

correspondence theory of truth (G; see previous paragraph) made every past-tensed truth dependent on a set of *bona fide* past facts. He therefore (A 5-6) shifted the attack to Proposition 2, with the ingenious counter-example recorded in F (see further, 34 commentary).

A different strategy is preserved in E 4-6. Directly derivable from Proposition 2 of the Master Argument is the rule that what follows from a necessary proposition is itself necessary. Chrysippus may have held his counter-example to Proposition 2 to invalidate this rule too (E 5, penultimate sentence), but on this occasion he assumed, at least for the sake of argument, that it was valid. Now Chrysippus was a firm believer in divination (see 42; 55), and hence in laws which derived truths about the future from truths about the past. But, the challenge runs, since the truths about the past are necessary (by Proposition 1 of the Master Argument), the truths about the future which follow from them will themselves be necessary, according to the above-mentioned rule. Chrysippus, in response, rightly notes that while a transitive property like necessity is indeed transmitted from one proposition to another in a *conditional*, which asserts a relation of logical dependence, it is not so transmitted in a negated conjunction, which asserts no direct logical connexion between the two conjoined propositions. For the distinction see 35A 6, B 4, and commentary. And since laws of divination assert empirical rather than logical connexions between past and future truths, the negated conjunction is indeed the appropriate means of formulating them. Thus the necessity of future truths is not, at least, a consequence of divination.

EPISTEMOLOGY: STOICS AND ACADEMICS

39 Impressions

A Diogenes Laertius 7.49-51 (SVF 2.52, 55, 61)

[Diocles of Magnesia says] (1) 'It is the Stoics' policy to give primary position to the account which deals with impression [*phantasia*] and sense-perception, in as much as the criterion which decides the truth of things is generically an impression, and in as much as the account which deals with assent and cognition and thinking, while it precedes the rest, is not composed without impression. (2) For the impression arises first, and then thought, which has the power of utterance, expresses in language what it experiences by the agency of the impression. (3) An impression is different from a figment [*phantasma*]. A figment is the kind of fanciful thought which occurs in dreams, whereas an impression is a printing in the soul: i.e., an alteration, as Chrysippus suggests in his *On soul II*; for the printing should not be taken to be like that of a signet-ring, since it is impossible for there to be many such prints at the same time affecting the same subject . . . (4) They divide impressions into those which are sensory and those which are not. Sensory impressions are ones obtained through

one or more sense-organs, non-sensory are ones obtained through thought such as those of the incorporeals and of the other things acquired by reason. (5) Some sensory impressions arise from what is, and are accompanied by yielding and assent. But impressions also include appearances which are quasi-products of what is. (6) Furthermore, some impressions are rational, and others non-rational. Those of rational animals are rational, while those of non-rational animals are non-rational. Rational impressions are thought processes; irrational ones are nameless. (7) Also, some impressions are expert and others not: a work of art is viewed in one way by an expert and differently by a non-expert.

B Aetius 4.12.1-5 (SVF 2.54, part)

(1) Chrysippus says that these four [i.e., impression (*phantasia*), impressor (*phantaston*), imagination (*phantastikon*), figment (*phantasma*)] are all different. (2) An impression is an affection occurring in the soul, which reveals itself and its cause. Thus, when through sight we observe something white, the affection is what is engendered in the soul through vision; and it is this affection which enables us to say that there is a white object which activates us. Likewise when we perceive through touch and smell. (3) The word 'impression' [*phantasia*] is derived from 'light' [*phōs*]; just as light reveals itself and whatever else it includes in its range, so impression reveals itself and its cause. (4) The cause of an impression is an impressor: e.g., something white or cold or everything capable of activating the soul. (5) Imagination is an empty attraction, an affection in the soul which arises from no impressor, as when someone shadow-boxes and strikes his hands against thin air; for an impression has some impressor as its object, but imagination has none. (6) A figment is that to which we are attracted in the empty attraction of imagination; it occurs in people who are melancholic and mad.

C Cicero, *Academica* 2.21

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus in defence of Stoic epistemology] (1) Those characteristics which belong to the things we describe as being cognized by the senses are equally characteristic of that further set of things said to be cognized not by the senses directly but by them in a certain respect, e.g., 'That is white, this is sweet, that is melodious, this is fragrant, this is rough.' Our cognition of these is secured by the mind, not the senses. (2) Next, 'That is a horse, that is a dog.' (3) The rest of the series then follows, connecting bigger items which virtually include complete cognition of things, like 'If it is a human being, it is a mortal, rational animal.' (4) From this class [i.e. mental perceptions in general] conceptions of things are imprinted on us, without which there can be no understanding or investigation or discussion of anything.

D Diogenes Laertius 7.53 (SVF 2.87, part)

(1) It is by confrontation that we come to think of sense-objects. (2) By similarity, things based on thoughts of something related, like Socrates on the basis of a picture. (3) By analogy, sometimes by magnification, as in the case of Tityos and Cyclopes, sometimes by diminution, as in the case of the Pigmy; also the idea of the centre of the earth arose by analogy on the basis of smaller spheres. (4) By transposition, things like eyes on the chest. (5) By combination, Hippocentaur. (6) By opposition, death. (7) Some things are also conceived by transition, such as sayables and place. (8) The idea of something just and good is acquired naturally. (9) That of being without hands, for instance, by privation.

E Aetius 4.11.1-4 (SVF 2.83)

(1) When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanding-part of his soul like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his conceptions. (2) The first method of inscription is through the senses. For by perceiving something, e.g. white, they have a memory of it when it has departed. And when many memories of a similar kind have occurred, we then say we have experience. For the plurality of similar impressions is experience. (3) Some conceptions arise naturally in the aforesaid ways and undesignedly, others through our own instruction and attention. The latter are called 'conceptions' only, the former are called 'preconceptions' as well. (4) Reason, for which we are called rational, is said to be completed from our preconceptions during our first seven years.

F Plutarch, *On common conceptions* 1084F-1085A (SVF 2.847, part)

Conception is a kind of impression, and impression is a printing in the soul . . . They [the Stoics] define conceptions as a kind of stored thoughts, and memories as permanent and static printings.

G Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 7.242-6 (SVF 2.65, part)

[The Stoics say] (1) Of impressions, some are convincing, others unconvincing, others simultaneously convincing and unconvincing, and others neither convincing nor unconvincing. (2) Convincing are ones which produce an even movement in the soul, e.g., at this moment, that it is day and that I am talking, and everything which maintains a similar obviousness. (3) Unconvincing are ones which are not like this but make us decline to assent, e.g., 'If it is day, the sun is not above the earth', 'If it is dark, it is day.' (4) Convincing and unconvincing are ones which, according to their relative disposition, are sometimes of one kind and sometimes of another kind, such as the impressions of insoluble arguments. (5) Neither convincing nor unconvincing are ones which are

impressions of such things as 'The number of the stars is odd', 'The number of the stars is even.' (6) Of the convincing (or unconvincing) [a misleading addition by Sextus or an interpolator], some are true, others false, others true and false, and others neither true nor false. (7) True are ones of which it is possible to make a true assertion, e.g., at the present 'It is day' or 'It is light.' (8) False are ones of which it is possible to make a false assertion, e.g., that the oar under the water is bent, or that the colonnade gets narrower. (9) True and false are ones like the impression Orestes had of Electra in his madness: in so far as he had an impression of an existing thing it was true - for Electra existed - but in so far as he had an impression of a Fury it was false - for there was no Fury. So too a dreamer's false and vacuous attraction when his impression of Dion, who is alive, is of Dion's actual presence. (10) Neither true nor false are the generic ones. [continued at 30F]

- The texts of this section should be studied in conjunction with material in 53 where 'impression' is treated in relation to the other faculties of the soul. Here our focus is on the mental experiences which the Stoics considered to be founded on impressions, the cognitive value of those experiences, and the relation between impressions of the outside world received through the senses and the formation of concepts. The fundamental criterial role ascribed to 'cognitive' impressions specifically is treated in 40.

Our translation of *phantasia* by 'impression' seeks to capture the Stoics' own elucidation of the term (A 3), while it also places this within the modern empirical tradition that they have influenced. The notion of an *imprint* in their usage gets its particular point from the assumption that any such 'affection' requires a corresponding 'impressor' as its cause (B 4). Through the mediation of the senses, external objects impress their sensory characteristics on the soul, and the resultant affection or impression 'reveals . . . its cause' (B 2), i.e. the object. This account, however, by itself does not explain awareness by the recipient of the revelation. That point seems to be covered by the statement (B 2-3) that the impression 'reveals itself', analogously to light. The comparison suggests that impressions are self-revealing in the sense that they make their recipient *aware* of their occurrence - i.e., aware of the objects that they reveal. The texts do not imply that impressions are internal pictures or images, so that what we perceive is images of objects. Rather, like light, impressions are the illumination of, or means of our observing, actual things. And just as light can vary in its illuminating effects, so sense-impressions can vary in the clarity and distinctness with which they represent their objective causes. The claim that every impression has a corresponding impressor does not imply that every impression will be an equally clear and distinct indication of its object. Impressions as a class, however, are distinguished from the 'imagination' of 'figments', which refers to purely illusory states, produced in the mentally abnormal without any 'impressor' (A 3, B 5-6).

An impression is not a belief (see 41). To have an impression is simply to entertain an idea, without any implication of commitment to it. We may put this point by saying that a Stoic impression is not an impression *that* something is

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the case – which, in modern English, does imply some degree of belief – but just an impression of something's being the case. (In a cinema we get the impression of John Wayne's being on the screen in front of us, but not of course the impression *that* John Wayne is on the screen in front of us.) Belief consists in the mind's positive reaction to an impression, its 'assent' to it (see Zeno's celebrated hand simile, 41A 1–3).

The general thrust of A and B is to affirm the *normal* reliability of impressions, treating sensory ones as paradigmatic (cf. 41B 3), without raising questions about problem cases or the differences between certainly reliable impressions and all others. Notwithstanding the elaborate classifications of G, which does not even get to the 'cognitive impression' (see the continuation in 40E) and includes examples of highly complex impressions, the Stoics probably took the majority of impressions to be cognitive (cf. A 5) and to comprise most basically impressions of simple sensory objects (cf. B 2, 4).

Such objects provide the foundations of all conceptions (E 1–2), which arise most primitively by 'confrontation' (D 1). In interpreting the 'priority' of impression to thought (A 2) and of sense-perception to other means of concept-formation, priority should be taken to include both temporal and logical priority. The first impressions of an infant, like those of other animals, are pre-conceptual or non-rational, providing as they do the basic materials for those conceptions which constitute the emergence of reason in the developing human (E 2–4). Apart from this chronological priority, sense-impressions seem to be envisaged as logically prior to the operations of reason (A 1–2, cf. C). This is intelligible in the sense that the mind's reacting to its sense-impressions presupposes their occurrence. Yet in the mature human being all impressions are 'rational' or 'thought processes' (A 6), and all conceptions are themselves 'a kind of impression' (F). This suggests that all impressions of mature human beings are envisaged to have a propositional content, and that we assent to impressions (e.g. 40B 1) by assenting to their corresponding *lekta* or propositions, which are the proper objects of assent (see 33I, and Arcesilaus' criticism in 41C 8). Notice too that the truth and falsehood of impressions are defined in terms of the kinds of assertions that can be made of them (G 7–8). So understood, rational impressions of the external world will not imply a theory that the mind receives raw data which it subsequently interprets. Rather, we should take it that rational impressions themselves represent their objects in ways that presuppose language and concepts: minimally 'This is white' etc. (C 1). The rationality of all mature human impressions presumes that the mind's stock of conceptions is immediately activated when a sense-impression is received, with the result that the impression presents its object in a conceptualized form. There will of course be a richness and subjectivity to rational impressions – my manner of seeing, hearing etc. – which endows these mental events with characteristics that are not fully reproducible in their corresponding propositions (see 33 commentary). Just so, how an expert views an object will be different from the layman's impression (A 7).

Since all states of awareness involve impressions (see 53 commentary), their objects include, under the heading of 'non-sensory impressions' (A 4), both corporeal items, e.g. god (cf. 40P), and incorporeals (see 27). The former present no special problems for the Stoics, since they can be presumed to have a causal

effect on the mind via their effect on the world; and the Stoics' anxiety, wherever possible, to employ a corporeal account of awareness is shown by their claim that even the virtues are bodies and perceptible (see 60R, S). The incorporeals remained intractable to such an account. That the Stoics acknowledged this is clear from their attempt to find a relationship other than causal to fit the case (see 27E). The claim there that the commanding-faculty 'is impressed in relation to sayables' and not physically 'by them' is too mysterious to explain the process. Perhaps, however, we should connect it with 'transition', a method by which incorporeals are said to be conceived (D 7); this refers, we suggest, to the mind's capacity to abstract, e.g. the idea of place from particular bodies. (For the philosophical contexts in which these incorporeals were isolated, see 27; 33; 49; 51; 55.)

In any event, transition, along with the other mental processes listed in D, helps to provide the mind with all objects of thought which are not simply the particular memories ('permanent printings', F) of its sense-impressions. The natural accumulation of experience of perceptible objects, through 'many memories of a similar kind', results in generic impressions or 'conceptions' of man, horse, white etc. (E; cf. C, 40N). As universal 'concepts', the objects of these impressions are 'figments' of thought (30A 1), which lack any corresponding 'impressor' in the external world, since there is no generic man etc. to impress the senses. The conceptions themselves, however, differ from imagination and its figments (B 5–6), in being the way rational beings 'naturally... and undesignedly' (E 3) interpret their experience of the world; and so they retain the status of impressions through their foundation in sense-perception (cf. 40M, N; 41B 3). To indicate these characteristics of basic conceptualization, the Stoics called naturally acquired generic impressions 'preconceptions', using this term to distinguish them from conceptions that are culturally determined or deliberately acquired (cf. Epicureanism, 17). As the stuff of reason itself (E 4), preconceptions have a fundamental role as criteria of truth (see 40).

The priority accorded to impressions (A 1–2) suits their fundamental role in the philosophy quite generally. Sayables are defined by reference to rational impressions (33C), which also help to define scientific knowledge (31B 6) and the dialectical virtue of 'non-randomness' (31B 5). As one of the partitions of 'significations' (31A 7), impressions are acknowledged, along with language itself, to be a way of *interpreting* experience. Thus they are basic to the Stoics' analysis of impulse and action (cf. 40H 2–3; 53A 4, P, Q, S), and to their moral evaluation of these (cf. 56C 7; 65X, Y). The self-conscious use or scrutiny of impressions is Epictetus' favourite way of referring to moral intelligence at work (62K; 63E).

40 The criteria of truth

A Diogenes Laertius 7.54 (including SVF 2.105, Posidonius fr. 42)

(1) They [the Stoics] say that the cognitive impression is the criterion of truth, i.e. the impression arising from what is. This is what Chrysippus says in the second book of his *Physics*, and also Antipater and

Apollodorus. (2) Boethus admits a number of criteria – intellect, sense-perception, desire and scientific knowledge. (3) And Chrysippus, at variance with himself, says in the first of his books *On reason* that sense-perception and preconception are the criteria; preconception is a natural conception of universals. (4) Some of the older Stoics admit right reason as a criterion, as Posidonius says in his book *On the criterion*.

B Cicero, *Academica* 1.40–1 (SVF 1.55, 61, 60, part)

[Speaker: the Antiochean Varro in defence of Stoic epistemology] (1) He [Zeno] made a great many changes in the third division of philosophy. First, he made some new statements about sense-perceptions themselves, regarding them as compounded out of a sort of blow provided from outside . . . but adding to these impressions received as it were by the senses the mind's assent, which he took to be located within us and voluntary. (2) He did not attach reliability to all impressions but only to those which have a peculiar power of revealing their objects. Since this impression is discerned just by itself, he called it 'cognitive' [*katalepton*] . . . (3) But once it had been received and accepted, he called it a 'grasp' [cognition], resembling things grasped by the hand. [continued at 41B]

C Diogenes Laertius 7.46 (SVF 2.53, part)

(1) Of impressions, one kind is cognitive, the other incognitive. (2) The cognitive, which they [the Stoics] say is the criterion of things, is that which arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is. (3) The incognitive is either that which does not arise from what is, or from that which is but not exactly in accordance with what is: one which is not clear or distinct.

D Cicero, *Academica* 2.77–8 (following 68O)

[Speaker: Cicero on behalf of the New Academy] (1) We may take him [Arcesilaus] to have asked Zeno what would happen if the wise man could not cognize anything and it was the mark of the wise man not to opine. (2) Zeno, I imagine, replied that the wise man would not opine since there was something cognitive. (3) What then was this? Zeno, I suppose, said: an impression. (4) What kind of impression? Zeno then defined it as an impression stamped and reproduced from something which is, exactly as it is. (5) Arcesilaus next asked whether this was still valid if a true impression was just like a false one. (6) At this point Zeno was sharp enough to see that if an impression from what is were such that an impression from what is not could be just like it, there was no cognitive impression. (7) Arcesilaus agreed that it was right to add this to the definition, since neither a false impression nor a true one could be cognized if the latter were just such as even a false one could be. (8) But he

applied all his force to this point of the argument, in order to show that no impression arising from something true is such that an impression arising from something false could not also be just like it. (9) This is the one controversial issue which has lasted up to the present. [continued at 69H]

E Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 7.247–52 (SVF 2.65, part)

(1) Of true impressions, some are cognitive, others not. (2) Non-cognitive are ones people experience when they are in abnormal states. For very large numbers of people who are deranged or melancholic take in an impression which is true but non-cognitive, and arises purely externally and fortuitously, so that they often do not respond to it positively and do not assent to it. (3) A cognitive impression is one which arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is, of such a kind as could not arise from what is not. Since they [the Stoics] hold that this impression is capable of precisely grasping objects, and is stamped with all their peculiarities in a craftsmanlike way, they say that it has each one of the following as an attribute. (4) First of all, its arising from what is; for many impressions have their origin in what is not, as happens with the insane, and these are not cognitive. (5) Secondly, its being both from what is and exactly in accordance with what is; for some impressions, though they are from what is, do not represent exactly what is, as for instance in the case of the insane Orestes . . . [see 39G 9] (6) Furthermore, its being stamped and impressed, so that all the impressors' peculiarities are stamped on it in a craftsmanlike way . . . For, just as the seals on rings always stamp all their markings precisely on the wax, so those who have cognition of objects should notice all their peculiarities. (7) 'Of such a kind as could not arise from what is not' was added by the Stoics, since the Academics did not share their view of the impossibility of finding a totally indiscernible [but false] impression. For the Stoics say that one who has the cognitive impression fastens on the objective difference of things in a craftsmanlike way, since this kind of impression has a peculiarity which differentiates it from other impressions, just as horned snakes are different from others.

F Diogenes Laertius 7.177 (SVF 1.625) and Athenaeus 354E (SVF 1.624, part)

(1) Sphaerus . . . went to Ptolemy Philopator at Alexandria. One day a conversation took place on whether the wise man would opine, and Sphaerus said that he would not. Wishing to refute him, the king ordered wax pomegranates to be placed before him. (2) Sphaerus was deceived and the king cried out that he had given his assent to a false impression. Sphaerus gave him a shrewd answer, saying that his assent was not [to the impression] that they were pomegranates but [to the impression] that it

was reasonable that they were pomegranates. (3) He pointed out that the cognitive impression is different from the reasonable one . . . The former is incapable of deceiving, but the reasonable impression can turn out otherwise.

G Plutarch, *On common conceptions* 1059B–C (SVF 2.33)

(1) One Stoic said that in his opinion it was not by chance but by divine providence that Chrysippus came after Arcesilaus and before Carneades, the former of whom initiated the violence and offence against common sense, while the latter was the most productive of the Academics. (2) For by coming between them, Chrysippus with his rejoinders to Arcesilaus also fenced in the cleverness of Carneades; he left sense-perception many reinforcements, for it to stand siege as it were, and entirely removed the confusion regarding preconceptions and conceptions by articulating each one and assigning it to its appropriate place.

H Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 7.402–10

(1) [With regard to the definition of the cognitive impression, E 3] Carneades says that he will concede the rest of it to the Stoics, but not the clause 'of such a kind as could not arise from what is not'. For impressions arise from what is not as well as from what is. (2) The fact that they are found to be equally self-evident and striking is an indication of their indiscernibility, and an indication of their being equally self-evident and striking is the fact that the consequential actions are linked to [both kinds of impression]. Just as in waking states a thirsty man gets pleasure from drinking and someone who flees from a wild beast or any other terror shouts and screams, so too in dreams people satisfy their thirst and think they are drinking from a spring, and it is just the same with the fear of those who have nightmares . . . Just as in normal states too we believe and assent to very clear appearances, behaving towards Dion, for instance, as Dion and towards Theon as Theon, so too in madness some people have the similar experience. When Heracles was deranged, he got an impression from his own children as though they were those of Eurystheus, and he attached the consequential action to this impression, which was to kill his enemy's children, as he did. (3) If then impressions are cognitive in so far as they induce us to assent and to attach to them the consequential action, since false impressions are plainly of this kind too, we must say that incognitive ones are indiscernible from the cognitive . . . (4) The Academics are no less effective in proving indiscernibility with respect to stamp and impression. They confront the Stoics with appearances. In the case of things which are similar in shape but different objectively it is impossible to distinguish the cognitive impression from that which is false and incognitive. E.g. if I give the Stoic first one and

then another of two exactly similar eggs to discriminate, will the wise man, by focusing on them, be able to say infallibly whether the egg being shown is one and the same or different? The same argument applies in the case of twins. For the virtuous man will get a false impression, albeit one from what is and imprinted and stamped exactly in accordance with what is, if the impression he gets from Castor is one of Polydeuces.

I Cicero, *Academica* 2.57

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus] (1) I will even concede that the wise man himself, who is the subject of this whole discussion, when he experiences similar things which he cannot keep distinct, will withhold his assent and will never assent to any impression unless it is of a kind which a false one could not be. (2) But just as he has a specific expertise which enables him to distinguish the true from the false in other matters, so he has to apply practice to those similarities you adduce. Just as a mother can distinguish between her twins by the habit of her eyes, so you will do if you practise.

J Cicero, *Academica* 2.83–5

[Speaker: Cicero on behalf of the New Academy] (1) There are four headings to prove there is nothing which can be known, cognized or grasped, which is the subject of this whole controversy. The first of these is that some false impression does exist. (2) The second, that it is not cognitive. (3) The third, that impressions between which there is no difference cannot be such that some are cognitive and others not. (4) The fourth, that no true impression arises from sensation which does not have alongside it another impression no different from it which is not cognitive. (5) Everyone accepts the second and third of these headings. Epicurus does not grant the first, but you [Stoics and sympathizers], with whom we are dealing, admit that one too. The entire battle is about the fourth. (6) If someone looking at Publius Servilius Geminus thought he was looking at Quintus, he was experiencing an impression of the incognitive kind because there was no mark distinguishing the true from the false. With that difference removed, what mark could he have of the kind which could not be false for recognizing Gaius Cotta who was twice consul with Geminus? (7) You say that such a degree of similarity does not exist in things . . . we will allow that for sure. Yet it can certainly appear to exist and therefore deceive the sense, and if a single likeness has done that, it will have made everything doubtful. With that criterion removed which is the proper instrument of recognition, even if the man you are looking at is just the man you think you are looking at, you will not make the judgement with the mark you say you ought to, viz. one of a kind of which a false mark could not be . . . (8) You say that everything

is in a class of its own and that nothing is the same as something else. That is certainly a Stoic thesis and not a very plausible one – that no hair or grain of sand is in all respects of the same character as another hair or grain. (9) These claims can be refuted, but I don't want to fight. It makes no difference to the matter in hand whether a visual object is no different in every one of its parts, or even if it does differ, is incapable of being distinguished.

K Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 7.253–60

(1) While the older Stoics say that this cognitive impression is the criterion of truth, the later ones added the words 'and one which has no impediment'. For there are times when a cognitive impression occurs, but it is incredible owing to the external circumstances. (2) Thus when Heracles stood before Admetus, having brought Alcestis back from the dead, Admetus then took in a cognitive impression of Alcestis, but did not believe it . . . for he reasoned that Alcestis was dead, and that one who is dead does not rise again though certain spirits do sometimes roam around . . . (3) Therefore the cognitive impression is not the criterion of truth unconditionally, but when it has no impediment. This impression, being self-evident and striking, all but seizes us by the hair, they say, and pulls us to assent, needing nothing else to achieve this effect or to establish its difference from other impressions. (4) So too, whenever someone is keen to grasp something precisely, he is seen to chase after such an impression of his own accord, as when, in the case of visible things, he gets a dim impression of the object. He strains his sight and goes close to the visible object so as not to go wrong at all; he rubs his eyes and does just everything until he takes in a clear and striking impression of what he is judging, as though he thought the reliability of the cognition rested on this. (5) Moreover it is quite impossible to state the contrary thesis; and one who holds back from the claim that an impression is the criterion, since he is in this state by virtue of a second impression's existence, inevitably confirms the fact that impression is the criterion. (6) For nature has given the sensory faculty and the impression which arises thereby as our light, as it were, for the recognition of truth. So it is absurd to abrogate so great a faculty and to rob ourselves of the light, so to speak. (7) Just as it is the height of absurdity to allow colours and the differences between them while removing sight as non-existent or unreliable, and to assert the existence of sounds while denying that of hearing – for without those organs through which we conceive colours or sounds we cannot experience colours or sounds – so too one who grants the facts while completely undermining the sense-impression through which he grasps them is thunderstruck and putting himself on a level with soulless things.

L Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 7.424

For a [cognitive] sense-impression to occur, e.g. one of sight, five factors in their [the Stoics'] view must concur: the sense-organ, the sense-object, the place, the manner and the mind; since if all of these but one are present (e.g. if the mind is in an abnormal state), the perception, they say, will not be secured. For this reason some said that the cognitive impression is not a criterion universally, but when it has no such impediment.

M Cicero, *Academica* 2.22 (following 39C)

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus] (1) But if these conceptions were false or imprinted by the kind of impressions which were indiscernible from false ones, how on earth could we make use of them? (2) How too could we see what is consistent with each fact and what is inconsistent? (3) Quite certainly memory, which is the one chief foundation not only of philosophy but of all daily life and all expert skills, has no place at all left for itself. For how can there be a memory of what is false? Or what does anyone remember which he fails to grasp and hold in his mind?

N Cicero, *Academica* 2.30–1

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus] (1) The mind itself, which is the source of the senses and is even identical with the senses, has a natural force which it applies to the things by which it is activated. So it seizes some impressions in order to make immediate use of them, others, which are the source of memory, it stores away so to speak, while all the rest it arranges by their likenesses, and thereby conceptions of things are produced, which the Greeks call sometimes *ennoiai* and at other times *prolēpseis*. (2) With the addition of reason, logical proof and a multitude of innumerable facts, cognition of all those things manifests itself and reason, having been perfected by these stages, arrives at wisdom. (3) Since then the human mind is completely suited to the scientific knowledge of things and to consistency of life, it embraces cognition above all, and it loves that *katalēpsis* of yours . . . both for its own sake and also for its utility. (4) Therefore it makes use of the senses and creates the expert skills as second senses, and strengthens philosophy itself up to the point where it produces virtue, the one thing on which the whole of life depends. (5) Those accordingly who say that nothing can be grasped tear out the very tools or equipment of life, or rather they actually ruin the foundations of the whole of life and rob the living being itself of the mind which gives it life, so that it is difficult to speak of their rashness as the case demands.

O Cicero, *Academica* 2.37–8

[Speaker: the Antiochean Lucullus] (1) When we were explaining the power which exists in the senses, it was simultaneously made clear that many things are grasped and cognized by the senses; and this cannot take place without assent. (2) Moreover, since the principal difference between the animal and the non-animal is that an animal is an active being (for a completely inactive animal is quite inconceivable), an animal must either have sense-perception removed from itself or it must be granted that kind of assent which lies in our power. (3) But those refused sense-perception and assent are virtually robbed of their minds. For just as a scale must sink when weights are placed in the balance, so the mind must give way to what is self-evident. It is no more possible for a living creature to refrain from assenting to something self-evident than for it to fail to pursue what appears appropriate to its nature.

P Diogenes Laertius 7.52

It is by sense-perception, they [the Stoics] hold, that we get cognition of white and black, rough and smooth, but it is by reason that we get cognition of conclusions reached through demonstration, such as the gods' existence and their providence.

Q Diogenes Laertius 7.52 (*SVF* 2.71)

Aisthēsis is the Stoics' name for the breath which extends from the commanding-faculty to the senses, and for the cognition of which they are the instruments, and for their surrounding structure in respect of which some people get injured. The activity [of sensing] is also called *aisthēsis*.

R Plutarch, *On common conceptions* 1060A

I want to enjoy the revenge of observing the men [the Stoics] being convicted of the same thing, doing philosophy contrary to the common conceptions and preconceptions, which they regard as the very seeds of their school and claim to be the source of its unique agreement with nature.

S Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.22.1–3, 9–10

(1) Preconceptions are common to all men, and one preconception does not conflict with another. For which of us does not assume that the good is expedient and choiceworthy and that in every circumstance we should go after and pursue it? . . . So when does the conflict arise? In fitting preconceptions to particular entities, as when someone says, 'He acted nobly, he is brave', and another says, 'No, he is crazy'. This is the source

of men's disagreement with one another . . . (2) What is education? Learning to fit the natural preconceptions to particular entities in agreement with nature, and further, making the distinction that some things are in our power and others are not.

T Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 8.331a–332a

(1) It is agreed that a preconception and conception must precede every object of investigation. For how can anyone even investigate without some conception of the object of investigation? . . . (2) We grant this, then, and are so far from denying that we have a conception of the object of investigation that, on the contrary, we claim to have many conceptions and preconceptions of it, and that we come round to suspension of judgement and indecision owing to our inability to discriminate between these and to discover the most authoritative of them.

□ Throughout their history the Stoics did not budge from the thesis, first adumbrated by Zeno (B; 41B), that infallible knowledge of the world is possible, and that all normal human beings have a natural faculty to make secure discriminations between discoverable truths and falsehoods. During the first two centuries of the school's existence the sceptical Academy was equally resolute in resisting and criticizing these claims. When Antiochus of Ascalon, as an Academic, returned from scepticism to a positive interpretation of the Platonic tradition (see 68 commentary), he took over the main lines of the Stoics' epistemology, as may be seen from I, M–O (Lucullus' reports of his views, and cf. K). Sextus Empiricus, as a neo-Pyrrhonist, continued to attack the Stoics with arguments largely derived from the earlier Academic confrontation by Arcesilaus and Carneades. This epistemological debate, and the adjustments made by both sides over time (for the Academics, see 68T, U; 69I), is one of the high points of Hellenistic philosophy. The texts excerpted here should ideally be supplemented with reading the whole of Cicero's *Academica* 2, and much more from Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 7 and 8, than it is possible to include here. (For some of this further material see 41, and 68–70.) Our present selection concentrates on evidence for the 'cognitive impression', which was the bastion of Stoic epistemology and the principal object of criticism. These texts also include some of the Academic objections, and rejoinders to them by later Stoics. It is essential to recognize the continuing dialectic between the schools, which fostered much that was best in their contributions to the theory of knowledge.

In explicitly nominating 'criteria of truth', the earliest Stoics followed the policy laid down by Epicurus (see 17), and their own account of the subject should be studied against that background. Epicurus had defended the truth of all sense-impressions (J 5; cf. 16), justifying this bold thesis by sharply distinguishing *impressions* as unfailingly accurate reports of atomic images from *judgements* (true or false) about objects that we make on their basis. In his philosophy, the senses' reports are taken to be entirely irrational events; their truth is purely a function

of the mechanism that produces them, and imports no vestiges of judgement concerning the objects of which they are impressions. The Stoics, as was indicated in 39, adopted the more (to us) familiar notion that impressions themselves can be false as well as true (cf. J 1, 5). This thesis suits their theory that any impression of a normal adult is a rational activity, which represents the object of the impression in the form of a putative judgement – 'This (which I see) is white' etc. Thus a Stoic could say, 'Purely on the basis of what I am now seeing, I would claim that the colonnade gets narrower as it recedes from my position (cf. 39G 8); but I know, from my familiarity with optics and the colonnade's actual rectangularity, that this is a false impression.' In Stoicism impressions are entertained by the mind like competent or incompetent messengers (cf. Carneades' use of this simile in 70A 7), and the faculty of assent has the function of judging the value of their reports (see B).

This task is supposedly made easy, and indeed causally necessary in most cases (see K 3, O 3), by the so-called 'cognitive impression', *phantasia kataleptikē*. A more literal translation would be 'impression capable of grasping (its object)', and Zeno exploited this tactile image in his simile of the hand (41A). Whereas Epicurus had argued that sensations cannot refute one another (16A–B), the Stoics, from Zeno onwards (B), maintained the converse thesis, holding that there is a type of impression which gives its recipient an absolute guarantee that it represents the object with complete accuracy and clarity. As the criterion of truth (A 1), the cognitive impression is nature's gift (K 6; 41B 3) of a standard for securely determining what really is the case. Largely under Academic provocation, accounts of the cognitive impression and its criterial role were modified as the Stoa developed. From B to O our texts are arranged in their approximate chronological order, to exhibit this history.

In its earliest Zenonian form the cognitive impression has two attributes which jointly constitute its status as the criterion: (a) it has a real object as its cause; (b) it represents that object with complete accuracy and clarity (C 2, D 4; cf. 39B 2–4 for (a) as characteristic of impressions generally). An impression which has (a) but not (b) fails to be cognitive (C 3; cf. the Orestes example, 39G 9). The clarity and distinctness which are the mark of (b) are features which distinguish cognitive from all other kinds of impressions. In Zeno's terminology (B 2), cognitive impressions 'have a peculiar power of revealing their objects'; i.e. they make us perceive their objects in a way in which incognitive impressions do not. (Our word 'perception' derives from Cicero's translation of *katalepsis* by *perceptio*.) This peculiar power is an intrinsic feature of cognitive impressions, providing us, 'just by itself' (B 2), with the guarantee that we are perceiving real objects as they really are. The essence of Zeno's claim is probably captured by the notion (K 4) that it is sufficient to see things in a certain way (clearly and strikingly) to be sure that our perception is reliable (cf. Cicero, *Academica* 2.19).

Two assumptions underlie the self-certifiability of cognitive impressions. First, the Stoics take it to be basic to nature's plan that ensouled beings, and especially those endowed with reason, have the mental equipment to make the accurate discriminations which are necessary to living in accordance with nature (cf. K 6–7, M–O; 41B 3). Secondly, they assume that the faculty of assent is naturally determined to give its approval to such impressions (O; cf. K 3). These

form the foundations of the preconceptions (N 1, S; cf. 39E) and other general notions which stock the mind, and enable it to conceptualize and recognize the objects presented by any fresh cognitive impression. The outcome of assent to a cognitive impression is 'cognition' (B 3), which will be discussed in 41.

A cognitive impression, then, is supposedly peculiar in the accuracy and clarity with which it represents its real object. If, however, it is to serve as the final arbiter in all questions about what is really the case, the Stoics need to show that this peculiarity can and actually does mark off the cognitive from all other impressions. In response to Arcesilaus' challenge on this point (D 5), Zeno added a third attribute to the cognitive impression, 'of such a kind as could not arise from what is not' (D 6–7, cf. E 7), which then became canonical in definitions of the concept. The effect of this addition is to insist that only real things as they really are *can* produce the clarity and distinctness characteristic of cognitive impressions. Arcesilaus' rejoinder was 'no impression arising from something true is such that an impression arising from something false could not also be just like it' (D 8). The 'many different considerations' (41C 8) he adduced can be assumed to have included instances of deception over pairs of similar-looking objects (H 4, J 6–7; 28O 1–2), and use of the Sorites (see 37F, H). Carneades continued to attack in the same vein. For the purpose of argument, he was quite prepared to accept the existence of impressions which arise from and accurately represent real objects (the first two attributes of E 3–6; cf. H 1). The fundamental issue, as Cicero observes (D 9), was the discernibility of the cognitive impression from what the Academics declared were its possibly false and deceptive congeners (cf. 70A, B).

The debate seems to have focused upon various situations in which the requisite discriminations appear fallible. (a) Someone who behaves as Heracles did (H 2) shows by his actions that he took his impression to be like a cognitive one, but he was mistaken. His impression induced his assent, but it 'arose from what was false'. Thus *at the time when* he receives it, a person may find a false impression thoroughly 'self-evident and striking' (cf. Ptolemy's attempt to trick Sphaerus, F). (b) The cognitive impression supposedly fastens upon all the 'peculiarities' of its object (E 6). Yet there can be objects so similar that they prove to be indiscernible by the ways they stamp our impressions, and so fail to satisfy the second attribute of cognition (H 4, J 6–7) and therefore the third.

To (a) the Stoics reply that the impressions of a deranged Heracles say nothing about a normal mind's capacity to discriminate cognitive from incognitive impressions. They advance the cognitive impression as the way truth presents itself to normal minds (E 2), and point out that the kind of impressions which the Academics advance as problematic are the product of abnormal conditions (cf. 39G 8–9). Nor did later Stoics at least deny that a normal person may mistake cognitive for incognitive impressions and vice versa, under unusual conditions such as those experienced by Admetus (K 1–2). The mental state of the percipient, and all the other perceptual conditions, are allowed to be factors which can prevent a cognitive impression from performing its criterial function (L). This restriction, as a defence against objection (a), prompted the revisionary thesis of K 1: the cognitive impression is the criterion of truth 'provided it has no impediment'.

As to objection (b), the Stoics rejected its premise. According to their

metaphysics (J 7–9; cf. 28), the identity of indiscernibles excludes the possibility of there being pairs of twins or eggs which are actually indiscernible. For if they exist as discrete objects, they must each exist as 'peculiarly qualified individuals' with distinguishable properties that impressions, in theory at least, can discriminate. This thesis does not imply that a normal person will have cognitive impressions to decide which of two eggs he is looking at. But the Stoics are not committed to the position (as implied in H 4) that people in general or even the wise man can expect cognitive impressions of every possible object. Suspension of judgement is the wise man's response to every case where his impressions fail to discriminate objects with the requisite clarity and distinctness (I). Yet, as was pertinently observed, familiarity and training enable experts to make extremely precise discriminations in many such cases (cf. 39A 7), which implies that even here cognitive impressions are possible.

Contrary to what is often alleged, the Stoics have the better of the argument. In order to undermine the cognitive impression as a criterion of truth, the Academics need to prove that the true impressions we receive under normal conditions are always liable to be confused with similar but false impressions. Rather than addressing the problem cases which they chose to cite, they might have done better to challenge the feasibility of specifying normal conditions (cf. 72E). Stoics acknowledge that human beings are frequently precipitate in giving assent to incognitive impressions; but they could explain this as due to mental weakness and lack of education (41D, G). Nor does the claim that there are cognitive impressions imply that their mere occurrence is sufficient to free their recipient from error; for he may be the kind of person who is incapable of recognizing the truth even when he sees it. What the Academics fail to refute is the thesis that certain true impressions are of a type to make a fully functioning rational being perceive things as they really are.

Along with their defence of the cognitive impression, later Stoics and Antiochus produced a battery of arguments directly attacking the sceptical Academics' refusal to grant the empirical foundations of knowledge (K 5–7, M–O). They charged their critics with logical incoherence (K 5–7), and flagrant disregard of psychology (53S) and ethics (N 5, O). (Much more of the same will be found in other sections of Cicero, *Academica* 2.17–39.) These Stoic strategies help to throw light on the status and interpretation of Chrysippus' other criteria of truth (A 3, cf. commentary on Epicureanism, 17). There is evidence elsewhere (e.g. 48C 5) for Chrysippus invoking 'common conceptions' (i.e. ones supposedly held by people in general) as well as 'preconceptions' as criteria, and his further mention of 'sense-perception' (A 3) is a clue to what they involve. By 'sense-perception' (*aisthēsis*) Chrysippus must mean our cognition of simple perceptible objects (cf. P, Q), which is brought about by the most basic cognitive impressions. Sense-perception, however, is also the foundation of all our conceptions and cognitions (N 1; cf. 39C–E), and all our conceptions are impressions (39F). We need not, then, suppose that Chrysippus contradicted himself in specifying different criteria in different contexts, as A 3 maintains. In their generality and complexity, preconceptions and common conceptions cover truths which cognitive impressions, or at least sensory ones, do not transmit directly; but Chrysippus can be assumed to have regarded these criteria

as complementary to sense-perception, and grounded in the cognitive impressions of which it consists (cf. G, M; 39C).

The gods' existence and providence, cited as examples of cognition established by rational argument (P), are standard cases of items the Stoics referred to preconceptions and common conceptions (cf. 54K). It appears, then, that these function as criteria to validate theories and to adjudicate truth in areas where simple cognitive sense-impressions will not serve. Thus Chrysippus claimed that his theory of mixture could be 'proved through the common conceptions' (48C 5) and that Epicurus' denial of divine providence was inconsistent with our conceptions of the gods as beneficent and philanthropic (see 54K).

This of course is a deliberate dig at Epicurus' claim that his own non-providential theology is founded on 'preconceptions' which differ from the 'false suppositions' of the many (23B 3); and it shows up the frailty of both schools' attempts to extend empirically-based criteria beyond the domain of the uncontroversial and obvious. Critics found it all too easy to point out that Stoicism was full of doctrines, not to mention paradoxes, which were totally alien to the common conceptions of people (R) and therefore inappropriately heralded to be 'natural'. The Stoics, to be sure, will reply that their conceptions are properly (and so naturally) founded on experience (N); but the reply does nothing to weaken the force of Sextus Empiricus' admirable comments on the criterial impotence of conceptions and preconceptions (T). He can agree with the Stoics that conceptions are a prerequisite of all investigation (39C 4, so too Epicurus 17C, E). Yet this totally fails to justify their claim (M) that the use we make of them is well grounded, especially since one philosopher's preconceptions may conflict with another's. Epictetus tries to retain community of preconceptions by referring disagreement to their application to particulars (S). For this quite promising move to work, the scope and content of preconceptions would need to be far more restricted than the Stoics were willing to admit. On this aspect of the debate over criteria of truth, the sceptics can be judged to have carried the day.

As for the other criteria mentioned in A, Posidonius' report concerning right reason (A 4) is a highly suspect piece of history (see vol. 2 note), while Boethus' extended list (A 2) is unique, and seems to rely on a broader notion of 'criterion' than was adopted by other Stoics.

41 Knowledge and opinion

A Cicero, *Academica* 2.145 (SVF 1.66)

[Speaker: Cicero on behalf of the New Academy] (1) Zeno used to clinch the wise man's sole possession of scientific knowledge with a gesture. (2) He would spread out the fingers of one hand and display its open palm, saying 'An impression is like this.' (3) Next he clenched his fingers a little and said, 'Assent is like this.' (4) Then, pressing his fingers quite together,

he made a fist, and said that this was cognition (and from this illustration he gave that mental state the name of *katalēpsis*, which it had not had before). (5) Then he brought his left hand against his right fist and gripped it tightly and forcefully, and said that scientific knowledge was like this and possessed by none except the wise man.

B Cicero, *Academica* 1.41–2 (SVF 1.60, part; continuing 40B)

[Speaker: the Antiochean Varro] (1) What was grasped by sense-perception Zeno called itself a sense-perception, and if it had been so grasped that it could not be disrupted by reason, he called it scientific knowledge; but if it were otherwise, he called it ignorance, taking this to be the source of opinion as well, which was something weak and related to what was false and incognitive. (2) That cognition I mentioned above [40B 3] he placed between scientific knowledge and ignorance, counting it neither as good nor as bad, but said that it was to be trusted on its own. (3) Accordingly, he also attached reliability to the senses, because, as I said above, he regarded cognition effected by them as both true and reliable; not because it grasped all of a thing's properties, but because it left out nothing capable of confronting it, and also because nature had given it as the standard of scientific knowledge and as the natural foundation for the subsequent impression of conceptions of things upon the mind, which give rise not just to the starting-points but to certain broader routes for discovering reason. (4) But from virtue and wisdom Zeno removed error, rashness, ignorance, opinion, conjecture, and in a word, everything foreign to firm and consistent assent.

C Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 7.151–7

(1) The Stoics say there are three things which are linked together, scientific knowledge [*epistēmē*], opinion [*doxa*] and cognition [*katalēpsis*] stationed between them. (2) Scientific knowledge is cognition which is secure and firm and unchangeable by reason. (3) Opinion is weak and false assent. (4) Cognition in between these is assent belonging to a cognitive impression; and a cognitive impression, so they claim, is one which is true and of such a kind that it could not turn out false. (5) Of these they say that scientific knowledge is found only in the wise, and opinion only in the inferior, but cognition is common to them both, and it is the criterion of truth. (6) Arcesilaus contradicted these statements of the Stoics by proving that cognition is no criterion in between scientific knowledge and opinion. (7) For what they call cognition and assent to a cognitive impression occurs in either a wise or an inferior man. But if it occurs in a wise man, it is scientific knowledge; and if in an inferior man, it is opinion; and there is no further variation except a purely verbal one. (8) And if cognition is assent belonging to a cognitive impression, it is

non-existent: first, because assent occurs not in relation to an impression but in relation to language (for assents belong to propositions). Secondly, because no true impression is found to be of a kind such that it could not turn out false, as is attested by many different considerations. (9) But if the cognitive impression does not exist, cognition will not occur either, for it was assent to a cognitive impression. And if cognition does not exist, everything will be incognitive. And if everything is incognitive, it will follow, according to the Stoics too, that the wise man suspends judgement. (10) We may consider it in this way: given that everything is incognitive, owing to the non-existence of the Stoic criterion, if the wise man should assent, the wise man will opine. For given that nothing is cognitive, if he assents to anything, he will assent to the incognitive, and assent to the incognitive is opinion. So if the wise man is one of those who assent, the wise man will be one of those who opine. But the wise man is certainly not one of those who opine (for they [the Stoics] claim this to be a mark of folly and a cause of wrongdoing). Therefore the wise man is not one of those who assent. And if this is so, he will have to withhold assent about everything. But to withhold assent is no different from suspending judgement. Therefore the wise man will suspend judgement about everything.

*DIF.
Stoics &
C/MC

D Anonymous Stoic treatise (Herculaneum papyrus 1020) col. 4, col. 1 (SVF 2.131, part)

(1) < So it is > that we respect non-precipitancy and uncarelessness, but we are rightly criticized for their opposites. Non-precipitancy is a disposition not to assent in advance of cognition . . . strong in [dealing with] impressions and not yielding to those which are incognitive. For one who is non-precipitate should not be pulled by an incognitive impression . . . and keeps control over his assents . . . (2) We say that the wise man's absence of opinion is accompanied by such characteristics as, first of all, his supposing nothing; for supposal is an incognitive opinion . . . (3) A further consequence is that wise men are incapable of being deceived and of erring, and that they live worthily and do everything well. Therefore they also give greater attention to ensuring that their assents do not occur randomly, but only in company with cognition.

E Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1056E–F (SVF 2.993, part)

[Fate] . . . frequently produces impressions, in matters of very great importance, which are at variance with one another and pull the mind in opposite directions. On these occasions the Stoics say that those who assent to one of them and do not suspend judgement are guilty of error; that they are precipitate if they yield to unclear impressions, deceived if they yield to false ones, and opining if they yield to ones which are incognitive quite generally.

F Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1057A–B (SVF 3.177, part)

Furthermore, Chrysippus says that both god and the wise man implant false impressions, not asking us to assent or yield but merely to act and be impelled towards the appearance, but that we inferior persons out of weakness assent to such impressions.

G Stobaeus 2.111, 18–112,8 (SVF 3.548, part)

(1) They [the Stoics] say that the wise man never makes a false supposition, and that he does not assent at all to anything incognitive, owing to his not opining and his being ignorant of nothing. (2) For ignorance is changeable and weak assent. (3) But the wise man supposes nothing weakly, but rather, securely and firmly; and so he does not opine either. (4) For there are two kinds of opinion, assent to the incognitive, and weak supposition, and these are alien to the wise man's disposition. (5) So precipitancy and assent in advance of cognition are attributes of the precipitate inferior man, whereas they do not befall the man who is well-natured and perfect and virtuous.

H Stobaeus 2.73,16–74,3 (SVF 3.112, part)

[The Stoics say] (1) Scientific knowledge [*epistēmē*] is a cognition [*katalēpsis*] which is secure and unchangeable by reason. (2) It is secondly a system of such *epistēmai*, like the rational cognition of particulars which exists in the virtuous man. (3) It [scientific knowledge here = science] is thirdly a system of expert *epistēmai*, which has intrinsic stability, just as the virtues do. (4) Fourthly, it is a tenor for the reception of impressions which is unchangeable by reason, and consisting, they say, in tension and power.

I Stobaeus 2.68,18–23 (SVF 3.663)

They [the Stoics] also say that every inferior man is insane, since he has ignorance of himself and of his concerns, and this is insanity. Ignorance is the vice opposite to moderation, and this is insanity because in its relative dispositions it makes our impulses unstable and fluttering. Hence they give this outline of insanity – fluttering ignorance.

- The cognitive state that results from assent to a cognitive impression is 'cognition' (*katalēpsis*, A 4, C 4). Like the clenched fist, to which Zeno likened it (A 4), cognition (or 'perception', in Cicero's Latin translation) is the 'grasp' of its object – the state of affairs whose truth is guaranteed by the cognitive impression. Such impressions, by being assented to, give someone the certainty that he perceives some truth(s), and this cognition takes on the necessary reliability and criterial power (B 3, C 4–5) of the cognitive impression itself. It might seem accordingly that the Stoics should identify 'cognition' with

knowledge, a hallmark of which is often regarded as certified true belief. Their doctrine in fact is more interesting and more complex. It would be possible to translate *katalēpsis* by 'knowledge' in many contexts, and *katalēpsis* is certainly the foundation of *epistēmē*, the highest cognitive state, which we render by 'science' or 'scientific knowledge' (cf. A 4–5, B 3, H). But cognition, though a necessary condition of this state, is not sufficient to constitute it. To become 'scientific knowledge', cognition must be made impregnable to any reasoning that might be adduced to persuade a change of mind (B 1, H 1, 4). We may approach elucidation of this further condition by noting a more striking indication of the insufficiency of cognition on its own to be the highest form of knowledge: it straddles the basic dichotomy between wise and inferior men (C 5, cf. B 1–2), and in the latter case coexists with 'ignorance'.

As 'changeable and weak assent' (G 2), 'ignorance' is defined as the contradictory of 'scientific knowledge' (cf. H 1). The ignorant 'fool', i.e. the vast majority of mankind, is not typified by the falsehood of his beliefs, nor even by his lack of knowledge in ordinary Greek senses of that term. 'Ignorance' accommodates all cognitive states, including 'cognitions' (certified true beliefs), which fall short of the impregnable stability and systematic consistency – hand over fist (A 5) – that belong to the wise man's scientific knowledge. The absolute disjunction between scientific knowledge and ignorance is an important instance of the Stoics' ruthless insistence on excluding any mental disposition intermediate between excellence and its opposite (virtue/vice, wisdom/folly, sanity/insanity, cf. I, and see 61I). Nor is this breached by the admission that 'cognition' is common to both classes of people (C 5) or 'between scientific knowledge and ignorance' (B 2). The same quasi-intermediate status belongs to 'proper functions' in ethics (59B 4, F 1). Inferior people will typically perform many of these – looking after their health, their parents etc. – and thus share the same moral domain as the wise man. Since, however, they lack his virtuous and perfectly consistent disposition, even their proper functions, though objectively right, are counted as 'wrong-doing' (59F 3). It is just the same with the evaluation of cognitions. Neutral though trustworthy in themselves (B 2), they acquire positive or negative epistemic status from the strength or weakness of the mind to which they belong. The wise man's grasp of truths is so secure and systematic that his commanding-faculty is identical to 'truth' (33P 2, 4). That of the inferior man, by contrast, is so insecure that even those truths of which he does have cognition do not save him from comprehensive ignorance.

In Sextus Empiricus' report of Arcesilaus' critique of Stoic epistemology, which should for chronological reasons refer to its Zenonian form (cf. B), the equivocal intermediacy of 'cognition' is exploited as part of an argument against its existence (C 1–7). As reported, Arcesilaus argued that the exclusive disjunction between the two classes of people and between their mental dispositions reduces cognition to either (a) scientific knowledge in the wise or (b) opinion in the inferior. Zeno's doctrine of B 1 justifies (a), but (b) will only hold good if the Stoics counted the cognitions of inferior men as 'opinions'. That however would be a flagrant contradiction of E (cf. D 2), according to which the general characteristic of 'opining' is 'assent to the incognitive'. That claim too has Zeno's authority (40D, and cf. Cicero, *Academica* 2.60, 'opining is

assenting to a thing either false or incognitive'). But on the evidence of **B 1**, Zeno could have been taken not to have clearly distinguished 'ignorance', which includes the inferior man's true cognitions, from opining; and it should be noted that Arcesilaus says 'assent to the incognitive is opinion' (**C 10**) and not 'opinion is assent to the incognitive', which leaves it open that some opinions may involve assent to cognitive impressions. Such possible indecision by Zeno on the scope of 'opinion' could have allowed Arcesilaus to substitute 'opinion' for 'ignorance' in his argument, and thus imply that the inferior man's so-called cognition is really opinion in the wider sense, so negating the distinction within 'ignorance' between true cognitions and false or uncertified opinions. Arcesilaus' argument will still go through if 'ignorance' is substituted throughout **C 1-7** for 'opinion', but this need not trouble later Stoics. They could accept the conclusion that cognition in the inferior man is ignorance, but deny that this robs cognition of its significance, since ignorance is made up of both cognitions and opinions, and only the latter are false or uncertified as true.

Unlike most previous philosophers (the clear exception is Parmenides), no Stoics officially recognize the existence of *true* 'opinions'. As they normally use the term *doxa*, it refers to beliefs that result from assent to the incognitive (**E**, **G 1**), where incognitive covers everything that cannot be grasped, both falsehoods and states of affairs whose truth is not clearly or distinctly certified (**40C**). (This pejorative assessment of 'opining' was a point on which Stoics and sceptics were in agreement: see **40D**; **69**.) The Stoic equivalent of true or correct opinion, as Plato uses that expression, would be the 'cognitions' of inferior men, which fall short of scientific knowledge (cf. Plato, *Meno* 98a, where correct opinions become knowledge when 'tethered by working out the reason'). A crucial difference between wise and inferior men is their disposition with respect to knowing when suspension of judgement is called for (cf. **40I**). The wise man has infallible control over his assent, giving it only to impressions of whose cognitive status he is quite certain (**D 1**); this is a characteristic of his scientific knowledge (**H 4**). In all other cases, he suspends judgement, which Arcesilaus exploits in the second part of his argument (**C 9-10**): he cleverly concludes that the Stoics' wise man, on their own admission, would have to suspend judgement about everything if the cognitive impression and cognition do not exist. (Suspension of judgement, which is the fundamental notion in Academic scepticism, was probably at home in the Stoa before Arcesilaus turned it against them in arguments, with Stoic premises, for scepticism). Inferior men, by contrast, are characterized by their 'precipitancy' (**E**, **G 5**), or disposition to assent to 'unclear impressions', their 'erroneous' assent where suspension of judgement is in order, and their 'self-deception in yielding to false impressions'. All of these are represented as types of 'assent to the incognitive', the general mark of 'opinion' (**E**).

From this and other evidence we have argued that the inferior man's true cognitions were not normally counted as cases of 'opining'. They must however share in the 'changeableness and weakness' which characterize his ignorance generally (**G 2**). 'Weakness' denotes the insecurity, instability and inconsistency of the inferior man's mental state, and seems to cover the following cases: (a) not

assenting firmly to cognitive impressions, (b) not going through with right decisions, (c) assenting precipitately to incognitive impressions, (d) assenting to what is patently false. (For (a) cf. **B 1**, for (b) **65T**, for (c) **D 1**, **G 4-5**, for (d) **F** and **65C**.) Stobaeus' treatment of 'weak supposition' as a second type of 'opinion' (**G 4**) reads in its context like an alternative description of 'precipitancy'. But it is possible that he preserves traces of a (?) Zenonian doctrine in which the inferior man's weak assent to cognitive impressions was counted as an 'opinion' (cf. **B 1**, **C 3**), as well as his assent to what is false and incognitive.

By allowing all normal people to have some cognitions, albeit weakly held in most cases, the Stoics provided a basis for 'progress' (see **59I**) exactly analogous to their doctrine of 'proper functions'. What perfects these latter is not a change in their objective content, but the expert understanding, consistency and moral integrity of their agent. So too with the conversion of cognitions into scientific knowledge. The evidence does not suggest that the wise man must grasp more facts than other people. His scientific expertise is rather a function of what he knows and *how* he knows what he knows – systematically, completely securely, so rationally grounded that no reasons can be furnished which could possibly subvert it (cf. **H**). His ignorance of nothing (**G 1**) does not imply literal omniscience, but the absence of all doubt, uncertainty, falsehood and instability from his cognitive state.

At this point we should remember that the Stoics' principal philosophical motivation was ethical. What chiefly inhibits people from becoming wise, in their view, is proneness to emotional disorder, and this is reflected in the startling identification of ignorance with insanity (**I**). The 'unstable and fluttering impulses', which ignorance is said to exhibit, are the passions, which are false judgements of what is good and bad for men (see **65A**, **G**, and note the role of assent in the latter text). Scientific knowledge in Stoicism, it turns out, is an intensely practical disposition, and a far cry from Aristotelian 'contemplation' (*theōria*). In its prevailing emphasis on the avoidance of error and baseless opinion (cf. **B 4**, and see the 'dialectical virtues', **31B**), it is most convincingly interpreted as an attempt to provide foundations for the kind of knowledge that Socrates failed to find.

42 Scientific methodology

A Olympiodorus, *On Plato's Gorgias* 12.1

(1) Cleanthes says that expertise is a tenor which achieves everything methodically. (2) This definition is incomplete. After all, nature also is a tenor which does everything methodically. (3) That is why Chrysippus added 'with impressions', and said that expertise is a tenor which advances methodically with impressions . . . (4) Zeno says that an expertise is a systematic collection of cognitions unified by practice for some goal advantageous in life.

the other topics, were originally represented as subdivisions of others: for instance, passions could be properly located as a subdivision of 'impulses' (cf. 65A 1) and 'proper functions' as a subdivision of 'primary value and actions'. The eighth topic, 'encouragements and discouragements', naturally comes last, as the educational precepts based upon the previous doctrines (cf. 66J).

In organizing the ethical material ourselves, we have accepted these topics as section headings but have adapted the order of A as follows: 57 = (i), 58 = (vi), 59 = (vii), 60 = (ii), 61 = (iv), 63 = (v), 65 = (iii), 66 = (viii).

Seneca and Epictetus (B, C) specify a threefold division. Though differing over details, their accounts are sufficiently similar to indicate an agreed logical and educational progression. The first heading, in this system, is concerned with the assessment of what it is worthwhile to pursue or avoid; the second with the impulses and resulting actions appropriate to this assessment; the third with the achievement of consistency and full understanding. Epictetus helpfully observes that the third 'applies to those who are already making progress' (C 7). This threefold arrangement, if articulated in A's terms, would broadly incorporate under the first heading, 'good and bad things', 'passions' (cf. C 5), 'primary value and actions'; under the second, 'impulse', and 'proper functions'; under the third, 'virtue', and 'the end'.

57 Impulse and appropriateness

A Diogenes Laertius 7.85-6 (SVF 3.178)

(1) They [the Stoics] say that an animal has self-preservation as the object of its first impulse, since nature from the beginning appropriates it, as Chrysippus says in his *On ends* book 1. (2) The first thing appropriate to every animal, he says, is its own constitution and the consciousness of this. For nature was not likely either to alienate the animal itself, or to make it and then neither alienate it nor appropriate it. So it remains to say that in constituting the animal, nature appropriated it to itself. This is why the animal rejects what is harmful and accepts what is appropriate.

(3) They hold it false to say, as some people do, that pleasure is the object of animals' first impulse. For pleasure, they say, if it does occur, is a by-product which arises only when nature all by itself has searched out and adopted the proper requirements for a creature's constitution, just as animals [then] frolic and plants bloom. (4) Nature, they say, is no different in regard to plants and animals at the time when it directs animals as well as plants without impulse and sensation, and in us certain processes of a vegetative kind take place. But since animals have the additional faculty of impulse, through the use of which they go in search of what is appropriate to them, what is natural for them is to be administered in accordance with their impulse. (5) And since reason, by way of a more perfect management, has been bestowed on rational beings, to live correctly in accordance with reason comes to be natural for them. For reason supervenes as the craftsman of impulse. [continued at 63C]

B Seneca, *Letters* 121.6-15 (with omissions)

(1) No one sets his limbs in motion with difficulty, no one is hesitant in the activation of himself. Animals do this as soon as they are born. They begin life with this knowledge . . . (2) So little does fear of pain compel them to [move their parts appropriately] that they strive for their natural motion even against the pressure of pain. A baby who is set on standing up and is getting used to supporting himself, as soon as he begins to try his strength, falls down and with tears keeps getting up again until he has trained himself through pain to do what nature demands . . . A tortoise on its back feels no pain, but desire for its natural state makes it restless, and it does not stop struggling and shaking itself until it stands on its feet. So all animals are conscious of their own constitution, and this explains such easy handling of their limbs . . . (3) Each period of life has its own constitution, one for the baby, and another for the boy, < another for the youth, > and another for the old man. They are all related appropriately to that constitution in which they exist.

C Hierocles 1.34-9, 51-7, 2.1-9

(1) It seems right to say a few words about sensation. For this contributes to knowledge of the first thing which is appropriate, the subject which we said would be the best starting-point for the elements of ethics. (2) We should realize that as soon as an animal is born it perceives itself . . . The first thing that animals perceive is their own parts . . . both that they have them and for what purpose they have them, and we ourselves perceive our eyes and our ears and the rest. So whenever we want to see something, we strain our eyes, but not our ears, towards the visible object . . . Therefore the first proof of every animal's perceiving itself is its consciousness of its parts and the functions for which they were given. (3) The second proof is the fact that animals are not unaware of their equipment for self-defence. When bulls do battle with other bulls or animals of different species, they stick out their horns, as if these were their congenital weapons for the encounter. Every other creature has the same disposition relative to its appropriate and, so to speak, congenital weapons.

D Hierocles 9.3-10, 11.14-18

(1) The appropriate disposition relative to oneself is benevolence, while that to one's kindred is affection . . . Just as our appropriate disposition relative to our children is affection, and, to external property, choice, so an animal's appropriate disposition relative to itself is < self-preservation > and, to things which contribute to the needs of its constitution, selection . . . (2) We are an animal, but a gregarious one which needs someone else as well. For this reason too we inhabit cities; for there is no human

being who is not a part of a city. Secondly, we make friendships easily. By eating together or sitting together in the theatre . . . [text breaks off]

E Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1038B (SVF 3.179, 2.724)

(1) Why then again for heaven's sake in every book on physics and ethics does he [Chrysippus] weary us to death in writing that we have an appropriate disposition relative to ourselves as soon as we are born and to our parts and our offspring? (2) In his *On justice* book 1 he says that even the beasts have an appropriate disposition relative to their offspring in harmony with their needs, except for fish, since their spawn is nurtured through itself.

F Cicero, *On ends* 3.62–8 (with omissions)

[Speaker: the Stoic Cato] (1) [They think it is important to understand that nature engenders parents' love for their children. That is the starting-point from which we derive the general sociability of the human race. This must be clear first of all from bodies' shape and limbs, which make it plain by themselves that reproduction is a principle possessed by nature. But it could not be consistent for nature both to desire the production of offspring and not to be concerned that offspring should be loved. Even among animals nature's power can be observed; when we see the effort they spend on giving birth and on rearing, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. As it is evident therefore that we naturally shrink from pain, so it is clear that nature itself drives us to love those we have engendered. (2) Hence it follows that mutual attraction between men is also something natural. Consequently, the mere fact that someone is a man makes it incumbent on another man not to regard him as alien.] Just as some parts of the body, like the eyes and ears, are created as it were for their own sake while others, such as the legs and the hands, serve the needs of the other parts; so, some large animals are created only for themselves, whereas . . . ants, bees, and storks do certain things for the sake of others as well. Human behaviour in this respect is much more closely bonded. We are therefore by nature suited to form unions, societies, and states. (3) The Stoics hold that the world is governed by divine will: it is as if we were a city and state shared by men and gods, and each one of us is a part of this world. From this it is a natural consequence that we prefer the common advantage to our own . . . This explains the fact that someone who dies for the state is praiseworthy, because our country should be dearer to us than ourselves . . . (4) Furthermore we are driven by nature to desire to benefit as many people as possible, and especially by giving instruction and handing on the principles of prudence. Hence it is difficult to find anyone who would not pass on to another what he himself knows; such is our inclination not only to learn but also to teach . . . (5) Just as they think that rights bind men together,

so they deny that any rights exist between men and animals. For Chrysippus excellently remarked that everything else was created for the sake of men and gods, but these for the sake of community and society; consequently men can make beasts serve their own needs without contravening rights. (6) Since, moreover, man's nature is such that a kind of civil right mediates between himself and the human race, one who maintains this will be just, and whoever departs from it, unjust. (7) But just as the communal nature of a theatre is compatible with the correctness of saying that the place each person occupies is *his*, so in the city or world which they share no right is infringed by each man's possessing what belongs to him. (8) Furthermore, since we see that man is created with a view to protecting and preserving his fellows, it is in agreement with this nature that the wise man should want to play a part in governing the state and, in order to live the natural way, take a wife and want children by her.

G Hierocles (Stobaeus 4.671,7–673,11) - The 'circles' passage

(1) Each one of us is as if we were entirely encompassed by many circles, some smaller, others larger, the latter enclosing the former on the basis of their different and unequal dispositions relative to each other. (2) The first and closest circle is the one which a person has drawn as though around a centre, his own mind. This circle encloses the body and anything taken for the sake of the body. For it is virtually the smallest circle, and almost touches the centre itself. (3) Next, the second one further removed from the centre but enclosing the first circle; this contains parents, siblings, wife, and children. The third one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and cousins. The next circle includes the other relatives, and this is followed by the circle of local residents, then the circle of fellow-tribesmen, next that of fellow-citizens, and then in the same way the circle of people from neighbouring towns, and the circle of fellow-countrymen. (4) The outermost and largest circle, which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race. (5) Once these have all been surveyed, it is the task of a well tempered man, in his proper treatment of each group, to draw the circles together somehow towards the centre, and to keep zealously transferring those from the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones . . . (6) It is incumbent on us to respect people from the third circle as if they were those from the second, and again to respect our other relatives as if they were those from the third circle. For although the greater distance in blood will remove some affection, we must still try hard to assimilate them. The right point will be reached if, through our own initiative, we reduce the distance of the relationship with each person. The main procedure for this has been stated. (7) But we should do more, in the terms of address we use, calling cousins brothers, and uncles and aunts,

fathers and mothers . . . For this mode of address would be no slight mark of our affection for them all, and it would also stimulate and intensify the indicated contraction of the circles.

H Anonymous commentary on Plato's *Theaetetus*, 5.18–6.31

(1) We have an appropriate relationship to members of the same species. (2) But a man's relationship to his own citizens is more appropriate. For appropriation varies in its intensification. (3) So those people [the Stoics] who derive justice from appropriation, if on the one hand they are saying that a man's appropriation in relation to himself is equal to his appropriation in relation to the most distant Mysian, their assumption preserves justice; on the other hand no one agrees with them that the appropriation is equal. That is contrary to plain fact and one's self-awareness. (4) For appropriation in relation to oneself is natural and irrational, whereas appropriation in relation to one's neighbours, while also natural, is not independent of reason. (5) If, at any rate, we charge people with misbehaviour, we not only criticize them but we are also alienated from them, whereas they themselves, having done wrong, although they do not welcome the < criticisms >, cannot hate themselves. (6) So appropriation in relation to oneself is not equal to appropriation to anyone else, given that our relationship to our own parts is not one of equal appropriation. For we are not disposed in just the same way relative to our eyes and our fingers, let alone to our nails and hair, seeing that we are not alienated from their loss equally either, but to a greater or lesser extent. (7) If on the other hand they themselves should say that appropriation can be intensified, we may grant the existence of philanthropy, but the situations of shipwrecked sailors will refute them, where it is inevitable that only one of two survive. (8) Even apart from situations, they themselves are in a position to be refuted. Hence the members of the Academy pose the following argument as well . . .

- The Stoics made 'impulse' (see 56A) the first topic of their ethical theory. Impulse, together with sensation, distinguishes animals quite generally (including man) from plants (A 4; cf. 53A 4), and gives them the innate capacity to activate themselves in an animal's way of life. This way of life is programmed, as it were, by the fact that animals are born with self-preservation as the object of their first impulse (A 1). Against the Epicureans, who held that living creatures are impelled to pursue pleasure and avoid pain from the moment of birth (A 3, B 2; cf. 21A 2), the Stoics argued that an animal's first motivation is determined by its innate awareness of its physical constituents and their functions (B 1–2, C 2–3). These passages from Seneca and Hierocles base their claims for this thesis on empirical data. In A 1–2 Chrysippus proceeds more theoretically. The

argument reported there derives its force from implicit teleological assumptions about nature in general, which is equivalent to both the sum of all particular 'natures' and their creative or organizing principle. In this sense nature is identical to god or cosmic reason (60H 3–4), and this is doubtless the unexpressed ground for rejecting 'alienation' as a likely action by nature with regard to animals. The logic of A 2 is: not-*p*; but either *p* or *q*; therefore *q* (where *p* = alienation and *q* = appropriation). Like the craftsman which nature is, it has good reason to take an interest in its products.

'Alienation' and 'appropriation' are literal translations of the Greek terms *allotriōsis* and *oikeiōsis*. Their English associations with property ownership capture the main force of the Stoic concepts here, though any translation will miss something of the original. The advantage of 'appropriation' is its providing a means, through the verb or adjective 'appropriate', of rendering grammatically related forms of the Greek root *oik-*. This connotes ownership, what belongs to something, but in Stoic usage that notion is also conceived as an affective disposition relative to the thing which is owned or belongs. Hence the English associations of 'appropriation' with forcible possession are to be discounted in our translations. Correspondingly, the notion of claiming or desiring ownership needs to be read in our translation of the adjective *oikeion* by 'appropriate'. So, in A 2, the 'first thing appropriate to every animal', means the first thing 'fitting' or 'suitable', but the relevant suitability is like that of a house to its owner, a recognition of ownership, or like that of a kinsman to a blood relation, a recognition of affinity coupled with affection.

In A 1–2 Chrysippus uses the concept of 'appropriation' to establish causal links between the creative organization of nature, the first impulses of animals, and the empirical fact that animals have an innate capacity to behave discriminatingly towards their external environment. In the letter excerpted in B Seneca stresses the fact that the earliest animal behaviour is instinctive (B 1). 'Appropriation' ensures that animals are born with dispositions of affectionate ownership towards themselves, and this is the consequence of nature's disposition towards them. Our text in A 1–2 is probably correct in moving from 'nature appropriates the animal' to 'nature appropriates the animal to itself' (i.e. to the animal). This will mean that nature manifests her affectionate ownership of animals by giving them this disposition relative to themselves.

The 'appropriate' object of an animal's first impulse can thus be described as 'self-preservation'. In A 2 this is expanded into 'its own constitution and the consciousness of this'. The stress on consciousness or awareness is a feature of B and C (cf. 53B 5–9). Stoics may have defined 'appropriation' as 'perception of what is appropriate' (see note on E in vol. 2). Why this should be thought to require self-consciousness, however rudimentary (see Seneca, *Letters* 121.11–13), may seem inadequately explained in their reasoning. But not too much weight need or should be attached to the term 'consciousness'. It is an attempt, and an interesting one, to do justice to data which would now be explained by reference to natural selection and genetic coding. The Stoics were probably little interested in animal behaviour for its own sake. But they did suppose, very unusually, that its principles could provide them with the foundations for their ethical theory.

What links animals, and even plants (A 4) to men, so far as ethics is concerned, is nature. Any ethical theory must make provision for the proper rearing of children. The Stoics were impressed by the fact that animals, as well as humans, take pains over the rearing of their young (F 1), and some animals also have forms of social organization (F 2). Nature, then, even in its more rudimentary products, provides a programme of 'impulsive activity' which is both immediately self-sustaining, and also other-related. The principle of 'appropriation', even at the level of animal behaviour, extends beyond the self to affectionate ownership of offspring (E).

The entry of strictly ethical norms and values is a topic for later sections. What the present material indicates is a basic common ground in nature between animal and human behaviour in preserving oneself and looking after one's young. The Stoics are not saying *we* should do these things because animals do them. They are claiming that animals and humans alike are so structured that such behaviour is natural and appropriate to them both. It is pertinent to ask what the introduction of animals contributes to the ethical theory. As already noted, it serves as a basis from which to reject the Epicurean thesis of pleasure as all creatures' natural objective, and that is of great importance to the foundations of Stoic ethics. Related to this point is the insistence that nature, as a providential power, establishes values or norms of appropriateness along with the physical structures it creates. Against sceptical challenges which sought to undermine any objective criteria of values the Stoics could point to the discriminating faculties natural to men and animals (see 53B, O, P). If there is continuity as well as difference between human and animal 'appropriation', that fact can draw attention to the significance of the difference. The nature of man as a rational being (cf. A 5) requires understanding of the impulses he shares, or seems to share, with the animals.

Moral virtue is the perfection of man's specific nature, his rationality in harmony with universal nature or divine reason (60H 4). Texts in this section show how this ethical ideal is based upon a conception of human nature which is as general in its scope as the philosophy of animal behaviour. In D Hierocles outlines a series of 'appropriate relationships' which purport to explain normal characteristics of human behaviour with regard to one's self, one's children, property, other human beings. The procedure in F is similar: it is natural for human beings to be friendly and philanthropic, to live in organized communities, to possess private property, to marry and have children. Community life is represented as a natural consequence of a man's instinctive love of his children. It is important to observe that Hierocles and Cicero are not concerned here with the *distinctive* activities and attitudes of the Stoic wise man; rather the wise man is mentioned in F 8 as conforming to the general pattern of human nature. Strictly no one but the wise man can be just in Stoicism, but the justice and injustice of F 6 are hardly to be given so exclusive an interpretation. The whole thrust of this passage is to endorse the normal customs and institutions of human society as natural.

This point will be reinforced in the doctrine of 'proper functions' (see 59E 2; and cf. 53Q 1). On these foundations the Stoics will seek to erect a moral theory which takes account of the fact (A 5) that human reason must be the ultimate

arbiter of what is appropriate to human nature; as the 'craftsman' of impulse, reason can be presumed to establish 'assent' as a necessary precondition of all mature human action (cf. 33I; 53A 5, S). 'Appropriation' as something innate and animal-like is only a foundation, a beginning. But our 'appropriate' attitudes of self-love, affection towards kindred, choice towards external property (D), are not forgotten in the fully developed doctrine of the virtues. We are born with 'tendencies' towards the virtues (61L), and an example of how this should work out is presented, for the case of justice, in G and criticized in H.

According to G a man instinctively, without training, experiences himself as the closest object of his concern, while his concern for other people progressively diminishes as their blood relationship to him declines from that of his closest relatives to 'the whole human race'. Hierocles implies that this arrangement of 'concentric circles', though natural to the untutored mind, is incompatible with a proper understanding of our 'appropriation' of our fellow human beings (cf. 67A). We should (and here the moral 'ought' has its full force) make every effort to 'reduce the distance of the relationship with each person' (G 6). The unexpressed assumption of this passage seems to be this: we have an instinctive disposition to show affection to our relatives as well as ourselves, but without training we remain self-centred and treat others as increasingly alien. Hierocles proposes that we 'appropriate' other people to our self, and so extend to them the same kind of concern we show to ourselves. In H an attack (probably Academic) is launched against the practicality of 'appropriation' as the foundation of justice. The Stoics probably did not commit themselves to the claim (H 3) that appropriation in relation to others is *equal* to that in relation to oneself (cf. however 67A), but H's polemic presents a dilemma according to which problems for justice arise whether the appropriation is equal or variant; equal appropriation is false to experience (H 3), and variant appropriation (H 7) will not fit problem cases where self-interest conflicts with the equal rights of a second person. There is independent evidence (SVF 1.197) for the claim that the Stoics made 'appropriation' the origin of justice (H 3), and the thought appears to be similar to the doctrine of G (cf. F 2-7). Self-preservation will promote justice if it is recognized that concern for other people is a natural development of concern for one's self.

As much of this material makes plain (B 3, D, F-H), the Stoics did not confine the scope of 'appropriation' to the evaluative discriminations of our 'first impulse'. That receives emphasis in the texts because of its priority, but the paramount desirability of moral virtue was also represented as a function of 'appropriation' (see 65M 2 where the claim that 'we have an appropriate relation only with rectitude' has to be understood in reference to people at the higher stages of moral progress). It is thus a mistake to complain, as Alexander of Aphrodisias did (SVF 3.165), that the Stoics limited the scope of 'appropriation' to 'self-preservation' as distinct from 'the good itself'. The grounds of his misunderstanding probably relate to a more fundamental difficulty frequently seized upon by opponents of Stoicism: how can it be consistent to derive 'the good', a term exclusively limited to moral value, from natural impulses which justify the appropriateness of other values? The gist of the Stoics' answer is given

by Seneca in **B** 3: 'constitution' and therewith 'appropriateness' evolve over a lifetime. He uses this point to dismiss the objection (*Letters* 121.14) that a young child, 'not yet rational', could not have an 'appropriate' relation to a rational constitution.

58 Value and indifference

A Diogenes Laertius 7.101-3

(1) They [the Stoics] say that some existing things are good, others are bad, and others are neither of these. (2) The virtues – prudence, justice; courage, moderation and the rest – are good. (3) The opposites of these – foolishness, injustice and the rest – are bad. (4) Everything which neither does benefit nor harms is neither of these: for instance, life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, noble birth, and their opposites, death, disease, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, low repute, ignoble birth and the like . . . For these things are not good but indifferents of the species 'preferred'. (5) For just as heating, not chilling, is the peculiar characteristic of what is hot, so too benefiting, not harming, is the peculiar characteristic of what is good. But wealth and health no more do benefit than they harm. Therefore wealth and health are not something good. (6) Furthermore they say: that which can be used well and badly is not something good. But wealth and health can be used well and badly. Therefore wealth and health are not something good.]

B Diogenes Laertius 7.104-5 (SVF 3.119)

(1) ['Indifferent' is used in two senses: unconditionally, of things which contribute neither to happiness nor unhappiness, as is the case with wealth, reputation, health, strength, and the like. For it is possible to be happy even without these, though the manner of using them is constitutive of happiness or unhappiness.] (2) In another sense those things are called indifferent which activate neither impulse nor repulsion, as in the case of having an odd or even number of hairs on one's head, or stretching or contracting a finger. (3) But the previous indifferents are not spoken of in this sense. For they are capable of activating impulse and repulsion. Hence some of them are selected and others disselected, but the second type is entirely equal with respect to choice and avoidance.

C Stobaeus 2.79,18-80,13; 82,20-1

(1) Some [indifferent things] are in accordance with nature, others are contrary to nature, and others are neither of these. (2) The following are in accordance with nature: health, strength, well functioning sense organs, and the like . . . (3) They [the Stoics] hold that the theory on these starts from the primary things in accordance with nature and contrary to

nature. For difference and indifference belong to things which are said relatively. Because, they say, even if we call bodily and external things indifferent, we are saying they are indifferent relative to a well-shaped life (in which living happily consists) but not of course relative to being in accordance with nature or to impulse and repulsion . . . (4) All things in accordance with nature are to-be-taken, and all things contrary to nature are not-to-be-taken.

D Stobaeus 2.83,10-84,2 (SVF 3.124)

(1) All things in accordance with nature have value and all things contrary to nature have disvalue. (2) Value has three senses: a thing's contribution and merit *per se*, the expert's appraisal, and thirdly, what Antipater calls 'selective': according to this, when circumstances permit, we choose these particular things instead of those, for instance health instead of disease, life instead of death, wealth instead of poverty. (3) Disvalue, they say, also has three senses analogous to these.

E Stobaeus 2.84,18-85,11 (SVF 3.128)

(1) Some valuable things have much value and others little. So too some disvaluable things have much disvalue and others little. (2) Those which have much value are called 'preferred' and those which have much disvalue 'dispreferred'. Zeno was the first to apply these terms to the things. (3) That is preferred, they say, which, though indifferent, we select on the basis of a preferential reason. The like principle applies to being dispreferred, and the examples are analogous. (4) No good thing is preferred since they possess the greatest value. But the preferred, since it has the second place and value, is in some way adjacent to the nature of goods. For in the court the King is not in the rank of the preferred, but they are preferred who rank after him.

F Sextus Empiricus, *Against the professors* 11.64-7 (SVF 1.361)

(1) Aristo of Chios denied that health and everything similar to it is a preferred indifferent. (2) For to call it a preferred indifferent is equivalent to judging it a good, and different practically in name alone. (3) For without exception things indifferent as between virtue and vice have no difference at all, nor are some of them preferred by nature while others are dispreferred, but in the face of the different circumstances of the occasions neither those which are said to be preferred prove to be unconditionally preferred, nor are those said to be dispreferred of necessity dispreferred. (4) For if healthy men had to serve a tyrant and be destroyed for this reason, while the sick had to be released from the service and, therewith also, from destruction, the wise man would rather choose sickness in this circumstance than health. (5) Thus neither is health

unconditionally preferred nor sickness dispreferred. Just as in writing people's names we put different letters first at different times, adapting them to the different circumstances . . . not because some letters are given priority over others by nature but because the circumstances compel us to do this, so too in the things which are between virtue and vice no natural priority for some over others arises but a priority which is based rather on circumstances.

G Diogenes Laertius 7.160 (*SVF* 1.351, part)

Aristo of Chios . . . said that the end is to live with a disposition of indifference towards what is intermediate between vice and virtue, not retaining any difference at all within that class of things, but being equally disposed towards them all. For the wise man is like the good actor who, whether he puts on the mask of Thersites or Agamemnon, plays either part in the proper way.

H Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1048A (*SVF* 3.137)

In his *On good things* book 1 he [Chrysippus] concedes in a sense and gives way to those who wish to call the preferred things good and their opposites bad, in the following words: 'If someone in accordance with such differences [i.e. between the preferred and dispreferred] wishes to call the one class of them good and the other bad, and he is referring to these things [i.e. the preferred or the dispreferred] and not committing an idle aberration, his usage must be accepted on the grounds that he is not wrong in the matter of meanings and in other respects is aiming at the normal use of terms.'

I Cicero, *On ends* 3.50 (*SVF* 1.365)

[Speaker: the Stoic Cato] Next comes an explanation of the difference between things, by the denial of which all life would be made completely indiscriminated, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task for wisdom could be found, since there would be no difference at all between the things that concern the living of life, and no choice between them would have to be made.

J Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.6.9 (*SVF* 3.191)

Therefore Chrysippus was right to say: 'As long as the future is uncertain to me I always hold to those things which are better adapted to obtaining the things in accordance with nature; for god himself has made me disposed to select these. But if I actually knew that I was fated now to be ill, I would even have an impulse to be ill. For my foot too, if it had intelligencè, would have an impulse to get muddy.'

K Stobaeus 2.76.9-15

(1) Diogenes [of Babylon represented the end as]: reasoning well in the selection and dissection of things in accordance with nature . . . (2) and Antipater: to live continuously selecting things in accordance with nature and dissecting things contrary to nature. He also frequently rendered it thus: to do everything in one's power continuously and undeviatingly with a view to obtaining the predominating things which accord with nature.

- The bastion of Stoic ethics is the thesis that virtue and vice respectively are the sole constituents of happiness and unhappiness. These states do not in the least depend, they insisted, on the possession or absence of things conventionally regarded as good or bad – health, reputation, wealth etc: 'It is possible to be happy even without these' (B 1). They expressed this thesis by restricting 'good' to what is morally excellent and 'bad' to the opposite of this, and termed everything which makes no difference to happiness or unhappiness 'indifferent' (B 1, cf. A; and 1F 3 for Pyrrhonian use of the term). In relation to happiness health is no more of a contributor than an odd rather than an even number of hairs on one's head. Yet, as we saw in the last section, living beings are naturally impelled to preserve themselves, and to do so by discriminating between things which are appropriate to their constitution, and their opposites (57A 2). Such behaviour, moreover, has the providence and rationality of cosmic nature as its foundation. In relation to a creature's nature and what it is impelled to pursue or avoid, health and its opposite are not indifferent, by contrast with the absolute indifference of an odd or even number of hairs.

Thus the class of items indifferent to happiness includes things that have value or disvalue 'relative to being in accordance with nature, or to impulse and repulsion' (C 3). At the most elementary level these are instantiated in the objects specified in C 2 – health, strength etc. and their opposites, which are called 'primary things in accordance with nature' (*PAN* things) and 'primary things contrary to nature' (*PCN* things). Founded as they are upon the primary needs of a creature's nature, these primary valuables must be construed as objective; 'accordance with nature' is laid down as the criterion of value (D 1; 59D 2). The same naturalness or objectivity pertains to the value of the things specified as 'indifferent', i.e. to happiness, in A 4, B 1; some of these, such as wealth or noble birth, can be interpreted as 'secondary' things in accordance with nature. Their activation of impulse will be subsequent in a human life to that of *PAN* things. A human being is represented as developing awareness of a larger range of *AN* (in accordance with nature) and *CN* (contrary to nature) things as it matures (cf. 57B 3). (For apparent discrepancies in the sources concerning the strict scope of 'accordance with nature' as the criterion of indifferent things' value, see note on m in vol. 2.)

Valuable though they are, *AN* things lack goodness, for reasons set out in A 5-6. Here we are invited to regard 'good' as a property analogous to the heat of anything which is hot. A hot thing necessarily heats and never chills anything with which it is in contact. By analogy we are to take it that a good thing

necessarily benefits and never harms that with which it is associated (cf. 60G). But *AN* things lack this necessary relation to benefiting, and they can also be possessed by someone who puts them to bad use. Similarly, it is implied, something *CN* like poverty does not necessarily harm a person nor is it bound to be misused. These arguments, which are Platonic in origin (see vol. 2 note on A), identify the virtues and vices as the only things which exhibit the requisite connexion between benefit and good use, or harm and misuse.

For orthodox Stoics, none the less, the value attaching to *AN* things and the disvalue of their *CN* counterparts provide prima facie grounds for 'selecting' the former and 'disselecting' the latter (B 3). These discriminations conform in general to nature's provisions for human life, since *AN* things naturally activate our impulses and *CN* things our repulsions. This 'selective value' (D 2), though conditional upon circumstances (contrast the absolute value of virtue), resides in the natural preferability of health to sickness etc. That is to say, the value of health is not based upon an individual's judgement but is a feature of the world. The role of moral judgement is to decide whether, given the objective preferability of health to sickness, it is right to make that difference the paramount consideration in determining what one should do in the light of all the circumstances (see J). In the case of those indifferenters of 'preferred' status (A 4, E 2), there will be 'preferential' reason (E 3) for selecting these 'when circumstances permit' (D 2). It is up to the moral agent to decide, from knowledge of his situation, whether to choose actions that may put his health at risk rather than preserve it, but the correctness of sometimes deciding in favour of the former does not negate the normal preferability of the latter. Only an unusually prescient or unfortunate person will have the foreknowledge to adapt his impulses to unavoidable *CN* states of affairs, as in J, where Chrysippus indicates that consistent selection of *AN* things is the right policy 'as long as the future is uncertain'.

'To-be-taken' is another standard way of describing the value of such things (C 4). This attribute, like that of 'selection', indicates the attitude a Stoic should adopt towards *AN* things which happen to be available (cf. D 2), and which he can take or select without compromising his moral principles. He should not go out of his way to 'choose' or 'desire' such things, since such unreservedly positive attitudes are appropriate only in relation to the good (59D 5). Provided, however, that he realizes the indifference of *AN* things to his happiness, it is rational and appropriate to discriminate in favour of anything which accords with other features of human nature.

The relative value of 'indifferent' things, which admit of their own ranking (e.g. 'preferred' things are more valuable than other *AN* things), goes back to Zeno himself (E 2). But not every early Stoic was happy with the concept. Aristo (F) rejected all distinctions within the class of the 'indifferents'. The nub of his argument is F 4-5: in some circumstances the wise man would select sickness rather than health (cf. Chrysippus in J); therefore health is not unconditionally preferable to sickness. Zeno could accept this conclusion, but reply that the intrinsic preferability of health over sickness is not overturned. Aristo's objection does not show that there are no *natural* preferences, but only that circumstances can alter preferences.

The interest of Aristo's heresy is its attempt to exclude all factors except virtue and reason in moral judgement (see 2F-H). His formula for the 'end' was 'indifference towards what is intermediate between vice and virtue' (G), supposing such a disposition to be undermined if non-good or non-bad things were deemed to activate impulse or repulsion by their intrinsic nature. An orthodox reply to his position is given in I: unless there are intrinsic differences of value between *AN* and *CN* things, life becomes completely indiscriminated and the wise man will have no objective criteria for grounding his preferences.

The controversial character of Zeno's teaching on 'indifferents' is evident from the fact that Herillus, another of his immediate followers (see 1J), also rejected the difference between *AN* and *CN* things as far as the wise man's end is concerned. According to Diogenes Laertius 7.165 (= I in vol. 2) Herillus distinguished a 'subordinate end', aimed at by non-wise men, and probably having supposedly *AN* things as its content. (Another source relates 'subordinate end' to objects of the first impulse, see note on I in vol. 2.)

Orthodox Stoics were adamant that the 'preferred' values did not introduce any equivocation over the absolute and incomparable goodness of virtue, though Chrysippus conceded that 'preferred' and 'dispreferred' coincided with ordinary-language use of 'good' and 'bad' (H, cf. 66B). Both sets of values are natural to man, and the distinction between *AN* and *CN* things is the starting-point for understanding what 'accordance with nature' should mean to a mature rational being (see 59D). No more than Aristo did Zeno and Chrysippus make *AN* things a constituent of happiness. Unlike him they held that the required attitude towards them is not unqualified indifference but knowledge of how they should be used (cf. B 1). (Epictetus' constant insistence on 'making correct use of impressions', cf. 62K, may be viewed as a later, and perhaps expanded, version of this doctrine.)

In later sections we shall see how orthodox Stoics attempted to integrate *AN* and *CN* things into their other ethical doctrines, while retaining the differences of moral and non-moral value. For convenience we give one example here: Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater (K), in striking contrast with Aristo and Herillus, incorporated 'selection of' or 'efforts to obtain' *AN* things into their accounts of the end. The interpretation of these proposals, together with the Academic criticism they generated or responded to, will be studied in 64.

59 Proper functions

A Plutarch, *On common conceptions* 1069E (*SVF* 3.491)


He [Chrysippus] says: 'What am I to begin from, and what am I to take as the foundation of proper function and the material of virtue if I pass over nature and what accords with nature?'

B Stobaeus 2.85,13-86,4 (*SVF* 3.494)

(1) Proper function is so defined: 'consequentiality in life, something which, once it has been done, has a reasonable justification'. The contrary

According to Sextus' careful analysis in **G**, good is a concept of wider extension than virtue, but every good thing other than virtue or virtuous action has virtue as one of its parts. These other goods satisfy the second disjunct of the definition of good, 'benefit or not other than benefit'. Whereas virtue and virtuous action are *wholly* defined by 'benefit', benefit is intrinsic to but not exhaustive of such good things as virtuous man and friend. ('Friendship exists only among the virtuous', **67P**.) The more complex classifications of goods reported by Stobaeus (**J-M**) may appear to open the door to a much more diverse set of items, and to drop the essential connexion between benefit = virtue/virtuous action and good. But the point of Stobaeus' divisions, we can assume, is not to give up this principle but to exhibit differences between goods in ways that are fully compatible with it. Thus friends (one of the examples in **G**) are classified as purely 'instrumental' goods: i.e. they share with the virtues the property of generating happiness, but are not, in addition, its actual constituents, as is the case with the virtues. Joy, cheerfulness etc. are 'final' goods only (**M**), and not virtues (**K 1**). But since we know that joy, cheerfulness etc. are 'good feelings' (**65F**) which are peculiar to the virtuous man, they evidently arise only in such a disposition. Similarly with the 'pursuits' of **J 4** and **L**, which are said to be included in 'virtuous tenors' (**26H**).

The relation of goods to 'tenor' must be handled with caution. **J**, where virtues are tenors, may appear to conflict with **L**, where they are said not to be tenors. But the appearance is misleading. Tenor is one kind of 'state', an enduring state, while 'character' is an enduring state which additionally does not admit of degrees (**47S**). Consequently 'tenor' (like 'state' itself in **J 2**; cf. a parallel case at **39E 3**) seems to be used in two senses: sometimes of the genus of which 'character' is one species (e.g. at *SVF* 3.525), sometimes for *mere* tenor, as a species of tenor alongside character, marking off those enduring states which *do* admit of degrees. Thus we can construct a tree (see diagram).



We can now eliminate the apparent conflict between **J** and **L**, by observing that the former uses 'tenor' in its generic sense, the latter in its specific sense. The Stoic doctrine is consistent. Virtues, as states of moral perfection, do not admit of degrees. But the wise man's other talents, e.g. at music, do admit of degrees, while still counting as 'goods' because he uses them wisely.

There are no degrees of virtue or vice, of happiness or unhappiness; the absence of variation within these mutually exclusive classes tallies with the thesis that all men are either completely virtuous or completely vicious (**61I**), perfectly happy

or utterly unhappy (**R 1**). **P**, if all too briefly, makes a claim that bears crucially on the relation between moral goodness and happiness. If I am benefited by benefiting you, and vice versa, the distinction between altruism and egoism collapses into a single beneficial relation of mutual betterment. The coincidence of happiness and moral virtue, so adamantly endorsed by Plato, acquires its distinctive Stoic colouring in the 'community' of goods belonging to all the wise, whose life is characterized by a common set of principles (*homonoia*, see note on **P** in vol. 2).

As a character of the commanding-faculty (see **61B 8**), which itself consists of breath (**53**), virtue, and thus the prime instance of the good, is corporeal. Independent reasons for the corporeality of the good are advanced in **S**, and **R 2** develops one consequence of this in its interesting claim that good and bad things are perceptible. Passions, virtues, and vices are states of persons, and there is every reason to agree with the Stoics that we do perceive such things. Obvious cognitive problems arise about the foundations of objective moral judgement if **R 2** is denied.

The conception of good and bad as moral benefit and moral harm respectively gave rise to some of the most famous Stoic paradoxes: no harm can affect the good man, since he cannot be injured by vice, and nothing except vice is harmful in the strict sense. By parity of reasoning, no inferior man can do anything beneficial or be the recipient of such an act (cf. *SVF* 3.567-81).

61 Virtue and vice

A Diogenes Laertius 7.89 (*SVF* 3.39)

(1) Virtue is a consistent character, choiceworthy for its own sake and not from fear or hope or anything external. (2) Happiness consists in virtue since virtue is a soul which has been fashioned to achieve consistency in the whole of life.

B Plutarch, *On moral virtue* 440E-441D

(1) Menedemus of Eretria eliminated the plurality and the differentiations of the virtues, holding that there is a single one, called by many names; for it is the same thing that is called moderation and courage and justice, like 'mortal' and 'man'. (2) Aristo of Chios also made virtue essentially one thing, which he called 'health'. (3) It was by relativity that he made the virtues in a way different and plural, just as if someone wanted to call our vision 'white-seeing' when it apprehended white things, 'black-seeing' when it apprehended black things, and so on... (4) as the knife, while being one thing, cuts different things on different occasions, and fire acts on different materials although its nature is one and the same. (5) Zeno of Citium also in a way seems to be drifting in this direction when he defines prudence in matters requiring distribution as justice, in matters requiring choice as moderation, and in matters

requiring endurance as courage. (6) In defence of this they take it to be science that Zeno is here calling prudence. (7) But Chrysippus, invoking the 'qualified' and holding a virtue to be constituted by its own quality, unwittingly stirred up, in Plato's words, a 'swarm of virtues', both unwonted and unfamiliar. For corresponding to courage in the courageous man . . . and justice in the just man, he has posited graceliness in the graceful man . . . and greatliness in the great man . . . and filled philosophy with many absurd names which it does not need. (8) All these men agree in taking virtue to be a certain character and power of the soul's commanding-faculty, engendered by reason, or rather, a character which is itself consistent, firm, and unchangeable reason. (9) They suppose that the passionate and irrational part is not distinguished from the rational by any distinction within the soul's nature, but the same part of the soul (which they call thought and commanding-faculty) becomes virtue and vice as it wholly turns around and changes in passions and alterations of tenor or character, and contains nothing irrational within itself. (10) It is called irrational whenever an excessive impulse which has become strong and dominant carries it off towards something wrong and contrary to the dictates of reason. (11) For passion is vicious and uncontrolled reason which acquires vehemence and strength from bad and erroneous judgement.

C Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1034C-E

(1) Zeno admits several different virtues, as Plato does, namely prudence, courage, moderation and justice, on the grounds that although inseparable they are distinct and different from each other. (2) Yet in defining each of them he says that courage is prudence <in matters requiring endurance, moderation is prudence in matters requiring choice, prudence in the special sense is prudence> in matters requiring action, and justice is prudence in matters requiring distribution – on the grounds that it is one single virtue, which seems to differ in actions according to its dispositions relative to things. (3) And not only does Zeno seem to contradict himself over this, but so does Chrysippus, who criticizes Aristo because he said that the other virtues were dispositions of a single virtue, (4) yet supports Zeno for defining each of the virtues in this way. (5) And Cleanthes in his *Physical treatises*, having said that tension is a stroke of fire, and that if it becomes adequate in the soul to achieve what is fitting it is called strength and might, adds the following words: 'This strength and might, when it arises in what seem to be matters requiring persistence, is self-control; when in matters requiring endurance, courage; concerning deserts, justice; concerning choices and avoidances, moderation.'

D Stobaeus 2.63,6-24 (*SVF* 3.280, part)

(1) All the virtues which are sciences and expertises share their theorems and, as already mentioned, the same end. Hence they are also inseparable. For whoever has one has all, and whoever acts in accordance with one acts in accordance with all. They differ from one another by their own perspectives. (2) For the perspectives of prudence are, primarily, the theory and practice of what should be done; and secondarily the theory also of what should be distributed, <what chosen, and what endured,> for the sake of infallibly doing what should be done. (3) Of moderation the special perspective is, primarily, to keep the impulses healthy and to grasp the theory of them; but secondarily, the theory of what falls under the other virtues, for the purpose of conducting oneself infallibly in one's impulses. (4) Likewise courage primarily grasps the theory of everything that should be endured; and secondarily, that of what falls under the other virtues. (5) And justice primarily studies individual deserts; but secondarily, the rest too. (6) For all the virtues focus upon the range of objects that belongs to all of them and upon each other's subject-matter.

E Seneca, *Letters* 113.24

One could say, 'The virtues are not a plurality of living beings, and yet they are living beings. For just as someone is both a poet and an orator but still one person, so the virtues are living beings but not a plurality of these. The same mind is both moderate and just and prudent and brave, being disposed in a certain way with respect to the individual virtues.'

F Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1046E-F (*SVF* 3.299, 243)

(1) They [the Stoics] say that the virtues are inter-entailing, not only because he who has one has them all but also because he who does any action in accordance with one does so in accordance with them all. For they say that a man is not perfect unless he possesses all the virtues nor an action either, unless it is performed in accordance with all the virtues. (2) But in his *Moral questions* book 6 Chrysippus says that the cultivated man is not always being courageous or the inferior man cowardly, since it is when certain things arise in their impressions that the former must remain steadfast in his decisions and the latter back away; and it is plausible, he says, that the inferior man is not always being immoderate either.

G Stobaeus 2.66,14-67,4 (*SVF* 3.560)

(1) They [the Stoics] also say that the wise man does everything well – that is to say, everything that he does: for as we say that the flute-player or

the lyre-player does everything well, with the implications 'everything to do with flute-playing', and 'everything to do with lyre-playing', so the prudent man does everything well, so far as concerns what he does, and not of course also what he does not do. (2) In their opinion the doctrine that the wise man does everything well is a consequence of his accomplishing everything in accordance with right reason and in accordance with virtue, which is expertise concerned with the whole of life. (3) By analogy, the inferior man does everything that he does badly and in accordance with all the vices.

H Stobaeus 2.59,4-60,2; 60,9-24 (SVF 3.262, 264, part)

(1) Prudence is the science of what should and should not be done and of neutral actions, or the science of things that are good and bad and neutral as applied to a creature whose nature is social . . . (2) Moderation is the science of what should be chosen and avoided and of neutral situations. (3) Justice is the science concerned with distributing individual deserts. (4) Courage is the science of things that are fearful and not fearful and neither of these. (5) Imprudence is <ignorance> of things that are good and bad and neutral, or ignorance of what should and should not be done and of neutral actions . . . (6) Some virtues are primary, but others are subordinate to these. The primary virtues are four: prudence, moderation, courage, justice . . . (7) To prudence are subordinated good sense, good calculation, quick-wittedness, discretion, resourcefulness; (8) to moderation, good discipline, seemliness, modesty, self-control; (9) to courage, endurance, confidence, high-mindedness, cheerfulness, industriousness; (10) to justice, piety, honesty, equity, fair dealing.

I Diogenes Laertius 7.127

(1) It is their [the Stoics'] doctrine that nothing is in between virtue and vice, though the Peripatetics say that progress is in between these. For as, they say, a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, but not either more just or more unjust, and likewise with the other virtues. (2) Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, on account of intoxication or depression, but Cleanthes takes it to be irremovable owing to secure cognitions. (3) They regard virtue as choiceworthy for its own sake. For we are ashamed at our bad behaviour as if we knew that rectitude is the only good. And virtue is sufficient for happiness.

J Plutarch, *On common conceptions* 1076A (SVF 3.246)

[According to Chrysippus:] 'Zeus does not exceed Dion in virtue, and Zeus and Dion, given that they are wise, are benefited alike by each other whenever one encounters a movement of the other.'

K Diogenes Laertius 7.91 (SVF 3.223)

Virtue is teachable . . . as is evident from the fact that inferior men become good.

L Stobaeus 2.65,8 (SVF 1.566, part)

[Cleanthes says] All men have natural tendencies to virtue.

M Alexander, *On fate* 196,24-197,3 (SVF 2.984, part)

(1) 'If', they [the Stoics] say, 'those things are in our power of which we are also capable of the opposites, and it is to such cases that praise and blame and encouragements and discouragements and punishments and rewards are given, being prudent and having the virtues will not be in the power of those who have them, since they are no longer capable of receiving the vices which are opposite to the virtues. And in like manner vices will not be in the power of those who are bad. For it is not in their power to be bad no longer. (2) But it is ridiculous to deny that the virtues and vices are in our power and that praise and blame are given with respect to these. (3) Therefore, what is in our power is not like this.'

N Alexander, *On fate* 199.14-22 (SVF 3.658, part)

(1) If virtue and vice alone, in their [the Stoics'] opinion, are good and bad respectively, and no other creatures are capable of receiving either of them; (2) and if the majority of men are bad, or rather, if there have been just one or two good men, as their fables maintain, like some absurd and unnatural creature rarer than the Ethiopians' phoenix; (3) and if all bad men are as bad as each other, without any differentiation, and all who are not wise are all alike mad, (4) how could man not be the most miserable of all creatures in having vice and madness ingrown in him and allotted?

O Cicero, *Tusculan disputations* 4.29, 34-5

(1) Viciousness is a tenor or character which is inconsistent in the whole of life and out of harmony with itself . . . (2) It is the source of disturbances which . . . are disorderly and agitated movements of the mind, at variance with reason and utterly hostile to peace of mind and of life. (3) For they cause troubling and severe ailments, oppressing the mind and weakening it with fear. They also inflame the mind with excessive longing . . . a mental powerlessness completely in conflict with temperance and moderation . . . (4) So the only cure for those vices is situated in virtue alone.

P Marcus Aurelius 8.14

Whoever you meet, say to yourself at once: 'What are his doctrines concerning good and bad things?' For if he has doctrines of a certain sort

concerning pleasure and pain and their sources, and fame and its absence, and death and life, I shall not think it remarkable or strange if he acts as he does. I shall remember that he is compelled to act in this way.

Q Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1039E (SVF 3.761, part)

Later he [Chrysippus] says that it is appropriate even for inferior men to continue to live . . . 'For, to begin with, virtue quite on its own has no relevance to our living, and similarly neither is vice of any relevance to our needing to depart.'

R Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1050F, 1051A–B (SVF 2.1181, part; 1182)

(1) In his *On nature* book 2 he [Chrysippus] writes as follows: 'Vice, by comparison with terrible accidents, has its own peculiar explanation. (2) For in a way it does occur in accordance with the rationale (*logos*) of nature, and its occurrence is not, so to speak, useless in relation to the whole world. (3) For otherwise the good would not exist either.' . . . (4) Again, in *On justice* book 2, having described the gods as resistant to certain acts of wrong-doing, he says: (5) 'Vice cannot be removed completely, nor is it right that it should be removed.'

S Plutarch, *On moral progress* 75C (SVF 3.539, part)

(1) So in philosophy we should assume neither progress nor any perception of progress, if the soul discards and purges itself of none of its stupidity, but deals in absolute badness right up to its acquisition of the absolute and perfect good. (2) In that case, the wise man has changed in a moment from the greatest possible worthlessness to an unsurpassable virtuous character, and has suddenly shed all the vice of which he failed to remove even a part over a considerable time.

T Plutarch, *On common conceptions* 1063A–B (SVF 3.539, part)

'Yes', they [the Stoics] say, 'but just as in the sea the man an arm's length from the surface is drowning no less than the one who has sunk five hundred fathoms, so even those who are getting close to virtue are no less in a state of vice than those who are far from it. And just as the blind are blind even if they are going to recover their sight a little later, so those progressing remain foolish and vicious right up to their attainment of virtue.'

U Plutarch, *On common conceptions* 1062B

What you would find most extraordinary . . . is their [the Stoics'] belief that, having got virtue and happiness, a man often does not even perceive them, but it eludes him that he has now become both prudent and

supremely happy when a moment earlier he was utterly wretched and foolish.

- As the primary species of good, virtue is supremely beneficial or useful to its possessor (60G; cf. 26A). It can be summed up as 'the natural perfection of a rational being as a rational being' (Diogenes Laertius 7.94), a perfection brought about by the person himself on the foundation of his innate mental equipment (cf. 57A 5; 60H 3). The unlikelihood of anyone's achieving this utterly secure and faultless character was admitted by Stoic philosophers (N 2). Yet they insisted on its possibility (K; 54H 4), its relation to all men's natural tendencies (L; cf. 59A), and its coincidence with happiness (A 2, U). Because happiness is wholly constituted by virtue, virtue is 'choiceworthy for its own sake' (A 1), and not as a means to achieving anything, including happiness, other than itself (contrast Epicurus, 21O–P). That was the essence of Socratic ethics, and the Stoics showed their indebtedness to Socrates and Plato in treating virtue as an 'expertise concerned with the whole of life' and analogous to the ability to 'do well' in professional pursuits (G 1–2; for the concepts of expertise, science, and pursuit, see 41H; 42; 26H). Central to Stoic ethics is the claim that virtue is an utterly self-sufficient art of living. At its most general, it embraces the whole of philosophy (26A), and includes the virtue(s) of dialectic (31B–C), as well as the more familiar moral excellences.

The good itself was characterized as agreement or consistency (59D 5), and this notion, filling out what is beneficial about goodness, is incorporated in the standard account of virtue as a 'consistent character' (A 1, B 8). *Homologia*, the term translated 'consistency', was ideally suited to capture the essence of Stoic virtue, since its linguistic form (*homo-logia*) is interpretable as 'harmony of (or with) reason'. Virtue, then, is rational consistency, a character of the soul's commanding-faculty (B 8; cf. 60G). The distinctively Stoic conception of rationality emerges in their claim that the soul's powers cannot be divided, as other Greek philosophers proposed, into rational and irrational. (For Posidonius' return to this alternative model, see 65K.) The commanding-faculty (see 53G–H) is rational through and through. The 'irrationality' which constitutes vice is an aberrant state of the unitary reason (B 9–11). This 'monistic psychology', as it is sometimes called, helps to explain such doctrines as the absence of degrees of virtue or vice, or of any intermediate state (I 1, T). A person's reasoning faculty is conceived as being either consistent or inconsistent; this consistency, or the virtues it promotes, is analogous to the straightness of a perfectly straight line (I). It is their inability to admit degrees that earns virtues their technical designation 'character' (*diathesis*: A 1, B 8; 47S 2; 60L).

The four 'primary' virtues (H 6) had been canonical since the time of Plato. The thesis that they are inseparable had won widespread acceptance, and its originator Socrates, as represented for example in Plato's *Protagoras*, may well have meant by it that they are essentially identical – alternative characterizations of a single state of mind, knowledge of good and bad. At any rate, that extreme version of the unity thesis was standard in the fourth-century Socratic schools, represented at B 1 by Menedemus.

The Stoic Aristo's thesis (B 2–4; see also 29E) is itself self-consciously Socratic, identifying the unitary virtuous state of soul as 'health', or, in another source, 'knowledge of good and bad', and regarding the individual virtues as merely accidental differentiations of this state due to circumstances – courage when it is applied to matters requiring endurance, justice when applied to matters requiring distribution, etc. Zeno may have seemed to legitimize this thesis by his own definition of each virtue as 'prudence in matters requiring . . .' (B 5, C 2). Aristo's contemporary Cleanthes (C 5) reasonably enough took 'prudence' to designate an identical state of soul in each of its occurrences in Zeno's definitions; and Aristo's position is essentially the same. For a parallel Stoic treatment of vices, cf. 41I.

But Zeno is also reported (C 1) to have believed in a plurality of different virtues. Chrysippus was therefore probably right, from the point of view of orthodoxy, to criticize Aristo's position and defend Zeno's definitions (C 4) by the suggestion that his 'prudence' (*phronēsis*) was equivalent to 'science' (*epistēmē*, B 6; a standard Socratic equivalence). This enabled him to interpret each of the primary virtues in Zeno's definitions as constituting a *different* science – a view reflected in the canonical definitions in H (cf. also 60K 2). Chrysippus put this point technically by locating the virtues in the genus of the 'qualified', making each of them a distinct quality of the soul (B 7, cf. E; see further 28–9).

A notable merit of the Chrysippean version is that it is better equipped than Aristo's account to explain why we should continue to describe a man as courageous even when he is not employing his courage. Its corresponding disadvantage, from the Stoic point of view, is that it now becomes much less obvious why the virtues should be inseparable.

Chrysippus' defence of the inseparability thesis emerges from D. A primary virtue, being a science (cf. 60K 2), is characterized by its constituent theorems (see 26C; 42), which we can take to be principles of conduct. All the virtues have their theorems in common, but from differing perspectives. Each takes as its primary perspective the theorems governing its own special area of conduct: this is sufficient to differentiate it as a distinct virtue. But each takes as a secondary perspective the theorems governing other areas of conduct; and this is sufficient to guarantee that they have all their theorems in common, and hence are inseparable. This doctrine of 'secondary perspective' (cf. 63G) could be defended with the following example. A moderate act may not itself be properly described as a brave act. Even so, it is a necessary condition of the act's being moderate that it should not be performed with cowardice, injustice or folly. And this can only be guaranteed if the moderate man has mastered the principles of conduct, or 'theorems', proper to courage, justice and prudence. To this extent, but to this extent only, to act in accordance with moderation is to act 'in accordance with all the virtues' (D 1, F 1). (Thus the contradiction alleged by Plutarch in F is illusory: when Chrysippus says that the virtuous man need not always manifest his courage in action, he is naturally thinking of courage as normally understood, and as defined by its *primary* perspective.)

We follow convention in translating *kakia*, the contradictory of *aretē* (virtue), by 'vice'; but the modern associations of 'vice' should be discounted here. *Kakia* is

the noun answering to the commonest Greek adjective for 'bad'. In Stoic usage the relevant badness is exclusively moral defectiveness/absence of perfection, which covers the whole range of moral dispositions, including those of men 'making progress', which are not virtue. This indiscriminate treatment of all who fall short of moral perfection (N 3) was an inevitable consequence of I 1: the denial of any intermediate state or of degrees of virtue or vice (T, U). The decisive characteristic of virtue is the absolute firmness of the wise man's rationality (B 8), the certitude of his knowledge which guarantees his 'doing everything well' (G). This is what the person who has made maximum progress still lacks (59I), and it helps to explain the bold claim that a wise man is as virtuous as Zeus (J), and also Chrysippus' disagreement with Cleanthes concerning the possible loss of virtue (I 2). Cleanthes took it that the wise man's understanding of true values is so secure that nothing could ever change his moral disposition. Chrysippus seems to have supposed that even the wise man could be knocked off balance by (presumably uncontrollable) factors such as depression and intoxication, and would then (temporarily?) lose the perfect consistency of his soul's 'tension'. This was perhaps no more than an *ad hominem* response to the objection that even a wise man could be the victim of circumstances outside his control (cf. 66G).

Vice is the negation of virtue, and its principal characteristics were established by parity of reasoning (F 2, G 3, H 5, O 1): note the emphasis on ignorance and inconsistency. The injuries which bad men do are injurious to themselves, just as virtuous acts redound to the benefit of their agents as well as those affected by them (60P). This point fits the Stoics' practice of interpreting virtue and vice in terms of mental health, a conception which is cardinal to the identity of virtue with happiness and vice with unhappiness. Medical analogies had been characteristic of Greek philosophical ethics since Socrates and Plato (for Epicurus, see 25C); but the Stoics elaborated the point in distinctive detail, as is evident from their 'pathology' of the emotions (65). That subject must be treated later in its own right. What should be noticed here is the conception of vice as mental sickness, manifesting itself in emotional disturbances which are contrary to virtuous dispositions (O). The foundation of such 'sickness' is ignorance, or errors of value judgement (B 11, P). (For their causes and cure, see 65.) Passages such as P (which abound in Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus) indicate that committed Stoics tempered the harshness of their absolute moral categories by a charitable attitude towards those whose values are mistaken. Virtue is what human life is ultimately for; but living involves having the wherewithal to live, which requires an adequate provision of the 'preferred indifferents'; suicide is not required of the man who lacks virtue (Q, cf. 66G)!

As determinists (see 38; 55; 62) the Stoics were faced with problems concerning the propriety of taking virtue and vice to be 'in our power'. Apart from determinism, however, their conception of virtue and vice as absolute and mutually exclusive characters rendered any transition from one to the other problematical. Yet they insisted that 'inferior men become good' (K; cf. 54H 4). This is technically in conflict with M, where moral responsibility ('being in our power') is asserted, but detached from the possibility of receiving the opposite

character: we can be praised or blamed for our moral character, even though, once having acquired it, we are incapable of acquiring its opposite. But some oversimplification may be suspected here, since the central point, that our responsibility for our moral character cannot *depend* on its being open to us to acquire the opposite character (cf. 62G 1), requires only the weaker, and more orthodox, premise that such transitions are *normally* not possible. The rare exceptions noted in N 2 may be exempted from the generalization. Nor does anything in M conflict with the thesis that one vicious person may be much closer than another to attaining virtue (T). In line with this, the Stoics defended what their critics found paradoxical: the change from vice to virtue is instantaneous (S), and may even elude the notice of the person undergoing it (U). Since virtue and vice are related as contradictories, no intermediate, transitional state is possible.

A further problem was how to reconcile the existence of vice with a world providentially organized to be the best possible (see 54). The Stoics faced difficulties similar to those of Christian theologians, but they rejected any conception of original sin (see 65M 3–8). Among their various defences, that found in R and 54Q is the most prominent: vice is compatible with cosmic order, since without it its opposite could not exist. Moreover, from the cosmic perspective harmony prevails in the whole, even if it is not perceptible from the human position (see 54I).

62 Moral responsibility

A Hippolytus, *Refutation of all heresies* 1.21 (SVF 2.975)

They too [Zeno and Chrysippus] affirmed that everything is fated, with the following model. When a dog is tied to a cart, if it wants to follow it is pulled and follows, making its spontaneous act coincide with necessity, but if it does not want to follow it will be compelled in any case. So it is with men too: even if they do not want to, they will be compelled in any case to follow what is destined.

B Cleanthes, quoted by Epictetus, *Manual* 53 (SVF 1.527)

Lead me, Zeus and Destiny, wherever you have ordained for me. For I shall follow unflinching. But if I become bad and am unwilling, I shall follow none the less.

C Cicero, *On fate* 39–43 (SVF 2.974)

(1) The ancient philosophers had taken two views. There had been those who thought that all things came about by fate, in such a way that that fate applied the force of necessity. That was the view taken by Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Aristotle. (2) The holders of the other view believed that there are voluntary motions of our minds, free from all fate. (3) My own impression is that Chrysippus wanted to act as

unofficial umpire between these views, and to strike a happy medium. But while his leanings are more towards those who want the motions of our minds to be freed from necessity, by his own use of terminology he slides into difficulties which lead him unintentionally to assert the necessity of fate. (4) Let us see how this works out in the context of assent, which I treated in my first disquisition. Those ancient thinkers who held that all things come about through fate said that acts of assent were the result of force and necessity. Their opponents, on the other hand, freed acts of assent from fate, denying that they could, if made subject to fate, be dissociated from necessity. They argued as follows: 'If all things come about through fate, all things come about through an antecedent cause. And if impulses do this, so do the things which are consequent upon impulse; therefore so do acts of assent. But if the cause of impulse is not located in us, neither is impulse itself in our power. If that is so, not even the results of impulse are in our power. Therefore neither acts of assent nor actions are in our power. The result is that neither commendations nor reproofs nor honours nor punishments are just.' Since this argument is unsound, they think it a plausible inference that not all events come about through fate. (5) But Chrysippus, disapproving of necessity and at the same time wanting nothing to happen without antecedent causes, distinguishes between kinds of cause, in order to escape necessity while retaining fate. 'Of causes', he explains, 'some are complete and primary, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence when we say that all things come about through fate by antecedent causes, we do not mean this to be understood as 'by complete and primary causes', but 'by auxiliary and proximate causes'. (6) He thus counters the argument which I expounded a moment ago in the following way: 'If all things come about through fate, it does follow that all things come about by prior causes – not however by primary and complete causes, but by auxiliary and proximate causes. If these latter are not in our power, it does not follow that not even impulse is in our power. If, on the other hand, we said that all things come about by complete and primary causes, it *would* follow that, since these causes were not in our power, impulse would not be in our power either.' (7) Therefore against those who introduce fate in such a way as to import necessity, the earlier argument will be valid. But it will have no validity against those who will not speak of the antecedent causes as complete or primary. (8) He thinks that he can easily explain the statement that acts of assent come about by prior causes. For although assent cannot occur unless it is prompted by an impression, nevertheless, since it has that impression as its proximate, not its primary, cause, Chrysippus wants it to have the rationale which I mentioned just now. He does not want assent, at least, to be able to occur without the stimulus of some external force (for assent must be prompted by an

have any reasonable foundation, and happiness to be consistently within our power. If this was Antipater's main point, his formula may have been intended as a purely dialectical manoeuvre, to show that the Stoics could hit back at Carneades. The formulation still fails, of course, to show how it can be rational to make happiness depend upon aiming at objectives whose attainment is irrelevant to happiness.

Such an interpretation gains support from Stoic reactions to Antipater's formula. His recourse to the goal-directed conception of an expertise was explicitly rejected in Stoic analogies of wisdom with acting or dancing (H), and Posidonius' comments (I 2) are equally hostile to the inclusion of AN things as a 'target'. But those were the terms which Carneades had chosen for attacking the 'selection' formula; Antipater could disclaim responsibility for them, and retreat to more orthodox accounts of the end in his dealings with fellow Stoics. Why his definition should merit Posidonius' charge of 'inconsistency' (I 2), is not entirely clear. Perhaps the inconsistency is the presence in the end of an objective (getting AN things) which is not the end (cf. C 2). But while Posidonius dismisses Antipater's formula as a valid interpretation of 'living in agreement', he concedes its value as a dialectical device, once it is granted that 'doing everything possible for the sake of the first things in accordance with nature' is a 'necessary accompaniment of the end', rather than the end itself. Coupled with D 2, this strongly suggests that Antipater's second formula was designed to give the Stoics an answer to Carneades in the Academic's own terms.

If any leading Stoic had actually abandoned the sufficiency of virtue for complete happiness, we should expect to find mention of this in Cicero. But in K, which reports Antiochus' criticisms; objection continues to be made to the Stoics' refusal to accept possession of AN things as a constituent of the end. Antipater is said by Seneca to have attributed to 'externals' a tiny importance for the final good (*Letters* 92.5 = m in vol. 2). This may be little more than a reflection of K 3, in which case his concession may have been an *ad hominem* point, not intended to compromise the standard doctrine, which is still presupposed in his own formulations. Given I 2, Posidonius can hardly have regarded health and wealth as 'goods' (as claimed at Diogenes Laertius 7.103 = n in vol. 2), and his and Panaetius' alleged denial of virtue's sufficiency (Diogenes Laertius 7.128 = o in vol. 2) is not borne out by any other evidence. The upshot seems to be as Cicero says (*On ends* 3.33): 'there are slight differences between Stoic definitions of good, but they all point in the same direction.'

65 The passions

A Stobaeus 2.88,8–90,6 (*SVF* 3.378, 389, part)

(1) They [the Stoics] say that passion is impulse which is excessive and disobedient to the dictates of reason, or a movement of soul which is irrational and contrary to nature; and that all passions belong to the soul's commanding-faculty. (2) Therefore every fluttering is also a passion, and likewise, every passion is a fluttering. (3) Since passion is of this kind, one

must suppose that some passions are primary and dominant, while others have these as their reference. The generically primary ones are these four: appetite, fear, distress, pleasure. (4) Appetite and fear come first, the former in relation to what appears good, and the latter in relation to what appears bad. Pleasure and distress result from these: pleasure, whenever we get the objects of our appetite or avoid the objects of our fear; distress, whenever we fail to get the objects of our appetite or experience the objects of our fear. (5) [= C] (6) 'Irrational' and 'contrary to nature' are not used in their ordinary senses: 'irrational' is equivalent to 'disobedient to reason'. For every passion is overpowering, since people in states of passion frequently see that it is not suitable to do this but are carried away by the intensity, as though by a disobedient horse, and are induced to do it . . . (7) The sense of 'contrary to nature', in the outline account of passion, is of something that happens contrary to the right and natural reason. Everyone in states of passion turns aside from reason, but not like those who have been deceived in something or other, but in a special way. (8) For when people have been deceived, for instance over atoms being first principles, they give up the judgement, once they have been taught that it is not true. But when people are in states of passion, even if they realize or are taught to realize that one should not feel distress or fear or have their soul, quite generally, in states of passion, they still do not give these up, but are brought by them to a position of being controlled by their tyranny.

B Andronicus, *On passions* 1 (*SVF* 3.391, part)

[Reporting Stoic definitions:] (1) Distress is an irrational contraction, or a fresh opinion that something bad is present, at which people think it right to be contracted [i.e. depressed]. (2) Fear is an irrational shrinking [aversion], or avoidance of an expected danger. (3) Appetite is an irrational stretching [desire], or pursuit of an expected good. (4) Pleasure is an irrational swelling, or a fresh opinion that something good is present, at which people think it right to be swollen [i.e. elated].

C Stobaeus 2.88,22–89,3 (= A 5; *SVF* 3.378, part)

In the case of all the soul's passions, when they [the Stoics] call them 'opinions', 'opinion' is used instead of 'weak supposition', and 'fresh' instead of 'the stimulus of an irrational contraction or swelling'.

D Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 4.2.1–6 (*SVF* 3.463, part)

(1) In his first definitions of the generic passions, he [Chrysippus] completely departs from the doctrine of the ancients, defining distress as 'a fresh opinion that something bad is present . . .' (2) In these definitions he obviously mentions only the rational part of the soul, omitting the

appetitive and competitive . . . (3) But in some of his next definitions he writes things more consistent with Epicurus and Zeno than with his own doctrines. (4) For in defining distress, he says that it is 'a shrinking at what is thought to be something to avoid', and he says pleasure is 'a swelling up at what is thought to be something to pursue'. (5) 'Shrinkings and swellings', of course, and 'expansions and contractions', which he sometimes mentions as well, are affections of the irrational faculty that result from opinions.

E Stobaeus 2.90,19–91,9 (SVF 3.394, part)

(1) The following are classified under appetite: anger and its species . . . intense sexual desires, cravings and yearnings, love of pleasures and riches and honours, and the like. (2) Under pleasure: rejoicing at another's misfortunes, self-gratification, trickery, and the like. (3) Under fear: hesitancy, anguish, astonishment, shame, confusion, superstition, dread, and terror. (4) Under distress: malice, envy, jealousy, pity, grief, worry, sorrow, annoyance, mental pain, vexation.

F Diogenes Laertius 7.116 (SVF 3.431)

(1) They [the Stoics] say that there are three good feelings: joy, watchfulness, wishing. (2) Joy, they say, is the opposite of pleasure, consisting in well-reasoned swelling [elation]; and watchfulness is the opposite of fear, consisting in well-reasoned shrinking. For the wise man will not be afraid at all, but he will be watchful. (3) They say that wishing is the opposite of appetite, consisting in well-reasoned stretching [desire]. (4) Just as certain passions fall under the primary ones, so too with the primary good feelings. Under wishing: kindness, generosity, warmth, affection. Under watchfulness: respect, cleanliness. Under joy: delight, sociability, cheerfulness.

G Plutarch, *On moral virtue* 446F–447A (SVF 3.459, part)

(1) Some people [meaning the Stoics] say that passion is no different from reason, and that there is no dissension and conflict between the two, but a turning of the single reason in both directions, which we do not notice owing to the sharpness and speed of the change. (2) We do not perceive that the natural instrument of appetite and regret, or anger and fear, is the same part of the soul, which is moved by pleasure towards wrong, and while moving recovers itself again. (3) For appetite and anger and fear and all such things are corrupt opinions and judgements, which do not arise about just one part of the soul but are the whole commanding-faculty's inclinations, yieldings, assents and impulses, and, quite generally, activities which change rapidly, just like children's fights, whose fury and intensity are volatile and transient owing to their weakness.

H Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 3.1.25 (SVF 2.886, part) [Chrysippus:] 'I think that people in general come to the view that our commanding-faculty is in the heart through their awareness, as it were, of the passions that affect the mind happening to them in the chest and especially in the region where the heart is placed. This is so particularly in the case of distress, fear, anger and above all, excitement.'

I Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 5.6.34–7 (Posidonius fr. 33, 166, part)

(1) Posidonius also shows in what follows that [Chrysippus] is not only at variance with the facts, but also with Zeno and Cleanthes. (2) He says that Cleanthes' doctrine concerning the passionate part of the soul is revealed in these verses:

'What is it, Passion, that you want? Tell me this.'
'I want, Reason? To do everything I want.'
'A royal wish; but tell me it again.'
'Whatever I desire I want to happen.'

(3) Posidonius says that these alternating verses by Cleanthes give clear indications of his doctrine concerning the soul's passionate part, since he has represented reason and passion in conversation, as two different things. (4) Chrysippus, however, does not believe that the soul's passionate part is different from the rational; and he takes passions away from the non-rational animals, although they are plainly governed by appetite and competition, as Posidonius also explains in a fuller treatment of them.

J Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 4.2.10–18 (SVF 3.462, part)

[Chrysippus in *On passions* book 1] (1) 'First of all we should bear in mind that a rational animal follows reason naturally, and acts in accordance with reason as if that were its guide. (2) Often, however, it moves towards and away from certain things in a different way, pushed to excess in disobedience to reason. (3) Both definitions [i.e. the definitions of passions both as 'irrational' and as 'excessive impulses', cf. A I] refer to this movement: the movement contrary to nature which occurs irrationally in this way, and the excess in impulses. (4) For this irrationality must be taken to mean "disobedient to reason" and "reason turned aside"; with reference to this movement we even speak in ordinary language of people "being pushed" and "moved irrationally, without reason and judgement". What we mean by these expressions is not as though a person moves in error and overlooking something that accords with reason, but we refer chiefly to the movement of which the

expressions provide an outline account, since it is not a rational animal's nature to move in his soul in *this* way, but in accordance with reason . . . (5) This also explains the expression "the excess of impulse", since people overstep the proper and natural proportion of their impulses. (6) My meaning can be made more intelligible in this way. When someone walks in accordance with his impulse, the movement of his legs is not excessive but commensurate with the impulse, so that he can stop or change whenever he wants to. (7) But when people run in accordance with their impulse, this sort of thing no longer happens. The movement of their legs exceeds their impulse, so that they are carried away and unable to change obediently, as soon as they have started to do so. (8) Something similar, I think, takes place with impulses, owing to their going beyond the rational proportion. The result is that when someone has the impulse he is not obedient to reason. (9) The excess in running is called "contrary to the impulse", but the excess in the impulse is called "contrary to reason". For the proportion of a natural impulse is what accords with reason and goes only so far as reason itself thinks right.'

K. Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 4.3.2–5 (Posidonius fr. 34, part)

(1) On this point [i.e. his holding the passions to be judgements], he [Chrysippus] is in conflict with Zeno and himself and many other Stoics, who do not take the soul's judgements themselves to be its passions, but identify these with results of the judgements – the irrational contractions, cowerings, tearings, swellings and expansions. (2) But Posidonius completely dissented from both opinions. He does not regard the passions as either judgements or as results of judgements, but as effects of the competitive and appetitive faculty, in full accordance with the ancient doctrine. (3) In his study *On passions* he frequently asks Chrysippus and his followers: 'What is the cause of the excessive impulse? For reason could not exceed its own occupations and limits. So it is evident that some other irrational faculty causes impulse to exceed the limits of reason, just as the cause of running's exceeding the limits of choice is irrational, the weight of the body.'

L. Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 4.5.21–5 (SVF 3.480, part)

(1) [Chrysippus from his book *Emotional therapy*:] 'The passions are called ailments not just in virtue of their judging each of these things to be good, but also with regard to their running towards them in excess of what is natural' . . . (2) One might take him [Chrysippus] to say . . . that the opinion that possessions are a good is not yet an ailment, but becomes so when someone takes them to be the greatest good and supposes that life deprived of property is not worth living: for this is what the ailments love of property and money consist in.

M. Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 5.5.8–26 (Posidonius fr. 169, part)

(1) We have by nature these three appropriate relationships, corresponding to each form of the soul's parts – to pleasure because of the appetitive part, to success because of the competitive part, and to rectitude because of the rational part. (2) Epicurus only took notice of the appropriate relationship belonging to the soul's worst part; Chrysippus only that which belongs to the best; saying that we have an appropriate relationship only with rectitude, which he takes to be evidently good as well. (3) In neglecting two of them, Chrysippus was understandably puzzled about the origin of vice . . . He was unable to discover how it is that children do wrong. These were all matters on which Posidonius, quite rightly in my opinion, criticized and refuted him. (4) For if children had an appropriate relationship to rectitude, right from the start, vice would have had to be engendered in them not internally nor from themselves but solely from outside. Yet even if they are brought up in good habits and properly educated, they are always seen to do something wrong, and Chrysippus too admits this. (5) He could of course have overlooked the obvious facts and accepted only what agreed with his own assumptions, claiming that children will invariably become wise in the course of time if they are well brought up. (6) But he did not have the nerve to falsify the facts on this point at least; he accepted that even if children were reared by no one but a philosopher and never saw or heard any example of vice, they would still not necessarily become philosophers . . . (7) When he says that the persuasiveness of impressions, and conversation, are responsible for the maladjustments which occur in inferior men concerning good and bad things, we should ask him why pleasure projects the persuasive appearance that it is good, and pain that it is bad. Similarly, why are we readily persuaded, when we hear victory at Olympia and erection of statues being praised and blessed as good things by people in general, and defeat and disgrace regarded as bad? (8) Posidonius criticizes Chrysippus on this as well . . . holding that impulse is sometimes generated as a result of the judgement of the rational part, but often as a result of the movement of the passionate part. (9) Posidonius was quite right to connect these theories with the findings of the physiognomist. Animals and men that are broader-chested and hotter are all more competitive by nature, but those that are wide-hipped and colder are more cowardly. (10) He also says that their habitat makes no small difference to men's characters in respect to cowardice and daring, or attitudes to pleasure and pain, on the grounds that the soul's passionate movements always follow the body's disposition, which is altered to no small extent by the mixture [of elements] in the environment. For even the blood in animals, he says, differs in temperature and density and in

many other ways, which Aristotle expounded at length . . . (11) At present my argument is against Chrysippus and his followers, who understand nothing about the passions, including the fact that the body's mixtures produce the 'passionate movements' (as Posidonius normally calls them) that are appropriate to them.

N Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 5.6.18–19 (Posidonius fr. 161, part)

[Summarising Posidonius:] Some people in error have the opinion that what is appropriate to the soul's irrational faculties is appropriate without qualification. They do not know that having pleasure and dominating one's neighbours are the objects desired by the brutish part of the soul, but wisdom and everything good and honourable are the objects desired by the part which is rational and divine.

O Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 4.7.12–17 (*SVF* 3.466, part)

[Chrysippus in *On passions* book 2] (1) 'On the lessening of distress, the question might be asked as to how it occurs, whether because a particular opinion is altered, or with them all persisting, and for what reason this will be so . . . (2) I think that this kind of opinion does persist – that what is actually present is something bad – but as it grows older the contraction and, as I take it, the impulse towards the contraction, lessen. (3) Perhaps also the impulse persists, but the consequences will not correspond because a differently qualified disposition supervenes, which does not reason from those events. (4) So it is that people cease weeping and people weep who do not want to, when different impressions are created by external objects, and something or nothing stands in the way. For the way grief and weeping stop is probably what happens in those other cases as well: at their onset things cause greater movement, as I said happens with what activates laughter, and the like.'

P Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 4.7.24–41 (Posidonius fr. 165, part)

(1) He [Posidonius] himself shows that passions are caused by competition and appetite, and why they subside in time even if the opinions and judgements of something bad belonging to or having happened to the affected persons persist . . . (2) For as the passionate part of the soul pursues objects of desire appropriate to it, so having got them, it has its fill, and thereupon puts a stop to its own movement, which was controlling the animal's impulse and leading it by itself towards its own misguided end. (3) Therefore the causes of the passions' ceasing are not beyond reason, as Chrysippus used to say . . . (4) Habits and time in general evidently are of

the greatest effectiveness for the passionate movements. For the soul's irrational faculty slowly appropriates itself to the habits in which it has been reared.

Q Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 5.6.22–6 (including Posidonius fr. 162)

(1) It is through irrational activities that the irrational faculty is helped and harmed, whereas knowledge and ignorance have these effects on the rational faculty. (2) These then are the benefits that Posidonius says we derive from understanding the cause of the passions [see 64I], and in addition, 'it explained the problems concerning the impulse that arises from passion . . . (3) For I think you are quite familiar with the way people are without fear and distress when they have been rationally persuaded that something bad for them is present or approaching, but they have these passions when they get an impression of those things themselves. (4) How could anyone activate the irrational by means of reason, unless he set before it a picture like a perceptual impression? Thus some people have their appetite roused by a description, and when someone vividly tells them to flee the approaching lion, they are frightened without having seen it.'

R Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 5.2.3–7 (Posidonius fr. 163, part)

(1) Chrysippus says that it [the soul of inferior men] is comparable to bodies which are liable to contract fevers or diarrhoea or something else like this, on a slight and chance cause. (2) Posidonius criticizes his comparison: the soul of inferior men, he says, should not be compared to them but to bodies that are healthy without qualification. (3) For whether one contracts a fever from large causes or little, it makes no difference to one's being affected by it and being brought into any affected state at all. Bodies differ from one another by the fact that some are prone to fall sick while others are not. (4) So Chrysippus, he says, was incorrect in comparing the soul's health with that of the body, while comparing the soul's sickness to the condition of the body that falls easily into sickness; for the mind of the wise man is immune to affection, obviously, whereas no body is immune. (5) It was more correct to compare the souls of inferior men 'either to bodily health with a proneness to sickness' (this was Posidonius' expression), 'or to sickness itself', since they are either a kind of sickly tenor or one that is already sick. (6) But he himself agrees with Chrysippus to the extent of saying that all inferior men are sick in soul and that their sickness is like the stated conditions of the body. (7) His actual words are: 'Therefore the soul's sickness is not, as Chrysippus supposed, like the sickly disorder of the

body whereby the body is driven to fall into irregular, non-periodic fevers; the soul's sickness, rather, is like either bodily health with proneness to sickness, or sickness itself. For bodily sickness is a tenor already sick, but the sickness Chrysippus speaks of is more like proneness to fevers.'

S Stobaeus 2.93.1-13 (*SVF* 3.421)

(1) Proneness to sickness is a tendency towards passion, towards one of the functions contrary to nature, such as depression, irascibility, malevolence, quick temper, and the like. Proneness to sickness also occurs in reference to other functions which are contrary to nature, such as theft, adultery, and violence; hence people are called thieves, violators and adulterers. (2) Sickness is an appetitive opinion which has flowed into a tenor and hardened, signifying a belief that what should not be pursued is intensely worth pursuing, such as the passion for women, wine and money. By antipathy the opposites of these sicknesses occur, such as loathing for women or wine, and misanthropy. (3) Sicknesses which occur in conjunction with weakness are called ailments.

T Galen, *On Hippocrates' and Plato's doctrines* 4.6.2-3 (*SVF* 3.473, part)

Some of men's wrong actions are referred by Chrysippus to faulty judgement, others to the soul's lack of tension and its weakness, just as their right actions are guided by right judgement together with the soul's good tension . . . He says there are times when we give up right decisions because the soul's tension gives in, and does not persist till the end or fully execute the commands of reason.

U Epictetus, *Manual* 5

It is not things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about things. For example, death is nothing terrible, otherwise Socrates would have thought so; what is terrible is the judgement that death is terrible. So whenever we are impeded or disturbed or distressed, let us blame no one but ourselves, that is, our own judgements.

V Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.12.20-1

(1) You are impatient and discontented, and if you are alone, you call it isolation, but if you are with people, you call them plotters and bandits, and you even criticize your own parents and children and brothers and neighbours. (2) But when staying alone, you ought to call it peace and freedom and regard yourself as like the gods; and when you are with a number of people, you should not call it a crowd or a mob or an unpleasantness, but a feast and a festival, and so accept everything contentedly.

W Stobaeus 2.155,5-17 (*SVF* 3.564, 632)

(1) They [the Stoics] say that the good man experiences nothing contrary to his desire or impulse or purpose on account of the fact that in all such cases he acts with reserve and encounters no obstacles which are unanticipated. (2) He is also gentle, his gentleness being a tenor by which he is gently disposed in acting always appropriately and in not being moved to anger against anyone. (3) He is also calm and orderly, his orderliness being knowledge of fitting activities, and his calm the proper regulation of his soul and body's natural activities and rests. (4) The opposites of these occur in all inferior men.

X Seneca, *On anger* 2.3.1-2.4

(1) None of those things which rouse the mind fortuitously should be called passions; the mind suffers them, so to speak, rather than causes them. Therefore, passions consist not in being moved as a result of impressions of things, but in surrendering oneself to them and following up this fortuitous movement. For if anyone thinks that pallor, floods of tears, sexual arousal, heavy breathing or a sudden brightening of the eyes and the like, are evidence of passion and a mark of the mind, he is mistaken and fails to realize that these are bodily drives . . . (2) Anger not only has to be moved but has to rush out. This is because it is an impulse, and impulse never exists without the mind's assent. For it is impossible that any action concerning revenge and punishment should take place without the mind's awareness.

Y Gellius 19.1.17-18 (Epictetus fr. 9)

(1) When some terrifying sound . . . or anything else of that kind occurs, even a [Stoic] wise man's mind must be slightly moved and contracted and frightened - not by a preconceived opinion of anything bad but by certain rapid and involuntary movements which forestall the proper function of mind and reason. (2) Soon, however, the wise man does not . . . assent to such impressions nor does he add an opinion to them, but he rejects and belittles them and finds nothing in them that should be feared.

□ Although control of the passions was a basic principle in all Greek ethics, popular as well as philosophical, its importance in Stoicism was and has remained notorious. Here the word 'stoical' retains a direct connexion with the ancient school. Socratic doctrines, as mediated by the Cynics, help to explain the Stoics' conception of the wise man as free from all disturbing passion. But the Stoics treated passion in several novel ways which are among the best guides to their view of the good and happy life. Passion is the source of unhappiness, wrongdoing and the flaws of character which issue in wrong-doing (A 6-7, R). The term *pathos* includes not only the obviously turbulent emotions of sexual desire,

ambition, jealousy etc., but also such states of mind as hesitancy, malice and pity, all classified under one of the four primary passions, appetite, pleasure, fear and distress (E). The classification needs to be read in conjunction with that of the 'three good feelings' in F. (There is no good feeling corresponding to 'distress'.) Passion is thereby revealed as an unhealthy state of mind, not synonymous with emotion in ordinary language. The 'good feelings' include a wide spectrum of attractive human characteristics which temper the 'austerity' of the wise man, so strongly emphasized in the more hostile ancient sources. In acknowledging, as one must, the apparent harshness of including pity as a passion (E 4), it should also be noted that the wise man could be sociable, generous, affectionate, cheerful and gentle (W 2).

Chrysippus seems to have approached the elucidation of passion from the assumption that a person in such a state, by assenting to a certain kind of false value-judgement, has issued himself with an 'excessive impulse' to pursue or avoid something (for the relation between assent and impulse, cf. 33I). The meaning of 'excessive' is explained in J 5-9: given that someone can seek to achieve what he wants by walking, such a person could be said to 'exceed' his wants by running, an action which prevents immediate control of his body's movements. By analogy, Chrysippus argued, an impulse or want is 'excessive' if it goes beyond the natural control of reason. The idea might be more clearly conveyed by a speedometer which marks all speeds beyond 70 mph in red – someone who drives beyond that speed is driving excessively, with speeds below that figure corresponding to impulses commensurate with reason. The important and original insight expressed by the analogy is the continuity and difference between normal, healthy impulses and passions. According to Chrysippus' psychology (cf. 53Q), any impulse is an efficient cause of action. Impulses are that activity of the soul's commanding-faculty which converts its judgements of what it should pursue or avoid into purposive bodily movements. Since reason characterizes the whole commanding-faculty (61B 9), there is nothing irrational about an impulse as such: volition is a natural and necessary function of reason. In the case of passion, however, Chrysippus used 'irrational', as explained in J 1-4 (cf. 61B 10-11), to describe impulses which exceed the natural limits of reason. Their unnaturalness or irrationality, he stresses, consists in the immoderation of their movement (J 4). They are not like ordinary errors of fact (cf. A 7-8), a point which probably means that the pro or contra judgement underlying a passion may be perfectly natural in itself (cf. L): the wise man will naturally select or seek to avoid many of the things that form the objects of passions; but he will do so at a walking pace, as it were, on the basis of a properly rational judgement of such things' moral indifference. He always gets what he desires, since he 'acts with reserve'; and thus his impulses are rationally regulated so as to accord with everything that occurs in his environment, impervious to disappointment or any passion (W). Passions are characterized by their 'excess', which is revealed both in the nature of the judgement – taking what is not good or bad in the strict sense to be such (cf. B) – and in the concomitant psychosomatic movements, the 'shrinkings' and 'stretchings', 'swellings' and 'contractions' (B, D 4-5), which form their coordinate definitions. A passion is a *weak* opinion (C; see 41), whereby 'weakness' describes the state of a 'perverted' reason, assenting to impressions

that trigger off impulses inconsistent with a well-reasoned understanding of what their objects are worth.

The precedence of appetite and fear to pleasure and distress (A 4) can be explained by the fact that the former motivate actions which result in one of the latter. Appetite and fear are defined by reference to the agent's 'expectations', pleasure and distress by his 'fresh' beliefs about the good or bad things he is presently experiencing (B). Thus the objects of appetite and fear will typically be external states of affairs towards which we literally 'stretch forth' or from which we 'shrink back'. (The Stoics, as our translations seek to bring out, liked to exploit the etymological sense of ordinary words, in this case 'desire' and 'aversion'.) The two 'resultant' passions, pleasure and distress, have internal objects which are (or manifest themselves in) the soul's 'swelling' and 'contraction'. B taken together with O shows that the 'freshness' of the false judgements which constitute pleasure and distress reveals itself in the opinion that one ought to be elated or depressed. Hence Chrysippus was prepared to explain the lessening of distress (O) not as an alteration of the false opinion that something bad is present, but as a weakening of the impulse to the 'contraction', that is, the *further* false opinion that one ought to be depressed. To suppose that property is something good is a basic error, but not a sufficient condition of having a passion for wealth – judging it to be the greatest good (L).

As the name of a primary passion, 'pleasure' needs to be distinguished from the synonymous state described as a 'by-product' (57A 3) and variously classified as 'indifferent but preferred', 'natural but without value', 'neither natural nor valuable' (see note on A 4 in vol. 2). What this neutral pleasure signifies is established by the fact that its opposite is one of the standard words for physical pain (58A 4). The pleasure which is indifferent should be taken to cover pleasurable sensations which are entirely involuntary or unavoidable by-products of natural human behaviour. Pleasure only becomes a passion when a person assents to false judgements concerning the desirability and goodness of pleasurable experiences. So too with the undesirability and badness of pain when this refers to the passion 'distress'. More generally, the Stoics are not committed to the utterly implausible claim that every state of a person's mind is immediately under the control of reason. They acknowledged that even a wise man is so constituted that he may be *involuntarily* subject to weeping, sexual arousal, shock at sudden noises etc. (X, Y). Such responses to circumstances will only be signs of passions if they belong to someone who has misjudged his situation, and thereby given himself an excessive impulse manifested in appetite, fear etc.

Because we are responsible for the state of our reason, we are responsible for our passions, a fundamental Stoic doctrine which explains their emphasis on strength of will and character (cf. T). The passions' dependence on faulty judgements, and thus on the perversion of reason, is exemplified in U and V. We as a whole are to blame for our passions, Epictetus maintains, which follow directly upon mistaken interpretation of our mental impressions, or misdescription of experience. Thus passion, as reason gone astray, is not a feature of the non-rational animals (I 4).

At the basis of this theory is Chrysippus' important denial that the human soul

consists of rational *and* irrational faculties. He rejected the Platonic model of a simultaneously divided self, whereby emotional conflict is explained in terms of reason and passion pulling a person in opposite ways at the same time (G). For Chrysippus, emotional conflict is a fluctuation of the unitary commanding-faculty, which is capable of changing so swiftly that it gives the misleading appearance of being divided into two distinct powers (cf. 61B 9–11). Zeno had already described passion as a 'fluttering' (SVF 1.206, cf. A 1–2), the ornithological metaphor being chosen to convey its volatility; and that thought is developed in G. Thus the dominant Stoic conception of those subject to passion is their instability and lack of consistent direction; note the references to 'weakness' and 'lack of tension' (C, T). Galen, our principal source for Chrysippus' psychology, was tediously critical of Chrysippus' abandonment of Plato's tripartite division of the soul into rational, appetitive and competitive faculties, and of his locating reason as well as passion in the heart (H). He attacked him by means of Posidonius, who had returned to the Platonic model of the soul (K 2), using this as his explanation of the *naturalness* of the passions to the latter two irrational faculties (M 1–2, P 1, cf. N). Posidonius had also represented Chrysippus as being out of line with Zeno and Cleanthes (I 1–2), but the surviving evidence is insufficient to corroborate his opinion. Most of Chrysippus' terminology for the passions goes back to Zeno (cf. SVF 1.205–15), and Cleanthes' verses, quoted in I 1, do not prove that he distinguished reason and passion in the way Posidonius alleged. Against Posidonius is 61B, which attributes monistic psychology to Zeno and Aristo as well as Chrysippus.

Some innovations and developments, however, were doubtless made by Chrysippus himself, probably with a view to clarifying the difficulty (cf. K 3) of positing an 'irrational' state of a rational faculty. Where Zeno had spoken, somewhat loosely perhaps, of judgements *resulting* in 'irrational movements', Chrysippus insisted that the passion itself is a judgement (K 1). This suggests that he identified the cognitive activity and the 'irrational movement', a thesis which would be reflected in the co-ordinate definitions of B (cf. D).

Posidonius' principal objections to Chrysippus' doctrine of passion are recorded in K, M, P, and Q. One of these is conceptual, the impossibility of reason exceeding itself (K 3). Taking up Chrysippus' analogy with running (J 7), Posidonius argued that running's 'excess' over rational choice is due to an irrational factor, the body's weight. But this is a hopeless rejoinder. Chrysippus' point is that the runner's impulse to run is an aberrant activity of reason itself—a volition which makes a person lose control of himself. That indicates perception of the fact that passions are both voluntary or intentional *and* sometimes recognized by their subjects to be excessive (cf. A 6–8). Posidonius' more interesting objections are empirical. Chrysippus had explained the origin of vice by reference to the corrupting effect of the external environment (M 7; but cf. 62D and commentary, which show that Chrysippus' position was much more complex than Posidonius allows). Posidonius challenged the implicit optimism concerning human nature in an ideal environment. On his view the 'persuasiveness' of the environment is only intelligible on the assumption that the passions are predisposed by internal features of the soul and of the bodily constitution. Posidonius found support for his doctrines in the effectiveness of habits (P 4) and

'irrational activities' (Q 1) in stimulating and assuaging the passions. As Q 3 shows, he interpreted reason more restrictively than Chrysippus, counting a perceptual impression on its own as something 'irrational'. The difference between the two Stoics emerges particularly clearly in M 8 and 64I 6: for Posidonius, impulse is a mental function which has *either* reason *or* passion as its source. For Chrysippus, passion itself is a rational impulse which has deviated from nature's norm. Posidonius' definition of the end (63J 2) indicates the centrality to his ethics of accepting the irrational as an independent and corrupting power in human nature.

On his tripartite view of the soul, pleasure and power *are* 'appropriate' to its irrational faculties, appetite and competition, and these facts of human nature explain people's 'proneness to sickness' (S 1), when they mistake what is naturally desirable to the soul's 'brutish' part as desirable without qualification (N). By thus internalizing the causes of the passions, Posidonius thought he had done more than Chrysippus to explain their origin and cure (cf. M 3, P, Q). Even so, it is not an obvious truth that a life devoted to philosophy is any more rational than one committed to wine-tasting or political ambition. As moral therapy, Posidonius' doctrines have some interest, but they do far less than Chrysippus' to promote understanding of what passion is and its relation to reason.

In Chrysippus' use of the analogy with bodily health (R 1), the unpredictability of the passions and slightness of their external causes are emphasized. Posidonius, in line with his conception of internal disorder, preferred to stress the dispositional tendencies, 'proneness to sickness' (R 5), a doctrine which has left its mark in the terminology of S.

66 Ethics in action

A Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1041F (SVF 3.545)

In his *On Justice* book 3 he [Chrysippus] said: 'For this reason then, owing to the extreme magnitude and beauty [of justice], we seem to be talking fiction and not on the level of man and human nature.'

B Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1034B (SVF 3.698)

Chrysippus, again, by writing in his *On rhetoric* that the wise man will make public speeches and engage in politics as if he regarded wealth and reputation and health as good, agrees that the Stoics' theories are not for public consumption and of no social relevance.

C Seneca, *Letters* 116.5 (Panaetius fr. 114, part)

I think Panaetius gave a charming answer to the youth who asked whether the wise man would fall in love: 'As to the wise man, we shall see. What concerns you and me, who are still a great distance from the wise man, is to ensure that we do not fall into a state of affairs which is disturbed, powerless, subservient to another and worthless to oneself.'