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Self and Sacrifice: An Investigation, of Small Boat Fisher Individualism
and Its Implication for Producer Cooperatives
SVEIN JENTOFT and ANTHONY DAVIS*
Small boat fishers have often been characterised as uncooperative
individualists resistant to forming and sustaining representative organisations.
This essay argues that small boat fishers are a heterogeneous group expressive
of divergent and often conflicting ideologies and behaviours. We contend
that the character and play of these differences impact directly upon the
dynamics in and outcomes for representative organisations such as producer
cooperatives. As an exploration and demonstration of these factors, the
essay examines aspects of small boat captains' engagement with and attitudes
towards an eastern Nova Scotia producer cooperative. The notions "rugged
individualism" and "utilitarian individualism" are employed in an effort
to conceptualise and analyse small boat fisher ideological and behavioural
heterogeneity and its potential meanings for the success or failure of
representative forms of organization.
Key words: ideology, individualism, producer cooperatives, small
boat fishers
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1. INTRO
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2. A BRIEF REVIEW AND EXPLANATION OF KEY IDEAS
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
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4. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SETTING AND BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
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5. SELF AND SACRIFICE
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6. CONCLUSIONS
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7. NOTES
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8. REFERECNCES CITED
COMMERCIAL and subsistence fisheries are both in crisis around the world,
most probably because of over-exploitation as a consequence of too many
people and too much capacity chasing too few ocean resources, frequently
in an ecologically disastrous manner (McGoodwin 1990:1). This explanation
may be overly simplified, but there is no doubt that those most dependent
upon fishing as a basis of their livelihoods are confronted with widespread
reductions in the availability of ocean resources and very uncertain economic
and social futures. This situation is certainly true for commercial small
boat fishers in Norway, Atlantic Canada, and elsewhere.
Such crises, which threaten livelihoods and community sustainability,
frequently renew interest in exploring and developing alternative approaches
to issues such as the management of access to and participation in fisheries,
and the socioeconomic organization of fishers, their communities, and their
industry. For example, within the last decade alternative approaches to
fisheries management have been suggested and explored, ranging from the
implementation of individual transferable quotas (Government of Canada
1982, 1989) through government-fisher co-management arrangements (Pinkerton
1989) to fisher self-management (Davis 1991a). Interest has also attended
the ways and means of developing organisational approaches dedicated to
enhancing the socioeconomic viability and the sustainability of small boat
fisheries and the coastal communities dependent upon them. To this end,
options such as broad-based unionization (Clement 1986, Theriault and Williams
1990) and producer cooperatives (Bailey and Jentoft 1990; Jentoft 1986,
1989; Pollnac 1988) have been described and analysed.
Within the body of literature concerned with these latter issues, considerable
attention has been given to the notable lack of success experienced by
small boat fishers in their efforts to form and to sustain effective representative
organisations (Clement 1986). Producer cooperatives have been the focus
of particular interest in this regard, especially since the cooperative
is viewed as an organisational alternative bearing unique potentials (Jentoft
1986, Pollnac 1988). Among these potentials are qualities such as capture
of economic values created by processing and collective marketing, access
to lower cost goods and services, achievement of "voice" and leverage concerning
conditions affecting livelihoods, representation within local and external
decision-making forums, and freedom from the often draconian control exercised
over small boat fishers by ocean resource buyers, processors, brokers,
and marketers.
The cooperative approach may offer a sensible and effective organisational
alternative, but its track record has achieved mixed results at best. More
often than not, small boat fisheries cooperatives fail, either by disintegrating
or by becoming private, limited partner companies. Their propensity to
fail has been attributed to factors such as scale of organization, lack
of a democratic modus operandi, inadequate member participation,
insufficient management expertise, and, perhaps most interestingly, an
apparent inability of independent-minded, individualistic small boat fishers
to root themselves adequately within the cooperative as a formal institution
(Davis and Jentoft 1989, Jentoft 1986).
In this essay we examine the notion of small boat fisher individualism
and its relevance to the organization, dynamics, and fate of producer cooperatives.
Contrary to many previous descriptions and analyses, we contend that small
boat fisher cooperators constitute a heterogeneous collectivity that is
expressive of contrasting and often conflicting views concerning and expectations
regarding "their" cooperative. That is, fisher-owner relations to and within
the cooperative will be informed, if not directed, by their convictions
regarding the cooperative's raison d'etre . Fisher-owner convictions,
in turn, are constrained by the rationality, derived from background occupational
and general acculturation experiences, that contextualizes and drives their
participation in small boat fishing. "Rationality" is taken here to mean
the socio-cultural logic underwriting participation in fishing; small boat
fishers' rationality is expressed, both by the fishers themselves and by
many social researchers, as attachment to and expression of a way of life
that emphasizes self-reliance, independence, and individual control of
the labour process.
We, however, think that this view of fishers' rationality is inadequate,
particularly if we hope to understand the social dynamics of and likely
outcomes for producer cooperatives. In our judgment, this view presumes
a more or less homogeneous quality to small boat fisher rationality when,
in fact, we expect that fisher-owners will express identifiable and important
contrasts in their rationalities. We postulate that within contemporary,
industrial capitalist settings, discernible groups of small boat fishers
will express at least two contrasting and, to some extent, conflicting
rationalities, i.e., the rationality of the "rugged" individualist and
the rationality of the "utilitarian" individualist. Furthermore, we postulate
that the particular individualist rationality driving the owner-members
is articulated in contrasting expectations of and relations with the cooperative,
thereby fueling the fragility of this organisational alternative.
In order to explore these notions and their salience, we examine interview
data obtained in a study of membership participation in and attachment
to an independent small boat fisheries cooperative situated on the Gulf
of St. Lawrence coast of eastern Nova Scotia, Canada.
The essay opens with a discussion of the distinctions between "rugged"
and "utilitarian" individualism, particularly in reference to small boat
fishers situated within capitalist industrial settings. This discussion
is then related to a brief review of previous research concerning commercial
small boat fisheries cooperatives. The next section of the essay presents
a description of the research methodology. We also outline the approach
we have taken to operationalizing the distinctions drawn between "rugged"
and "utilitarian" individualism in the construction of what we have termed
"the individualism index." We then present and discuss our findings. In
our conclusions, we summarize the key points and develop their implications
for several salient applied issues. For instance, we discuss the importance
of differentiating individualisms in the study and assessment of producer
cooperatives within capitalist industrial settings, if only to assure an
appreciation of the heterogeneous and multiplex character of socioeconomic
relations. We also discuss the implications of our findings to conceptualizations
of the producer cooperative model as a promising alternative organisational
form, especially in regard to the demands and strains expected for those
with managerial responsibilities and to the socioeconomic premises upon
which cooperatives are organised. Finally, we consider our findings in
relation to recent proposals concerning the management of access to and
participation in the small boat commercial fisheries, in particular co-
and self-management regimes.
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A Brief Review and Explanation of Key Ideas
Fisheries cooperatives are characterised by their many-sided potentials
(Jentoft 1986). For instance, co-ops are often introduced into the fishery
as a strategy for job-creation and community self-help. As such, development
agencies working in the Third World or in marginal communities of industrial
economies often promote fisheries cooperatives as part of their assistance
programs (Bailey and Jentoft 1990, Pollnac 1988). From the fishers' point
of view, forming a cooperative is a way to get free of bonds to private
buyers and marketers, and to create an institution to represent their needs
and concerns vis-à-vis the larger community, particularly government.
In this way, cooperatives bring small-scale fishers into the political
process from which they so often are alienated. In some instances, cooperatives
play a role in fisheries management, exercising regulatory power over fisher-members
(Jentoft 1989, McCay 1988, Ruddle 1989). It is often argued nowadays that
"co-management" should be more generally applied in the fishery as an alternative
to a bureaucratic, top-down approach (Jentoft 1989, McCay and Acheson 1987,
Pinkerton 1989).
For these reasons, fisheries cooperatives end up viewed as multipurpose
organisations, with inconsistently expressed goals (Jentoft 1985, 1986;
Pollnac 1988; Poggie 1980), most especially those that aim simultaneously
at community development and fisheries management. Therefore, it should
not come as a surprise that fisheries cooperatives have achieved, at best,
mixed results. Indeed, the evidence indicates that they have failed more
often than succeeded, if success is measured on all the dimensions mentioned
above. Nonetheless, it is clear that many fisheries cooperatives have survived
and thrived over a long period of time. This fact begs for an explanation
of the socioeconomic dynamics and organisational approaches that lead to
successful fisheries cooperatives. Social researchers who have investigated
the problem point out that there are both external and internal factors
contributing to the success of fisheries cooperatives (Meynell 1989), and
that there are many ways to improve their organisational design and performance
(Ben-Yami and Anderson 1986, Pollnac 1988). In some studies. for instance,
government and union policies in relation to fisheries cooperatives have
been highlighted (Carter 1984. Clement 1986, Otnes 1980, Revold 1980).
Lack of government financial and legal support has often hampered co-ops
in their effort to grow and prosper. This factor has also hindered fisheries
co-ops from improving their position within the fishing industry as a whole.
Moreover, as Otnes' (1980) study demonstrates, cooperatives do not necessarily
fail because they are co-ops, but for the same reasons that lead
private firms into closure or bankruptcy. If this factor is not kept in
mind, one risks misjudging the proficiency of the cooperative model.
Sometimes, however, fisheries cooperatives fail because they are
co-ops. That is, their problems are, directly or indirectly, related
to the cooperative organisational form. For instance, a cooperative may
be unable over time to sustain the essential levels of loyalty among and
support from its members. Brox (1984) contends that fisher-members in Norway
regarded their co-op as just an extension of their fishing operation and
not as an independent profit-center. As soon as cooperative income exceeded
operational costs, the fisher-members claimed dividends. This practice
hampered capital formation in the co-op, which again reduced its credit
worthiness in private and public banks. Also in Norway, Revold (1980) and
Otnes (1980) report that in some instances internal conflicts resulted
in a variety of outcomes such as high turnover of managers, a slow and
tedious decision-making process in urgent situations, and the dissolution
or transformation of the cooperative into private, limited shareholding
companies. In the study of a Newfoundland fisheries cooperative, McCay
(1988:128) points to the dilemma of "staying in business in a very difficult
environment while being responsive to the needs and values of its members."
Carter (1988:217) notes that the same co-op experienced pressure from its
members to supply credit to individual members. The co-op is seen by members
as having "'social obligations' which most of its private competitors do
not accept."
Furthermore, Meynell (1989:6), in a study of 26 fisheries co-ops in
11 countries, found the manager to be a key person in the dynamics of and
outcomes for the organization, as "The members' appreciation of the need
for a manager and their confidence in him tended to be more marked in successful
organisations than in failing ones." This, Meynell (1989:6) maintains,
"...is probably a reflection of success conferming the satisfaction of
members in their organisation." Managers of cooperatives, however, often
find themselves in a role conflict. On the one hand, managers are there
to protect the integrity of the co-ops, meaning that they have a responsibility
towards employees, banks, and customers on a day to day basis. At the same
time, managers are employee-hired and controlled by members who often give
their fishing operations first priority, even if harmful to the business
success of their co-op. As members of the cooperative, fishers are in a
position to force their views on the management. As noted by Hayes (1985:51)
in a Newfoundland study:
Given the democratic nature of co-ops, management can find
itself in a considerably different position than it enjoys in a private
industry. There is much more opportunity for the membership to question
the stewardship of managers, and management must also deal daily with a
Board of Directors who are directly responsible to the members. As decisions
taken by management may adversely affect some members, management may find
itself being criticised by those who feel they are disadvantaged.
One may therefore conclude that for co-ops to be successful, managers should
strive to keep members at an arm's length when decisions are made or, conversely,
that some form of oligarchy is the most efficient form of leadership. Such
conclusions are not, however, fully warranted. As Meynell (1989:6) reports,
"In successful organisations members tended to have a lot of influence,
whilst in failing ones they had little influence." This finding may seem
inconsistent with what has been said above, but Meynell (1989:6) also notes
that, "If members make decisions about their organisation, they tend to
be more responsible and committed to it." Davis and Jentoft (1989) have
drawn a similar conclusion. They noted that participation nurtures and
reinforces members' attachment to their co-op and, hence, that "organisational
slack" is produced.1 For
instance, when involved in the decision-making process of the cooperative,
fisher-members may accept a lower price than the going market rate. To
the co-op this concession represents a special buffer, unavailable to most
privately owned business, when price competition compromises the cooperatives'
economic performance.
There are limits to a manager's authority, however, and they are expressive
of members' tolerance. The bottom line for success in a cooperative is
always the extent to which the members remain loyal and committed. This
is a quality that can be ruined by authoritarian managers, no matter how
qualified and competent they may otherwise be. If members feel alienated
from their co-op, even the best manager will fail. As Poggie, Pollnac,
and Fierro (1988a:240) argue in a study of 48 Ecuadorian fisheries cooperatives,
"This does not mean that poor management will not cause a capture co-operative
to fail. It means that good management alone is not enough to ensure success.
The capture fishermen's cooperatives also appear to need high social solidarity
in order to be successful." But solidarity is hard to achieve in the first
place. Fishers, it is argued, are independent, competitively oriented,
and will not easily let themselves become subordinated to cooperative rule.
Poggie, Pollnac, and Fierro (1988b:3-4) go so far as to claim that this
is a "personality characteristic" of small-scale fishers related to, and
selected by, the environmental fact that most fishers are physically removed
from the help and support of land-based society. According to these researchers
(1988b:3-4), ". . . the success of fisheries co-operatives will require
more mechanisms of social solidarity among members to counteract their
tendency towards independence and inter-crew competitiveness."
This perspective is, perhaps, generally salient to understanding success
and failure in small boat fisheries cooperatives. In our judgment, however,
it fails to explore adequately the heterogeneous qualities and differing
socio-cultural dynamics associated with the fishers' ethic of individualism
as it is expressed in independence and competition, especially within contemporary
industrial capitalist settings. As briefly noted earlier, we postulate
that, within contemporary capitalist industrial settings, identifiable
groups of small boat fishers will embody and express at least two varieties
of individualism, "rugged" and "utilitarian" individualism. Furthermore,
we anticipate that the socioeconomic dynamics of the interplay between
these individualisms within producer cooperatives will determine both process
and outcomes.
Rugged individualism is rooted in and expressive of fisher control of
the labour process; that is, the relations embedded in the social organization
of work. Rugged individualist small boat fishers are petty commodity producers
centered in their relation to work on factors such as direct ownership
of boas and equipment and discretion regarding the social organization,
time, pace, duration, and location of work. These qualities of the labour
process are ordinarily articulated within a web of personal social relationships.
That is, rugged individualism is rooted in, arises from, and is expressive
of a way of life and livelihood worked out within a face-to-face setting
peopled by family and friends. Fishing crews are composed of persons who
are either related to or have intimate knowledge of one and another; this
pattern holds true for both individual boats and entire harbor-based fleets.
While the physical conditions of fishing may demand and reinforce self-reliance,
stoicism, and independent-mindedness, the intimacy of inter-personal social
relations predominant in these settings exerts a constraining effect on
the expression of rugged individualism. Indeed, this form of individualism,
rooted in and defined by the material and social relations of kin and community,
expresses itself in a remarkable variety of informally cooperative and
considerate practices. For instance, numerous studies documenting the informal
rules that are often conceptualised as fisher self-management practices
actually describe the social necessities and outcomes of making a living
within a human landscape of family and friends (Acheson 1981, Andersen
1979, Davis 1984, Faris 1972, McCay and Acheson 1987, Stiles 1979). These
features largely defined small boat fishing for the participants as both
a source of livelihood and a way of life. In such settings, rugged individualism
is expressed in competitiveness that underscores attributes such as skill,
knowledge, strategies, and pride rather than behaviors nakedly expressive
of economic self-interest that can result in the cut-throat denial of livelihoods
for others. As a result, the rugged individualist small boat fishers have
been found to express extremely high levels of attachment to and satisfaction
with their work and social lives, evaluations and sentiments reflective
of the deeply rooted, intrinsic relation between such fishers and their
labour process (Apostle, Kasdan, and Hanson 1985; Pollnac and Poggie 1979;
Thiessen and Davis 1988).
In contrast, utilitarian small boat fishers will express a more explicit,
instrumental relation to their labour process and fishing activities. While
sharing the physical and social contexts of small boat fishing with the
rugged brand of fisher individualists, the utilitarians' evaluations and
perceptions of work and social life will be shaped largely by points of
reference such as the extent to which they achieve material and income
goals. Indeed, the utilitarians will be prone to express their relation
to their labour processes as well as their occupational and social communities
in terms of self-interested goals and the strategies necessary for their
achievement.
The rugged individualist fishers reflect the local-level social face
of the small boat fisheries, while the utilitarians are largely artifacts
of contemporary capitalist industrial culture and institutional processes.
That is, they mirror broadly referenced socio-cultural conditions and are
products of the contemporary era whereby coastal communities have become
fully integrated into the mainstream, particularly as a consequence of
acculturation processes levered by mass media and mass education, Their
understanding of the occupation as well as their expectations of fishing
can therefore be expected to be expressive of the "atomistic" condition
once understood as an expected social-personal outcome of modernization
processes (Honigmann 1968). Utilitarian individualist fishers can be expected
to rest more comfortably with bureaucratic institutional processes than
can the rugged individualists. To the latter, bureaucratic institutional
processes constrain independence, violate discretion over labour processes
and threaten the basis of a way of life. To the former, bureaucratic processes
are a necessary and seemingly "natural" precondition of the pursuit of
livelihood goals, especially material advantage. Formal institutions and
bureaucratic processes are viewed in this way by utilitarians mainly because
they are more culturally familiar with them. Most of all, utilitarians
welcome the bottom line assurances that bureaucratic institutions provide
regarding matters such as credentialing occupational participation (e.g.,
the definition of professional fishers) and exerting control over, distributional
factors the management of access to particular fisheries through devices
such as limited licensing and quotas). These qualities reflect the utilitarians'
rationality by creating economic value in association with an institutionally
defined, allocated, and managed privilege to participate in small boat
fishing. For the rugged individualists, however, they underscore the social
meaning of being of and from a fishing way of life.
While this discussion highlights points of contrast, we do not mean
to suggest that these forms of individualism exist as discrete entities.
Rather, we expect that qualities of one type or the other will be ascendant
and therefore determinant in the behavior and outlook of identifiable groups
within contemporary capitalist industrial small boat fishing settings.
In our judgment, the differentiation of individualism and their contrasting
rationalities is crucial to understanding the heterogeneity of fisher cooperative
owner-members and the consequences of that heterogeneity for the socioeconomic
dynamics of this sort of organization. To our way of thinking, this understanding
is a key to appreciating the complexities that weaken fisher co-ops.
For instance, rugged individualist owner-members would be expected to
express a different view of and relationship to the cooperative than would
their utilitarian counterparts. We would expect that the rugged individualists
would be resistant to cooperative involvement in the labour process, would
express moderate expectations of the cooperative's economic performance,
would express tolerance for and support of the cooperative and its management,
i.e., organisational slack. For the rugged individualists, the cooperative
would be understood as an extension of their way of life, embedded in and
reflective of the intimacies and meaning of their labour process, families,
and communities. Utilitarian individualist fishers by contrast see the
cooperatives raison d'etre as primarily the advancement of material
goals, i.e., the business of buying, processing, and selling ocean resources
for economic advantage. We therefore expect the utilitarian fishers to
be less supportive and tolerant of the cooperative and its management than
their rugged individualist counterparts when unsatisfied with the organization's
economic performance.
We also expect that rugged and utilitarian fishers will contrast relative
to the character and the extent to which they are prepared to sacrifice
time and resources for the benefit of the cooperative. Rugged individualist
fishers would not be expected to support subordination of their control
over labour processes to the cooperative, but they would be expected to
provide "on shore" sacrifices, The utilitarians, in contrast, would be
expected to be more inclined to surrender some control over labour processes
if convinced that the cooperative is dedicated to the advancement of their
economic interests. The utilitarians would not, however, be expected to
provide much by way of "on shore" support, if only because voluntary involvement
would not be perceived as reliable and worthwhile relative to the work
expected of those hired to take care of the business and its owners' interests,
i.e., the manager and employees.
The play and implications of owner-member characteristics such as contrasting
rationalities expressed in and through individualism can be expected to
have notable consequences for the socio-economic dynamics, member loyalty,
and outcomes of cooperative organization. Having sketched our key conceptual
considerations, we will now provide a preliminary exploration of these
notions with reference to the compositional qualities, expectations, and
performances of small boat fisher members within one cooperative.
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Research Design and Methodology
The data presented here were gathered in a larger study of membership
attachment to and participation in an independent, small boat fisheries,
producer cooperative located on the Gulf of St. Lawrence side of eastern
Nova Scotia (Davis and MacNevin 1988). The membership of this cooperative
is composed solely of fishing captains. In February 1988 a research proposal
was presented to the cooperative's board of directors. Board cooperation
with the study was obtained following a series of discussions concerning
the overall purpose and specific focus of the research. An up-to-date and
complete list of members' names, addresses,'and telephone numbers was provided
by the board.
The interview instrument designed for the study contained questions
that drew heavily on what have become more or less standard wordings in
the study of fisher job satisfaction and community attachment (Apostle,
Kasdan, and Hanson 1985; Pollnac and Poggie 1979; Thiessen and Davis 1988).
In addition, questions were designed that focused on the issues of members'
perceptions of, expectations from, and participation in the cooperative. A
number of questions were designed for the purpose of exploring the extent
to which the members were prepared to sacrifice individual control over
their enterprises and labour processes, as well as to subordinate immediate
self-interest to the presumably collective goal of their cooperative's
success.2 The interview
instrument was pretested and revised in May 1988.
While the pretest was underway, a letter introducing the study was mailed
to each member. The letter explained the purpose of the study, described
the board of directors' cooperation, and informed the members that they
would be approached by an interviewer. Face-to-face interviews were conducted
from June through August 1988, usually at the member's place of residence.3
Fifty-one of the 60 members (85%) participated in the study; two
refused (4%), and repeated efforts were unable to obtain interviews with
the remaining seven (11%). Copies of the research report containing a preliminary
analysis of the data gathered were mailed to every member, as well
as to the cooperative's manager by February 1989.
Previously published analyses of these data focused on a number of factors
influencing membership attachment to and participation in their cooperative
(Davis 1991b, Davis and Jentoft 1989). These analyses revealed that the
intensity and character of membership participation in the cooperative
and attachment to cooperative organization were positively associated with
members' preparedness to tolerate shortcomings such as lower prices and
dissatisfaction with the extent to which they are consulted, thereby providing
the cooperative with organisational slack. Organizational slack, we argued,
was a key to the success of producer cooperatives. Our analyses also revealed
tension between members in their relation to and expectations of the cooperative.
In particular, a substantial portion of the membership indicated that support
was conditional on the ability of the organization to further, immediately
and on an on-going basis, narrowly defined economic goals. Classifying
these respondents as fishers embodying utilitarian individualism, we identified
the negotiation of the tension between these members and the remainder
as key to the cooperative's success.
In order to further explore the salience of the distinction drawn between
the utilitarian individualist fishers and the others, classified here as
"rugged" individualists, to the small boat fisher form of production and
cooperative organization, we developed an "individualism index." This index
was constructed by totalling response distributions across nine items that
specifically queried fishers' feelings about and perceptions concerning
the labour process and the community in which they live. The measures of
the fishing labour process incorporated in the index included questions
concerning satisfaction with work hours, ability to come and go as one
pleases, opportunity to be ones own boss, length of fishing trips, physical
fatigue from work, and the mental pressure associated with fishing. Perceptions
regarding the community of residence were measured by replies to questions
concerning attachment to community, familiarity with neighbours, and satisfaction
with community life. Respondents who reported that they were very satisfied
on six or more of the nine items were conceptualised and categorized as
"high rugged/low utilitarian individualists." Those
respondents who reported that they were very satisfied on three or fewer
of the items were conceptualised and categorized as "high utilitarian/low
rugged individualists." 4
Those falling between these categories are labelled, for lack of a better
word, "ambivalent."
Our reasoning in adopting this approach reflects a number of considerations
regarding the socioeconomic organization and relations documented as key
to commercial small boat fishing. As noted in our discussion of ideas and
previous research, rugged individualism among fishers is often understood
as an intense attachment to and an expression of the social values of independence
and self-reliance, values that are rooted in lived experiences in a form
of production where the pace, social and technical organization, duration,
and time of work are subject to the self-direction and discretion of participants.
Coupled with and contextualizing these lived experiences within the labour
process, however, is the fact that this form of production is peopled ordinarily
by family members, friends, and acquaintances. In short, rugged individualism
is rooted in and expressive of intrinsic associations among independence,
social life, and work. These qualities have led us to the conclusion that
rugged individualist fishers will express the highest levels of satisfaction
with and attachment to both their work and their communities.
The utilitarian individualist fishers, while similar to the rugged individualists
in being self-directing and independent, will express a notably extrinsic
relation with their labour process and social life. That is, utilitarians
understand their relation to work in terms of narrowly defined, profoundly
self-interested goals, primarily economic in character, and the strategies
necessary to achieve them. We therefore anticipate that utilitarians will
express lower levels of satisfaction with and attachment to work and community.
We reason this to be likely since the utilitarian fishers' relation to
their labour process will be driven and referenced by economic considerations
such as achieving maximum fishing capacity, competitive participation in
high value fisheries, and maximizing incomes earned from each fishing trip
and within each fishery. The anxieties, frustrations, and difficulties
associated with satisfying these goals will situate the utilitarian fisher
in a more instrumental relation with labour processes and the social context
of small boat fishing than would be the case for the rugged individualist
fisher. We surmise that the utilitarian fishers' perception of labour process
qualities such as trip length, mental pressure, and physical fatigue will
be colored by their sense of what is necessary to achieve economic goals,
as well as by their level of satisfaction with outcomes, and not by intrinsic
values derived from their relation to and place in the labour process itself. This
reasoning underlies our classification on the individualism index of least
satisfied fishers as "high utilitarian/low rugged."5
We appreciate that a certain degree of arbitrariness is an inescapable
and unfortunate quality of such an endeavour. Rugged individualist fishers
express qualities attributed to the utilitarian and vice versa. By approaching
these questions in this manner, we are not suggesting anything other than
that lived experiences within a socio-cultural matrix and motivational
factors articulate rationalities that underlie human relations to and within
labour processes and social life. In our judgment, the qualities and operative
consequences of these rationalities are potentially a key to appreciating
the complexities and the dynamics of social relations within organisations
such as producer cooperatives, particularly if we are to understand and
to champion such forms of organization as alternatives to existing circumstances
that offer often hard-pressed peoples the potential to improve their socioeconomic
situation.
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An Overview of the Setting and Background Characteristics
Cooperative forms of organization in eastern Nova Scotia have a comparatively
long history, beginning with the rise of the Antigonish Movement during
the late 1920s and early 1930s. The Antigonish Movement, initiated by several
Catholic priests based in the St. Francis Xavier University Extension Department,
stressed local-level self-help and the formation of community-rooted cooperatives
as practical methods of improving socioeconomic conditions, particularly
among impoverished primary resource producers. Coastal communities along
the shores of St. Georges Bay and the Northumberland Strait were among
the early participants in the social movement. (See map, Fig. 1.)
The St. Georges Co-operative, based in Ballantynes Cove, Antigonish
County, Nova Scotia, was begun within this context. Through its first 20
years, the cooperative retained a broad base of involvements and community
participation. The cooperative was a multifaceted organization engaged
in practically every area of community life. For instance, it bought, processed,
and sold ocean resources as well as woodlot and agricultural products;
it ran a retail general goods store; it purchased tractors and haymowers
that were shared among members; and it functioned as a vital center of
community social life.
FIGURE 1. MAP OF ST. GEORGES BAY FISHING COMMUNITIES
By the early 1950s, the fish processing and lobster marketing segments
of its business were transferred to a newly formed, county-wide fishers
cooperative, the Antigonish Fisheries Co-op (AFC). The AFC, in turn, affiliated
with the United Maritime Fishermen's Co-operative (UMF), an Atlantic Canadian-wide
umbrella organization that was developed as a vehicle within and through
which local-level cooperatives could concentrate their marketing and economic
interests. With these institutional and specialized business focus developments,
fishing captains assumed primacy as co-op members excluding participation
by all others, including crew. In the late 1970s, the AFC/UMF business
relationship failed. Almost immediately, the small boat owner-operators
in the Ballantyne Cove area formed the North Bay Fishermen's Co-operative
(NBFC). Following negotiations, the NBFC purchased the AFC/UMF office and
processing facilities situated a Ballantyne's Cove and, by early 1983,
was fully operational. In short, the NBFC is the latest organization in
almost 60 years of continual association by small boat fishers, their households
and communities with cooperatives.
This reincarnation incorporated several organisational and operational
features not seen in the earlier cooperatives. Unlike the earlier co-ops,
the NBFC was constituted as an owner-operator cooperative organization.
That is, only those in possession of a fishing boat and currently engaged
in the fisheries were permitted membership. All others, including crew
and members' families, were excluded from purchasing shares and achieving
voting membership. Moreover, the co-op was designed to be concerned solely
with the economic interests of its captain members. For instance, several
founding members noted during interviews that their co-op, unlike the previous
organisations, was only involved in buying, processing, and selling members'
catches. Moreover, they stressed that the membership would not allow the
co-op to get involved in running large credit fishing supply accounts for
members, let alone purchase and manage boats and licenses as an aid to
members or others inclined to enter the fisheries and join the co-op.
Most of the captain-members interviewed share several background characteristics.
For example, over 90% were raised within the community in which they currently
reside; and over four in five were fathered by men who were self-employed,
most of them being participants in the small boat fisheries. When asked,
"If you had your life to live over, would you go into fishing?" over 90%
answered in the affirmative. Moreover, a like percentage stated that they
would not move from their present community even if offered a better job
than fishing. With few exceptions, they fish in vessels failing within
a rather narrow scale range, 9 to 12 m. in length. Their crew size, including
the captain, is either two or three persons. Crews are composed commonly
of family members, e.g., fathers and sons, and are always composed of friends.
The pattern in these data create the impression that the small boat fishers
interviewed are a remarkably homogeneous group, sharing background characteristics
and exhibiting notable levels of attachment to both fishing and their communities.
This impression is reinforced by the members' fishing activities. All the
captain-members own their boats and equipment. Likewise, the vast majority
participate in the lobster and herring gill net fisheries, the key small
boat, coastal zone fisheries of this area in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
Indeed, a great majority of these fishers were raised within households
in which their fathers and/or grandfathers belonged to a producer cooperative.
On the face of it, these similarities reinforce the impression that these
fishers are a remarkably homogeneous social group.
Notable background differences between groups of these fishers appear,
however, when they are examined in relation to the individualism index
(Table 1). The data presented in Table 1 reveal a pattern of notable contrasts
and differences. To begin with, the rugged individualist
fishers are, on average, older and less educated formally than their utilitarian
counterparts.6 There
are two reasons why these differences deserve attention. On the one hand,
unlike the occupational experiences of those over 45 years of age, younger
small boat fishers have spent all, or at least the greater part, of their
fishing careers working in a Canadian federal government fisheries public
policy context largely framed by intensive management regimes governing
conditions of access and participation. Federal intervention in management
gradually has shifted the social dynamics governing access and participation
within the Atlantic Canadian coastal zone small boat fisheries from local-level,
informal processes to formal rules developed and administered by a bureaucratic
institution.
The former systems of informal regulation were constrained largely by
the priorities of making a living from fishing in relation to demographic,
household, kinship, and community considerations, thereby defining access
as expressive of socially rooted, individual rights, and participation
as a negotiation of individual livelihood needs mediated through occupational
courtesies and consideration of intimate others, i.e., family and friends
within a face-to-face, community setting. In contrast, the bureaucratic
institutional approach to regulation defines access as an achieved privilege
allocated to individuals as a consequence of formal qualities such as credentials,
e.g., full-time professional participants with the material means to acquire,
maintain, and employ their small business enterprises successfully, including
the acquisition of requisite licenses. The 1968 implementation of limited
entry licensing and controls on fishing effort in the lobster fishery was
the first large-scale application of the federal government access management
regime. By 1977 access to practically every fishery of significant scale
and technological sophistication was regulated by some sort of licensing
program. The socioeconomic logic and the world
view rationality underlying these two approaches to regulation represent
opposed assessments of small boat fishing's raison d'etre . The
younger fisher-members have pursued their livelihoods largely within the
context of the bureaucratic access management system and the rationality
it seeds and nurtures-utilitarian individualism.7
TABLE 1 Selected Background Characteristics by Individualism
Index
|
-
Individualism Index
|
-
High rugged/
-
Low utilitarian
|
Ambivalent
|
-
High utilitarian/
-
Low rugged
|
Background Characteristics |
(n = 18)
%
|
(n = 11)
%
|
(n = 22)
%
|
Age |
46 and older |
61
|
55
|
32
|
45 and younger |
39
|
45
|
68
|
Education |
< Grade 12 |
61
|
64
|
50
|
Grade 12 and > |
39
|
36
|
50
|
Fishing History |
Continuous |
72
|
55
|
59
|
Interrupted |
28
|
45
|
41
|
Held an official position in co-op |
Yes |
28
|
46
|
32
|
No |
72
|
54
|
68
|
Belonged to an other fisheries organization |
Yes |
50
|
64
|
82
|
No |
50
|
36
|
18
|
Holds a crab fishing license |
Yes |
17
|
55
|
41
|
No |
83
|
46
|
59
|
This background contrast is reinforced by the fact that the utilitarian
fishers have acquired, on average, a more thorough formal education than
their rugged counterparts. This is telling background difference insofar
as success at completing higher grades of schooling reflects success at
individual competition for educational rewards. This process has been define
in numerous studies as central in the design and delivery of contemporary
education. Indeed, the seeding and encouragement is argued to be a definitive
culture feature of formal education (Richer 1988).
The level of educational achievements among the utilitarian also suggests
that although fishing scores consistently low on measures of occupational
prestige, it is still an occupation of choice rather than an occupation
of family inheritance, household economic necessity, or last resort (Pineo
and Porter 1967; Pineo, Porter, and McRoberts 1977). The relation between
relatively high levels of educational attainment and occupational choice
is notable in that the motivations and material expectations of these fishers
can be expected to contrast with those from a different background.
As would be predicted from the above discussion, the utilitarian individualist
fishers are more likely than their rugged individualist counterparts to
have an interrupted fishing career. Almost three in every four (72%) of
those in the rugged individualist category have fished continuously, while
two in every five of those in the utilitarian individualist category have
at some point withdrawn from full-time fishing. These data suggest contrasts
in the attachments, commitments, and motivations between these two categories
of fishers. This point is accented by the fact that a greater number of
utilitarians than ruggeds are in possession of a crab fishing license,
the one high-value license that is distributed differentially across the
cooperative's membership. The possession of this license bestows a level
of benefit that, in effect, differentiates the economic value of fishing
enterprises, both in terms of income earning profiles and resale values.
It is not uncommon for crab licenses to have a market value exceeding $50,000.
For many of the utilitarians, their participation in fishing would be contingent
upon acquisition of the crab license. Indeed, possession of the license
would reinforce the utilitarian's world view, including the relation of
satisfaction with work and life to the achievement of narrowly focused
economic goals. The fishing boats and equipment necessary to participate
in the crab fishery, while similar in design and physical scale to the
others, are more technically advanced, newer, and more expensive to acquire;
they frequently cost over $75,000. In short, crab fishers must attempt
to realize their economic goals with an enterprise that, in all likelihood,
is burdened by heavy debt charges and, thereby, less tolerant economically
of mixed returns from fishing. Such a circumstance can be expected to be
expressed in lower levels of satisfaction with the labour process as measured
by indicators such as mental pressure and physical fatigue, as crab fishers
strive to satisfy the tyranny of capital debt as well as income expectations.
Utilitarian individualist fishers can be expected to ally their interests
more readily than the rugged individualists with formal institutional settings
such as representative organisations and the cooperative. The utilitarian
is in no small measure the product of formal institutional processes and
their rationality. Formal, bureaucratic institutions, however, express
a logic and sensibility that articulate institutional processes as necessary
to and consistent with the definition and the achievement of the utilitarian's
goals. Our data show that fishers in the utilitarian category are much
more likely than rugged individualist fishers to belong to a fisheries
organization in addition to the cooperative (82% as compared with 50% respectively).
The Maritime Fishermen's Union is most commonly the additional organization
to which the membership belongs (Davis 1991b). While the utilitarian individualist
fishers are more organization persons than are the rugged individualists,
they are as likely as those in the rugged category to have held an official
position in the cooperative, We surmise that, while the pattern of participation
is similar, the reasons underscoring similarly low levels of participation
are different, reasons that will be explored in the next section of the
essay.
In summation, this sketch of background characteristics, has identified
at least two contrasting groups of fisher- members. Contrary to approaches
that treat small boat fishers as more or less a homogeneous category, these
data indicate notable heterogeneity among the cooperatives membership.
We suspect that the character and the play of these differences and the
substantial contrasts, particularly in world view rationalities and behaviors,
that they represent have important implications for understanding the socioeconomic
dynamics of and likely outcomes for small boat fisher cooperatives. Next
we will explore some of the particulars of these suspicions.
Back To Top
Self and Sacrifice
As seen in the review of key ideas, membership participation in and
attachment to the cooperative, especially expressed through the maintenance
among members of a sense that they have an ongoing "voice" within the organization,
have been argued as vital to outcomes. High levels of participation nurture
attachment to the extent that members will provide the cooperative with
slack, i.e., continued support during difficult times. Conversely, factors
contributing to low levels of slack reduce the likelihood that the cooperative
will be able to sustain member support. Exposing the level of slack and
its distributional qualities across the membership will be essential to
appreciating the cooperative's socioeconomic dynamics and its likelihood
of success.
The character of and the extent to which fisher members are prepared
to sacrifice time, economic resources, and individual discretion over fishing
activity should be substantial measures of slack, its expression within
and distribution across the membership. Furthermore, these features should
reveal essential elements of membership relations with and expectations
of the cooperative. We suggest that the rugged individualist fishers will
express more diffuse and lower expectations of the cooperative and their
place within it than will be the case for those in the utilitarian category.
Moreover, the rugged individualists, since they are rooted intrinsically
in the labour process, will be less likely than the utilitarians to subordinate
individual control over fishing to the cooperative. The rugged individualist
fishers should, however, display greater attachment to and tolerance for
the cooperative than the utilitarians. Conversely, the utilitarians would,
as persons more comfortable with organisations, be expected to be more
likely than the rugged individualist fishers to subordinate individual
discretion over fishing activity to the cooperative. Utilitarian fishers
will tolerate subordination only insofar as it is believed to be in their
narrowly defined interests. Utilitarian fishers would therefore be expected
to abandon the cooperative more quickly than the rugged individualists
if provided with an economic alternative evaluated as more beneficial.
The patterns evident in the data presented in Table 2 largely support
these expectations. For instance, when asked if they would sacrifice control
over specific aspects of fishing and the labour process for the benefit
of the cooperative, over ~)one in every two (59%) of the fishers in the
utilitarian category reported that they would reduce their fishing effort,
almost one in four (23%) indicated that they would reduce their boat capacity,
and, similarly, almost one in four reported that they would allow the cooperative
to control the distribution of licenses and quotas. In contrast, 39% of
those categorized as rugged individualists reported that they would reduce
fishing effort, about one in ten (12%) indicated that they would allow
the cooperative to distribute quotas and licenses; not one supported the
notion of reducing the capacity of their fishing boats. A notably greater
proportion of the utilitarian individualist fishers are prepared to sacrifice
elements of discretionary control over the labour process if doing so was
thought to be of benefit to the cooperative. The patterns in these data
also indicate the strength of the entrenched resistance among rugged individualist
fishers to the transfer of control over labour processes to formal institutions.
TABLE 2 Indicators of Willingness to Sacrifice for the Co-op
by the Individualism Index
|
Individualism Index
|
-
High rugged/
-
Low Utilitarian
|
-
Ambivalent
|
-
High Utilitarian/
-
Low Rugged
|
Sacrifice indicators |
-
(n = 18)
-
%
|
-
(n = 11)
-
%
|
-
(n = 22)
-
%
|
Satisfied with sacrifices in price and
time |
72
|
82
|
54
|
Satisfied with time given |
72
|
73
|
54
|
Satisfied with selling to co-op |
72
|
82
|
91
|
Would sell to other buyers offering higher prices |
28
|
36
|
41
|
Members should be required to give time |
72
|
82
|
36
|
If beneficial to the co-op, would you: |
|
|
|
a. Reduce fishing effort? |
39
|
54
|
59
|
b. Reduce boat capacity? |
-
|
9
|
23
|
c. Allow co-op to control fishing? |
12
|
36
|
23
|
At first glance, these data appear to suggest that the utilitarian fishers
are actually much more supportive of the cooperative, a suggestion seemingly
reinforced by the fact that more of the utilitarians relative to the rugged
individualist fishers indicate that they are dissatisfied with their sacrifices
made in price and time to the cooperative. This finding implies that they
would be prepared to give more. The response patterns for other indicators,
however, suggests otherwise. More utilitarian than rugged fishers report
satisfaction with selling their catches to the cooperative (91% as compared
with 72%), but fully 41% of the utilitarians claim that they would sell
to other buyers if offered higher prices. Fewer than three in every ten
of the rugged individualists (28%) indicated that they were so disposed.
These data indicate the extent to which economic considerations constitute
a key reference for many in the utilitarian individualist category, even
though they report high levels of satisfaction with selling to the cooperative.
This dynamic is underscored by the fact that while the rugged individualist
fishers largely reject measures permitting the cooperative to intervene
in the labour process, fully 72% report support for the notion that members
should be required, as a condition of membership, to give time to the cooperative.
Only a little over one in three (36%) of the utilitarian fishers indicated
support for this idea, even though a majority of them report dissatisfaction
with the sacrifices in time they have made.
We interpret these patterns to indicate two qualities of these contrasting
categories of fishers. On the one hand, the rugged individualists are prone
to draw distinctions between what is required of them by the cooperative
"on the water," i.e., in relation to the labour process, and "on the shore,"
i.e., within the shore-based needs and dynamics of the organization. In
part, the rugged individualists indicate, in these and other response patterns
a view of their relationship to the cooperative that expresses a sense
of the organization as an extension of their work lives and social communities.
The rugged individualist fishers also report lower performance expectations
and higher tolerances than is the case for the utilitarian fisher-members.
As long as the labour process is left to them, rugged individualist fishers
seem prepared to support and to work for the cooperative.
On the other hand, the utilitarian fishers' resistance to the notion
of membership carrying a requirement to give time reflects, in our judgment,
a narrower definition of the cooperative's purpose and their relation to
the organization. A requirement to provide voluntary time does not serve
the priority of economic self-interest, especially since time service would
provide undifferentiated benefits to all members. Indeed, as noted earlier,
utilitarians would understand their relation to and support of the cooperative
in terms of self-interested, instrumental goals. A requirement for voluntary
time sacrifices to the organization would not satisfactorily reflect this
relationship, especially given the expenditure of economic resources on
employees responsible for overseeing the cooperatives affairs in the interests
and under the direction of its owner-members, i.e., the managerial and
support staff.
Further analyses of response patterns to additional measures of satisfaction
and expectations not presented in tabular form underscore these interpretations.
For example, over four in every five of the rugged individualist fishers
(83%) report that they are satisfied with the cooperatives accounting and
business practices, while fewer than one in every two of the utilitarians
(45%) as so disposed. The latter tend to have more particular expectations
and focused evaluations in terms of business practices than do the former,
no doubt expressing the utilitarians location of self-interest. Indeed,
when asked if members should surrender more of their fishing income to
the cooperative because management thought it necessary, fewer than one
in every ten of the utilitarian fisher-members (9%) reported that they
subscribed to this notion, as compared with over one in every five of the
rugged individualists (22%). Fisher-members in both categories are generally
resistant to surrendering income to managerial assessments, but a notably
larger number of the utilitarians appear more resistant than those in the
rugged individualist category. Although more likely than the rugged individualists
to subordinate personal control over labour process to cooperative control,
the utilitarians are less likely to agree to surrender more of their fishing
income, an additional reflection of the utilitarians' point of reference
and its contrast with those of the rugged individualist fisher-members.
This contrast is further highlighted by the response patterns concerning
fisher-member expectations of the cooperative. When asked if they thought
that the cooperatives officers should be doing more to assist members to
acquire boats, equipment, and fishing licenses, the rugged individualist
fishers were more likely to answer in the affirmative than were those classified
as utilitarians. About one in every two of the rugged individualist fishers
thought that the cooperative's officers should be providing more assistance,
while fewer than one in every three of the utilitarians were of this opinion.
The rugged individualist fishers expressed greater expectations than the
utilitarians in regard to the sorts of support services provided by the
cooperative. This finding is consistent with our expectation that the former,
in considering the cooperative an extension and an elaboration of their
labour process, will express a broader interpretation of what they think
the cooperative should be doing. For the utilitarians, involvement in providing
such support services would be interpreted as both draining to the organization's
time, energy, and resources, as well as a diversion from the organisations
raison d'etre, i.e., pursuit of business and economic benefits.
Back To Top
Conclusions
Our exploration of fisher individualism in relation to membership perspectives
on and expectations of their cooperative has drawn into focus several issues
salient to understanding small boat fishers within capitalist industrial
settings, and particularly the socioeconomic dynamics of cooperative organisations.
The analyses presented underline the necessity of approaching fishers and
their circumstances as a complex, heterogeneous collectivity, composed
and expressive of contrasting and frequently conflicting' behaviors, motivations,
understandings, and expectations. When we being with presumptions regarding
occupational homogeneity, psycho-social uniformity and similarity consequent
to adaptive necessities, we are inhibited rather than facilitated in our
descriptions and analyses.
In particular, the conceptual approach and exploratory investigation
presented reveal that there is theoretical and analytical promise affiliated
with a perspective that begins by operationalizing notions that reveal
the materially rooted, socio-cultural rationalities underlying and manifest
in observed behavior and expressed world view. For example, independent-mindedness
and self-reliance would mean quite different things to rugged and utilitarian
individualist small boat fishers. In the former, one would expect these
qualities to be rooted and understood in relation to implicit, socio-personal
associations among self, family, and friends, and the socio-material dynamics
and meaning of the labour process. In the latter, one would expect these
qualities to be rooted and understood in relation to explicit, instrumental
associations between economic goals and the social-material resources necessary
to achieve them. Both rationalities are culturally constructed artifacts.
The rationality of the rugged individualist is an artifact of a way of
life and livelihood worked out in an historically deep, relatively self-contained
community setting peopled by kin and friends, a setting framed up by a
political economy in which small boat fishers occupied a subordinate material
and class position within relations of unequal exchange. In such a circumstance,
the socio-personal articulation and dynamics of the labour process became
a key element in the meaning and communication of self, the basis of the
rugged individualist fishers' sense and expression of qualities such as
dignity, independence, self-reliance. For these same reasons, rugged individualism,
an individualism which poorly discriminates the self from the social. is
contextualized in, referenced to, and constrained by a way of life and
livelihood that requires consideration of and courtesy towards occupational
and social others, the others being composed of family members, kin, friends,
and acquaintances. The rugged individualist has a sense of belonging to
their communities to the extent that they define themselves as an integral
part of a group. in Etzioni's (1988:x) terms: While the rugged individualist
would adopt a "I and we" perspective on their relation to their community
members, the utilitarian individualist would regard the community as an
external environment-"an imposed restraining 'they'."
The rationality of the utilitarian individualist fisher is an artifact
of contemporary capitalist industrial culture. Acculturated to a greater
extent than in previous time through urban-centric institutional processes
such as formal education and mass media, the utilitarian individualist
fisher approaches the occupation and the labour process as ways and means
devices whose primary purposes are the achievement of economic goals. Their
rationality is largely that of the "possessive individualist" (MacPherson
1962) who necessarily employs self-possession, articulated through ownership
of boats and equipment as well as the prerogatives of ownership expressed
in the organization of the labour process, in the competitive struggle
with other self-possessed enterprises for scarce economic rewards. Competitive
advantages are pursued and welcomed by the utilitarian individualist fishers,
particularly through formal institutional mechanisms that delimit the conditions
of access and participation and facilitate the differential distribution
of economic advantage and rewards. While partly confounded by the socio-personal
context of the contemporary small boat fishery, the currently ascendant
rationality is that of the utilitarian individualist fisher.
The patterns evident in the data presented support our contention concerning
the salience of the rugged individualist and utilitarian individualist
conceptual categories. Moreover, the evidence indicates that this approach
offers promise in relation to the explanation of social dynamics within,
as well as likely outcomes for small boat fisheries cooperatives within
capitalist industrial settings. Our analysis clearly demonstrates the complexity
of the cooperative form of organization and the challenges this complexity
poses for management. The manager is confronted with a heterogeneous membership
with dissimilar aspirations towards, expectations of and claims on "their"
organization. Therefore, the manager must adopt the role of "broker" and
cannot rely on members' unconditional support. In the short run, the manager
may be forced to strike compromises between what is socially acceptable
and economically feasible. In the long run, such compromises may harm the
co-ops' ability to form capital and to be market competitive.
A year after our study was completed, the North Bay Fisheries Co-operative
was transformed into a more broadly focused cooperative, more consistent
with the sort of organization and dynamics expressive of and comfortable
to the rugged individualist fishers. To some extent, one can say that this
change came about through an unsuccessful alliance between the manager
and those of the members we have termed the utilitarian individualist fishers.
In the struggle for control over future development, such as growth and
investment, the manager and the utilitarian fishers lost. As a consequence,
they left the cooperative, thereby withdrawing an important portion of
the co-op's resource supply. The utilitarians immediately switched their
business to a private buyer, the primary price competitor to the cooperative.
To date, the future of this cooperative remains uncertain.
The fate of this co-op is shared by many other fisheries cooperatives
in Nova Scotia and elsewhere. Given the ascendant quality of the utilitarian
individualist fisher rationality, this development should hardly come as
a surprise. In fact, it raises questions regarding the extent to which
the cooperative mode of organization is a realistic alternative to privately
owned businesses. But our analysis and discussion also suggests that the
future of fisheries cooperatives is closely linked to the general forces
directing development of the small boat fishery. In short, the same utilitarian
individualism found in industrial accumulation fisheries and that has resulted
in resource over-exploitation and biological crisis is also bringing the
viability of the cooperative option into question.
Back To Top
NOTES
* Svein Jentoft is affiliated
with the Instituté of Social Science,University of Tromso, Tromso,
Norway. Anthony Davis is in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology
at St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada. Lead
authorship rotates with each essay produced through their collaboration.
The research reported herein was supported by grants from the Centre for
Research on the Future of Work, St. Francis Xavier University and the Norwegian
Fisheries Research Council. Drs. R. Apostle and V. Thiessen provided helpful
comments on an earlier draft of the essay.
1.The concept of "organisational
slack" was developed by Cyert and March (1963).
2. Dr.
Svein Jentoft and Dr. Daniel MacInnes were significant contributors to
the substance and the design of these questions. Copies of the questionnaire
can be obtained by request from Anthony Davis.
3.The interviews were conducted
by Anthony Davis, Audrey MacNevin, and Kimberly Adams.
4. A check on the relatedness
of the job satisfaction and community attachment revealed that 85% of those
scoring six on the index reported high community attachment on at least
one of the three measures. Fully 100% of those scoring seven on the index
reported high community attachment on at least two of the three measures
employed. From these findings we are confident that the measures of job
satisfaction and community attachment are closely associated in their description
of respondent feelings and conditions.
5. We have classified those
who fall between the rugged and the utilitarian poles on the individualism
index as ambivalent, inasmuch as small boat fishers falling into this category
express various tendencies toward one pole or the other. We do not present
an analysis of this group of fishers here. We anticipate, however, that
a systematic study of such fishers will be important to understanding the
operational and situational socio-political dynamics of fisheries cooperatives.
In some measure, they represent expressions of both poles and, we suspect,
would likely constitute key persons in the negotiation of cooperation,
leadership, and development.
6. The categories employed regarding
age groupings, under 45 and 45 and older, were constructed in respect to
the period of time, 24 years during which them has been broad-based implementation
of limited entry licensing in the Atlantic Canadian fisheries. We reasoned
that fishers over 45 years of age would more than likely have come to and
been acculturated in fishing during a time of more or less open access.
In contrast, co-op members 45 years old or younger would have learned their
trade and engaged in fishing livelihoods largely within an era of limits
on access to participation in a variety of fisheries, especially those
of higher economic value. We hypothesized that the public policy environment,
i.e., open or limited access, within which fishers learn and pursue their
livelihood, would underscore, if not determine, the socioeconomic rationality
of their relation with and participation in fishing.
7.Detailed descriptions and
analyses of both the formal and informal systems managing access to and
participation in small boat fisheries, both in Canada and elsewhere, can
be found in Acheson ,1981), Andersen (1979), Berkes (1989), Davis (1984,
1991a), Jentoft and Kristoffersen (1989), McCay and Acheson (1987), Pinkerton
(1989), and Sinclair (1983, 1985).
BACK TO TOP
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