labour leader Keir Hardie in January 1907 enjoining individuals to follow ‘the example of the Master’, i.e. Christ, as well as by an essay by W. R. Inge on the theme of taking Christ as one’s model.14 That he wanted this paper published is clear from written instructions given in November 1921 to his executors, his brother A. C. Bradley and his sister Marian de Glehn. When preparing Collected Essays in 1934, Marian de Glehn struggled with the decision as to whether to adhere to her brother’s wishes or to suppress the paper, given that its forthright and harsh denunciation of taking Christ as one’s moral guide was likely to be offensive to many. Taking into account the ‘injury’ it might do to Merton College, to ‘ordinary good people’, to Clarendon Press and to Dean Inge, a friend of the Bradley family, as well as the news media’s penchant for scandal, she ultimately decided against publication, though the paper eventually was published in 1983.15
Mrs de Glehn did include, however, ‘On Sexual Detail in Literature’, written in 1912 by Bradley at the request of Elinor Glyn, the well-known novelist whose Three Weeks had been censured in Britain in 1907. He first met Elinor Glyn while vacationing on the Riviera in the winter of 1910–11 and saw her again in the following winter, prior to her moving to the United States where she would write scripts for Hollywood and originate the ‘It’ girl. Bradley had wanted her to publish this paper under her name, but, as he informed his brother A. C. Bradley, she declined to do so.16 That he later intended to publish it, in gathering various articles for a collection, is confirmed by his writing a note c. 1921 to accompany such publication, a note which Marian de Glehn included with this essay in Collected Essays. Still another essay that Bradley intended for inclusion in any further collection of his articles is ‘On the Evidence for Spirit-Identity’ (3.7), written c. 1921–2, the final draft of a paper he had written to correct a mistake he had made in his 1885 Fortnightly Review article ‘The Evidences of Spiritualism’. This 1885 article Marian de Glehn did include in Collected Essays, appending to it later references that Bradley had made about it, but omitting inclusion of the paper he wished to accompany it.
The task of collecting such articles and papers fell to Marian de Glehn because Bradley, upon completion of Essays on Truth and Reality, turned immediately to revising The Principles of Logic, highlighting its main errors by drawing upon Appearance and Reality and, to a still greater extent, Essays on Truth and Reality. His indebtedness to Bernard Bosanquet’s criticism and constructive work in logic he also readily and often acknowledged.17 The new material – additional notes and ‘Terminal Essays’ – altered such key doctrines as those of inference, judgment, and the ‘this’, clarified the nature of absolute truth and probability, together with such concepts as the possible and impossible, and corrected both his misuse of the term ‘disparate’ throughout The Principles and his discussion of uniqueness in Essays on Truth and Reality. The revised edition, moreover, is informed by Bradley’s extensive reading across the movements of Idealism, Pragmatism and Realism. However, he generally refrains from direct confrontation or detailed criticism of a given philosopher’s position, addressing these movements in a general manner, with the exception of his essay on E. G. Spaulding’s ‘A Defense of Analysis’.18 Since in a letter to Gabriel Marcel in 1920, Bradley remarks that one need not read the first edition of The Principles of Logic if one has his later Mind articles (i.e. the articles included in Essays on Truth and Reality), one can only surmise that he would extend this comment to the new material in the second edition of that work as well.19
That this volume includes none of the notebooks among the Bradley Papers devoted exclusively to The Principles of Logic, requires explanation. Though there are several such notebooks, all include either final versions or penultimate drafts which in substance have only negligible differences from the published material, and it is for this reason that none is included here. A few entries germane to this revision can be found, however, both in MS BK L and in MS BK W (3.1. and 3.5). It should be noted as well that Bradley spent a number of years on this revision, from mid-1913 to 1920, and questioned whether he had made the best use of his time in doing so.20 His declining health, which, as he so often said, left him ‘stupid’ for months at a time, was certainly a factor in his slow progress, and problems with printing also contributed to the subsequent delay in publication.
MS BK W (3.5), his final commonplace book in use from 1915 to his death, covers much ground, from entries relating to Essays on Truth and Reality to a few entries anticipatory of the revision of Ethical Studies; its final entry suggests that Bradley knew he was dying, for it is about fear, including fear experienced by dying persons. In the main, however, MS BK W consists of Bradley’s reading notes on DeWitt Parker’s The Self and Nature, Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity, and Bertrand Russell’s The Analysis of Mind, works that would be key to his seeking still again to clarify his view of relations and of their grounding in immediate experience. In 1923, he began making notes in preparation of an article on relations. The ‘Notebook on Relations’ (3.9) and ‘MSS and Notes for an Article on Relations’ (3.10), an intermediate draft of an article he intended for Mind, are the products of this effort. Though excerpts from these manuscripts and MS BK W have been previously published in Collected Essays, together with ‘Relations, the First Part of an Intended Article’, because of the centrality of the issues addressed in them to Bradley’s thought, the misconceptions that have arisen about his theory of relations, and the continuing critical interest in this theory, they are offered here in their entirety.
During the years covered by this volume, F. C. S. Schiller, a pragmatist and Fellow of Corpus Christi College, had virtually made a career out of criticizing Bradley. Bradley, on the other hand, largely tried to ignore him, disgusted with his sophomoric manner of expression. However, when Schiller levelled charges of plagiarism and atheism against Bradley in 1915, he was sufficiently provoked to write ‘On Dr. Schiller’s “The New Developments in Mr. Bradley’s Philosophy”’ (3.6), a response that he decided against publishing, choosing not to give Schiller any further publicity. The context of his response is given in the headnote accompanying this paper. But beyond his reply is an action that reveals something about the man. Disgusted as well with an editorial practice that would permit such material to be published in Mind, he withdrew from the Mind Association, being unable to support a journal that violated his sense of propriety. This was not a singular action on his part; other occasions, too, arose from time to time in which he found himself morally compelled to take action beyond mere expression of principle. But he appears to have given Stout, the editor of Mind, the second chance that he had requested, for Stout continued to list Bradley as a member of the Association and Bradley intended to send his article on ‘Relations’ to Mind.21
The circumstances leading to Bradley’s private printing in 1922 of ‘On the War Memorial’ (3.8), detailed in the headnote accompanying this paper, too, reveal something about the man. He was much concerned about the College’s drifting from the original intent of the Memorial Fund for fallen Mertonians, in its discussion of how to use funds that remained after the major memorial was established. Various proposals were being advanced to designate certain needed renovations as part of the Memorial. Bradley, a member of the Governing Board, felt strongly that such moves, which smacked of mere expediency, were inappropriate. Hence he circulated ‘On the War Memorial’ to remind members of the original intent of the Memorial Fund, and proposed a resolution in accordance with that intent which the Board promptly adopted. His conscientiousness in his responsibilities to Merton College is often noted in biographical accounts. But that he exercised leadership as well is exemplified by this action regarding the War Memorial, as well as by his success in keeping German field-guns from being placed in the College Garden at Merton on the ground that symbols of war had no place in such a place of tranquility.22 Bradley had a keen sense of propriety, an envious sense of moral indignation, and a strength of will to make his voice heard when matters of impropriety crossed his path.
His final days were spent revising Ethical Studies, after returning from a trip abroad early in September 1924. He died 18 September 1924. Why did he so delay work on a revision of this book? That he wished to finish the article ‘Relations’ and hence continued to work on it into the spring of 1924, is an immediate reason. But one can ask why he did not approach this work as soon as he had finished revision of The Principles of Logic. His correspondence suggests that he had developed a distaste for ethics.23 He may also have become sceptical about moral judgment. Then, too, he may have been somewhat embarrassed by the harshness of some of his youthful remarks, remarks that had a tone that Schiller might have envied. In any case, the notebook (Bradley Papers 1A15) which he used in preparing additional notes for this work was faithfully adhered to by Marian de Glehn and H. H. Joachim in their publication of the second edition of Ethical Studies in 1927.
During these last decades of his life, as we have had occasion to mention earlier, Bradley read in multiple branches of philosophy and multiple schools of philosophical thought. The ‘Selections from Bradley’s Reading Notes’ (3.11), together with those reading notes included in MS BK W (3.5), show his commitment to keeping up with current philosophical work of major figures in the field. From his undergraduate days to his death, he never wavered in his advocacy of philosophical pluralism. Though the dominant ‘schools of thought’ change, the discipline, in his view, can be strengthened and remain vital only by the clarification of issues which challenges from plural points of view demand.
The years from 1903 to 1924 were also years in which Bradley read widely in non-philosophical literature. ‘Bradley’s Book Order Lists’ (Appendix A, Part 1) offers a somewhat unusual glimpse of this man about whom so little remains known. In or about 1903, according to the Bradley Papers, he began to order books of virtually every known genre from various book clubs, including the Times Book Club, Days’ Library, and Mudie’s Library. His letters during these final decades reveal that he spent much of each year by the seashore at Totland Bay on the Isle of Wight, or at Weston-super-Mare, or, again, at Bolougne where he usually wintered with the Radcliffs and other friends. Because of the increasing frequency and intensity of his bouts with his kidney ailment, he was often unable to do any serious reading or philosophic work for months at a time. During these periods, especially when at Totland and Weston-super-Mare where he spent months alone, he did much ‘light’ reading. While there is no way to confirm whether he actually read all of the books that he ordered, we can provide a list of those works, chiefly philosophical, for which there is evidence that he read them in whole or in part. ‘Works Bradley Cited’ (Appendix A, Part 2) is that list. An ‘Inventory of the F. H. Bradley Papers’ (Appendix B) and a list of ‘Books from Bradley’s Personal Library’ (Appendix C) have further been provided.
1 As examples of this trend in recent years, see James Bradley (ed.), Philosophy after Bradley (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996); Nicholas Griffin, Russell’s Idealist Apprenticeship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Peter Hylton, Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytical Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Leemon B. McHenry, Whitehead and Bradley (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992); Anthony Manser, Bradley’s Logic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Anthony Manser and Guy Stock (eds.), The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Peter P. Nicholson, The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists (Cambridge University Press, 1990); T. L. S. Sprigge, James & Bradley: American Truth & British Reality (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), and Guy Stock (ed.), Appearance Versus Reality: New Essays on Bradley’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), a work which I received only as this edition was going to press. See also Don MacNiven, Bradley’s Moral Psychology (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987) and Philip MacEwen (ed.), Ethics, Metaphysics and Religion in the Thought of F. H. Bradley (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996), the latter prompted by MacNiven’s work which not only gives attention to Bradley’s psychological writings but seeks to relate Bradley to G. E. Moore and Lawrence Kohlberg as well. Thought-provoking earlier works include Robert Donald Mack, The Appeal to Immediate Experience: Philosophic Method in Bradley, Whitehead and Dewey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945) and Garrett L. Vander Veer, Bradley’s Metaphysics and the Self (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). The journals Bradley Studies and Idealistic Studies also evidence this trend.
2 See CW, vol. 2, ‘Introduction’.
3 In a letter of 16 July 1903 to Stout, Bradley alludes to Stout’s ‘Mr. Bradley’s Theory of Judgment’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 3 ns (1902–1903), pp. 1–28 as spurring him to write on this theme; see CW, vol. 4, pp. 257–9.
4 For Bradley’s brief notes on The Principles of Logic, see the Bradley Papers 1B19. For his correspondence with John Neville Keynes regarding the latter’s Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1894), see CW, vol. 4, pp. 235–45.
5 See ‘Some Remarks on Memory and Inference’, Mind, vol. 8 ns (April 1899), pp. 145–66, reprinted in ETR, pp. 353–80.
6 See ‘On Truth and Practice’, Mind, vol. 13 ns (July 1904), pp. 309–35, reprinted in ETR, pp. 75–106.
7 See CE, pp. 595–617. For the final draft of this correction, see pp. 297–307 in this volume.
8 See Bertrand Russell’s ‘On the Nature of Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 7 ns (1906–1907), pp. 28–49 and G. F. Stout’s ‘Immediacy, Mediacy and Coherence’, Mind, vol. 17 ns, no. 65 (January 1908), pp. 20–47, prompted Bradley to write ‘On Truth and Coherence’, Mind, vol. 18 ns, no. 71 (July 1909), pp. 329–42; reprinted in ETR, pp. 202–18. Given the number of letters that discuss these articles, the reader is simply directed to the index of CW, vol. 5.
9 See ETR, p. v.
10 Of the intended book chapters, Bradley had already published by January 1909 ‘On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary’, Mind, vol. 15 ns, no. 59 (July 1906), pp. 445–72, reprinted in ETR, pp. 28–64; ‘On Truth and Copying’, Mind, vol. 16 ns, no. 62 (April 1907), pp. 165–80, reprinted in ETR, pp. 107–26; ‘On Memory and Judgment’, Mind, vol. 17, no. 66 (April 1908), pp. 153–74, reprinted in ETR, pp. 381–408; and ‘On our Knowledge of Immediate Experience’, Mind, vol. 18, no. 69 (January 1909), pp. 40–64, reprinted in ETR, pp. 159–91.
11 See ETR, p. v regarding his remark that he ‘is not offering a formal treatise’. In the prefaces to his earlier works, too, he consistently disowns offering a systematic treatment.
12 See Bertrand Russell, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 11 ns (1910–11), pp. 108–28. For Bradley’s notes on this article, see pp. 421–4 in this volume.
13 See ETR, p. v.
14 ’Some Remarks on Punishment’ was published in International Journal of Ethics, vol. 4 (April 1894), pp. 269–84, reprinted in CE, pp. 149–64; and ‘The Limits of Individual and National Self-Sacrifice’, written in 1878 or 1879, was published in the same journal, vol. 5 (October 1894), pp. 17–28, reprinted in CE,
pp. 165–76. The Bradley Papers 2B9 consist of the ‘Note’, together with correspondence of Marian de Glehn and H. H. Joachim regarding whether to include it in Collected Essays. It is Marian de Glehn who gives the date of ‘in or about 1909’, apparently the date when Bradley finished the ‘Note’. The Inge essay is ‘The Person of Christ’, in Contentio Veritatis by Six Oxford Tutors (London: John Murray, 1902), pp. 59–104.
15 See Gordon Kendal, ‘F. H. Bradley: An Unpublished Note on Christian Morality’, Religious Studies, vol. 19 (1983), pp. 175–83. See also T. L. S. Sprigge, ‘Bradley and Christianity’, Bradley Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 69–85, for discussion of this paper within the broader framework of Bradley’s other discussions germane to Christianity.
16 See Bradley’s letter of Summer [?] 1912 to A. C. Bradley, CW, vol. 5, pp. 172–3.
17 Throughout the second edition of The Principles of Logic, Bosanquet’s Knowledge and Reality (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1885) and Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888; 2nd ed., 1911) are frequently cited.
18 See Terminal Essay 9, pp. 691–4. This essay of Spaulding appeared in The New Realism, ed. Edwin B. Holt et al. (New York: Macmillan, 1912), pp. 155–247. See pp. 450–56 in this volume for Bradley’s notes on this essay.
19 See Bradley’s letter of 5 January 1920 to Marcel, CW, vol. 5, pp. 243–4.
20 See Bradley’s letter of 30 August 1919 to Bernard Bosanquet, CW, vol. 5, pp. 242–3.21 See CW, vol 5, pp. 218–22 for the 1915 correspondence between Bradley and Stout on this matter.
22 See G. R. G. Mure, ‘F. H. Bradley: Towards a Portrait’, Encounter, vol. 16 (1961), pp. 31–2. Mure adds that the guns appeared in Merton’s cricket field for a year or so and then disappeared.
23 For an example of his distaste for ethics and, indeed, for Ethical Studies, see his letter of 24 May 1901 to G. F. Stout, CW, vol. 4, pp. 196–7. This matter is further explored in the Introduction to CW, vol. 4.
Bibliographical references are given in full for the works cited and for other works consulted by the editor, with the exception of the writings of Bradley himself. For a list of his previously published writings, the reader is directed to CW, vol. 5, Appendix E. The year of initial publication is given for texts referred to by Bradley, unless he has specified otherwise.
Alexander, Samuel, ‘Mental Activity in Willing and in Ideas’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 9 ns (1908–1909),
–––––, Space, Time and Deity, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1920).
Aliotta, Antonio, The Idealistic Reaction Against Science, trans. by Agnes McCaskill (London: Macmillan, 1914).
Bain, Alexander, The Emotions and the Will, 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1875).
Baldwin, James Mark, Genetic Theory of Reality (New York: Putnam’s, 1915).
Balfour, Arthur J., ‘Beauty and the Criticism of Beauty’, in Essays Speculative and Political (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920), pp. 57–95.
Balzac, Henri, Histoire des Treize: Ferragus, La duchesse de Langeais, La fille aux yeud d’or (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1903).
Barrett, William F., On the Threshold of the Unseen (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1917).
Bergson, Henri, Le Rire, 5th ed. (Paris: Alcan, 1908); trans. by
C. Brereton and E. F. Rothwell as Laughter (London: Macmillan, 1911).
Bosanquet, Bernard, Knowledge and Reality (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 1885).
–––––, Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888); 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911).
–––––, The Principle of Individuality and Value (London: Macmillan, 1912).
–––––, The Value and Destiny of the Individual (London: Macmillan, 1913).
–––––, Lectures on Aesthetic (London: Macmillan, 1915).
–––––, Some Suggestions in Ethics (London: Macmillan, 1918).
–––––, The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1921).
Bosanquet, Bernard et al., ‘F. H. Bradley’, The Times,
20 September 1924.
Bradley, A. C., The Uses of Poetry (London: English Association Leaflet, No. 20, 1912; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912).
Bradley, James (ed.), Philosophy after Bradley (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996).
Brentano, Franz, The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, trans. Cecil Hague (London: Constable, 1902).
Broad, C. D., ‘Mr. Bradley on Truth and Reality’, Mind, vol. 23 ns, no. 91 (July 1914), pp. 349–70.
Bussell, F. W., ‘The Future of Ethics: Effort or Abstraction’, in Personal Idealism, ed. H. Sturt (London: Macmillan, 1902),
Byron, George Gordon, Lord, Don Juan (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1996).
Carlyle, Thomas, Jesuitism, np, 1850.
Carr, H. Wildon, ‘The Problem of Recognition’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, vol. 17 ns (1916–17), pp. 1–27.
Carrington, Hereward and Meader, John R., Death: Its Causes and Phenomena (London: Rider, 1911).
Carroll, Lewis, ‘A Logical Paradox’, Mind, vol. 3 ns, no. 11
(July 1894), pp. 436–8.
–––––, ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’, Mind, vol. 4 ns,
no. 14 (April 1895), pp. 278–89).
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© Carol A. Keene, 1999.
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