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Insidious Rationalities:
The Institutionalisation of Small Boat Fishing and the Rise of the Rapacious
Fisher
Anthony Davis
St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish
ABSTRACT This essay contends that the Atlantic Canadian small
boat fishery is being systematically dehumanised as the socio-economic
and organisational conditions in which fishers work become ruled by capitalist-industrial
formal institutions and their rationalities. More specifically, small boat
fishers, largely participating in an owner/operator and small community
referenced fishery, are driven from deeply rooted attachments and modus
operendi articulated in familial and familiar social conditions to sharp-edged,
self-interested utilitarian rationalities as their livelihoods become dependent
upon and expressive of the imperatives and logic of capitalist-industrial
formal institutions such as government and board-based representative organisations.
Canadian federal government management interventions, the rise of representative
organisations, and small fisher responses are examined through social historical
and case study means for the purposes of investigating this contention
and illustrating key moments in the process.
1. INTRODUCTION
2. PROFESSIONALISING SMALL BOAT FISHERS
3. AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE
4. CO-OPERATIVE ATTACHMENTS?
5. CONCLUSIONS
6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
7. NOTE
8. REFERENCES CITED
Introduction
The Atlantic Canadian fisheries are currently in the convulsions of
yet another socio-economic crisis. While not the only factor, tremendous
expansions in the capacity to catch and process marine resources, particularly
since the declaration of the 200 mile economic management zone, have precipitated
over-exploitation of resources and, possibly, ecological/environmental
damage resulting in dramatic declines in groundfish stocks. This situation
has left many small boat as well as industrial-scale fishers and fish companies
without access to sufficient resources. Consequently, boats and plants
now lie idle for lengthy portions of the year, and increasing numbers of
catching and processing operators throughout Atlantic Canada are finding
themselves unable to continue in the industry. As possessors of technologically
sophisticated, specialised fishing capacity and its accompanying debt,
numerous small boat owners face the prospects of either marginal incomes
or creditor repossession since buyers for idled vessels and fishing licenses
are few and far between. Many fisheries dependent communities are experiencing
unemployment levels of such magnitude that their future as anything more
than retirement villages is being placed in jeopardy (Department of Fisheries
and Oceans 1989).
It is my contention that this crisis has been facilitated and expedited
by transformations in the small boat sector, wherein owner/operators have
undertaken the widespread adoption of industrial fishing practices and
their associated organisational forms and world views. In essence, the
brand of utilitarian rationality particular to industrial capitalist market
systems has been woven systematically into the socio-economic fabric of
the Atlantic Canadian small boat fishery and its communities.
While always thoroughly integrated in the capitalist industrial market
and class systems at the level of exchange, small boat fishers mainly engaged
in fishing for their livelihoods rather than to accumulate capital. That
is, the vast majority fished in order to satisfy their material and social
requirements. Moreover, they recognised and expressed, in their behaviour
more so than in their words, the necessity to fish in a manner which did
not jeopardise the livelihoods of others and which did not inhibit access
to livelihood for others. Equipped with more or less the same technical
ability and know-how, socio-economic distinctions between small boat fishers
within harbours arose situationally rather than substantively, expressing
differences in factors such as work motivation, luck and risk taking. Rarely
would such distinctions be derived from circumstances that violated the
livelihood interests of others. Moreover, their sense of collective interest
and collective destiny construed the small boat fishers' approach to and
organisation of fishing. It also influenced within harbour fisher relations
as well as the broader fishing communities' social dynamics (Acheson 1981;
Andersen 1979; Davis 1984; McCay and Acheson 1987; and Pinkerton 1989).
The last twenty years in particular have seen considerable
pressure brought to bear on these localised practices and norms. Federal
and provincial government fisheries management and industrial development
policies, changes in industry structure such as the movement away from
salt fish and towards fresh and fresh-frozen fillets, and the thorough
immersion of rural coastal communities in urban-referenced ideology through
vehicles such as consolidated schooling and mass media are among the key
vehicles that have facilitated the ascendancy of competitive utilitarian
rationality among fishers and in coastal communities. Competitive utilitarian
rationality has become predominant in fisher decisions to invest in expanded
capacity and to specialise in mass harvesting approaches to resource exploitation,
thereby, expediting intra-occupational and intra-community differentiation
and the current resource crisis (Davis 1991; Environment Canada 1976; Government
of Canada 1983; Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1989; Sinclair 1983;
1985; and Thiessen and Davis 1988).1
In order to develop the argument this essay opens with a brief presentation
of recent developments concerning the professionalisation and institutionalisation
of small boat fishing. Here an emphasis is placed on fisher-government
relations. This is followed by a presentation and analysis of some interview
data concerning membership opinions, attitudes and attachments to an independent
small boat fisher co-operative in Eastern Nova Scotia. These data are employed
to illustrate the character and expression among many small boat fishers
of competitive utilitarian rationality. These data are also employed to
suggest avenues of interpretation regarding the characteristics of response
associated with whether or not co-op members also belong to a fishers'
trade union.
Back to Top
Professionalising Small Boat Fishers
Notably, the rise of competitive utilitarian rationality among small
boat fishers is coupled with the push to professionalise small boat fishing.
In Canada, national surveys over the last three decades concerning the
socioeconomic status of occupations have reported fishing consistently
in the bottom quarter of the occupational status system (Pineo and Porter
1967; Pineo, Porter and McRoberts 1977; and Blishen, Carroll and Moore
1987). Low in status, fishing and fish processing occupations are thought
of as minimal skill pursuits, jobs done in the main by persons with a poor
formal education and few alternatives. In short, these are viewed as occupations
of last resort.
While some of these perceptions persist, considerable resources have
been directed toward 'professionalising' fishing occupations, especially
fishing itself. For instance, achievement of 'professional status' by fishers
was identified as one of the key strategies in the new fisheries management
policy proposed in 1976 (Environment Canada 1976:66). In large measure,
professionalisation of fishing has been an objective of federal government
development policy predicated on the notion that the small boat fishery
must be made economically effective.
The effective matching of fishing effort to the resource ... require(s)
a fair and practical means to distinguish the professional fisherman from
the casual participant that is, to differentiate between the full-timer
and the part-timer ... the fishery cannot possibly support all those who
now claim to be fishermen (Government of Canada 1983:215).
Economic sensibility, in turn, is taken to mean consistent in organisation
and performance with industrial capitalist market-driven dynamics. That
is, small boat fishers would become professional once their livelihoods
were derived from an organisation of production and occupational relations
embodying a small business ethos as well as the efficiencies of
economic competition.
To this end, the federal and provincial governments initiated training
programmes, beginning in the mid-seventies, in areas such as accountancy,
small business operations, and taxation /fiscal planning. These courses
were designed for delivery within coastal communities during the winter
months. While providing useful information, these programmes were also
intended to seed and nurture the ethos of approaching fishing as a small
business enterprise rather than simply as a way to make a living (Government
of Nova Scotia 1972-85). Inherent in the new ethos was the rationality
of competitive utilitarian individualism, the presumption that business
enterprises are necessarily locked in competition with each other in their
pursuit of scarce economically valuable goods; the idea that success is
measured by the ability of individual enterprises to maximise their portion
of available wealth; the notion that future economic success in the fishery
is contingent upon the ability of fishers to approach their occupation
as professional small business operators.
Wedded to this ethos embodied in the government industrial development
policy were measures prescribing access participation in regulation and
in management. For instance, throughout the late sixties and seventies
various government-fisher committees were required by the federal Department
of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) to recommend terms and conditions of fisher
access and participation. Out of these meetings came the bonafide fisher
designation, reserving primary access to participants who derived a substantial
portion of their yearly income from fishing. These were to be considered
the professional small boat fishers. Part-time, seasonal participants in
specific fisheries such as lobster fishing were at first systematically
constrained through special regulations prescribing the amount of gear
they were permitted to deploy. Eventually, many part-timers were eliminated
as the DFO refused to issue the necessary licenses to those without bonafide
status (Davis and Thiessen 1988; and MacDonald 1984).
Of singular importance in this illustration is the setting within which
the new policy decisions and recommendations were developed. Basically,
it entailed a DFO constituted formal committee composed of fishers from
various sectors, DFO policy and science officials, and others of expert
and vested interest status including representatives of fishers' organisations
such as co-operatives, associations and unions. These committees have since
evolved into various management consultative mechanisms fully incorporated
within the DFO and its policy formation and implementation processes (Department
of Fisheries and Oceans 1985, 1988, 1989). Of course, fisher participation
in the committees was and remains legitimatised by the assumption that
these bodies constitute the basis whereby DFO consults directly with industry
professionals before designing and implementing policy. As a stage in professionalising
the occupation of commercial fishing, these committees formalise consultative
processes and dynamics within institutional settings invented for this
purpose, institutional settings foreign to most small boat fishers and
their communities.
Moreover, representation in these institutional settings remains contingent
upon bonafide fishers nominating or electing peers from among categories
of participants largely specified by DFO, categories which largely reflect
geographical location and sector participation, that is, the type of fishing
gear used in conjunction with locational factors (e.g., inshore, midshore
and offshore) and business characteristics (e.g., corporation, independent
fisher). Sector representation was, from the outset, designated as a key
element of fisher participation in the consultative process. From the DFO
point of view, the industry is comprised of different groups defined by
differences in technology and scale that compete for the resource and that
are, as a result, often in conflict with one and another. This approach
represented a large step in the direction of legitimising and concretising
sector divisions, beside the existing differences between livelihood and
accumulation approaches, as 'real' organisational elements in the fishery.
Moreover, in addition to being legitimised and concretised within the formal
institutional setting, sector divisions have become definitive frames of
reference and now underlie fishers' categorical thinking about their industry.
Now, not only is the participant a bonafide fisher, he/she is also a bonafide,
professional longline, gill net, lobster, drag net, crab or scallop fisher.
These developments further facilitate fundamental transformations in the
world view, behaviour and social organization of small boat fishers, transformations
signifying the ascendancy of a competitive utilitarian rationality (MacInnes
and Davis 1991).
The determination of representation on consultative committees, not
to mention order among participants in the industry, provided impetus for
federal and provincial government fisheries departments to encourage independent
small boat fishers to form organisations through which they could pursue
their interests and assure themselves a voice at government-industry councils.
Throughout the seventies and eighties numerous organisations have arisen
which purport to represent a body of independent small boat fishers. While
most of these are associations organised along either geographical and/or
sector participation lines (e.g., The Eastern Fishermen's Association,
the Cape Breton Island Fishermen's Association, the Southwest Nova Scotia
Inshore Longliner's Association and the like), several trade unions, particularly
the Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU) and The Canadian Automobile Workers
Union (CAW), have had notable success in presenting themselves as representative
voices (Clement 1986). The MFU, an organisation which arose during the
mid-seventies from the struggles of Northeast New Brunswick Acadian small
boat fishers, styles itself as concerned exclusively with organising Maritime
small boat fishers in order that they have effective leverage in shaping
economic and occupational futures (Theriault and Williams 1986). Regardless
of the organisational form of preference, the DFO insisted that fisher
participation on its consultative bodies be representative, whether derived
from special pan-fisher elections or interest group formations. Either
way, the voices of small boat fishers had to be derived from formal organisational
contexts and institutionalised processes, the only references and processes
sensible to the DFO and other governmental-industry agencies. Indeed, the
ability of small boat fishers to form themselves into such organisations
was considered indicative of the extent to which participants had matured
as professional, independent business operators. After all, to be professional
is to recognise that your particular interests, within the crucible of
industrial capitalist dynamics, are furthered by working through institutions
that provide voice which is especially necessary when other participants
in the fishery are seen as competitive and antithetical to one's own particular
goals.
Central to the professionalisation and institutionalisation of small
boat fishers are the government access and resource management initiatives,
such as limited entry licensing and quota allocations. Stock collapses
in the late 1960s and early 1970s created an industry crisis which compelled
government to de-emphasise industrial development and focus upon the creation
of stock and access management strategies. For the first time, the central
problem of the industry was redefined as too much capacity uncontrollably
pursuing too few fish. Consequently, the federal government developed policies
intended to constrain fishing effort to within the biological capacity
of the stocks to bear specific rates of exploitation.
Replacing the view that argued for the necessity to modernise through
the adoption of new and better technologies was a biologically-grounded
perspective that insisted the industry had too many fishermen pursuing
too few fish. The solution for this problem was believed to reside in the
development of a more refined, sophisticated and comprehensive management
regime that would limit access to marine resources through mechanisms such
as licenses and quotas. With this change came a much greater emphasis by
government on 'policing' fish catching and processing activities in order
to assure compliance with the regulations.
By the late seventies, commitment to this approach of fisheries management
had become thoroughly entrenched. Now the thrust of government policy was
to regulate precisely the exploitative effort directed at marine resources
by making participation the specific fisheries with particular technologies
contingent upon the annual provision of governmentally issued licenses.
Entry into fisheries such as scallop, lobster, shrimp, and snow crab, as
well as those employing mobile gears (seine and drag nets), is only possible
today after obtaining the necessary government issued limited entry permits
which are commonly purchased from retiring fishermen for tens of thousands
of dollars (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1989; MacDonald 1984). Added
to the capital cost for a boat and fishing equipment, this licence 'investment'
assures that new entrants begin with a debt load that can only be serviced
through high volume catches and heavy exploitative pressure on ocean resources
and environments. Indeed, a fishing strategy solely expressing the individual
needs and goals of the captain/owner, over all other concerns, must come
to the fore in a set of circumstances shaped by debt servicing pressures.
After all, it is the individual captain/owner who is professionalised,
who benefits from and is targeted in government management and development
programmes, and who must satisfy livelihood needs and enterprise costs.
In short, government management and development policy assures that the
self-interested harvester upon which the policy is predicated comes to
dominate the socio-economic profile of the fishery, thereby creating fishers
as pirates (Davis 1991; Davis and Thiessen 1988; and Sinclair 1983).
Of course, many fishers, especially those middle-aged and younger, have
done little to resist and much to accelerate the industrialisation/professionalisation
process. As they have entered the fisheries as captains and owners, these
participants have demanded the latest and the best in boats, engines, electronics
and equipment. Fueled by promises of endless prosperity following the declaration
of the 200 mile zone and buoyed by access to 'cheap' (low merest) money
through provincial loan boards, many fishers have displayed n almost insatiable
appetite for new capacity throughout the late seventies and early eighties.
Thus, by the time caps were slammed into place in the mid-1990s the new
fishing capacity and the debts it represented were in place and fishing,
fishing at a pace and with an avarice previously unseen in the Atlantic
Canadian small boat fisheries (Davis and Kasdan 1984). Competitive utilitarian
rationality was well seeded and nurtured by these developments, developments
that have placed the concerns and interests of individual small oat captain/owners
front and centre in industry dynamics.
Government management programmes, particularly limited entry licensing,
are imposing rules governing access and participation without regard for
local-level conditions and practices. In the process, these initiatives
are fundamentally altering the social topography of the fishing occupation.
First and foremost in this process is the impact of government management
programmes upon the social organisation of community- and familial-based
fisheries.
In such fisheries key aspects of the decision-making processes are governed
by an informal, locally-specific, system of rules worked out by the generations
of fishers who have exploited ocean resources from particular harbours.
These rules affect numerous areas of fishing activity. In many instances
they define the boundaries of harbour-specific fishing grounds. In addition,
these rules regulate certain aspects of exploitative behaviour. For instance,
they specify the types of fishing gear permissible (e.g., hook and line
as opposed to drag net or large mesh gill nets). Often these rules stipulate
who can fish the ground (the persons from 'our' harbour). They also spell
out expected behaviour, e.g., you don't sell 'tinkers' (undersized lobsters),
you don't touch another person's gear, and you don't interfere intentionally
with another person's gear (i.e., set lines or traps on top of someone
else's, drag a net through set gear, and so on).
Persons who persistently transgress the rules suffer consequences ranging
from verbal warnings, through tit-for-tat reprisals, to outright destruction
of their capacity to fish. Regardless of reputation, economic worth or
other measures of occupational success, individuals are expected to reflect
in their words and deeds respect for these experientially-based and consensually-derived,
local-level procedures. In effect, the rules constitute a fisher-generated
access and use management system. As with the most management systems,
this one constrains the expression of individualism by attaching conditions
to participation, conditions which define the points at which ,rugged individualism'
is subordinated to collective interest. This is particularly the case when
the actions of individuals jeopardise the ability of other fishers to make
their living from fishing (McCay and Acheson 1987; Pinkerton 1989).
Limited entry licensing and other management programmes focus on controlling
individual enterprises and their owners. This frame of reference is entirely
different from and at odds with the familial/community context prevalent
among fishing people. The definition and allocation of access and participation
resources in terms of individual participants and enterprises is contrary
to occupational and community-based solidarities and regulatory regimes.
The local-level, community-based social framework exercises a diminishing
influence in terms of construing participation. The key now is for each
individual to obtain the necessary permits and resources. Local interpersonal
relations among peers have become irrelevant to whether or not a person
obtains desired resources from government dispensaries. Now the social
field is institutional, and bureaucratic, largely the antithesis of the
familial and communal-based essence of the livelihood fishery. Success
in this field of action demands skills and points of reference substantially
different than those associated with getting along in the pre-government
access management era.
The successful fishers are increasingly those adept at pursuing personal
objectives through bureaucratic systems. An individualised point of reference
is now taking precedence over the community basis of occupational solidarity.
That is, with economic and occupational outcomes becoming contingent upon
access to state-controlled resources, fishers are adopting strategies that
are necessarily self-focused an orientation which policy makers always
assumed was an inherent feature of these rugged individuals. In short,
government management policies, which were predicated on the premise that
fishers were irresponsible self-seekers and, thus, prone to over exploit
ocean resources, have created the very conditions necessary to fulfil their
prophecy. With the basis of occupational and community solidarities becoming
irrelevant to economic outcomes, fishers, as professionalised and institutionally
referenced individuals, increasingly look to government agents for resources,
participatory licenses and problem solving.
The specific quality and character of the presence of these processes
is underlined in the brief discussion and analysis of the attitudes, opinions
and attachments of fisher members concerning their independent fisheries
cooperative.
Back to Top
An Illustrative Case
A study of membership attachment to and participation in an independent
Eastern Nova Scotian small boat fisheries co-operative was conducted during
the summer of 1988. The extent to which the Co-operative's membership is
affiliated with the Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU) was documented through
the course of interviews. For the purposes of illustrating competitive
utilitarian rationality and its institutionalisation within the small boat
fishing sector, the data discussed below contrasts the attitudes, opinions,
and involvements of union affiliated co-op members with those of the unaffiliated
membership. The assumptions guiding this exercise are, first, that union-affiliated
members are more likely to be involved in and supportive of formal institutional
mechanisms than are non-affiliated co-op members. Second, union-affiliated
co-op members are more likely than unaffiliated members to consider formal
institutions as necessary to representation and as appropriate vehicles
for their specific individual economic interests.
The North Bay Fishermen's Co-operative (N.B.F.C.) arose in the early
1980s from the ashes of the Ballantyne's Cove, Antigonish County, Nova
Scotia branch of the United Maritime Fishermen's Co-operative. Co-operative
forms of organisation have a long history in this area, one which begins
with the Antigonish Movement during the late 1920s and early 1930s. Coastal
communities along the shores of St. Georges Bay and Northumberland Strait
were among the early participants in the Antigonish Movement, a social
movement which stressed self-help and co-operative organisation and which
was initiated by several Catholic priests based in the St. Francis Xavier
University Extension Department.
The St. Georges Co-operative based in Ballantyne's Cove was begun within
this context. By the early 1950s, the fish processing and lobster marketing
segment of its business were transferred to a county-wide fishers co-operative,
the Antigonish Fisheries Co-op (A.F.C.). This, in turn, affiliated with
the United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative (U.M.F.), an umbrella organisation
developed as a vehicle within and through which local producer fishing
co-operatives could concentrate their marketing and economic interests.
However, once the A.F.C./U.M.F. business relationship failed, owner/ operators
in the St. George's Bay area formed the N.B.F.C. This co-operative purchased
the A.F.C./U.M.F. office and processing facilities at Ballantyne's Cove.
Since its inception in 1983, the N.B.F.C. has developed new facilities
and aggressively pursued market opportunities. At the time the study reported
herein was being constructed, the N.B.F.C. had sixty-one members fishing
out of a number of ports, the major ones being Cribbon's Point, Ballantyne's
Cove and Arisaig/Lismore.
Fifty-one of the sixty-one members participated in the study. Of these
members, thirty-one (60.8%) reported that they also belonged to the Maritime
Fishermen's Union (M.F.U.). The remaining twenty members did not report
any organisational affiliations other than the co-op. Notably, the M.F.U.
fishers are, on average, younger (74.2% forty- five years of age or younger)
and the possessors of more formal education (55.8% with vocational or university
training) than co-op members who do not belong to the M.F.U. (50.0% are
over forty-five years of age, while 40.0% have vocational school or university
training). The trends in these data predict that M.F.U. co-op members are
more likely than unaffiliated co-op members to have undergone capitalist
industrial enculturation of the sort which both seeds and nurtures competitive
utilitarian rationality such as has been documented to be elemental in
formal schooling and exposure to mass media.
Back to Top
Co-operative Attachments?
Table 1 provides a comparative profile of union and non-union co-op
members' opinions, attitudes, and involvements concerning the fisheries
co-operative. As indicated in the table, union-affiliated members are much
more likely than unaffiliated members to attend co-op meetings (80.6% versus
40.0% respectively) and to hold official positions within the co-operative
(41.9% versus 20.0%). Union members are also much more oriented than unaffiliated
members towards participation in formal organisations. Of course, their
membership in the union in addition to co-operative membership is testament
to this.
Table 1. Comparative Profile of Union and Non-Union Members for Selected
Categories of Opinions, Attitude and Involvement Concerning the Cooperative.
|
Membership
|
MFU Members
(N=31)
|
Non-MFU Members
(N=20)
|
CATEGORIES |
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Attend Meetings |
80.6
|
19.4
|
40.0
|
60.0
|
Held Official Position in
Co-op |
41.9
|
58.1
|
20.0
|
80.0
|
Co-op Represesnts Needs and Concerns |
67.7
|
32.3
|
60.0
|
40.0
|
Co-op Satisfying **
Needs and Concerns |
35.5
|
64.5
|
75.0
|
25.0
|
Memebers Consulted Enough*** About Plans
and Initiatives |
45.2
|
54.8
|
15.0
|
85.0
|
Members Kept Adequately Informed* |
62.0
|
35.5
|
15.0
|
85.0
|
Would Sell to Other Fish
Buyers |
29.0
|
71.0
|
45.0
|
55.0
|
Members Should be Required
to Give Time to the Co-op |
64.5
|
35.5
|
50.0
|
50.0
|
T test results
* .001
** .01
*** .05
While around two in every three of both the union and non-union members
think that the co-operative represents their needs and concerns,
three in every four non-union members, but only a little more than one
in three union members, claim that the co-operative is satisfying their
needs and concerns. One interpretation of this difference is that union
members, having closer affiliation with institutional vehicles for pursuit
of their interests, have more specific and demanding expectations of institutional
performance than do unaffiliated members. Ironically a much larger proportion
of non-union than union members report feeling that they are neither consulted
enough about the co-operative's plans and initiatives (85% as compared
with 45.2%), nor kept adequately informed (85.0% as contrasted with 62.0%).
Union member greater tendency to attend meetings and hold official positions
no doubt positively influences their assessment of whether or not they
are consulted and informed sufficiently. Active participation also explains,
in part, union membership dissatisfaction with the co-operative's attention
to their need and concerns. Knowledge of the particulars concerning plans
and activities allows union members to contrast the co-operative's performance
and intentions with their particular expectations. Conversely, non-union
members, while largely unsatisfied with the extent to which they feel that
they at kept informed and consulted about plans and initiatives, have lower
and met immediate expectations than union members regarding the co-operative
especially expectations which are being satisfied through sale of their
catches at acceptable prices.
Notably, on the question measuring satisfaction with selling their landing
to the co-operative, greater numbers of non-union than union member indicate
ambivalence. For instance, in response to the question 'If another fish
buyer were to set up here offering higher fish and lobster prices, would
you sell to them?,' almost one in two non-union members indicate that they
would while less than one in three union members were so disposed. Furthermore
fully 93.5% of union affiliated members claim they are satisfied with selling
to the co-operative as contrasted with 65.0% of the non-union members (cf.
Table 1 and 2). Again the union affiliated co-op members, when compared
with non- union members, indicate a much stronger attachment and loyalty
to formal institutions as vehicles necessary to furthering their specific
interests, even while registering significant dissatisfaction with co-operative
performance in regard to their needs and concerns.
This interpretation is further reinforced by members responses to questions
concerning the extent to which they are prepared to trust the co-operative's
management and to sublimate individual interests to institutionally situated
prerogatives. For example, almost one in three of the union affiliated
members agreed that the co-operative's management knew what was best in
terms of financial matters. Not one of the non-union members agreed with
this statement. Over two in three union members indicate satisfaction with
the co-operative's management, while less than one in two non-union member
are so disposed. While less than ten per cent of both union and non-union
members indicated they would transfer a fishing license to another co-op
member, surrender a license, or reduce their fishing capacity if these
steps were judged by the membership to be in the interests of the co-operative
almost two in three union members, as contrasted with less than one in
three non-union members, would agree to reduce their fishing effort. Moreover
almost one in three union members claimed that they would allow the co-operative
to hold and distribute fishing licenses and fishing quotas Contrarily,
little more than one in ten non-union members were disposed favourably
to this scenario. In short, few of the non-union co-op member indicate
that they are prepared to invest in or entrust their self-interests to
the co-operative, especially its decision-making and judgment dynamics.
In contrast, many union-affiliated members indicate that they are prepared
to do this.
Table 2. Comparative Profile of Union and Non-Union Members for Selected
Categories of Opinions, Attitude and Involvement Concerning the Cooperative.
|
Membership
|
MFU Members
(N=31)
|
Non-MFU Members
(N=20)
|
CATEGORIES |
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Management Knows Best |
29.0
|
71.0
|
--
|
100.0
|
Satisfied with Co-op Management |
67.7
|
32.3
|
45.0
|
55.0
|
Satisfied with Performance** of Federal
Officials |
22.6
|
77.4
|
60.0
|
40.0
|
Satisfied with Performance of Provincial
Officials |
46.7
|
53.3
|
68.4
|
31.6
|
Satisfied with Selling**
to the Co-op |
93.5
|
6.5
|
65.0
|
35.0
|
Would Reduce Fishing Effort***
if in Interests of the Co-op |
64.5
|
35.9
|
31.6
|
68.4
|
Would Allow the Co-op to Distribute Licences/Quota |
29.0
|
71.0
|
10.5
|
89.5
|
Would Advise a Young Person
to Enter the Fishery |
61.3
|
38.7
|
45.0
|
55.0
|
Would Advise Any Children to Enter the
Fishery |
64.5
|
35.5
|
55.0
|
45.0
|
T test results
* .001
** .01
*** .05
While it could be argued that these data indicate non-union members
are more individualistic than their union counterparts, virtually identical
negative responses to the scenario of surrendering licenses and reducing
fishing capacity suggests a different interpretation. Both union and non-union
co-op members are adamantly protective of their individual prerogatives,
particularly as these regard government regulated access to and participation
in fishing. But, there is a fundamental difference in the rationality of
the individualism evident in their orientations. On the one hand, the rationality
of the non-union co-op members' individualism expresses the notion of untrammelled
independence, a world view in which sublimation to institutional/formal
organisational dynamics contradicts, erodes, and fetters independence.
With this category of membership, the co-op is not to be trusted beyond
its role to address immediate needs and concerns. Certainly, these fishers,
by and large, do not consider the co-operative as an appropriate site for
working out key livelihood decisions and dynamics such as conditions regulating
access and participation.
On the other hand, union-affiliated members are, by and large, likely
to consider the co-operative to be both a necessary and an appropriate
instrument through which they can further their individual interests.
That is, instead of a suspicious, arms-length instrumental relation with
formal organisations, the union fishers' rationality connects and situates
individual interests to institutional/organisational settings and dynamics.
In this view, institutions are vehicles through which individual interests
and utilities can be furthered rather than impeded.
In order to examine the possibility that the more institutionally oriented
union members simply express in their opinions, attitudes and attachments,
a collectivist, union-consciousness concerning what is in their best interests,
responses to questions regarding the acceptability of extending membership
in the co-operative to persons other than fishers were examined. These
data are presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Comparative Profile of Union and Non-Union Member Responses
to the Idea of Opening Co-op Membership to Selected Categories of Persons.
|
Membership
|
MFU Members
(N=31)
|
Non-MFU Members
(N=20)
|
CATEGORIES |
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Yes
%
|
No
%
|
Membership to Fishing Crew |
32.3
|
67.7
|
40.0
|
60.0
|
Membership to Office Staff and Plant
Workers |
32.3
|
67.7
|
40.0
|
60.0
|
Membership to Co-op Management |
41.9
|
58.1
|
40.0
|
60.0
|
The notable quality of the response distributions is that, basically,
there is not any meaningful differences in the attitudes of union-affiliated
and non-union co-op members. If anything, union members are slightly less
inclined than non-union members to extend membership to fishing crews and
co-op wage workers. Certainly the lack of significant distinctions evident
in these responses confirms that for most union members attachment to the
co-op has little to do with collectivist, proletarian consciousness and
its associated rationalities, forms of consciousness often argued as elemental
to union formation (Clement 1986). Indeed, membership in both the union
and co- operative organisations reflects a conviction, regardless of whether
this is known to the fishers or not, that formal institutions are essential
for furthering individual interests. These are small boat fishers for whom,
unlike their rugged, independent individualist peers, institutional references,
settings and dynamics are expected and accepted vehicles within which individual
utilities are expressed and pursued. In short, the union co-op members
are much more 'organisation persons' than are the non-union members, meaning
that union members associate, in an elemental way, sensibility, activity,
pursuit of interests, livelihood orientation and the like with institutional,
not independent, settings.
The patterns in the findings reported here clearly differentiate institutionally
referenced small boat fishing captains from the more stereotypically rugged,
independent individualist, types. Given the character and content of small
boat fishers' professionalisation coupled with the consequences of holding
licenses and possessing industrialised fishing technologies, institutional
references for the elemental furtherance of self-interest reveals that
the competitive-individualistic rationality has become well-entrenched,
especially among the younger and better-educated fishers. These fishers,
like many others throughout Atlantic Canada, have formed a vested interest
in formal institutionalised organisations and processes. Unlike their forebearers,
these organisational forms and processes are fundamentally believed to
be necessary to, not the antithesis of, present day prosperity, future
success and the maintenance of independence. In all, this denotes a remarkable,
though predictable, transition in small boat fisher rationality.
Back to Top
Conclusions
Social science has long recognised the process and transformational
consequences of industrial, capitalist institutionalisation. Beginning
with Weber, the incorporation of the human into an organisational matrix
dominated by the formal institutions of industrial capitalism has been
recognised as providing a mixed blessing for the human condition (Gerth
and Mills 1946:212 ff.). On the one hand, this institutional form unlocks
individual potentials from subjective and local fetters while creating
possibilities for the generation and distribution of new wealth. On the
other hand, industrial capitalist institutions dehumanise people by subjecting
them to the rationalities of objectified economic calculation. The worth
of humans becomes reduced to elements such as formal credentials, consumption
patterns, income, and mobility within a market referenced economic rationality.
At the same time, industrial institutions are bureaucratic and autocratic.
They compel compliance and conformity to institutional objectives rather
than to the intimacies of family, familiars, kin and community. In so doing,
bureaucratic institutions dehumanise livelihoods and human relations.
Although simply put, this sketch draws into focus qualities of the professionalisation/institutionalisation
processes. 'Professionalising' small boat fishers, especially those in
the advantaged positions as vessel owners, license holders and/or quota
controllers, is an intimate quality of institutionalisation. In turn, institutionalisation
embeds the rationality of individual self-interest in and among advantaged
fishers. Their socio-economic situation becomes referenced by and dependent
upon relations with bureaucracies rather than upon face-to-face relations
with their family, friends, kin and community.
The professionalisation and institutionalisation of Atlantic Canadian
small boat fishers have been fundamental intentions and consequences of
both government development/allocation management policies, and, ironically,
the adoption of broad-based representative forms of organisation such as
associations and unions. The rise of the individualistic utilitarian and
rapacious small boat fisher in concert with professionalisation and institutionalisation
of the occupation is anything but coincidental. Indeed, the latter have
contributed to the creation, in no small measure, of the former. The rationality
of profession and formal institutions within the industrial capitalist
system presumes, specifies and requires the isolation of individually defined
interests as the meaningful units of reference and concern. This is the
form and forum that makes sense to capitalist industrial bureaucrats and
the socio-economic ideologies of market driven logic and evaluations. Pursuit
of livelihoods and the determination of competence in such forms of organisation
become contingent upon the extent to which players conform to the institutional
rules governing the conditions of access and participation. Institutionalisation
and professionalisation compel players to adopt the world views, the rationalities
and behaviours of the dominant institutions which control access to livelihoods.
In short, they compel compliance.
In the case of the small boat fisher, compliance translates into the
adoption of the rationality of individual self- interest negotiated through
and within formal capitalist industrial institutional settings. Consequently,
the collective reference of family, familiars, kin and community become
relatively meaningless to the individual fisher's pursuit of livelihood.
In this manner, substantive socio-economic divisions rise among small boat
fishers and their families and communities. Moreover, now unfettered by
the constraints of making their living within the matrix of face-to- face
intimate communities, advantaged fishers can become and increasingly are
becoming, in their pursuit of self- interest, rapacious. Underscoring this
process as a definitive feature of contemporary North American economy
and culture, Lasch argues:
Both the growth of management and the proliferation of professions represent
new forms of capitalist control... The struggle against bureaucracy therefore
requires a struggle against capitalism itself. Ordinary citizens cannot
resist professional dominance without also asserting control over production...
In order to break the existing pattern of dependence and put an end to
the erosion of competence, citizens will have to take the solution of their
problems into their own hands (1979: 396-397).
Small boat fishers and their families and communities have been subjected
to the systematic erosion of their competence and way of life for under
thirty years. Consequently, an ethos of self-help, co-operative self-reliance
and community-referenced action remains expressed as more than a residual
memory of the way things were done in the past. This ethos can constitute
the human resource foundation for the expression of an alternative approach
to managing the socio-economic conditions in and through which small boat
fishers and their communities realise satisfactory and sustainable livelihoods.
Back to Top
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by a grant from the Centre for Research
on Work, St. Francis Xavier University. Gratitude is owed Dr. Richard Apostle,
an anonymous reviewer and the editors of MAST for suggestions that
have been helpful to the improvement of this essay.
Note
1. This process of change has been
characterised in the American anthropological literature as the rise of
atomistic communities and inter- personal relationships, especially within
human settings undergoing so-called 'modernisation' (cf. Rubel and Kupferes
1968). Honigman (1968:220-221) identifies five characteristics of what
he calls 'structural atomism,' including primary concern for one's own
individual interests; retreat from intensive social contact with neighbours;
focus on the nuclear family and reluctance to commit to large groups; reluctance
to delegate or assume political authority; and local relationships characterised
by strain and invidiousness. These qualities are all associated, in one
way or another, with the social and interpersonal topographies consequent
to the entrenchment of competitive utilitarian rationality in human behaviour,
possibly terminating in what Lasch (1979) refers to as the culture of narcissism.
Back to Top
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