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Ambivalent Co-operators: Organisational Stack and Utilitarian Rationality
in an Eastern Nova Scotian Fisheries Co-operative1
Anthony Davis
St. Francis Xavier University |
Svein Jentoft
University of Tromso
|
ABSTRACT Employing case study data, we contend in this essay that the
success of cooperatives among small boat fishers, in large measure depends
up the degree to which members. remain loyal to the organisation, especially
when dissatisfied with particulars of its operation. Furthermore, we contend
that co-operatives' ability to cultivate and nurture this equality, referred
to here as 'organisational slack,' is jeopardised by a Canadian Fisheries
policy which rewards individualistically referenced utilitarian rationality.
RESUME En nous fondant sur les études de cas, nous démontrons
que le succès des sociétés coopératives des
pecheurs indépendants (small boat fishers), dans une large mesure,
dépend de letir loyauté envers la société,
surtout dans les cas où ils sont peu satisfaits de la gestion de
la société en question. En plus, nous démontrons que
la capacité de la société pour promouvoir ce caractéristique,
que nous appelons organisational slack, est menacée par une politique
du Ministère Fédéral de la Peche (Canadian Fisheries)
selon laquelle on récompense la rationalité utilitaire et
individualiste.
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE NORTH BAY FISHERMEN'S CO-OP
3. DIMENSIONS OF PARTICIPATION
4. DIMENSIONS OF ATTACHMENT
5. DIMENSIONS OF SATISFACTION
6. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS
7. CONCLUSION
8. NOTES
9. REFERENCES CITED
Introduction
Producer co-operatives within fisheries have been the subject of considerable
interest on the part of community development organisers, fisheries social
researchers and fishermen themselves (Jackson 1984; Jentoft 1986; Poggie
1980; Pollnac 1989; Siemens and Trudel 1984). Co-operatives have been considered
by many as an attractive organisational form enabling independent, especially
small-scale, producers to capture greater control over economic conditions
key to their survival. For instance, fisher participation, as collective
owners in community-based business ventures which buy, process and market
marine resources, enhances the share captured by producers of the economic
wealth generated from marine resources. A greater share enhances the material
conditions of fishers, their families and their communities. Moreover,
greater share of fisheries generated wealth retained within fishing communities
has the potential to generate spin-off economic activity that creates employment
and develop members beneficial to the entire community and area in so far
as it produces economic diversification, thereby reducing dependency on
the fisheries.
In addition, a co-operative is an attractive organisational form to
many small boat producers because it maintains independence . That
is, in joining a cooperative small boat fishers envision an organisation
that will both reinforce and develop their independence from marine resource
buyers and processors as well as enable them to capture an increased share
of potential economic wealth. Important to their independence is the co-operative
principle of participatory democracy : that is, participation enables
fisher members a say in the general and daily decision-making processes.
Consequently, participation in decision making enables the members to reconcile
their day-to-day concerns as clients with their broader interest as owners.
These factors have important implications for the viability of the co-operative
as a business venture in competitive markets. Firstly, co-owners and active
participants in decision-making and management, the members become attached
and committed, so the argument goes, to the organisation, something that
keeps the organisation together as a coalition in hard times. Attachment
makes members willing to sacrifice some of their economic interests, at
least in the short term, Secondly, the fisher's dual relation to the co-op,
as co-owner and producer (client), has similar effects. If he loses as
owner, he may still gain as producer (client), and vice versa, A third
factor is also important fur the viability of the co-op. Ownership participation
provides a fisher member with an extra channel for expressing his dissatisfaction
with the services of the co-op. He can use 'voice' in addition to exit,
the latter being the only option in private capitalist firms to which the
fisher's only relation is as producer/client (cf. Hirschman 1975).
Here lies the real comparative advantage of co-operatives over private
capitalist enterprises. Attachment, dual relations and voice provide a
"shock-absorbing capacity " (Löfgren 1972) in periods of crises, a
situation which frequently occurs in the fishing industry. Or, to put it
in Cyert and March's (1963) terms: cooperatives have "organisational slack.
" In private firms, slack often stems from incomplete information on the
producers' side of what their alternative sales opportunities are, or to
a time lag in adjusting the aspirations ration-levels to the actual economic
performance of the organisation. In addition to these factors, slack in
co-ops is also related importantly to ideology, personal commitment and
active participation in an organisation which is literally theirs. It follows
from this that fisheries co-operatives should be, ceteris paribus ,
more resistant to economic pressure when times are hard than is the case
for private firms.
This paper traces the roots of the slack factor in ideology and members'
attachment to an independent Eastern Nova Scotian fishermen's co-operative
- The North Bay Fishermen's Co-op, located at Ballantyne's Cove, Antigonish
County, Nova Scotia, Canada. To what extent is slack ideal or real? Considering
the many failures of co-ops in fisheries (Jentoft 1986; Poggie 1990), there
is a risk that slack either gets lost in the business process or that the
slack factor unique to co-ops is not sufficient to make them viable.
In this case study we identify membership attachment and how it is converted
into slack, In particular, we contend that, in spite of the formal aspects
of the co-operative organisation (i.e., dual relations, voice option, commitment
to co-op principles), slack is something a co-op cannot take for granted.
On the contrary, it has to be reproduced in business affairs on a daily
basis. Crucial to the reproduction of 'slack' is participatory decision-making.
Fisher members have to be involved actively in decision-making to feel
attached and therefore willing to make sacrifices which permit the co-op
to survive in the face of adversity.
We also contend that organisational slack, key to the survival and prosperity
of fisheries co-ops, is jeopardised by the individualistic, utilitarian
rationality inherent in and emphasised by federal government approaches
to the management of access and participation in the small boat sector
of the Atlantic Canadian fisheries. Through regulatory approaches such
as limited entry licensing largely introduced in and developed since 1968,
the federal government, in particular the Department of Fisheries and Oceans
(DFO), has cultivated an individualistic utilitarian ethic among small
boat fishing captains. Captains, as individual owners of fishing effort,
only have access to the 'privilege ' of participating in particular
fisheries (e.g., lobster, long-line, crab, otter trawl) by obtaining the
pertinent federal licenses. Their ability to satisfy individual livelihood
needs is levered by possession of the necessary licenses, often obtained
from other captains at prices greatly inflated by scarcity created through
strict controls on the number of licenses issued (cf. Commercial 1985,
Policy 1976, Levelton 1981 arid Navigating 1983). Consequently, fishing
captains increasingly have assumed a posture regarding participation and
fishing effort which sets their individual needs and goals in opposition
to those of other captains active in similar fisheries (cf. Davis and Thiessen
1988; Thiessen and Davis 1988, and Sinclair 1982). That is, the ethic of
and economic costs arising from regulatory mechanisms such as limited entry
licensing directly situate each individual captain in a competitive posture
relative to other captains. In short, public policies premised on the notions
that resources are scarce, and producers are exploitative maximisers and,
therefore, in need of regulation, have produced the necessary conditions
for small boat fishing captains to become maximising exploiters creating
resource scarcity through pursuit of individual utilities in redefined
competition with other captains.
Theoretically, such a situation would be expected to reduce the organisational
slack within a captain-owned fisheries co-operative such as the North Bay
Fishermen's Co-op. The cultivation in individual captains of utilitarian
rationality would express itself in judgements and attitudes about the
co-operatives ability to deliver economic goods, e.g., better resource
prices, business, and returns on share capital. In other words, membership
commitment in such a policy environment would become increasingly conditional
upon assessments of the co-operative's performance in satisfying goals,
needs and the like, as these are defined by the immediate utilitarian priorities
and imperatives of each captain member. That is, the process, for each
member, of articulating futures through commitment to collective action
becomes increasingly sublimated to the immediacies of current results,
as these are assessed continually relative to the immediacy of individually-referenced
priorities and imperatives. Dissatisfaction, voiced or not, would be expected
to express itself quickly in reduced loyalty, intolerance, and increasing
detachment. So, in addition to documenting the character of organisational
slack, we will also examine the extent to which this necessary feature
is contextualised and jeopardised by the cultivation and manifestation
of individualistic utilitarian rationality. Before we put these contentions
to the test, a short history of The North Bay Fishermen's Co-op is in order.
Back to Top
The North Bay Fishermen's Co-op
Established in 1983, the North Bay Fishermen's Co-op is the latest descendant
of area Fisher co-operatives first formed in the context of the Antigonish
Movement. Indeed, Moses Coady, a founder of the Movement, personally participated
in (he initial study clubs and development of the original co-operatives,
including the St. George's Co-op, established in 1935 and situated at Ballantyne's
Cove. The St. George's Co-op was a producer/consumer co-operative organisation.
Among other activities, it operated a lobster and fish buying/processing
facility as well as a general store which provided agricultural services
such as ploughing and mowing.
In 1954-55, the fish buying business was transferred to the Antigonish
Co-op Fishermen (ACF), a county-wide producer co-operative organised by
the St. Francis Xavier University Extension Department. Antigonish Co-op
Fishermen marketed their resources; through the United Maritime Fishermen
(UMF), which was developed as an umbrella organisation within and through
which local fisheries producer co-operatives; could centralise and concentrate
their marketing and economic interests. The North Bay Fishermen's
Co-op arose from the ashes of a failing ACF-UMF business relationship.
Once established, it purchased existing office and processing facilities
at Ballantyne's Cove.2 Since
its inception in 1983, the North Bay Fishermen's Co-op has developed new
facilities and aggressively pursued market opportunities. Today the co-op
has 60 members, most of whom have previous experience and investment with
fisheries co-operatives. In the following we examine in specific detail
the characteristics and qualities of membership attachment and participation.3
Back to Top
Dimensions of Participation
There are a variety of ways to measure and to describe membership participation.
In this instance, activities such as meeting attendance, active participation
in the co-op's affairs as measured by membership involvement with the Board
of Directors, committees, official delegations and the like are considered.
Over ninety percent of the fishermen interviewed (46 of 51) reported that
they had been members of the co-op for three or more years. In addition,
many of the current members belonged to the Fisheries co-operatives which
preceded North Bay. Consequently, the vast majority of the membership interviewed
have lengthy association with and experience in co-operative organisations.
When asked to indicate the various reasons why they joined the North Bay
Fishermen's Co-op, 72.5 He replied that the co-op represented the best
opportunity to sell their catches; 62.8% felt the co-op was vital to the
community and they wanted to support it; 33.3% noted that support for co-operatives
is part of their family tradition; and 43.1% reported that they also joined
because the success of the co-operative depended upon the support of as
many people as possible, In addition, 25.5% of the membership noted that
they joined because the co-operative form of organisation gives them a
greater say in and benefit from matters directly concerning their livelihood
such as dockside prices.
In sum, from these responses it is apparent that many of the members,
as a consequence of their previous experiences with co-operatives, readily
support and have formed positive feelings about the co-operative type of
organisation. Most joined for these reasons, noting that they chose participation
in the cooperative over the available alternative of selling their catches
to a local private fish buyer. This is a particularly telling set of attitudes
given the fact that most of the members had recently experienced the failure
of both the Antigonish Coop Fishermen and the United Maritime Fishermen
co-operatives. Numerous captains lost, in their judgement, considerable
economic resources, i.e,, their share capital in the collapse of these
co-operatives. Yet, instead of exercising the option of throwing up their
arms in despair and exiting from participation in co-operative ventures,
they immediately began the process of organising and building another co-operative
within a local environment which contains an alternative and, in terms
of prices attractive outlet for their sales. In short, this pattern of
response suggests that, by and large, the membership expresses 'co-op consciousness'
in their feelings, attitudes and choices.
Curiously, the breadth of the membership's willingness to join and support
co-operatives is not replicated in the more direct measures of participation.
For instance, almost thirty percent of those interviewed report that they
attend meetings either occasionally, rarely or never. Over sixty-six percent
stated that they have never held an official, elected position with the
co-op (34 of 51) and almost sixty-three percent (32 of 51) claimed that
they had never been a member of a co-op committee or delegation. These
data indicate that, while the vast majority of the membership are committed
to joining and supporting co-operatives, a substantial number art not motivated
sufficiently to always attend meetings and only about one in three of the
membership actively participate, beyond attending meetings, in the co-op's
affairs. Moreover, the spouses and children of co-op members are almost
totally uninvolved in the co-op. Of the married members interviewed, only
a couple reported that their spouses were involved with the co-op. In addition,
none of the members interviewed had children who were involved.
These data suggest that the instrumental purposes of fish sales and
situational conveniences such as location and services (e.g., credit, supplies,
and so on) underwrites, for many membership and participation. Certainly,
the recent negative experiences of many captains with co-op failures has
left a residual of cautious conservatism when it comes to co-op involvements
and affairs. Yet, for these captains, the option of forming and/or joining
a co-operative, with all of its attendant risks, outweighs the alternative
of simply selling catches to the local private fish buyer-processor, Arisaig
Fisheries. It would be simplistic to attribute this choice primarily to
instrumental purposes such as economic opportunism, particularly in a setting
where negative economic experiences with co-operative organisations have
been the rule rather than the exception. For these fishers the co-operative
represents the organisational form of choice, choice itself reflecting
almost sixty years of association between these fishers, their families,
their communities and the co-operative form of organisation. While it would
be foolhardy to deny instrumental associations, the maintenance of the
co-operative preference, especially given the extensive experience with
failure, can only be understood in reference to the 'co-op consciousness'
that has resulted from the years of association. However, having noted
this, the reported lack of participation and integration of many in co-op
affairs reveals a window of vulnerability for the organisation and its
membership.
Back to Top
Dimensions of Attachment
Potentials for vulnerability and crisis evident in the dimensions of
participation are further underlined by direct measures of membership attachment
and loyalty to the co-op. For instance, when asked if they would sell to
another fish buyer if offered higher prices, over thirty-five percent (18
of 51) of the members interviewed reported that they would sell to another
buyer. Needless to say, while a minority of the membership, the resource
supply represented by this group would be substantial, especially significant
because of the extent to which the co-op is a specialised, seasonal venture
largely dependent on lobster and herring roe sales over six months of the
year. For the North Bay Fishermen's Co-op these data reveal a fundamental
vulnerability to resource supply. This is rooted in both qualities of the
relationship these members have with the co-op and their feelings about
the co-op.
Aside from this measure of willingness to sell to other buyers, responses
to several other questions clearly indicate the extent to which the membership
has doubts about the co-op. Almost sixty-seven percent of those interviewed
(34 of 5 1) reported that they are unwilling to put more of their fishing
income into the co-op. About eighty percent (40 of 51) disagreed with the
statement that members. should be prepared to surrender income today in
order to encourage long-term success and over eighty percent (42 of 51)
responded negatively to the suggestion that the co-op management knows
what is in the best financial interests of the co-op and its membership.
In short, a large majority of the membership is unwilling to put more money
into the co-op and an even larger majority expresses suspicion regarding
the judgement of co-op management. Given that the members own the co-op
and that the success or failure of the co-op reflects directly on the members
livelihoods, the pattern of responses here hints at unease among the membership
and the potentials for difficulties concerning attachment and loyalty to
the organisation, thereby jeopardising 'organisational slack.'
This situation is further underlined by the fact that few of the members
are prepared to sacrifice aspects of their individual vested interests
in fishing to the co-op. In their responses to a question which asked what
they would be prepared to do if a majority of the co-op membership decided
that the success of the co-op required redistribution of fishing effort,
over ninety-six percent of those interviewed would refuse to surrender
a fishing license; over eighty-six percent would refuse to replace their
current boat with one that is smaller and less powerful; over eighty four
percent reported that they would not voluntarily transfer a license to
another co-op member; ninety percent claimed that they would, as individuals,
apply for new licenses; and almost seventy-seven percent reported that
they would refuse to allow the co-op to hold and distribute licenses and
quota. Only in one instance, reduction of fishing effort (e.g., number
of days fished and/or the amount of gear fished), did a slim majority of
those interviewed (52%) indicate a willingness to sacrifice individual
interests for the benefit of the co-op and its membership.
These data reveal that, when it comes to their individual livelihood
interests, most of the membership feel it necessary to maintain an arms
length relationship with the co-op. Without question, a good number of
the members are, minimally, unconvinced that the organisation can or should
be trusted to represent their individual interests, These findings contrast
sharply with the overall positive attitude and support expressed by the
vast majority of the members toward cooperative forms of organisation,
Why would members generally in favour and supportive of co-operatives report
little willingness to sacrifice their individual interests for the benefit
of the co-op and its membership, including themselves? Could this be yet
another expression of the classic small boat fishermen's, as 'rugged individualists,'
distrust of representative organisations, whatever form they may take?4
Are there aspects of the North Bay Fishermen's Co-op management
and organisation which underwrite members' suspicion and hesitation? In
order to attempt answers to these and other questions we must search out
explanations for the causes of the membership's ambivalence. Indeed, this
ambivalence expressed even more emphatically by the fact that over ninety
percent of the members (46 of 51) report that they feet their opinion counts
in the co-op and fully two in every three of the members report that they
would not sell to another fish buyer, even if offered high prices,
both features demonstrative of 'organisational slack.'
Back to Top
Dimensions of Satisfaction
To isolate aspects of satisfaction, we asked members questions intended
to reveal general feelings about the co-operative as well as opinions concerning
specific aspects of its organisation and operation. The vast majority of
the membership interviewed reports that they are moderately to very satisfied
with the service they receive from co-op dockside/plant workers (92.1%)
and co-op office personnel (83%). Many made a point of emphasising that
the people and their work were of 'the best sort.' Eighty-two percent indicated
that they were moderately to very satisfied with selling to the co-op.
Apparently, while about one in three would sell to another fish buyer,
most are satisfied with their present arrangement. The levels of satisfaction
notably decrease in association with co-op management and co-op business
and accounting practices. Almost sixty-seven percent reported satisfaction
with business and accounting practices while under sixty percent (58.8%)
noted they were moderately to very satisfied with co-op management. These
data suggest that a sizable number of members feel uneasy about these two
particular aspects of the co-op. Responses to several general questions
shed some light an the factors involved here.
Almost sixty-five percent of the membership interviewed reported that
the coop represents their needs and concerns. Yet, about only one in every
two of the members (26 of 51) claim that the co-op is satisfying their
needs and concerns. The suggestion here is that while the majority of the
membership welcomes the co-operative form of organisation as representative
of their needs and concerns, many feel that these are not being satisfied
through aspects of current practices. In particular, almost fifty-five
percent of those interviewed (28 of 51) claim that they are not being
kept adequately informed about the practices and plans of the co-operative.
Fully sixty-seven percent (34 of 51) feel that they are not consulted frequently
enough about management and development plans and initiatives.
These data reveal that the ambivalence of many towards the co-operative
specifically concerns the perceived or real distance that they feel from
the management and development plans, practices and initiatives ongoing
within the co-op. A majority of the members report they are inadequately
informed and insufficiently consulted about these areas. Consequently,
they are saying that, while they feel their opinion counts, it is not being
sought out frequently enough. As a result, the suspicion noted earlier
is rooted, at least to an extent, in the feeling that they are not being
integrated adequately in the decision-making processes, leaving many of
the members without confidence in their knowledge about cooperative affairs
as well as in disagreement with management decisions and practices and,
therefore, uncertain about and distrustful of management.
Back to Top
Analysis of Selected Characteristics
In order to develop a better understanding of the patterns reported
above, members bets' responses were examined in relationship to their attendance
at meeting and whether they felt they were being kept adequately informed.
Table 1 examines membership responses in terms of meeting attendance, This
information reveals that those who always attend meetings are much more
likely than those that do not to hold an official position with the co-op
(43.2% vs. 0%); to feel the co-op members are consulted enough about plans
and initiatives (70.3% vs. 57.1%); and to continue selling to the co-op
even it another fish buyer offers them higher prices (73.0% vs. 42.9%).
This information clearly reveals the importance of membership attendance
at meetings as a foundation for attachment to and participation in the
co-op, thereby maintaining 'organisational slack.'
Table 1. Members' Reported Attendance at Co-op Meetings by Selected
Response Categories
Response Categories
|
Attendance at Meetings |
Would Sell to a Fish Buyer Other than
Co-op
|
Held/Hold Official Position with Co-op
|
Co-op Represents Needs and Concerns
|
Co-op Members are Kept Adequately Informed
|
Member are Consulted Enough about Plans and Initiatives
|
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Always
(N=37) |
27.0
|
73.0
|
43.2
|
56.8
|
59.5
|
40.5
|
43.2
|
56.8
|
70.3
|
29.7
|
Less than Always
(N=14) |
57.1
|
42.9
|
--
|
100.0
|
78.6
|
21.4
|
50.0
|
50.0
|
57.1
|
42.9
|
Notably, meeting attendance was little influence on whether members feel
they are being kept inadequately informed (43.2% vs. 50.0%).
Indeed, if anything, regular attendance at meetings reinforces some
members' suspicions about not being kept adequately informed, 56.8% of
those always attending report they feel this way as compared with 50% of
the less frequent attendees. Furthermore, always attending meetings exerts
a negative influence on whether or not members think the co-op represents
their needs and concerns. Almost forty-one percent of those always attending
report they feel the co-op does not represent their needs and concerns
while only twenty-one percent of the less frequent attenders claim a similar
opinion. Several of the members interviewed volunteered the opinion that
an insufficient number of meetings are called each year. Indeed, the general
membership is drawn together on only a few occasions such as the Annual
General Meeting and fisheries section meetings (e.g., ground fish and herring).
The frequency with which the membership meets with its board of directors
and management, in addition to attendance at meetings, would be important
to instilling and cultivating the sense as well as the experience among
many of the members that they both are being kept informed and arc participating
in the decision-making process. Without question, the current practices
provided limited opportunity for the membership, particularly those resident
in and fishing out of ports other than Ballantyne's Cove, to sustain a
sense of ongoing, active participation in the co-operative. Moreover, for
those motivated to attend and to participate the practice of meeting infrequently
will provide little opportunity for nurturing attachment, encouraging participatory
decision-making and building confidence in the relations between members
and management.
It is curious that a greater percentage of those always attending meetings,
when compared with the less frequent attenders, express doubt about the
co-op representing their needs and concerns, especially since a good majority
of these very same members report they feet that members are consulted
enough about plans and initiatives (70.3%). This indicates that, while
those always attending think they are consulted enough, some of them do
not agree with the direction the co-op is taking. However, the attachment
that most have to the co-op is strong enough thus far to maintain, regardless
of this disagreement, their willingness to continue selling to the co-op
even if another fish buyer offers higher prices. This is a rather strong
indication of 'slack' in the organisation.
The impact on membership attachment and satisfaction of feeling adequately
informed is demonstrated in the distribution of responses presented in
Table 2. Of those claiming they feel adequately informed, 78.3% report
that they would not sell to another fish buyer, 78.3% feel the co-op
represents their needs and concerns, and 69.7% report that they think members
are consulted enough about plans and initiatives.
In stark contrast, of those reporting they feel inadequately informed,
46.4% would sell to another fish buyer, 46.4% feel the co-op does
not represent their needs and concerns, and fully 96.4% report that
they think members are not consulted enough. This pattern clearly
reveals that the development and maintenance of membership attachment to
and satisfaction with the co-op is strongly influenced by the extent to
which attention is paid to assuring the members have access, on a continual
basis, to information and participatory decision making about the organisation's
practices and plans.
In order to explore characteristics of satisfaction with co-op organisation
and practice, members were asked to indicate their feelings about specific
features on a five-point scale, ranging from very satisfied (5) through
to very dissatisfied (1).5
Table 2. Members' Response to the Kept Adequately Informed Question
by Selected Response Categories
Response Categories
|
Kept Adequately Informed |
Would Sell to a Fish Buyer Other than the Co-op
|
Held/Hold Official Position with
Co-op
|
Co-op Represents Needs and Concerns
|
Members are Consulted Enough About Plans and Initiatives
|
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Informed
(N=23) |
21.7
|
78.3
|
34.9
|
65.2
|
78.3
|
21.7
|
69.7
|
30.4
|
Not Informed
(N=28) |
46.4
|
53.6
|
32.1
|
67.9
|
53.6
|
46.4
|
3.6
|
96.4
|
Table 3. Measure of Members' Satisfaction with the Co-op by
Attendance at Meetings
Response Categories
|
Attendance at Meetings |
Co-op Management
|
Co-op Office Staff
|
Co-op Business and Accounting Practices
|
Selling to the Co-op
|
Time Given to the Co-op
|
Members' Sacrifices to the Co-op
|
|
S*
%
|
D**
%
|
S*
%
|
D**
%
|
S*
%
|
D**
%
|
S*
%
|
D**
%
|
S*
%
|
D**
%
|
S*
%
|
D**
%
|
Always
(N=37) |
59.5
|
40.5
|
89.2
|
10.8
|
62.2
|
37.8
|
86.5
|
13.5
|
73.0
|
27.0
|
75.7
|
24.3
|
Less Than Always
(N=14) |
57.1
|
42.9
|
85.7
|
14.3
|
78.6
|
21.4
|
71.4
|
28.6
|
42.9
|
57.1
|
42.9
|
57.1
|
*Satisfied
**Dissatisfied
The responses are presented in Table 3. This information reveals several
important characteristics of membership satisfaction and dissatisfaction.
To begin with, satisfaction is generally reported in association with selling
to the co-op. Here the greatest dissatisfaction with selling to the co-op
is registered among those who attend meetings infrequently (28.6%). Secondly,
members are divided on their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with co-op management,
including the business manager and Board of Directors. Almost sixty percent
of those always attending meetings reported satisfaction with management
while about forty percent claimed to be dissatisfied. Given that confidence
in management is a key to the day-to-day operation and long-term success
of organisations such as cooperatives, the several levels and specific
distribution of dissatisfaction in this regard represents a particular
source of ambivalence. As profiled in Table 3 a substantial number of those
interviewed report that they are dissatisfied both with the sacrifices
they have made and the time they have given to the co-op. High levels of
dissatisfaction are reported by a majority of those who attend meetings
infrequently (57.1%) for both sacrifice and time. Indeed over one in four
of regular attenders also report dissatisfaction in this regard. Here a
good number of the membership is expressing an awareness of the fact that
they could and should be doing more for the co-op. There is little doubt
that developing means to enable increased contributions/participation for
these members would dispel some concerns, raise satisfaction with management
and shore up 'organisational slack.'
Determination of the extent to which members are prepared to give their
time and resources as well as subordinate their immediate personal goals
to the welfare of the co-op and its membership provides an important measurement
of member attachment to and understanding of the organisation and its purpose.
Table 4 profiles responses to several questions intended to examine this.
Responses to several questions not included in the table clearly outline
aspects of what the members are not prepared to give. For instance,
96.1 % of the members would not transfer a fishing license to another
co-op member; 96.3% would not reduce the capacity of their fishing
vessels; 84.3% would not surrender fishing licenses; and 90.2% would
individually pursue new licenses. In short, co-op members are not prepared
either to jeopardise or to subordinate their ability to fish, as this is
specified by licenses and vessel capacity, to the co-op and its membership.
In part, the vested unanimity expressed here reflects the influence of
federal licensing policy upon the conditions of individual access to participation
in the fisheries. Livelihoods are inaccessible without appropriate licenses.
Such a 'reality,' attaches individual livelihood needs/goals, first, to
possession of federally dispersed/regulated licenses, rather than co-operative
organisational forms that are necessarily sensitive to some notion of majority,
if not collective, interests. The individualistic utilitarian rationality
emphatically cultivated by federal government regulatory policies delimits
arenas of action available to the co-operative, especially in regard to
areas such as pursuit of member interests through supply and/or access
management. Moreover, the terms of reference concerning member attachments
and expectations will be defined, to some degree by the logic of individually
'licensed' privileges, countervailing 'organisational slack.' However,
as is apparent in Table 4, many would voluntarily reduce their fishing
effort, for example the number of days fished and/or the amount of gear
fished, if this was necessary in order for the co-op to succeed. But, an
almost equal number would be resistant to taking such a step. Those that
reported they always attend co-op meetings are much more likely to reduce
fishing effort voluntarily (70.3%) than are those that attend meetings
infrequently (57.1% would reduce). Corroborating this pattern, additional
analysis not included in Table 4 shows that 56.5% of those reporting that
they are kept adequately informed would reduce fishing effort while only
48.1% of those feeling inadequately informed would support such a measure.
These data reveal that participation in the co-op (meeting attendance)
and feeling informed all positively impact upon members attachment to and
confidence in the co-op and its purpose, to the extent that they would
voluntarily reduce their fishing effort if such a measure was deemed necessary
for the success of the co-op.
As apparent in response to the question about allowing the co-op to
hold and distribute licenses and quotas, there are real limits to the extent
that the members are prepared to trust the organisation with management
of access and participation in the fisheries. Although this is generally
true, a much greater percentage of those who always attend meetings and
report feeling adequately informed would be prepared to trust the co-op
with access management responsibilities. Again, the importance of developing
and maintaining membership attachment to and confidence in the co-op is
apparent here. Membership attachment develops trust in the organisation
and its practices, reproducing and nurturing 'organisational slack.' It
also cultivates confidence in management and membership decisions, confidence
that the interests and practices of the co-op are synonymous with those
of the individual member.6
Table 4. Measure of Members' Attachment to the Co-op by Attendance
at Meetings
Measure of Members' Attachment
|
Attendance at Meetings |
Members Should be Required to Give Time to the Co-op
|
Would Reduce Fishing Effort
|
Would Allow the Co-op to Hold/Distribute Licenses and/or Quotas
|
I've Put Enough Money into the
Co-op
|
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Always
(N=37) |
67.6
|
32.4
|
70.3
|
29.7
|
25.0
|
75.0
|
70.3
|
29.7
|
Less than Always
(N=14) |
35.7
|
64.3
|
57.1
|
42.9
|
14.3
|
85.7
|
57.1
|
42.9
|
Similar associations are seen in the responses to the measure concerning
members' financial commitments. Here the principle explored expresses the
idea that the more attached to and confident in the co-op, the more likely
the members will closely identify the co-op with their economic interests
and future. Consequently, members so disposed should be willing to commit
more of their dollars to the co-op. While a majority of the members interviewed
indicate that they feel they have put enough money into the co-op, notable
differences in the responses support the association between attachment
and willingness to commit more financial support. For instance 47.8% of
those feeling adequately informed seem willing to put more money into the
co-op. On the one hand, these data suggest that those who feel they are
being kept adequately informed are much more likely to perceive their economic
interests as synonymous with those of the co-op and, as a result, willing
to commit even greater portions of their earnings to the organisation.
On the other hand, widespread dissatisfaction, as measured earlier, concerning
management practices, information management and consultation processes
without question would deter members from committing further financial
resources since they would have neither the confidence in nor attachment
to the organisation. Certainly this is expressed in the extent to which
the largest number of members feel that they have put enough money into
the co-op. When contrasted with member responses to the idea that members
should be required to give time to the co-op, most think that members
should be required to give time to (he co-op as a condition of membership.
This is particularly the case for those who report that they always attend
meetings (67.6%). Notably, in analysis not included in the tables, almost
sixty-one percent of those who feel they are not adequately informed
think that members should be required to give time. Only in the case of
those who attend meetings infrequently do we see a majority expressing
resistance to this idea (64.3%).
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Conclusion
The description and discussion presented here support our two contentions.
'Organisational slack' has been isolated within the measures of participation
an attachment examined. This is particularly evident in the contrast of
relatively high membership dissatisfaction in areas such as management,
consultation processes and information dissemination with essentially moderate
membership tendencies to feel dissatisfied with co-op prices and to report
that they would sell to another fish buyer. For many members, loyalty and
attachment to the co- operative overrides their dissatisfaction and unease
to the extent that they would not sell to another buyer, even if that buyer
was offering higher prices. The evidence presented also demonstrates that
participation in the co-operative is key to maintaining and reproducing
'organisational slack.' For instance, those who always attend meetings
when compared with those who do not, report greater contentment with most
areas of co-op organisation and operation arid claim to be notably less
inclined to sell to other buyers. Remarkably, those members who always
attend meetings, also report a much stronger conviction in regard to the
co-op not meeting their needs and concerns. Surely, the coexistence
of strong loyalties and attachments with negative assessments of needs
satisfaction is a clear indicator of organisational slack particular to
the unique characteristics of co-operatives, representing a tremendous
resource relative to its functioning as a business. That is, most of the
membership remains attached to the cooperative alternative, even though
notably unhappy with particular aspects of their own co-op's management
and organisation, thereby providing the organisation with the sort of support
and flexibility countervailing to exercise of the 'exact' option in times
of discontent. For the co-operative as a business this 'organisational
slack' is a resource in so far as it constitutes the basis of confidence
regarding resource supply, allowing the co-operative to invest its energies
in the development of alternatives in other areas of products and/or markets.
However, slack is not an aspect of membership attitudes which the cooperative's
management can take for granted. To the contrary, slack must be nurtured,
maintained and reproduced through measures that facilitate membership participation.
The positive effect of this is evident in the responses of members whom
report that they always attend meetings, while the consequences of fail
failure to do this is foreshadowed in the reports of members who attend
meetings infrequently, However, the assumption on the part of management
of slack, rather than constant attention to developing and sustaining it,
would transform an organisational and, especially, business strength into
a lost opportunity, thereby eroding the economic viability and threatening
the co-operative's survival.
Indeed, the necessity to underline the conditions sustaining and reproducing
organisational slack is made even more urgent given the evidence of membership
resistance to subordinating their individual prerogatives in fishing to
insure the well-being of the co-operative and its membership, including
themselves. The almost universal resistance of members to scenarios such
as transferring licenses to other members and allowing the co-operative
to hold and distribute licenses, clearly indicates an elemental tension
between convictions concerning livelihood self-interests and attachment
and sublimation to the co-operative as the organisational vehicle through
which to realize livelihood self-interest. Here is evidence of the individualistically-referenced
utilitarian rationality cultivated in federal government access management
regulation. Self-interested utilitarians would be suspicious of and resistant
to a co-operative, or any other organisation for that matter, as the vehicle
through which their livelihood needs and goals are met, particularly if
they were compelled to subordinate some of their individual prerogative
to an organisation directed by the judgement of its members/owners in terms
of what is in collective best interests. For instance, the redefinition
of participation in fishing as a privilege granted individuals by government
through issuance of limited entry licenses countervails practices or attitudes
among small boat fishermen that reference individual self-interest to collective
organisation and outcome (cf. Acheson 1979; Andersen 1979; and Davis 1984).
Once the individual captain is in possession of the privilege, livelihood
success is a measure of his/her ability to exercise the privilege in his/her
individual self-interest. Co-operation, while possible, is not the idea
residing at the core of the sort of rationality presumed in this model
(cf. Clark 1981). In fact the resistance to sublimation of individual prerogative
evident among the membership suggests that organisational slack is quite
fragile an attribute. Members unwilling to perceive their most elemental
self-interest in the co-operative are likely intolerant to abiding dissatisfaction
for long. While management would woe the presumption rather than nurturance
of slack, numerous of the members threaten slack through their utilitarian
posture, a condition aided and abetted by the utilitarian rationality inherent
to federal government regulatory policy. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion,
cultivation of individualistic utilitarian rationality among small boat
fishermen will erode organisational slack and, thereby, threaten the viability
of co-operatives as attractive alternative forms of organisation.7
Back to Top
Notes
1. The research reported here was
funded by a research grant from the Centre for Research on Work, St. Francis
Xavier University. We would like to thank Drs. L. Brown, D. MacInnes, V.
Thiessen and the editors of MAST for their critical assessment and advice
on an earlier draft of the essay, This manuscript was prepared, with the
usual care and professionalism by Mrs. Frances Baker of Antigonish.
2. While the failure of the UMF has
yet to receive systematic study, preliminary analyses suggest a number
of interrelated reasons underwrite its collapse (cf. Clement 1986). To
begin with, the management bureaucracy had grown to the extent that it
had come to absorb a disproportionate sham of the wealth generated by the
co-op, leaving less for the fishermen and fish plant workers. Secondly,
the growth in bureaucracy associated with the formation of a Maritime regional
co-op reduced the product, marketing and business decision making flexibility
available to co-op management, particularly in limes of market downturns
and economic squeezes. Thirdly, the sheer regional character and scale
of the co-op increasingly distanced membership from management, leaving
professional managers in the position of determination over co-op affairs.
Consequently membership involvement and loyalty waned as their client experience
with the co-op seemed to indicate that it was like any other fish business,
thereby eroding the readiness of members to sacrifice income and time for
the purpose of sustaining the UMF. Indeed, the regional scope of the co-op
and the negative consequence or this for member attachment, loyalty and
satisfaction underwrites the significance of modesty in scale to co-op
success (cf. Jentoft 1986). Discussion with members also indicated that
the UMF was systematically barred by existing players from participating
as a broker/wholesaler in U.S. shellfish markets. These members argue that
this development seriously eroded the ability of the UMF to remain competitive
and economically viable.
3. The data presented in this study
was gathered through in-person, structured interviewing. An interview questionnaire
was designed and pre-tested. The pre-tested interview, objectives of the
study, and a request for participation were presented to the Board of Directors
of the North Bay Fisheries Co-operative. The Board of Directors agreed
to participate with the study and released to the researchers the most
current membership list, including mailing addresses. It was understood
that, in all other ways, the study would proceed independent of the co-operative's
management. Once in receipt of the membership list a letter introducing
the study, outlining its purpose and requesting co-operation was sent to
all members. The interviewing was done by Ms. Kimberlee Adams, Ms. Audrey
MacNevin and Anthony Davis. One of the sixty-one members listed had withdrawn
by the time interviews had begun. Every effort was made to establish face-to-face
contacts with the remaining sixty members (through repeated visits to their
homes and boats between April and July, 1988. In this manner, fifty members
were met and asked if they would participate in the study. Forty-nine agreed
to be interviewed and one declined. Since it was essential that as many
members as possible be included in the study, copies of the questionnaire
accompanied with an explanatory letter, and stamped, self-addressed return
envelopes were mailed to the remaining ten members. Of these, two returned
completed questionnaires. One member sent back an uncompleted questionnaire
with an enclosed note indicating a desire not to participate. In sum, fifty-one
members participated in the study (85%) two declined (3%) and seven did
not respond to the mailed questionnaire (12%).
4. Additional findings not reported
in this essay question presumptions concerning fishermen's distrust of
representative organisations. Thirty-one of the members interviewed also
belong to the Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU). Generally, this block is
among those most favourably disposed toward the co-operative. Yet, most
of the MFU members also emphatically express the resistance and concerns
noted. Notably, the association of union membership with ardour of support
for the co-operative challenges assumptions some have made concerning the
association between 'class consciousness'/class politics and the form of
representative organisation adopted (cf. Clement 1986).
5. The small number of cases
involved in the study (51) requires that the responses on the scale be
recoded to the categories satisfied (scores 4-moderately satisfied and
5-very satisfied) and dissatisfied (scores 1-very unsatisfied, 2-moderately
unsatisfied and 3-neutral). Neutral is included in the dissatisfied category
in so far as such responses reflect lack of explicit satisfaction.
6. The role that co-operatives
can play in the management of access and participation has been documented
in several situations. For instance, Japanese fisheries co-ops play a control
management role in distributing license quotas, territorial rights and
so on (Jentoft 1989). Co-op participation as agents of management has also
been documented in the Southwestern Nova Scotia herring fishery (Kearney
1984).
7. Indeed, membership exercised
its concerns in the winter of 1989 by firing the co-operative's manager,
a full-time professional, and replacing the Board of Directors. Several
of these ex-Directors resigned from the co-operative and have shifted their
catches to a private fish buyer/processor. Apparently, the remaining membership
and new board of Directors have down sized operations and withdrawn plans
for expansion and development, at least until the co-operative achieves
a sounder economic footing.
Back to Top
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