David Crossley
University of Saskatchewan, Canada
A Unified Theory of Punishment
Green and Bosanquet discuss the traditional theories of punishment: deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation. And both remark that a true theory of punishment would have to include all three perspectives.
     This suggests a “mixed theory “ (Moore, 92 ff.), produced by distinguishing issues about the justification of the institution of punishment from those addressing its distribution. A. J. Milne found such a theory in Green’s Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: the institution of punishment is justified in terms of deterrence, with the distribution questions introducing justice constraints.
     However, one could argue that Green actually held the converse mixed theory, whereby the  institution of punishment is justified in terms of what justice demands (and so is centered on a retributivist conception of desert); with the distribution questions introducing consequentialist (deterrence and rehabilitation) concerns.
     A third possibility is that Green and Bosanquet held a unified theory  in which all three elements are entailed by the system of rights.  How this is possible in the face of their complaints about the various traditional theories presents a difficulty for this interpretation.
     In this paper I offer a case for this third interpretation of Green and Bosanquet’s theory of punishment, by drawing on some suggestions made by contemporary communication theories of punishment (e.g., Duff).

Bob Goodman
Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Israel
“What Is Thought About?”
This paper focuses upon the role of idealistic metaphysics in the philosophy of history.  It discusses the work of four philosophers:  Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Dilthey, R.G. Collingwood, and Michael Oakeshott.   These philosophers share in common the aim of finding an alternative to the dominant naturalistic orientation in the human sciences.  Each builds his work upon the foundation of an idealistic metaphysics; and each in his own way confronts the question of how to treat thought as an object of analysis.
    The paper emphasizes the extent to which different conceptions of the nature of history and different conceptions of the aims and limits of research  influence each of the philosopher’s understanding of the nature of thought and of the methods to be employed to bring to light its structure and content.
    Rickert, a late 19th Century Neo-Kantian philosopher, attempted to show the unique role of primary values as determinants of human action.  Dilthey was among the first philosophers to develop and employ hermeneutic methods for the study of thought.  Collingwood advocated focusing narrowly upon the thought of individual agents as they confront particular decisions and choices.  Like Collingwood, Oakeshott was deeply skeptical about the possibility of explaining history by means of general historical theories.  For him, thought should be understood by analyzing the preconceptions underlying primary modal categories, and it is in its guise as a modal category that Oakeshott analyzes the nature of history.         

James Connelly
Southampton Institute: School of Social Sciences,
Southampton, UK
Collingwood's moral philosophy - levels, duty and virtue

Raymond Plant

Efraim Podoksik

Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, 06800 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey
e-mail: podoksik@bilkent.edu.tr
[non-presenting participant]

Jan Olof Bengtsson
Lund University
The Idealist Origins of the Ethics of Personalism
While a personalist ethics in a vague, general sense is commonly accepted in today’s liberal democracy, personalism’s stricter, theoretical formulation as a distinct school (or schools) of philosophy is not only less well known, but antithetical to long dominant currents of both analytical and broadly postmodern philosophy. The paper looks at the earlier philosophical sources of the defence of the personalist values which, while undermined by contemporary philosophy, is still very much with us in humanist rhetoric. Philosophical personalism, which in Europe is associated with Mounier and to some extent with Marcel, Scheler, Buber, and Maritain, i. e., with phenomenology, existentialism, and Thomism, is defined by the major Anglo-American philosophical encyclopedias rather in terms of the American school of B. P. Bowne. This, I show, is correct, but not for the stated reason that this is the origin of personalism. It is correct rather because as an idealistic version of personalism the American school continues in important respects an earlier European tradition, often ignored by scholars, which should properly be considered the origin of modern philosophical personalism. Twentieth-century European personalism is non-idealist, but some of its most characteristic ethical positions developed, I argue, in the personalistic counter-current in German Spätidealismus which, as is also shown, was continued in the British and American schools of ‘personal idealism’, the latter of which it was that soon came to be called ‘personalism’ tout court. A focus, in this historical perspective, on the ethical side of personalism rather than its metaphysics, enables us to see that some of the the specific positions of the earlier tradition were fundamental to the later schools even as they relinquished its idealism. 

Don MacNiven
York University, Toronto
It is frequently argued that the root of our current environmental crisis lies in our homocentrism - our belief that nothing in the universe has intrinsic value except mankind.  It is our vanity which leads us to think that we alone have intrinsic worth and that the rest of nature can be exploited and ravaged for our benefit.  Pride, fuelled by our scientific and technological triumphs, is the true cause of our disastrous approach to the environment.  Until we conquer our Pride, abandon homocentrism, and adopt a biocentric attitude towards nature, in which we recognize the intrinsic value of all living things, the environmental crisis will always be with us.  Acquiring the appropriate humility to do this will not be an easy task because homocentrism is so deeply entrenched in western culture, which currently possesses world dominance.  For example, Judeo-Christian morality which informs western culture is essentially homocentric, as is western moral philosophy.
       My paper offers a critical analysis of his standard critique of homocentrismn.  Intuitively one might think that Idealism would be the natural ally of biocentrism because both support holistic views of nature.  However I argue, using an Idealist approach to virtue ethics, that the concepts of homocentrism, biocentrism, and pride are more complex than this critique implies.  I suggest that we need to distinguish between true and false pride and rational and irrational pride before we can determine if homocentrism necessarily involves the sin of pride.
       I conclude that false pride is certainly part of the problem, as the biocentrics maintain, but nevertheless a homocentric viewpoint is unavoidable in both theory and practice.  When properly developed homocentrism does not imply false pride and hence is not i icompatible with Idealism or antithetical to nature.

Ian Winchester
University of Calgary, Canada
Does physics presuppose history?
In a number of places Collingwood claims that natural science in general and physics in particular presupposes history.  This paper will try to understand what Collingwood means by this apparently absurd claim by looking at his various writings that suggest or boldly state this proposition.  It will also try to answer the question which is the title of this paper, namely, does physics in fact actually presuppose history. 

Cristiano Camporesi
Università Degli Studi di Firenze, Italy
Green, Bosanquet and Burke. A Synoptic View of three Styles of Moral Philosophy
The three principal issues of my paper are holism, volitional attitudes and belief. These aspects are connected in many Idealist thinkers: see, for instance, William Ritchie Sorley's works. the final result is not an Eclectic philosophy, as instanced in Victor Cousin'metaphysics, or the Hegelian universal synthesis, but the "synoptic view". Philosophical inquiry means Abstraction, notwithstanding Michael Bereford Foster's criticism of the "concrete universal", as exemplifed in the writings of Bosanquet, Bradley and Cook Wilson. I do consider Green's and Bosanquet's approach to moral philosophy similar from the standpoint of the "Synoptic view". Leonard T. Hobhouse's criticism is less positive.

Rebecca Toueg
University of Haifa
The Idea of History and the History of Ideas:  Conceptual Change in Lovejoy and Collingwood
The idea of conceptual change in historical analysis is presupposed by literary, philosophical and sociological historians. It was a predominant concern for both Lovejoy in his Great Chain of Being (1936) and Collingwood in his Idea of History (1945). But they differed in their conception of historical ideas and the processes by which they changed, developed or evolved, and this paper deals with their underlying metaphysical presuppositions that place them in diametrical opposition. Each tries to work out a rational framework in which conceptual change can be made intelligible, but each makes use of a different rationale – Lovejoy uses the hypothetico-deductive methods of experimental science while Collingwood uses the dialectical methods of emergent evolutionary processes to explain conceptual change.

Stamatoula Panagakou
University of York
Religious Conciousness in the Philosophy of Bernard Bosanquet

William Sweet